

INTRODUCTION

Macau is small — with a population of approximately 440,000 covering 26.8 square kilometers including the latest land reclamation.¹ Located on the southeastern coast of China – at 22° 11'N and 113° 33'E – it was occupied by the Portuguese in 1557, and for centuries, until the founding of Hong Kong, it was the main maritime gateway to China. On 20 December 1999, China resumed sovereignty over Macau after 442 years of Portuguese rule; this follows the transfer of power in Hong Kong two and a half years earlier. Macau's transition to Chinese rule followed the signing of the Sino-Portuguese Agreement, concluded in 1987, which, according to Portugal's President Jorge Sampaio, marked “a new phase in their centuries-old relationship, changing what had to be changed ... but keeping all that makes Macau so unique.”² For Portugal, the transfer represented an honorable withdrawal from a position it was no longer comfortable with since the 25 April 1974 coup d'état in Lisbon. In the aftermath of that coup, the rash abandonment of its African colonies and the loss of East Timor tarnished Portugal's international prestige. But for various reasons, Macau remained under Portuguese rule until 1999 following a transitional period of twelve years, which was seen as crucial to a smooth transfer. The smoothness masked the “mixed feelings” among sections of Macau's residents. Although the ethnic Chinese represent about ninety-six percent of the population of Macau, the Chinese community is not homogenous. According to the 2001 Census,

¹ *Macau Yearbook of Statistics* (Macau: Statistics and Census Service, 2002), p. 15.

² *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, second edition (Macau: Macau International Institute, 2001), p. 71.

nearly half (47.4 percent) of Macau's residents were born in Mainland China.³ The rest were born locally or are Chinese from South East Asia who fled the communal tensions there. Additionally, about a quarter of Macau residents are holders of Portuguese passports, which entitled them to reside in Europe. Moreover, the presence of the small but significant Macanese minority — the subject of our investigation — which represents about two percent of the population and the increasing numbers of “guest workers” from the Philippines and Thailand contribute to a rather diverse cultural environment. With such a disparate group of residents, it is not surprising to discover that different views exist towards the change of government — even within the Chinese community. It has been generally assumed that all the Chinese residents believed it “better for Chinese to govern Chinese” — as suggested by a respondent in a television interview.⁴ But such an assumption runs counter to the apparent disquiet observed amongst the Hong Kong Chinese concerning the end of British rule there. If disquiet exists in Macau, it is not apparent for it is claimed that Macau residents are generally more patriotic than their Hong Kong counterparts.⁵

Nevertheless, Macau surged with patriotic euphoria when President Jiang Zemin officially welcomed its retrocession to China on 20 December 1999. Significantly for the Mainland Chinese, the historic occasion brought to an end a century of national humiliation when Western powers imposed their will on China with impunity. Jiang

³ Isabel Castro, “Who we are and how many we are”, *MacaU*, June 2002, pp. 15-22.

⁴ Diana Lin, *Back to the Motherland II*, TVB 906 (Hong Kong: Television Broadcasts Ltd. 1999), television documentary broadcast on 21 October 1999.

⁵ According to Harald Bruning, unlike Hong Kong, Macau has never been labeled a centre of anti-China subversion by anyone in Beijing. See Harald Bruning, ‘Macau’ s Article 23 promises to be political trapeze act”, *South China Morning Post*, 4 October 2002.

outlined the key elements – embodied in the principle of “one country, two systems” enunciated by the late Deng Xiaoping – that will govern Macau for the next fifty years:

After the return of Macao, the Chinese Government will unswervingly implement the policies of ‘one country, two systems’, ‘Macao people administering Macao’ and a high degree of autonomy. ... Macao inhabitants, irrespective of race or belief, will all be masters of this land, enjoying, as equals, the rights and freedoms guaranteed by law. ... Macao, now back in the embrace of the motherland, will surely have an even brighter tomorrow.⁶

Through the continued success of Macau and Hong Kong, the Chinese leadership hopes to achieve national reunification with Taiwan.

The thesis project

This thesis is an investigation into what has happened to the small but significant Macanese community — officially designated as ‘local-born Portuguese’ (*tusheng puren*) but more commonly known as ‘Macanese’, an English term —in Macau during the first five years of Chinese rule. Their significance lies not in their numerical size, wealth or political influence but in their long association with the enclave and the cultural diversity that they represent, which the new Macau government has undertaken to maintain. Over the past centuries, they have made an indelible mark on the territory; they were an essential intermediary between the Portuguese colonial government and the Chinese community, becoming the fulcrum on which Macau functioned. Like other colonial societies dominated by the Western powers, this miscegenic community had

monopolised the public service positions at the intermediate and senior levels. Thus during colonial times, despite their small numerical size —no more than two to three percent of the population during the 1990s — the Macanese community enjoyed a position of influence through their social, political and economic roles. It can be said that they were part of the colonial edifice of power; with the end of Portuguese rule, it is anticipated that the community will undergo massive transformation and face grave uncertainties. The question is whether their community, culture and institutions will survive.

These uncertainties were vivid in 1999 during the Third International Reunion of the Macanese Communities (*Encontro das Comunidades Macaenses III*). Commenced in 1993 under the Portuguese Governor Vasco Rocha Vieira, these *encontros* were instituted as triennial events at great expense to the Macau Government. *Encontro III* was convened in Macau in March 1999, just nine months before the transfer of power. On that occasion, the looming transfer of sovereignty hung like a heavy cloud over the entire gathering, eased by the indulgent gestures of hospitality extended by the last Governor, Vasco Rocha Vieira and the casino licensee, Stanley Ho.⁷ As an attendee, I sensed the power-charged atmosphere and feelings of loss and uncertainty. Amongst those present, the overwhelming belief was that decolonisation would mark the end of their identity and culture in Macau. Indicative of the emotions pervading the entire week, there was even talk amongst some delegates of digging up ancestral graves at St. Michael's Cemetery for fear that future governments might resume the land for housing or for other purposes. To

⁶ *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, p. 76.

⁷ Cecília Jorge, 'III Encontro', *MacaU Special*, 1999, pp. 96-113.

my knowledge, ancestral remains were not exhumed but the idea was indicative of the level of apprehension and uncertainty.

It can thus be said that the genesis of this research project began during *Encontro III* and the questions readily suggest themselves. There were concerns that the community would suffer a mass exodus that threatened their cultural identity and survival as a community. This was evident from the many Western reports covering the transfer of sovereignty in Macau, such as by Todd Crowell of *Asiaweek* and Mike Chinoy of *CNN Asia Now*. Crowell described the Macanese as “a proud and threatened community”.⁸ Letting the Macanese speak for themselves, Chinoy quoted Nina Lichtenstein, a Macanese singer, who said: “We are very few to begin with and, in future, there’ s going to be very few Portuguese people to intermarry. So perhaps we are a dying race.”⁹ Yet, even in 1999, on closer examination, the issue of a mass Macanese exodus was not perceived as a foregone conclusion. Some of the Macanese interviewed by Chinoy did not hint at such a prospect for themselves or their families. As a matter of fact, there was evidence that some Macanese would soldier on. An unnamed Macanese told Harald Bruning, the Reuters correspondent and veteran journalist in Macau, that he and his family would stay provided that the lifestyle would not change too much:

Macau is the fountain of our [Macanese] existence; if we all leave Macau after 1999, the Macanese diaspora would soon lose its roots and our

⁸ Todd Crowell, “A Proud People”, *Asiaweek*, 24 December 1999.

⁹ Mike Chinoy, “Macanese population fears loss of identity”, *CNN.com Asia Now*, 18 December 1999, web posted at 10:07 a.m. HKT (0207 GMT).

identity would vanish for good. ... Macau without the Macanese would be like a soup without salt.¹⁰

Accordingly, the idea of a dying race and community is open to challenge. Although the phrase has been bandied around, it bears some scrutiny. It is not entirely clear what “dying” means in the post-1999 era, and when it is likely to occur. Presumably, an index of death in the Macanese context includes a decimation of their numbers close to extinction levels, the dilution of Portuguese ethnicity, and the declining use of Portuguese language in the home. These factors are bound up in the twin challenges of emigration and Sinicisation, which will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Five. But as will be surmised in that same chapter, the Macanese have survived the transition to Chinese rule in robust form —as yet, there is no death to speak of. Moreover, it is likely that the transformation of the community, which had begun long before 1999, will continue over an extended period, representing generations, perhaps centuries, not decades.

Although the survival of their culture and identity are major concerns for the Macanese community, this thesis is not a study of either, or of ethnicity. It is not lodged in the complex arena of colonial and postcolonial studies,¹¹ where the issues of race, class, colonial domination, and economic exploitation appear as dominant themes. But I shall draw on some postcolonial theories and it may be appropriate to mention a few at this juncture. To begin with, theories of race and racial classifications have been around since the beginning of humankind —race, being a powerful marker of the human

¹⁰ Harald Bruning, “Macanese reaffirm their roots”, *Hong Kong Standard*, 13 August 1996.

¹¹ According to Ania Loomba, “the term ‘postcolonialism’ has become so heterogeneous and diffuse that it is impossible to satisfactorily describe what its study might entail. This difficulty is partly due to the interdisciplinary nature of postcolonial studies which may range from literary analysis to research in the archives of colonial government, from the critique of medical texts to economic theory, and usually

identity. But as Ania Loomba has observed, as a marker, it is fragile —“hard to explain and identify and even harder to maintain.”¹² Being determined primarily by colour (black, white, brown or yellow), racial identification is, nevertheless, shaped by perceptions of religious, ethnic, linguistic and national differences. These issues are relevant to the discussions on “Who are the Macanese?” (see pp. 37-41 below) and the impact of Sinicisation on their community (see pp. 197-204 below). Furthermore, the pivotal role of the educated créole¹³ minorities in Latin America – who are comparable to the Macanese in terms of miscegenity, level of education and marginality – in the formation of national identities have been theorised by Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991). In a critique of Anderson’s work, Loomba states:

Spanish-speaking créole communities in South and Central America [in late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries] developed the notion of ‘nation-ness’ well before most of Europe did, and they co-opted the indigenous oppressed non-Spanish speaking peoples into this idea of an ‘imagined community’ with them. Why did this happen, and why were otherwise comfortable landowning families so willing to risk ruin for this idea of the nation? For Anderson the answer lies in the fact that the créoles were marginalised in the imperial administration and sought advancement that the existing system denied them. ... Their nationalism was born out of

combine these and other areas.” See Ania Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. xii.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 121.

¹³ A French word describing a person of mixed European and black ancestry in the West Indies or Latin America. See Christina Mui-bing Cheng, *Macau: a Cultural Janus* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999) p. 194.

both dispossession and privilege: a dichotomy which also informs various anti-colonial nationalisms at a later time in history.¹⁴

This combination of dispossession and privilege can be detected among sections of the Macanese community and may have something to say about why there was not the mass exodus from Macau, in 1999, as feared (see p. 163 below). It suggests a reason for the growing interest in forging a new Macau identity in the post-colonial era (see pp. 176-184 below).

This thesis project is also not a study of postcoloniality, even though the terms *decolonisation* and *post-colonial* have been frequently employed throughout, where they are used in a technical sense —denoting the formal transfer of sovereignty over Macau, from Portugal to China, in 1999.¹⁵ As Loomba has pointed out, the term *postcolonial* is complex and “fiercely contested” on many counts:

To being with, the prefix ‘post’ complicates matters because it implies an ‘aftermath’ in two senses —temporal, as in coming after, and ideological, as in supplanting. It is the second implication which critics of the term have found contestable: if the inequities of colonial rule have not been erased, it is perhaps premature to proclaim the demise of colonialism. ... Even in the temporal sense, the word postcolonial cannot be used in any single sense. ... The term is not only inadequate to the task of defining contemporary realities in the once-colonised countries, and vague in terms

¹⁴ Critique by Ania Loomba of Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991). See Ania Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, p. 186.

¹⁵ Throughout this thesis, ‘post-colonial’ has been used in order to emphasise this technical sense while ‘postcolonial’ is retained to describe postcolonial studies and theories.

of indicating a specific period of history, but may also cloud the internal and racial differences of many societies.¹⁶

The complications over terminology have led to a conscientious avoidance – in this thesis – of colourful semantic derivatives, such as ‘pre-postcolonial’, ‘reflex-colonialism’, and ‘neocolonialism’, found in a recent work on Macau.¹⁷

Principally, this thesis project is concerned with the decolonisation of Macau in 1999 and its impact on the small Macanese community, who are the miscegenic descendants of the Portuguese colonial settlers. The focus is on the management of the transition to Chinese rule and how it threatens their survival and the transformations, which the Macanese community has undergone as a result. It is interdisciplinary and leans more towards diaspora studies —in particular the under-researched area of mixed race communities who have been dispersed from their homelands.

Modern colonialism, according to Loomba, involves “a complex relationship” between the colonised and the colonial country.¹⁸ As such, the unraveling of that relationship through the act of decolonisation is highly disruptive, giving rise to uncertainties and anxieties. Yet, the decolonisation experience in Macau is not cast in the conventional mould where “colonial complexes” are institutionalised, and minority rights and interests, like those of the Macanese community, are cast aside. Guided by the pragmatic principles of “one country, two systems” and limited self-government, China wishes to ensure systemic continuity so that Macau can maintain its separate system for

¹⁶ Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁷ Cheng, *Macau: a Cultural Janus*, index.

¹⁸ Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, p. 3.

the next fifty years. Through Macau's [and Hong Kong's] success and continued prosperity, China hopes to entice Taiwan back to the fold.

Although it is still early days, the first five years of Macau under Chinese rule indicate guarded optimism for the small Macanese community. The evidence suggests that there was not the mass exodus that had been feared, and that the interests and rights of the Macanese community are largely preserved — at least until now. A principal conclusion is that by any objective measure, the Macanese community in contemporary Macau is a vibrant one. As a community, they remain very much a part of Macau. Their elite continues to have linkages to the government through the Legislative Assembly and is visible on the boards of the principal institutions, such as the Macau Foundation and the universities. In the public service, some members of the community continue to hold senior positions; the community continues to monopolise the legal profession where Portuguese remains the working language. In architecture and engineering, Macanese professionals continue their activities as in the past (elaborated in Chapters Four and Five). Moreover, this position is likely to continue due to the status given to the Portuguese language and the official policy that encourages cultural diversity. Their political influence will likely continue due to the close relations with the Chief Executive — unless a major rift emerges between them and the incumbent. The present Chief Executive Edmund Ho is perceived by the community to be supportive and appears fervent to promote trade and cultural ties with the Portuguese-speaking world, supported by the Central Government in Beijing. Fortuitously, these are areas where the Macanese community has a contribution to make. Thus enlisted in the cause of trade and national development, the Macanese community remains relevant in the post-colonial context.

Research questions

This thesis seeks answers to the following questions: Is the Macanese a dying race? Can the Macanese community survive the momentous changes that decolonisation represents? Has decolonisation led to the decimation of the community? Why did the Macanese leave Macau when their roots are embedded in the territory and their sense of belonging to it is strong? Why do so many Macanese remain when they could have moved overseas to live? Can the Macanese adapt to the new environment and maintain their relevance? Are they up to the task? What transformation, if any, has decolonisation wrought on their culture and institutions? In what way can the study of the Macanese diaspora contribute to the field of diaspora studies?

Justification

My decision to research Macau – specifically the aftermath of decolonisation and its impact on the Macanese community – grew out of my previous investigation which traced the history of the community from the founding of Macau in the sixteenth century to its retrocession to China in the twilight year of the twentieth. As contemporary Macau is an under-researched area, my supervisor Professor Edmund Fung suggested that I go a step further to investigate what has happened to the community after the transfer of sovereignty in 1999. But this investigation can also be justified on other grounds. First, it holds appeal for the study of human society, in particular the miscegenic communities that sprouted during extensive periods of Western colonisation in many parts of the world. Indeed, it can be said that Eurasian communities, such as the Macanese, are often referred to in the literature but rarely the subject of serious academic investigation.

Second, in academic works covering the colonial retreat of the Western powers during the twentieth century, hardly any research has been carried out concerning the outcome from the perspective of the Eurasian populations concerned. Little is known about what happened to them after the Europeans had left or the subtle ways in which their privileges and social positions were eroded and surrendered. The transfer of sovereignty in Macau in 1999, the last bastion of Western colonialism in Asia, provides a rare opportunity to examine some of these issues. Such an examination deserves scholarly interest if only for a more rounded view of the decolonisation outcomes for all the stakeholders —not just the main protagonists. The lack of interest to date may be due to the small numbers, their lack of political prominence and a general ambivalence shown by the main protagonists. Another factor was the social taboo that prevailed for much of the twentieth century, which viewed mixed race liaisons with a certain disdain —particularly in the areas dominated by the British. Invariably these Eurasians suffered social stigmatisation and rejection, as implied by an article, ‘The future of Malacca Eurasians’, published in *The Malacca Guardian* in May 1932:

... A Eurasian no matter how fair he may be, how blue his eyes are or golden his hair, must remember he is not a European. To live as Europeans live is to live in a fool’s paradise. Not to be born a European is not a disgrace. In the scheme of God’s creation, each race has its own life to live. To live one’s life honorably, ambitiously and with justice tempered by mercy – therein lies true worth. Curse not your parentage....¹⁹

¹⁹ ‘The Future of Malacca Eurasians’, *The Malacca Guardian*, 9 May 1932, p. 3.

Third, a study of the Macanese community in contemporary Macau has implications for diaspora studies in general. To begin with, miscegenic communities, such as the Macanese, have been under-assessed or ignored. Moreover, the existence of multifarious links between the community and its diaspora and the official encouragement given by past and present administrations suggest that the Macanese community in Macau should not be studied in isolation but in context with its diaspora. This represents a departure from the conventional approach that treats the remnant community and its diaspora as separate entities. Certainly, it runs counter to the preference of Wang Gungwu, an authority on the study of the Chinese diaspora, that diaspora communities be studied in their local context to avoid political complications arising from the perception of competing loyalties (see pp. 214-215 below). Further, there are implications for the study of the modern Chinese diaspora in particular. When the latter day Macanese emigrate to the West, they are officially categorised by the receiving countries as ‘Hong Kong immigrants’ and many scholars acknowledge them as part of the Chinese diaspora due to their long residence and acculturation back in their place of origin.²⁰ To the wider community, their part-Chinese ethnicity and facial features lend further support for such categorisation. This is a mistake because their diasporic profiles do not correspond to the Chinese, especially the Hong Kong Chinese with whom they have been grouped. The readiness and ease with which the Macanese have integrated into the host communities, and their community organisations, differentiate them from the Hong Kong and Macau Chinese at their destination countries. Such distinctiveness

²⁰ Diana Lary & Bernard Luk, ‘Hong Kong Immigrants in Toronto’, in Ronald Skeldon (ed). *Reluctant Exiles?: Migration from Hong Kong and the New Overseas Chinese* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994), p. 145.

lends weight to their claim to be treated as a separate category, not merely as a subgroup of the Chinese from Hong Kong and Macau.

Finally, the Macanese community may seem small and marginal to some but they do represent an important part of the Luso-Asiatic²¹ communities that, at one time, stretched from India to China and Japan in the north and to East Timor in the south. Some communities survived to this day — notably in Goa, Malacca, Myanmar, East Timor, Hong Kong and Macau. Individually they merit investigation; together they represent a lasting legacy of what is arguably the most significant period in modern world history when Europeans began settling in Asia en masse.

Analytical framework

The analytical framework for this investigation is lodged within the field of diaspora studies but it also touches on elements of postcolonial studies, in particular the changes that accompanied the process of decolonisation and the migratory pressure that such changes engender. In examining these, I have adopted the practical approach, emphasizing the management process by which sovereignty over Macau was transferred, its legal system modified and the civil service localised. These changes created a significant impact on the Macanese community in Macau — a miscegenic minority, which has identified itself with the previous colonial power through ethnicity, culture, religion and language.

When analyzing the Macanese, I scoured the field of diaspora studies to seek a model on which to frame the analysis but I could not find one that suited my purpose. On the surface, one would expect that in view of the centuries of European overseas

expansion, beginning from the early sixteenth century, there would be copious studies on which an investigation of the Macanese community can be referenced. Admittedly, the existence of a Goan diaspora in Western countries represents one possibility, but, as will be seen in Chapter Seven, it is manifestly inadequate because it remains an understudied area, and the Luso-Indians —a comparable community to the Macanese —is widely dismissed as insignificant or close to extinction. The reality may be somewhat different, but until more research is done, it is an impression one is left with. Likewise, the volume of work available on the Chinese diaspora suggests another alternative, which holds great appeal due to a similar geographical and historical context. Adding weight is the acceptance by some scholars, such as Diana Lary and Bernard Luk,²² for the Macanese (‘ethnic Portuguese’) to be considered as a sub-group of the Chinese due to their long residence, acculturation and common point of embarkation. But their miscegenity —an essential characteristic of the Macanese community —and their identification with the colonial power, Portugal, present certain theoretical difficulties, as will be seen in Chapter Two. Moreover, the pivotal roles of past and present Macau governments and the Portuguese institutions in the formation and maintenance of the Macanese diaspora infrastructure make the Macanese unique. To some extent, all governments hold a legitimate interest in the welfare of their diaspora but the level of interest shown by the governments and institutions, such as the Orient Foundation, is at the extreme end of the spectrum (see pp. 170, 237, 246).

Recent studies of the Hong Kong Chinese diaspora can be drawn on for comparative purposes. Within diaspora discourse, the term *modern Hong Kong Chinese*

²¹ ‘Luso’ is derived from Lusitania, a classical term for Portugal.

diaspora refers to the affluent Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong that came in the wake of the Sino-British Agreement, which was concluded in 1982. The looming transfer of sovereignty, in 1997, triggered sufficient concerns for many to seek a safe haven overseas. This group differentiates themselves from earlier ones due to their business and professional skills, and affluence. As some studies have noted, the Macanese community from Hong Kong and Macau have been categorised by the receiving countries as “Hong Kong immigrants” for statistical and policy purposes. Moreover, at the destination countries, due to their part-Chinese ethnicity and their partiality for Chinese cuisine, the Macanese are often mistaken for Hong Kong Chinese by the broader community. Such identification is erroneous, as this thesis will seek to demonstrate. In order to do so, the framework for this investigation needs to account for their miscegenity, the Macanese identity, the complex and multifarious links between the Macanese communities and the “home” governments (Macau and Portuguese), and their historical connectivity to China. The reasons for such an approach is outlined in the following chapter, while their implications for the field of diaspora studies will be summarised in Chapter Eight.

Themes

There are five themes in this investigation into the Macanese community in Macau during this early post-colonial period (1999-2004). The first is that Macanese emigration from Macau has been a constant feature of the community —a conscious response to the prevailing socio-economic conditions and perceived opportunities elsewhere. Yet emigration had not led to the death of the community. Surprisingly, in the

²² Diana Lary & Bernard Luk, ‘Hong Kong Immigrants in Toronto’, p. 145.

media reports before December 1999, this has not been adequately emphasised. Instead, many alarmist remarks were made, such as the article in the local Portuguese newspaper, *Ponto Final*, on 24 January 1997, which referred to the looming transfer of sovereignty as ‘a coming death’.²³ And on the eve of the change of government, a report filed by Mike Chinoy for *CNN Asia Now* saw fit to emphasise similar pessimism. In the Chinoy report, Nina Lichtenstein, the Macanese singer, said: ‘We are very few to begin with and, in future, there’ s going to be very few Portuguese people to intermarry. So perhaps we are a dying race.’²⁴ Members of the Macanese community, such as those interviewed by Diana Lin for Hong Kong television, in 1999, suggested that Macau’s retrocession to China would spell doom for their community and that it was the prime reason why many Macanese were leaving.²⁵ Their concerns echoed the remarks made a year earlier by Henrique de Senna Fernandes, considered by many to be the patriarch of the Macanese community:

We are leaving our land. Each day you go to Mass, you notice that yet another person has gone. We [Macanese] have become islands vanishing in a continuing tide of Chinese people. It is sad. My family has been in Macau for 200 years and suddenly I will become a foreigner in our birthplace.²⁶

This investigation will examine such fears, and challenge the belief that the Macanese community faces extinction and that there is no future for them in contemporary Macau.

²³ Paulo Rego, ‘Morte Anunciada’, *Ponto Final*, 24 January 1997, pp. 4-5. (in Portuguese)

²⁴ Mike Chinoy, ‘Macanese population fears loss of identity’, 18 December 1999.

²⁵ Diana Lin, *Back to the Motherland IV*, broadcast on 4 November 1999, TVB Hong Kong.

²⁶ Jane Camens, ‘After 200 years, the writing on the wall’, *The Sunday Post*, 16 August 1998.

The second theme is that as economic factors influenced the rate of emigration by the Macanese community – and other communities as well – in the past, it will continue to do so in the future. At the threshold of the so-called ‘Pacific Century’ and China’s emerging status as a world economic powerhouse, many foreigners and companies increasingly regard China as a ‘land of opportunity’, a view enhanced by her accession to the World Trade Organisation in November 2001. Such view of China as a new economic frontier is reminiscent of the post-Opium War (1842) period when many foreigners, including the forefathers of the Macanese, flocked to the newly opened ports and inland stations in pursuit of commerce. Far from being pessimistic, there are grounds to believe that the future for the Macanese community is by no means gloomy as they adapt to the changes taking place in China, Macau and Hong Kong.

The third theme concerns the fear of an anti-colonial backlash after 1999. It is encumbered upon the new Macau government to recognise such fear and manage the tensions so as not to let it disrupt social harmony. No one suggests that communal tensions would flare up in Macau as they did in the former African colonies following Portugal’s withdrawal in 1974. The resultant wars of succession created anarchy that savaged the economy and society of the newly decolonised states. Yet, in Macau, colonial complexes linger on due to the fragile relationship that had existed between the Macanese and the majority Chinese in the past. This tension was implied by Henrique de Senna Fernandes, the doyen of the Macanese community, who referred to the “fundamentalists in China who want to erase the Portuguese influence in Macau.”²⁷ In mentioning these hardliners, Fernandes alluded to the deep-rooted desire of the Chinese

²⁷ Jason Gagliardi, ‘Bridge between two worlds’, *The Sunday Post*, 28 November 1999.

people to bring Western imperialism to an end —but that was only part of it. Others believe that the communal tension is rooted in the colonial social structure, which set the Macanese at a higher level than the Chinese, prompting “feelings of superiority and even mistreatment or exploitation of the local Chinese”.²⁸

The fourth theme is that the transformation of the Macanese community, which, begun long before decolonisation, is a continuing process. Like China, which itself is rapidly changing, the Macanese community in Macau will continue to evolve in response to circumstance and leadership from different quarters. The findings suggest that those who dismissed the Macanese community at such an early stage commit a serious error. They have tended to hold up the pre-1999 community as ideal and subsequent deviations from that as corrosive. Although none of them knows what the future of the Macanese community will be, they assume that it will be worse. It is a basic assertion of this thesis that the transfer of sovereignty in Macau should not be viewed as a great divide or a watershed but as a *continuity*. This notion of continuity can also be applied to the customary indicators of the Macanese identity: language, ethnicity and culture. During the long Portuguese presence in China, it is clear that there has been a consistent evolution of these indicators long before 1999.

Lastly, undergirding the transformation of the Macanese community, as indeed the wider community, is the pragmatism of the Chinese Central government —which is infectious. A prime example is the application of the principle of “one country, two systems” under which China guarantees, through the Basic Law, a high degree of autonomy for Macau to administer its own affairs. Another is Beijing’s decision, in April

²⁸ Herbert Yee, *Macau in Transition* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 134.

2003, to establish, in Macau, a permanent Secretariat for the Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries. This last is perceived as highly significant for the Macanese community — a validation of their historical links and relevance in the territory. Such pragmatism on China's part is comforting for the Macanese community and serves to counter the negativity from some quarters over whether China can be trusted to keep her undertaking in respect to Hong Kong and Macau. So far, the record suggests that short of a challenge to her sovereignty and national integrity, the undertaking by China appears unlikely to be breached, despite current problems with Hong Kong over democratic and constitutional changes. Beijing's pragmatism has in turn energized Macau, including the Macanese community. This is manifested in the continuing evolution of their older institutions, such as APIM and the Santa Casa and the emergence of new ones, like the *Instituto Internacional Macau* and the *Casa de Portugal em Macau* (see pp. 167-176 below). Stating the obvious, Beijing's pragmatic approach is of fundamental importance for the future of Macanese community as it continues along the road of its own transformation in Macau.

Literature Review

This literature review makes no attempt to survey all the literature on Macau or the Macanese community. It is a discussion of some books and resources that have been utilised in the course of my research. One reason why this list is not exhaustive is because our focus is on the contemporary period — specifically the post-1987 period after the signing of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration on the future of Macau. Another is the existence of Richard Edmonds' comprehensive *World Bibliographical Series Vol. 105 – Macau* (1989), which contains an extensive listing of the works in

Portuguese and English. Although it does need updating, Edmonds' work remains an indispensable embarkation point for those seeking a background on Macau during the Portuguese period.²⁹

In this survey, I have deliberately concentrated on works in the English language. Regrettably the literature on Macau and the Macanese available in English is meager. Primarily, it is due to neglect and the obscurity to which Macau has been confined relative to Hong Kong. Geoffrey C. Gunn, a noted scholar on Macau, also blamed the international scholarly community for failing "to take Macau seriously" and for not paying as much attention to it as they did to Hong Kong under the British.³⁰ Jean Berlie, another researcher who has written on Macau, suggests that the transient tenure of Macau's academics may also be a contributing factor. Berlie notes that Macau is "a transit point for academics as well as for other travelers."³¹ Much of the neglect can be levelled at the Portuguese administration in Macau for the lack of information available in English and the late development of tertiary education in the territory. It was not until 1981 that the first modern tertiary educational institution was started in Macau —the privately owned University of East Asia. Later, it was renamed the University of Macau after being taken over by the Government. In contrast, the University of Hong Kong was founded some eight decades earlier, in 1910.

Generally speaking, the pre-1987 literature tended to regard Macau as an adjunct of a distant empire. This was the field dominated by C. R. Boxer whose volume of work included *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825* (London 1969) and *Fidalgos in*

²⁹ R. L. Edmonds, (compiler), *World Bibliographical Series Vol. 105 Macau* (Oxford UK: Clio Press, 1989).

³⁰ Geoffrey Gunn, in Berlie (ed.), *Macao 2000* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. vi.

the Far East 1550–1770: fact and fancy in the history of Macau, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1948). Portuguese scholarship on the subject has been criticised for its Salazarian ultra-nationalism, which, M. N. Pearson noted, is marked by severe censorship.³² This was graphically illustrated by the trial and imprisonment of the Macanese historian, Montalto de Jesus to which I shall return presently. On the Chinese side, an important work is the historical survey by Fei Cheng-kang, *Macao 400 years*. Although it does not cover the period of the Sino-Portuguese negotiations, the timing of the publication was clearly influenced by it. Fei's work represents a major contribution from the Mainland, providing a Chinese view of Macau's history from the beginning until 1949. When the Chinese version was published in 1988, Fei admitted that he had never visited Macau.³³ The English edition, published in 1996, benefited from his visits to the United States and Macau during 1993–1994 where he gained some new insights. Despite those insights, Fei's work suffers from a political mind-set that is overly doctrinaire. For example: reflecting on the circumstances under which the Portuguese settlers were permitted to settle in Macau around 1557, Fei was critical of the provincial officials, in particular their propensity to accept bribes. His anti-bribery obsession can be construed as an attempt to impose modern day inflections upon a practice that was an intrinsic part of the social and political protocols of the time.³⁴

³¹ Jean A. Berlie (ed.), *Macao 2000*, p. xiv.

³² Antonio Salazar dominated Portuguese politics for much of the twentieth century until his death in the late 1960s. Yet his influence lived on in his successor, Caetano whose regime was overthrown in the military coup of 25 April 1974. See M. N. Pearson, *The Portuguese in India* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 163.

³³ Cheng, *Macao: a Cultural Janus*, pp. 39-40.

³⁴ Fei Chengkang, *Macao 400 years* (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 1996), p. 76.

Clearly 1987 marked a defining moment in writings about Macau due to the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration and the advent of tertiary education in Macau. It ushered in a body of literature that may be categorised as “transitional history”. The publication in Western Europe of Roderick Ptak’s *Portuguese Asia: aspects in history and economic history (16th & 17th centuries)* (1987) has been noted for the contributions from local historians, such as K. C. Fok and Cesar Guillen-Nunez.³⁵ Fok, in particular, coined the phrase “the Macau formula” to describe the administrative principle that allowed the Portuguese in Macau to enjoy a high degree of autonomy under Ming China. Moreover, he considered that “the Macau formula” strikingly resembled the principle of “one country, two systems” under which Hong Kong and Macau were to be returned to China.

G. C. Gunn’s *Encountering Macau*, (1996) is a historical survey that has not been surpassed. But it has two major flaws. First, in discussing the Opium War (1839-1841), Gunn analyses it from the perspective of gunboat diplomacy but fails to mention the impact of the Opium War and its aftermath on Macau, in particular the competitive pressures posed by the new treaty ports and the outward movement of the Macanese community to Hong Kong and other parts of China—all of which are defining moments in the history of Macau and the Macanese community.³⁶ Further, in discussing the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, signed in 1987, Gunn fails to assess its likely impact on the Macanese community, which is a major failing given that his work was published in 1996. By then, the future of the Macanese community was the subject of much debate and public interest. Such neglect of the Macanese community is further evidenced in his

³⁵ Roderick Ptak (ed.), *Portuguese Asia: aspects in history and economic history, 16th & 17th centuries* (Stuttgart, Germany: Steiner-Verlag-Weisbaden, 1987).

failure to mention Montalto de Jesus, a Macanese historian who championed the Macanese cause during the 1920s. Like Carlos d'Assumpção in the late 1970s, de Jesus was the bane of successive Portuguese governors whom he criticised as exploiting and mismanaging Macau. His work, *Historic Macau* (1926), remains an influential history of Macau and the perceived failings by Portugal in developing Macau to its full potential. The publication of the second edition, which contained remarks critical of the Portuguese government, was confiscated and burnt in 1926. For suggesting that the colony would be better off under a different Western power or controlled by the League of Nations, he was tried and found guilty of treason. Gunn's reasons for under-assessing the impact of the Opium War cannot be guessed at. Although his work is peppered with references to the Macanese community, his lack of attention to the Macanese community reflects a common deficiency among writers who tend to view Macau's history and development solely from the perspective of the main protagonists —China and Portugal. From such vantagepoint, the Macanese community is considered either unimportant or an adjunct to the Portuguese colonialists, which, in my view, is defective. In this thesis, I shall attempt to fill this gap in Gunn's work, if only to set the record straight by providing a more rounded view of pre-1999 Macau.

The end of Portuguese rule has led some writers to pay attention to Macau's cultural heritage reflecting the emerging field of cultural studies in the 1990s. As a result, new phrases entered the Macau lexicon such as "the uniqueness of Macau", "the essence

³⁶ Geoffrey C. Gunn, *Encountering Macau: a Portuguese City-State on the Periphery of China, 1557-1999* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 56-57.

of Macau” and more recently “the Portuguese chromosome”.³⁷ Two well-regarded works in this genre are Jonathan Porter’s *Macau: the Imaginary City* (1996) and Christina Mui-bing Cheng’s *Macau, a Cultural Janus* (1999). Porter’s work, being a cultural history, adopts a thematic approach, in which he argues that Macau is defined by its hybridity.³⁸ With the departure of the Portuguese Administration, the process of cultural interchange will have effectively come to an end and Macau as many people know it to be will be no more; it will have lost its uniqueness and become just another Chinese city. For Porter, this evokes “a crushing sense of sadness and loss”.³⁹ Porter’s sense of loss strikes a sympathetic chord with the Macanese community and those who prefer nostalgic images of Macau. However, his representation overlooks the obvious: that the four and a half centuries of Portuguese rule in Macau did not result in mass adherence to Portuguese culture and language, or in mass conversion to Roman Catholicism. Instead, in 1999, less than six percent of Macau’s population were nominally Christian and only two-percent spoke Portuguese — a rather feeble status indeed. Moreover, by emphasising cultural encounters, Porter, in keeping with writing of this genre, has ignored the tensions that existed between the coloniser and the colonised.⁴⁰ There is no mention of the anti-Western labour unrest in the 1920s or the devastating – for the Portuguese – riots of December 1966. Another oversight is the lack of cognizance of the co-existence of local

³⁷ Jorge M. Flores, “The Portuguese Chromosome: Reflections on the Formation of Macau’s Identity”, a paper presented at the International Conference in Macau (2001) and subsequently published in *Macau on the Threshold of the Third Millennium* (Macau: Macau Ricci Institute 2003), pp. 39-56.

³⁸ According to Ania Loomba, the term *hybridity* is central to postcolonial studies. It describes the crossover of ideas and identities caused by colonialism, and is a definitive element. But in this thesis, the term is used in a general sense to describe the fusion of ethnicities within the Macanese genetic pool. Such blending manifests itself not only in their facial features but in elements of identity, such as the Macanese cuisine, their patois language and adherence to Portuguese and Chinese cultural traditions and festivals. See Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, pp. 173-176.

³⁹ Jonathan Porter, *Macau: the Imaginary City* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 2000), p. 193.

Chinese religious practices, which represents the principal argument of Christina Cheng in her work *Macau, a Cultural Janus*. Cheng's premise is entirely different to Porter's. While Porter emphasises hybridity, Cheng stresses its lack. She considers that since Portuguese rule, Macau has two cultural sides or faces co-existing alongside each other: a Chinese civilisation and a Portuguese impact. Hence her choice of title — Janus, a Roman god with two faces looking in opposite directions.⁴¹ Porter's perspective is essentially a Macanese perspective, a community that could be termed as hybridity personified. Cheng's perspective is of the panoramic variety. In her view, Macau is essentially Chinese with minimal Portuguese influence —not Portuguese with increasing Chinese influence. In my view, both writers are correct and their works are valuable contributions to a field that was overly concerned with politics and economics, such as the following.

The personal accounts of various members of the Macau elite have been presented by Jill McGivering in *Macao Remembers* (1999). They include prominent Macanese such as Jorge Rangel, the most senior member of the last Portuguese administration; Anabela Ritchie, President of the Macau Legislative Assembly until one month before the transfer; Dr. José Sales Marques, the former head of the now defunct municipal body, *Leal Senado*; Carlos Marreiros, architect and a key proponent for the preservation of Macau's cultural landmarks; and Henrique de Senna Fernandes, doyen of the Macanese community. Their stories provide insights into their various backgrounds and Macau's recent history. What has emerged from these Macanese stories is their vivid sense of belonging to Macau.

⁴⁰ Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, p. 181.

Jean A. Berlie's edited volume *Macao 2000* (1999) provides 'a last social and economic snapshot before the end of the century and before the colony's return to China.'⁴² Based on fieldwork, the various contributions to this collection of essays are intended to provide a platform for future research on Macau. There is some mention of the Macanese in various sections of the book, but the lack of a detailed profile of the Macanese community as part of the 'snapshot' is a serious omission. The editor Jean Berlie seems unaware that the transformation of the Macanese community – its size, social standing, and role – is of interest to social historians, especially those with particular interest in the impact of decolonisation on minority groups, such as the Macanese.

An indispensable backdrop to the political transition leading up to the transfer of sovereignty has been provided by Lo Shiu-hing's *Political Development in Macau* (1995). But for this thesis, a more important work is Herbert S. Yee's *Macau in Transition* (2001) —in particular, Chapter 3 'The Politics of Localisation' and Chapter 7 'The Eurasians (Macanese) in Macau: the Neglected Minority'. Yee's work will be discussed *in situ* in later chapters, however, two general comments may be made at this juncture. According to Yee, the government 'have a considerable amount of work to do if they wish to convince the Macanese of their sincerity in protecting Macanese interests post-1999.'⁴³ At the same time, Yee also believes that it is up to the Macanese community to demonstrate their ability to survive the 'the typhoon of 1999'.⁴⁴ These conclusions I can agree with. Unfortunately, Yee's work suffers from the universal

⁴¹ Cheng, *Macau: a Cultural Janus*, p. 4.

⁴² Berlie (ed.) *Macao 2000*, p. xiv.

⁴³ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 146.

problem of a lack of precise statistics and proper surveys of the Macanese community — a problem I also faced. Moreover, Yee may have erred in utilising a survey (Table 7.5) conducted in 1995 to stress “the strong link between the Macanese trust of the Chinese Government and the decision to leave Macau after 1999.”⁴⁵ In the normal course of events, such a survey conducted only a few years before may be quite acceptable but not in this instance due to subsequent events —which in my opinion are highly significant. Between 1995 and 2001 (the publication of Yee’s book), two events occurred that had an enormous impact on the Macanese community. One was the transfer of sovereignty in Hong Kong, on 30 June 1997, which turned out to be smooth, and which provided much comfort to the residents of Macau as they faced their own in 1999. The other was the Asian financial crisis in 1997 – and the subsequent economic malaise that engulfed the region – which propelled China to greater prominence as a factor of economic stability and growth. Beijing’s refusal to devalue the Chinese *renminbi* – which would send other Asian currencies into another downward spiral – despite a marked loss of competitiveness won China the respect of her neighbours and displaced her image as an economic and political ogre. Therefore, by 1999 the views of the Macanese community would have moderated since Yee’s 1995 survey. This is evidenced by the fact that the subsequent exodus of Macanese from Macau due to the regime change has been surprisingly small.⁴⁶ Further, any survey of a complex community such as the Macanese calls into question the issue of methodology. This was evident when Herbert Yee presented his paper at the Ricci Conference in Macau in December 2001 —at which I

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 129-149.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 145.

was present.⁴⁷ I shall return to this in Chapter Two in the section on methodology. I will also challenge other views expressed by Yee in his book in various contexts.

The international conference alluded to in the preceding paragraph illustrates the important role that scholarly conferences play to keep up to date in any field. In this context, I acknowledge the conference, in December 2001, organised jointly by the Macau Ricci Institute and the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, based respectively in Macau and Hong Kong. Entitled “*Macau on the Threshold of the Third Millennium*”, its objective was “[to reflect] on the historical role the city of Macau had played in the cultural encounter between China and the West [and] on the possible development of such a role in the future.” The conference papers were subsequently published in 2003.⁴⁸ The following year, the Macau Ricci Institute organised another conference – this time in conjunction with Instituto do Orient (Lisbon) – at which I delivered a paper entitled “The Malaccan Portuguese community and its relevance to contemporary Macau”, which forms part of the research undertaken for Chapter Seven. The Conference proceedings have since been published.⁴⁹

At this juncture, I should mention some of the sources that I have employed but which other writers have failed to consult. The magazine *MacaU* has proved

⁴⁶ Isabel Castro, “Who we are and how many we are”, *MacaU*, June 2002, 15-22, and Nuno Lima Bastos, in Gilberto Lopes, “A Year Of MSAR”, *MacaU*, December 2000, pp. 9-28.

⁴⁷ At the discussion that followed, a questioner from the floor challenged Yee over the suitability of surveys on the Macanese community conducted by Chinese, in particular using telephone polling methods. The issue of language medium appears to be quite important. In my view, Yee did not provide an adequate response on that occasion. See Herbert S. Yee, “Mass political culture and Political Development in Post-1999 Macau”, a paper presented at the International Conference in Macau (2001) and subsequently published in *Macau on the Threshold of the Third Millennium* (Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 2003), pp. 127-149.

⁴⁸ Macau Ricci Institute Studies I, *Macau on the Threshold of the Third Millennium* (Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 2003).

indispensable to this investigation due to its focus and contemporaneity. Owned by the Macau government, the current series is published quarterly in three languages: Chinese, Portuguese and English. Despite its trilingual nature, the magazine is not merely a translational exercise. For example, while looking for articles on the Macanese institution, Santa Casa da Misericórdia, I found one in Chinese but none in the English edition.⁵⁰ As this investigation is more concerned with the contemporary scene, Series II (commenced in May 1992) and Series III (started after 1999) are of particular interest. Although owned by the government, the production and distribution of the magazine was contracted out to a private company, who has continued the role after 1999 but its format and objectives have been changed—I believe, for the better. Prior to 1999, the *MacaU* magazine was headed by a Portuguese director with the stated aim of promoting the Portuguese heritage and the Macanese communities around the world. Now its stated focus is on Macau and its geographical surroundings, Macau’s multiculturalism, China and Chinese culture, and “countries and communities linked to Macau by various bonds.”⁵¹ In its current format, *MacaU* serves as a record of important developments. Despite the change at the director level where a Chinese is the head of the magazine, the contributors and staff of the English edition remain largely Macanese and Portuguese, giving the magazine content a slant that serves the purpose of this investigation.

The contemporaneity of this thesis requires close scrutiny of the local newspapers. Fortunately, they are readily available over the Internet although some locals say that

⁴⁹ B. Koo, “The Malaccan Portuguese community and its relevance to contemporary Macau”, in Macau Ricci Institute Studies II, *Religion and Culture: past approaches, present globalisation, future challenges* (Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 2004), pp. 167-198.

⁵⁰ *MacaU* (Chinese edition), August 2002, pp. 4-14.

⁵¹ *MacaU*, June 2000, p. 3.

none of the papers are really independent but are vehicles for sectional interests to leverage their views to government. However, the English newspapers in Hong Kong have a better claim to editorial independence than most. The *South China Morning Post* published a weekly column by the veteran correspondent Harald Bruning, who is also the Reuters correspondent for Macau and has been reporting on its affairs for over twenty years. But it was pointed out to me that Bruning is actually employed by a Chinese media group in Macau, which is considered pro-government. Accordingly, these newspapers must be approached with caution for the bias they can convey.

The pressure on the media barons emanating from China has been whispered but rarely documented until the publication of Jonathan Fenby's book *Dealing with the Dragon* (2000). Fenby was the Managing Editor of the *South China Morning Post* during the crucial first post-colonial years (1997-1999) in Hong Kong. In the book, he details the subtle pressure that was exerted on him to be less critical of the government, which included a personal visit from Anson Chan, Hong Kong's Chief Secretary at the time. Despite the main shareholder's ties to Beijing, Fenby provided opportunities for the airing of anti-government views such that the *South China Morning Post* achieved notoriety as the Hong Kong Government's "No.1 Critic". Although not directly related to the subject of this investigation, Fenby's book illustrates the subtle ways in which elites in Hong Kong and Macau are co-opted and the difficulty of maintaining the principle of "one country, two systems" with regard to the Fourth Estate.

Another point of divergence from other writers concerns my usage of television documentaries, in particular the four-part TV documentary produced by Diana Lin entitled *Back to the Motherland* (broadcast in Hong Kong between 14 October and 4

November 1999). The series employs a combination of interviews, narratives and archival footage to provide a historical backdrop to the change of sovereignty in Macau in 1999. The views are balanced and provide a guide to the issues covering Macau's return to China. Copies of the tapes are accessible through the video library of the University of Hong Kong.

Nowadays, resources must rightly include the Internet. A researcher on Macau will do well to first read Rui Isidro's article "Macau on the Net" that contains a guide to the net addresses of important institutions and sources of information in the territory.⁵² In particular, I find the Macau government's trilingual website *www.macau.gov.mo* useful for the information and the historical documents posted there.

Likewise, the empirical dimension must not go unmentioned in this context. Not wishing to preempt the section on the investigative process in Chapter Two, clearly without the extensive and repeat interviews conducted during the course of this investigation, it would have been difficult to make sense of what is actually happening in contemporary Macau, let alone synthesise the facts, figures and various propaganda emitting from different sources. Regrettably, the undertaking I have given to various participants does not permit me to divulge their identities or to acknowledge my indebtedness, which is colossal.

Arguments of the thesis

The principal arguments of this thesis may be summarised as follows. To begin with, the study of the Macanese holds implications for the field of diaspora studies due to the nature of the community and the uniqueness of Macau's decolonisation process,

which included a long transitional period and constitutional guarantees concerning the rights and civil liberties of minority groups, such as the Macanese. Such provisions diffused significantly the emigrative pressure arising from decolonisation, which, historically had been a prominent factor in the formation of diasporas. Moreover, the issue of miscegenity, a defining feature of the Macanese identity, challenges the conventional ideas of a diasporic *homeland* and *centre* from which the dispersion may be said to originate. In the case of the Macanese community, the factors combine to argue for an individual approach that reflects their miscegenity, complex identity and historical connections.

Having survived decolonisation in robust form, the Macanese community in Macau is not —as yet— a dying race. Monumental changes, represented by the transfer of sovereignty in 1999, have resulted in a community diminished in more ways than one. The loss, however, is quantitative, not qualitative; the attrition level can be played down due to the impact of the localisation program – which forced Macanese civil servants to choose, among others, to take up positions within the civil service in Portugal – and the propensity for emigration, which is a feature of the general Macau population, not just the Macanese. Despite the new stringencies, represented by problems associated with the nationality question and the localisation of the civil service, the community has, by and large, managed to remain relevant in different ways. Encouraged by signs of economic buoyancy and leadership from various quarters, including the Central Government in Beijing, the Macanese community —though undergoing transition— looks set to be an important part of Macau in the foreseeable future. It is likely that the transformation —

⁵² Rui Isidro, ‘Macau on the net’, *MacaU*, Special 1999, pp. 132-142.

begun long before 1999 — will continue over a long period of time, representing generations, perhaps centuries, not decades. Under this last scenario, it is more appropriate to view 1999, not as an end, but as a continuity, and the Macanese community in Macau as an endangered —not dying —species.

Chapter outlines

This thesis is an investigation into the survival of the Macanese community in post-1999 Macau but it goes beyond its geographical boundary. By incorporating two chapters on the related subjects of the Macanese diaspora and the Luso-Asiatic communities, I hope to present the Macanese community in a wider context. Accordingly, this thesis is divided into eight chapters including this Introduction. Chapter Two outlines the investigative method and process and some of the issues and problems encountered along the way. For convenience, they are grouped into two questions: Who are the Macanese, and how to approach the study of their diaspora? Chapter Three provides a historical perspective on Macau and the Macanese community with particular emphasis on the transition to Chinese rule in 1999. The developments and changes that helped to shape and transform the Macanese community in Macau are highlighted, including the two most powerful elements that shaped the community in the post-colonial era: the Macau Basic Law and the localisation of the civil service. In view of the interest shown by the international community in matters pertaining to Hong Kong, a comparison with the Hong Kong Basic Law is also incorporated in Chapter Three. The post-colonial period is the subject of Chapter Four, which outlines the changes that have taken place across the spectrum of social, political and economic areas, and international relations. Of the last, the most significant is the forging of a new relationship between

Macau and her former colonial power, Portugal. This relationship holds profound implications for the Macanese community in more ways than one, not least because the Macanese are perceived to face a crisis of identity and divided loyalty in the post-colonial era. Chapter Five begins by surveying the pressure to emigrate and the reasons why many Macanese choose to remain in Macau despite the monumental changes set in train by the decolonisation process. The impact of these changes on the Macanese community will also be canvassed with particular reference to their institutions, identity and relevance to contemporary Macau. Chapter Six positions the small Macanese community in Macau in a global context through a study of the Macanese diaspora. It seeks to demonstrate the links between the Macanese community and its diaspora and their importance to each other. By comparing the Macanese diaspora with the modern Hong Kong Chinese diaspora, I hope to dispel a popular misconception that the former is part of the latter due to a common geo-political background and the Macanese acculturation with Chinese ways. In Chapter Seven, a brief survey of the major Luso-Asiatic communities is undertaken to place the Macau Macanese in a regional historical context. These Luso-Asians attest to a time when the Portuguese empire was dominant around the globe. In Asia, its influence stretched to India, the Malay world, China, Japan and to Timor. Particular attention will be given to the communities in Goa and Malacca for lessons that are relevant for the Macanese in contemporary Macau. In the concluding chapter, Chapter Eight, the various threads are pulled together in an attempt to furnish answers to the research questions, which have provoked this investigation. In the process, where appropriate, suggestions have been given to stimulate thinking so that the Macanese community can continue as an effective force in Macau, adding value to China's external

relations and contributing to the on-going modernisation which their ancestors inadvertently triggered some five centuries ago.

SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND RESEARCH PROBLEMS

This chapter outlines the methodology adopted for this investigation and some of the issues and problems encountered during the course of research. One is the problem of defining who is and who is not a “Macanese”, a question to which there is no satisfactory answer yet, but which has serious implications for the compilation of statistics and consideration of the Macanese identity. Another is how to approach the study of the Macanese diaspora; being Eurasians, there is no known model on which to analyse such miscegenic communities. Following these discussions, an outline of the investigative method and process undertaken for this thesis is proffered.

Who are the Macanese?

The origin of the Macanese community can be traced back to Malacca where, after wresting control of this important regional trading port in 1511, the Portuguese came in contact with Chinese traders. The lure of Chinese merchandise was evident from the records kept by Tomé Pires, the scrivener and accountant of the Malaccan *fortaleza* (fortified settlement) at the time:

China is a profitable voyage, and moreover whoever loads up, hiring cabins (*peitacas*), sometimes makes three for one, and in good merchandise which is soon sold.¹

With great expectations Jorge Alvares, a merchant, was sent from Malacca in 1513 to find out more about the Chinese and to conduct business on behalf of the Portuguese Crown.² A few years later, Pires himself was sent to negotiate direct trade but the mission ended in disaster for him and his party.³ Confronted with China's refusal to sanction official trade, the Portuguese adapted themselves to the hostile environment. Consorting with pirates and recalcitrant local officials, trading posts and fledging communities were established along the coast of Zhejiang and Fujian provinces. Following a rapprochement of sorts between them and the Canton authorities, the Portuguese returned to the southern province of Guangdong and settled in Macau in 1557 where their descendants, the Macanese, have lived continuously to this day. This broad acceptance of the origins of the Macanese community masks some difficult issues. In this section, I shall mention only three: the problem of definition (who is, or is not a *Macanese*), the question of their size (statistics), and the issue of the Macanese identity.

Definitions

Traditionally the English used the term *Macanese* to describe the mixed-race descendants of the Portuguese settlers in Macau. Such a simple description obscures the

¹ Tomé Pires, *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires Series II, Vol. II*, translated and edited by Armando Cortesão (London: 1944), p. 284.

² *Ibid.*, 283 fn.

³ According to K. C. Fok, the failure was due to alleged misconduct by their compatriots on the China coast and their ignorance of the Chinese tributary system of trade and diplomacy. See K. C. Fok, "Early Ming

fact that there has been an inconclusive debate over definitions. This debate was canvassed in my previous research but it bears repeating here in order to understand the related issues such as the lack of statistical data.⁴ According to the Portuguese anthropologist, Joao de Pina Cabral:

To be Macanese is, fundamentally, to be from Macao, to descend from Portuguese, but not necessarily to be a Sino-Portuguese descendant.⁵

Cabral also advanced four distinguishing features for identifying members of the community: by bloodline, language, religion and self-affirmation. Regarding bloodline, the key element is the presence of Portuguese blood, irrespective of percentages. To the vast majority of Macau's population, Eurasian facial features are used as a method of identification. This has been criticised as narrow but, as Wong Chon's paper on Macanese *patois* dramas illustrates, even the Macanese in Macau use this element to distinguish themselves from the rest of the community.⁶

Another element of definition – perhaps the least controversial – is that of marriage. If one marries a Macanese and identifies with the community, one is automatically embraced by the community. The consideration that Macanese must be able to speak Portuguese or better still *patois* (their hybrid language) has relevance in Macau, but in the Macanese diaspora that sprang up during the twentieth century, many,

Images”, in R. Ptak (ed.), *Portuguese Asia: aspects in history and economic history, 16th & 17th centuries*, pp. 143-156.

⁴ B. H. M. Koo, “In Search of a Better World: a Social History of the Macaenses in China”, Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Western Sydney, 2000, pp. 20-22.

⁵ João de Pina Cabral, “The Ethnic Composition of Macao”, in *Review of Culture*, no 20, 1994, pp. 229-239.

⁶ At the opening session of *Encontro II*, J.M. Alves, criticised the definition based on physical attributes as too narrow. See Isabel Meneses, “Returning Home”, in *MacaU*, Special 1996, pp. 6-16. Also see Wong Chon, “Sons of Macau: Cultural Identity in Macanese literature as viewed through Patois dramas”, in R.

such as the Remedios brothers who were put on trial in Macau in 1933, can neither speak Portuguese nor *patois*.⁷ Such unfamiliarity with Portuguese and the Macanese *patois* is common among those who grew up in places like Shanghai, Hong Kong and other non-Portuguese environments.⁸ Among the Macanese elite, there is a preference for a broader definition. The one favoured by the literary figure Henrique de Senna Fernandes entails a Portuguese connection of one sort or another:

We call someone Macanese if he has Portuguese roots or identifies with Portuguese culture. Even if someone doesn't have any Portuguese blood but has the culture, he is Macanese.⁹

Carlos Marreiros, architect, prefers a definition that also incorporates an association with Macau:

I have friends who are ethnically Chinese and friends who are ethnically European. They were born in Macau and are as Macanese as I am.¹⁰

Even among official circles, definitions differ between the pre-1999 Portuguese regime and the current Chinese-led administration. Since the early 1980s, official Portuguese communications have used the term *Macaenses*, the Portuguese equivalent of *Macanese*,

Ramos, J. R. Dinis, R. Wilson & D. Y. Yuan (eds.), *Macau and its Neighbors towards the 21st Century* (Macau: University of Macau, 1998) pp. 333-342.

⁷ The *SCMP* reported that these two Macanese youths from Japan via Shanghai could only speak Japanese and English. See *South China Morning Post*, 14 September 1933, BMC-NLA, MS4300, Box 9, BRA/4016, p. 128.

⁸ Even in Macau in the 1990s, very few Macanese were able to speak or understand *patois*. Jane Camens brings this out in her report. In an effort to strengthen the Macanese identity, the *patois* drama group *Dóci Papiçam di Macau* was formed in 1993 (see pp. 175-176 below). See Jane Camens, "Macanese facing veiled future", *South China Morning Post*, 16 August 1998.

⁹ Katherine Tanko, "Macau Make Over", in *Silver Kris*, February 1999, pp. 34-39.

¹⁰ Jane Camens, "Macanese facing veiled future", *South China Morning Post*, 16 August 1998.

to refer to the entire population of Macau — defined by place, *not* ethnicity.¹¹ In contrast, the Macau Basic Law (Article 24, paragraph 3) defines the community by both place *and* ethnicity, referring to them as *tusheng puren* (in Chinese) and *Portugueses nascidos em Macau* (in Portuguese), which translates as ‘local-born Portuguese’ or ‘Portuguese born in Macau’. As we shall see later, these official definitions have impacted on the compilation of population statistics. Significantly, this official definition is narrower than is generally accepted by the community and local scholars like Herbert Yee, who describes Leonel Alberto Alves, a lawyer and legislator, as an important leader of the Macanese community even though he was not born in Macau. The Basic Law definition also tends to exclude others like Jorge Neto Valente, the President of Macau Lawyers Association who married a Macanese and has lived in Macau for over thirty-three years. Needless to say, it excludes the many members of the Macanese diaspora who, even though they can trace their roots to Macau, were nevertheless born in places away from it. Consequently, in the final decade of the twentieth century, the definition of *Macanese* has become rather blurred. The findings suggest that the definition favoured by Senna Fernandes, which emphasises the link to Portuguese roots and culture, is most appropriate as it reflected the reality in the diaspora as well as the current situation in Macau. Accordingly, it is the definition adopted in this thesis.

A crisis of identity?

The Macanese community is supposedly encountering a crisis of identity in post-1999 Macau and it appears that among the Macanese themselves, there are conflicting

¹¹ Cecilia Jorge & Beltrao Coelho, ‘Strengthening the Macanese Diaspora’, *MacaU*, Special 1993, pp. 6-15.

views concerning their own identity. In December 1999, *Asiaweek* magazine quoted Jose Luis de Sales Marques, then chairperson of the Macau Municipal Council:

We have our religion – we' re all Catholic – our food and our language.

We feel and believe that we are not Chinese. Not superior — just that we are different.¹²

Marques' view contrasts starkly to that of Maria Jose Jorge, a descendant of Jorge Alvares who was the first Portuguese to arrive in China in 1513. In a television documentary broadcast in Hong Kong just two months prior to Marques' statement, Jorge said (in Cantonese): 'I was born in Macau. I am Chinese, not a Westerner. I have many Chinese friends.' Her son, Pedro Jorge added: 'the heritage is part of my body ... Jorge Alvares was involved with the Chinese, he stayed here and never returned to Portugal.'¹³

How can such contending propositions be reconciled? Is the Macanese community facing a crisis of identity as commonly believed? According to the *Cambridge International Dictionary of English*, 'crisis' has a meaning of 'a situation that has reached an extremely difficult or dangerous point; a time of great disagreement, uncertainty or suffering.'¹⁴ Except for the element of uncertainty, the findings suggest that the use of the term 'crisis' to describe the state of the Macanese identity is both simplistic and alarmist — a misrepresentation of the nature of the community. As I have stated in a previous investigation, like the layers of an onion, the Macanese community in Macau can be said to have multiple and simultaneous identities comprising (in the main) of Macanese, Chinese and Portuguese. In the Macanese diaspora, they merely take on an

¹² Todd Crowell, "A proud people", *Asiaweek*, Vol. 25 No. 51, 24 December 1999.

¹³ Diana Lin, *Back to the Motherland I*, TVB 894, broadcast on 14 October 1999, TVB Hong Kong.

¹⁴ *Cambridge International Dictionary of English* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

additional layer. In this, the Macanese are not unique, as multiple identities are very much a distinctive feature of pluralistic societies and are juggled intermittently depending on the circumstances —where they are, whom they are interacting with, whom they are talking to and what they are talking about. When viewed from the prism of multiple identities, seemingly opposing statements of identity can be reconciled. It is this element that permits one to challenge the view advanced by writers such as Berlie that “those [Macanese] who wish to remain after the handover naturally and implicitly tend to identify themselves as Chinese. [Preferring] not to call themselves anything at all; they have already accepted their new Chinese identity.”¹⁵

Instead, the evidence suggests that the Macanese community has by and large remained proud of their miscegenic background. They appear content to continue on in Macau under the new regime despite the opportunity to avail of residency rights in Europe. In so doing, they are likely to continue juggling their composite identity as part of their daily living. Accordingly, the idea of *contending identities* may be more appropriate in their case because the word “contend”, again according to the *Cambridge International Dictionary of English*, means “to adjust to a difficult situation or try to solve a problem.” Also appropriate is the Chinese word for crisis, *wei-ji*, which suggests both “danger” and “opportunity”; as we shall see in Chapter Five, when faced with the challenges confronting them in post-1999 Macau, many Macanese have grasped the opportunities for themselves and their community to remain viable and relevant.

¹⁵ Berlie (ed.), *Macao 2000*, p. 23.

Statistics

The lack of reliable data on the Macanese community is due largely to the problem with definition and identification, a difficulty experienced by other researchers too.¹⁶ Even the government-owned publication *MacaU* emphasised the inadequacy of the census categories in determining the numbers of Macanese in Macau.¹⁷ Yet, in postulating whether the Macanese have survived the transition to Chinese rule, one is obliged to revisit this quantitative issue. Data on the Macanese community can be derived through raw statistics or through an interpretative medium such as the article by Isabel Castro ‘Who we are and how many we are’ (*MacaU*, June 2002).¹⁸ I chose the latter for various reasons. Primarily, I was aware of the imprecise nature of the raw data. Castro, being a Macanese, can be expected to scrutinise the raw data with a practiced eye that outsiders lack, although it remains a possibility that the interpretation may have been colored for political and sociological reasons. Moreover, her article provides a comparison over a ten-year period, which sheds light on the difficulties alluded to earlier viz. the inappropriateness of the census methodology. Analyzing her article on the Macau Census 2001, it is evident how problematic and inadequate the census figures are.

To accompany the following discussion, two tables are included below:

Table 1: Socio-demographics Characteristics of Macau

	<u>Census 2001</u>		<u>Census 1991</u>	
Population:	435,235	100%	355,693	100%

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 23; Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 131.

¹⁷ Isabel Castro, ‘Who we are and how many we are’, *MacaU*, June 2002, pp. 15-22.

¹⁸ Ibid.

Place of birth:	(Census 2001)		(Census 1991)	
Macau	191,139	43.9	142,697	40.1
Mainland China	206,384	47.4	179,028	50.3
Hong Kong	14,436	3.3	12,192	3.4
Portugal	1,616	0.4	3,625	1.0
Other	21,660	5.0	18,151	5.2*
Nationality:				
Chinese	414,200	95.2	335,693	94.4
Portuguese	8,793	2.0	11,965	3.4
Other♥	12,242	2.8	8,035	2.2

❖ In the source material this figure states 5.1 and is adjusted here to make it add up to 100.

♥ This row does not appear in source cited below. It is my computation to make it add up to 100. Source: Isabel Castro, “Who we are and how many we are”, *MacaU*, June 2002, p. 22.

Table 2: Ethnic Background of Macau Residents

	<u>Census 2001</u>	<u>Census1991</u>
Chinese	95.7	95.1
Chinese + Portuguese	1.0	1.3
Chinese, Portuguese or Other	0.1	0.2
Portuguese	0.6	1.5
Other	2.6	1.9♥

♥ In the source cited below this figure is stated “2.0”. It is adjusted here to make it total 100. Source: Isabel Castro, “Who we are and how many we are”, *MacaU*, June 2002, p. 17.

Regarding the size of the Macanese community, there are two ways of looking at the census figures: through ethnicity or nationality. Based on the ethnicity approach [Chinese + Portuguese category], Table 2 showed that in 2001 the Macanese community represented only one percent of the population of 435235, which set the numbers at 4352 persons. The comparative figure in Census 1991 for this category is 4,624 — representing 1.3 per cent when the population was only 355,693. The difference between

these two figures suggests that for the ten-year period, the Macanese community suffered a net loss of only 272. Clearly, these figures are too low and do not tally with the generally accepted numbers believed to have emigrated during the final decade of Portuguese rule.

Isabel Castro has adopted the second approach – based on nationality – as a basis to compare demographic change in Macau. Over the ten-year period (1991 to 2001), the number of residents identified as Portuguese nationals declined from 11,965 to 8,793, which represents a loss of 3,172 (see Table 1, above). In the same period, the number of residents who were born in Portugal declined from 3,625 to 1,616 – a loss of 2,009. Comparing these two losses, the mathematical deduction suggests that the loss of Portuguese nationals who were *not* born in Portugal declined by 1163 in the past ten years (1991 to 2001).¹⁹ In my opinion, this is a more realistic rate of attrition in view of the evidence gathered during this investigation. But ultimately, one can not be sure because this group (Portuguese not born in Portugal) includes Macanese, Portuguese from the former colonies such as East Timor and Macau Chinese who may have identified themselves as Portuguese nationals for census purposes. Depending on how many are from these last two groups, we can then get an idea of the net loss in the Macanese numbers.

The above exercise — aimed at estimating the number of Macanese who left Macau due to the change of government — highlights the fact that no precise figures exist for the Macanese population in Macau and how imprecise the census figures are. Nevertheless, others have corroborated the fact that the number of Macanese who left

¹⁹ Ibid. [3172 - 2009 = 1163].

Macau because of 1999 is small. Nuno Lima Basto, a Portuguese judge working in post-1999 Macau, blames the Portuguese government for exaggerating the fear of a mass exodus of Macanese and Portuguese, which proved to be unfounded:

We need only remember the recruitment procedure for Macau civil servants to staff the administration in Portugal, in which a fear prevailed - completely unfounded and close to ridiculous - that the African decolonisation scenario would be repeated with the Portuguese returning en masse to Portugal after 19 December 1999.²⁰

Another contributor to *MacaU* has also stated that the transfer of sovereignty “did not open the floodgates of *retornadoes* (Portuguese repatriates) returning to Portugal, as had happened with the decolonisation of the old colonies and the subsequent civil wars.”²¹ In sum, although one could speak of the “departure” of the Portuguese in technical terms, in reality many Macanese and Portuguese have chosen to remain in Macau for the time being. They number some 8793 or two per cent of the population according to Census 2001.²²

Approaches to the study of the Macanese diaspora

This thesis asserts that the Macanese community in Macau is best studied in conjunction with its diaspora because they form parts of a composite picture — enmeshed by the multifarious links between them, which are capable of influencing the movement of people in either direction. Historically the Macanese have been coming and going from Macau and by all accounts will continue to do so due to the impact of

²⁰ Nuno Lima Bastos, in Gilberto Lopes, “A year of MSAR”, *MacaU*, December 2000, pp. 25-26.

²¹ Eduardo Tomé, “The thriving Chinese community of Portugal”, *MacaU*, September 2002, p. 14.

globalisation, which requires and facilitates mobility across an increasingly borderless world.²³

The notion of a Macanese *diaspora* raises issues that challenge the fundamental concepts embedded in the term. To begin with, one can ask whether the term *diaspora* is applicable to the Macanese overseas community? According to Ronald Skeldon:

[The term *diaspora*] refers specifically to the dispersal of Jews from their *homeland* implying the idea of *exile*. The term is not generally used for the migration of Europeans towards the new worlds of the Americas or Australasia – these were considered ‘conquest’ or ‘settlement’.²⁴

But the Jewish diasporic communities used to have an image of living in enclaves and maintaining strong cultural and religious attachments to their homeland Israel. Like some Chinese diaspora communities, they are perceived as not fully assimilated into their countries of sojourn. Yet it can be argued that such image is flawed. In the Jewish diaspora today, cultural purity rarely exists due to the inevitable process of acculturation. According to S. B. Schwartz, *Implicit Understandings* (1994), in cultural encounters, “the contacts themselves caused readjustments and rethinking.”²⁵ Additionally, the notion of *exile* no longer applies, for while the Jews from the impoverished Eastern European countries have little choice but to emigrate to Israel, the Jewish communities in

²² Isabel Castro, “Who we are and how many we are”, *MacaU*, June 2002, pp. 15-22.

²³ The term “globalisation” is contentious. According to Scholte, the term has been linked ‘to well-nigh every purported contemporary social change, including an emergent information age, a retreat of the state, the demise of traditional cultures ... For others, however, the word has conjured up deprivation, disaster and doom. No one is indifferent. Most of us are confused.’ Scholte outlined five general conceptions: Globalisation as internationalisation, liberalisation, universalisation, westernisation and deterritorialisation. Scholte argues that of the five notions, only the last (deterritorialisation) ‘gives globalisation a new and distinctive meaning —and at the same time identifies an important contemporary historical development.’ See Jan H. Scholte, *Globalization, a Critical Introduction* (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 3, 14.

²⁴ Skeldon, “Reluctant exiles or bold pioneers”, in Skeldon (ed.), *Reluctant Exiles?*, p. 5.

Australasia, North America and Western Europe are unlikely to end their “exile” to return to Israel. Evidently, the term *diaspora* is loosely employed these days. According to the *Cambridge International Dictionary of English*, “diaspora” is simply “the spreading of people from one original country to other different countries”.²⁶ Van Hear, in *New Diasporas* (1998), considers the term applicable to a “trans-national community” dispersed from their homeland to two or more other territories; their presence abroad is enduring and there exists some kind of social, economic, political or cultural interchange between them.²⁷ The evidence suggests that Van Hear’s elements reflect the Macanese experience. Thus, it is in this general sense that the term is used throughout this thesis.

The term *diaspora* implies the existence of a *centre* or *homeland*, which traditionally has been bound up cognitively with ethnicity, places of birth, cultural adherence and nationalities. Broad as these references are, they do not suit the Macanese community due to its complexity. It begs the question: where is the centre or homeland for the Macanese? Some may ask whether it is the place of one’s ancestors or one’s adopted home?²⁸ Many Macanese can trace their Macau roots to ten generations or more — for them, is Macau to be considered an “adopted country” still? Some may also question whether one can designate a homeland for a community whose ethnicity is so blended? The Macanese ethnicity is an indeterminate blend — a mixture of mixture — and although part Portuguese, most, if not all, Macanese do not consider Portugal as their centre in diasporic terms.

²⁵ S. B. Schwartz (ed.), *Implicit Understandings* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 1-22.

²⁶ *Cambridge International Dictionary of English*.

²⁷ Nicholas Van Hear, *New Diasporas: the Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities* (London: UCL Press, 1998), pp. 2-6.

While many were born in Macau, the establishment of diasporic communities outside Macau gave rise to generations for whom the land of their forefathers have become distant and unfamiliar. Illustrative of this dilemma is the family of Cláudio José Da Silva (1836–1890) some of whose great-grandchildren live in Australia. The Portuguese genealogist Jorge Forjaz has not provided much information about Da Silva except that he was born in Macau and was a captain in the Macau Garrison. Nor has he indicated when or why Da Silva left Macau for Shanghai where his passing was recorded. There is more information about Da Silva's eldest son, Cláudio António (1860–1935). Also born in Macau, Cláudio António left for Singapore in 1884 after securing a position in the accounts department of the *Singapore Free Press*. His first wife, with whom he had five children, was a member of the distinguished Macanese family in Hong Kong, the Noronhas. His second wife, from the Dutch/Portuguese Eurasian community in Malacca, gave birth to twelve children — making a total of seventeen. All his children and grandchildren were born either in Singapore or Malaysia. Their education, careers and residencies clearly exhibited stronger ties to places other than Macau.²⁹ For Da Silva's descendants, the use of rigid criteria, such as places of birth, will exclude them; it follows that the majority of the Macanese diaspora as well as some living in Macau are excluded also. Clearly the application of such criteria is ludicrous and reminiscent of the heated debate – which took place during the Second International Reunion of the Macanese Communities in Macau during 1996 – over the question whether those born outside of

²⁸ Philip A. Kuhn, *The Homeland: Thinking about the History of Chinese Overseas* (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1997), p. 2.

²⁹ J. Forjaz, *Familias Macaenses: Volume III* (Macau: Fundacao Orient, 1996), pp. 672-683.

Macau can legitimately be called “Macanese”.³⁰ It was settled in the affirmative. Accordingly, the conventional notion of centre and homeland cannot be applied to this community. As the generations lengthen and the links with Macau become increasingly tenuous, a different approach is needed to reflect the uniqueness of the Macanese. The pride with which they wear their multi-ethnicities make them distinctive, enabling a strong sense of community to emerge — unlike the Anglo-Eurasians of Hong Kong whose community lacks form and substance, despite 150 years of British rule. A different approach will, appropriately, include Da Silva’s descendants who can be considered part of the Macanese diaspora because they can trace their origins to one of the Macanese families in Macau. For the Macanese diaspora then, their *centre* is Macau where their ancestors have settled since 1557. Henrique Senna Fernandes puts it well when he reflects:

It is hard to explain in a few words what it means to be Macanese. We have our own way of life here. We have memories and traditions lasting hundreds of years, even our own cuisine. We are part of the city and we always will be. You need to spend time in Macao to understand why we are all in love with this city. I could go to Portugal any time, I’ve got plenty of resources. I’ve got two houses in Portugal, but I stay here because I was born here, all my ancestors and my children are linked to this city. It is a very strong attachment and it would be terribly difficult to put all that aside and begin a new life.³¹

³⁰ F.C. Roliz, “We Macanese”, *UMA News Bulletin*, September-October 1997, p. 12.

³¹ Jill McGivering, *Macau Remembers* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press 1999), pp. 97-98.

Yet, many Macanese have managed to put it aside and left Macau to join the growing numbers in the diaspora, which will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Six.

If the Macanese community in Macau is to be studied in conjunction with its diaspora, there is no known model for the examination of a mixed-race community in this field —certainly not for one as complex as the Macanese. There are existing models for the study of the Jewish diaspora or for the Chinese in Singapore but none for the study of a mixed-race diaspora community like the Macanese and the issues raised, such as how to classify them. Indeed, miscegenic communities have been under-assessed or largely ignored in the diaspora discourse. Although Nicholas Van Hear, *New Diasporas* (1998), had identified a group of ‘imperial auxiliaries’ that had formed modern diasporas, there was no mention of the miscegenic offspring of the white settlers, such as the Macanese.³²

Despite their multi-ethnicity —African, Indian and Malay features exist within the Macanese genetic pool —centuries of settlement on the China coast has given rise to a community that is largely defined by its mixed Portuguese and Chinese characteristics. Which identity should be stressed: Portuguese, Chinese or Macanese? Or should one emphasise their place of birth, ethnicity, or nationality — in short, how does one approach the study of the Macanese diaspora?

Three approaches readily suggest themselves: based on their nationality, place of emigration, and ethnicity. First, as Portuguese nationals, the Macanese can be considered as a sub-group of the Portuguese but there are complications in this approach. Fundamentally, such treatment means that the Macanese community in Macau can be

³² Van Hear has employed the term ‘imperial auxiliaries’ to describe the Indians who filled the administrative and military roles and the many Chinese who worked in the mines, plantations and railways

considered as part of the Portuguese diaspora emanating from Europe. Most can see that such notion is conceptually difficult, if not nonsensical. Further, it does not accord with the self-image of the Macanese community who see themselves as different from the Portuguese expatriates who go to Macau on short-term stays. This perception has been highlighted by the experience of some Macanese in Portugal, where there is evidence that they encountered less than full acceptance, mistaken for Chinese and subjected to derogatory labels due in part to their physical characteristics, their imperfect command of the language and their cultural norms.³³ The distinction between Portuguese and Macanese can also be seen in the plight of the *Casa de Macau* in Lisbon, a social club established purportedly for the Macanese community in Portugal but has been underpatronised by them.³⁴ Instead, most of its members are said to be Portuguese expatriates whose link with Macau is their tenure of work there. The reasons why the Macanese in Lisbon do not readily associate with this club are said to be a serious lack of interest and its inconvenient location.³⁵ My own investigation suggests otherwise — that the Macanese see themselves as having little in common with the expatriates from Europe. This was reflected in the remarks made to me at the Third International Reunion of the Macanese Communities in Macau in 1999. More recently, this division is seen over the mediocre response by the Macanese community in Macau towards the formation of the

as indenture labourers. See Van Hear, *New Diasporas: the Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities*, p. 52.

³³ João Paulo Gonçalves, who left Macau for Lisbon in 1993, complains that he is frequently mistaken for a Chinese even though he exhibited strong European facial features. See Ana Isabel Dias, ‘The return home’, *MacaU*, Special 1999, p. 54.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-57.

Casa de Portugal em Macau, the Portuguese/Macanese social organisation formed in 2001.³⁶

A second approach is one based on place of emigration, which has been largely adopted by foreign governments for statistical purposes, thus placing the Macanese immigrants in the same category as other migrants from Hong Kong and Macau. Some scholars have adopted this approach because the Macanese have been in the region ‘for decades or generations and are more or less acculturated with the Hong Kong community.’³⁷ But as we shall see later, the Macanese diaspora does not fit the mould of the Hong Kong Chinese diaspora and should not be considered as a subgroup within the broader Chinese diaspora. My investigation has led me to take a third approach – based on ethnicity and communal identity. Thus, minority groups such as the Macanese diaspora can be studied in their own right for their uniqueness and individuality. Although hampered by the lack of literature and country-specific data, nevertheless, with the available information, it is possible to discern a picture of the Macanese diaspora that exists around the world today. This will be presented in Chapter Six.

The investigative method and process

This study has its origins in my previous investigation into the history of the Macanese community in China from its foundations in the sixteenth century to the end of the twentieth.³⁸ In one sense, it follows on chronologically from that but the nature of the

³⁶ Harald Bruning, ‘Portuguese ‘house’ seeks to promote solidarity’*South China Morning Post*, 2 June 2001; Harald Bruning, ‘Portuguese community only as good as its word’, *South China Morning Post*, 8 March 2002.

³⁷ Lary & Luk, ‘Hong Kong Immigrants in Toronto’, p. 145.

³⁸ B. H. M. Koo, ‘In Search of a Better World: a Social History of the Macaenses in China’, Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Western Sydney, 2000.

undertaking involves numerous sensitivities that ultimately determine the choice of methodology. For this investigation to reflect the situation in contemporary Macau, it is necessary to traverse hazardous terrain such as assessing the current political and community leaderships. This is difficult when dealing with the past, but it is doubly so when the focus is upon the present. Further complexity manifests itself in the form of entrenched cultural sensitivities such as the respect for authority and not wanting to speak badly of others so as not to cause unnecessary ill will. Moreover, Macau residents are also said to be politically docile when compared to their Hong Kong counterparts. In this regard, it is worth noting that even the organisers of the Falung Gong, a meditation group banned on the Mainland, have given up staging protests in Macau due to the lack of support from the public and interest from the media.³⁹ As one writer has observed, a compliant media and a high level of self-censorship among individuals and groups may be culpable.⁴⁰

All methodologies have their strengths and weaknesses. In order to gain firsthand knowledge and to augment the meager literature, I have considered gathering information by way of a questionnaire supplemented by personal interviews. The questionnaire is helpful in that it safeguards anonymity — an important consideration in the Macau context. Furthermore, as Shaughnessy and Zechmeister have indicated in *Research Methods in Psychology* (1990), questionnaires can “deal more directly with the nature of people’s thoughts, opinions, and feelings.”⁴¹ But, as the questionnaire is likely to be

³⁹ Harald Bruning, “Macau’s Article 23 promises to be political trapeze act”, *South China Morning Post*, 4 October 2002.

⁴⁰ Lo, “Macao’s Political System”, in Berlie (ed.), *Macao 2000*, pp. 53-70.

⁴¹ J. J. Shaughnessy & E. B. Zechmeister, *Research Methods in Psychology*, 2nd edn. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), p. 77.

conducted by way of a mailed survey, the main disadvantage is seen as the low response rate, at around thirty percent, and the danger of “systemic errors” if one is to rely on the returned data alone.⁴² In contrast, the response rate for a method based on personal interviews can be as high as eighty-five percent even though it has the distinct disadvantage of being time-consuming. Moreover, the personal interview method poses a danger of “interviewer bias” in which words and ideas can be suggested by the interviewer that form part of the interviewee’s response.⁴³ Additionally, as has been observed by B. M. Robertson in *Oral History Handbook* (1996), with techniques that involve human memory, the recollective process may be “faulty and prone to fabrication.”⁴⁴

In my case, the political and cultural sensitivities in Macau, the tyranny of distance and the fact that I am an outsider, determine the eventual methods chosen. A study conducted primarily via a mail survey is impractical due to the difficulty in obtaining names and addresses required to recruit the participants. Moreover, a broad-based recruitment exercise is considered time- and cost-prohibitive with indeterminate response rate. Furthermore, the inability to target the respondents to ensure a cross sectional viewpoint is likely to cause the research data to be unbalanced and incongruent. In a society considered to be politically apathetic, it appears unlikely that people will respond to a general questionnaire that asks sensitive questions about their views on the government and their community. Such methodological issues weighed heavy on my mind when I made an exploratory trip to Macau in December 2001 to attend the

⁴² Ibid., p. 90; D. Raj, *The Design of Sample Surveys* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 117.

⁴³ Shaughnessy & Zechmeister, *Research Methods in Psychology*, p. 92.

international conference organised jointly by the Macau Ricci Institute and the Hong Kong-based French Centre for Research on Contemporary China. During the conference, one of the presenters, Herbert Yee – a practiced exponent of empirical surveys in Macau and whose recent work is a major reference for this investigation – was challenged by a questioner over his survey method. Yee had presented a paper based on the findings of various surveys, some of which purportedly canvassed the opinions of members of the Macanese community. When asked about the prosecution of those surveys, Yee admitted that they were conducted via telephone polling from Hong Kong by Chinese assistants, recruited by him, using Cantonese as the medium of communication. The questioner alleged that not many Macanese of the middle and older generations could understand Cantonese well enough to respond adequately to sophisticatedly crafted survey questions. According to the questioner, unless Yee's assistants were proficient in Portuguese or English, a survey of the Macanese community must be open to question and the use of telephone polling of Macanese households was considered highly unreliable. In my view, Yee did not provide a satisfactory response on that occasion.

With insight gained from the foregoing exchange and other informal discussions, I determined that the methodology to recruit participants by way of a paid advertisement in a local Macau newspaper – as suggested by a member of my university's Ethics Clearance Committee – would not work for various reasons, the foremost of which is cultural. Instead, it became increasingly clear that the best way of recruiting participants in Macau is through *guanxi* (personal connections) where people will talk to you because someone they know introduces you and it can be ascertained that language is not an

⁴⁴ B.M.Robertson, *Oral History Handbook*, 3rd edn. (Adelaide, South Australia: Oral History Association

encumbrance.⁴⁵ In order to counter the weighting of Macanese elite among my interviewees, I sought out the younger and less well-to-do members of the community. Significantly, when the subject was raised with some of the elite, these Macanese on the lower socio-economic ladder were described as “unimportant” in terms of power and influence. Through perseverance and *guanxi*, I managed to talk with a few of them and some officials representing the *Associação dos Macaenses*, an association comprising the poorer Macanese residents. This method of utilizing *guanxi* to enlist participants and to collect the data proved invaluable within the time constraints of my various stays in Macau. Through *guanxi*, I also attempted to secure appointments with some senior government leaders, but unfortunately, the visit in 2002 coincided with a busy program in the Macau Legislative Assembly and the Chief Executive Edmund Ho’s Annual Policy Speech.

The selective targeting of respondents benefited the investigative process by permitting a broader perspective of the community to emerge. The resultant mix included the rich and the poor, heads of the various Macanese institutions, those involved in the various professions, current and former civil servants, teachers, church leaders, business people, restaurateurs, retirees, students, taxi drivers and young Macanese salary earners. In the process, I discovered that being an outsider – not having any familial or economic ties to Macau – was an advantage in that I was perceived to have no hidden agenda but merely as a scholar attempting to discover, for a Ph. D. thesis, how the changeover has affected their lives and community.

of Australia, 1996), p. 4.

⁴⁵ Further articulation of the *guanxi*-based interview methodology is provided in the Appendices for (see pp. 333-336 below).

The methodology thus chosen is more complex than a conventional interview method. Where appropriate, it involves a preliminary interview and a follow-up interview some twelve months later. In some cases, I interviewed the respondents three times over a three-year period. Suggested by my supervisor Professor Edmund Fung, the repeat interview was beneficial in ascertaining whether the respondents had changed their views over the intervening period; and if so, to discover the reasons for such change. The repeat interview also provided an opportunity of putting forward the “harder questions” that one might be reluctant to ask initially. This method (repeat interview) proved to be indispensable in an investigation of such contemporaneousness and sensitivity as the subject at hand. When I commenced my investigation in 2001, the post-colonial environment for the Macanese community appeared bleak indeed, reflected in the comments from Macanese and non-Macanese alike. The Macanese talked about the difficulties they faced and the confusion of not knowing whether their presence in Macau was welcome or not. While some Chinese I spoke with were sympathetic, one taxi driver (Chinese) expressed the feeling that the Macanese deserved to feel uncomfortable after 1999 because of their past arrogance and behavior towards the local Chinese. In the following year, my second visit coincided with the government’s resolve to emphasise Macau’s cultural and historical legacies and to promote her relations with the Portuguese-speaking world. Understandably, the policy boosted the image of the Macanese community, giving rise to guarded optimism and undisguised felicity. By the time of my third visit, the Central Government in Beijing had cemented this resolve through the inaugural meeting of the eight-nations Forum of Portuguese Speaking Countries, held in Macau and the establishment of a permanent Secretariat, also in Macau (see Chapter

Four). Clearly, without repeat visits and interviews, it would have been impossible to capture the changing circumstance encountered by the Macanese community.

Initially, as expected, not all respondents were enthusiastic about my project. Such reluctance underscored the sensitivity of the project and the complexity of their circumstance. As one respondent said to me, researching the community so soon after decolonisation is akin to conducting a survey after a funeral when people are mourning their losses and missing their absent friends, colleagues and relatives. Fortunately, sufficient people gave me their time to enable a definable picture of a community in transition to emerge.

I had visited Macau on previous occasions but the visit in December 2001 was the first under Chinese rule. The purpose of that visit was two-fold: first, to recruit participants for my research, the other to attend the international conference ‘Macau on the Threshold of the Third Millennium’, organised jointly by the Macau Ricci Institute and the Hong Kong-based French Centre for Research on Contemporary China. The proceedings of this conference had since been published in book form.⁴⁶ From the perspective of this investigation, it is difficult to overstate the significance of the conference and its timing. It helped to determine the methodology used, and with so many noted scholars focusing their attention on contemporary issues, I was accorded a massive dose that brought me abreast of current developments in Macau. The conference introduced many writers who have written on various aspects of Macau in the past decade; many are based in the region, which provides a perspective different from the

⁴⁶ *Macau on the Threshold of the Third Millennium* (Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 2003). No editor.

Euro-centric views that predominated in the past. Thus appraised, the option to pursue selective interviews, discussed in the previous section, presented itself as a logical choice.

In attending this conference, I was fortunate to secure accommodation in the small guesthouse where the participants were lodged, which provided opportunities to listen to interesting discussions away from the glare of formalities. The guesthouse, *Pousada de Mongha*, is a training establishment, part of the Institute for Tourism Studies. It is staffed entirely by students, some of whom are from overseas. During my stay, there were students from the Azores and Philippines as well as local students, including at least one Macanese. From the international students, their assessment of the plight of the Macanese culture was surprisingly perceptive — reflective perhaps of their interest in cultural tourism in their own countries. My taxi journeys across town permitted conversations with the drivers. Taxi drivers around the world have a reputation for knowing the pulse of a place, the ones in Macau are no exception.

Finding members of the Macanese elites who were willing to be interviewed was not as difficult as I had anticipated. My visit came soon after the conclusion of the Fourth International Reunion of the Macanese Communities (*Encontro IV*). As part of a previous research project, I had attended *Encontro III* in 1999 but circumstances did not permit me to attend this one. For the Macanese community, the decision by the new post-1999 Administration to continue its sponsorship of the *Encontro* was perceived as significant. Through the auspices of Casa de Macau in Australia, the Macanese diasporic organisation based in Sydney that I had joined as an associate member, I managed to gain access to some of the community leaders to seek their views. Fortuitously, the Conference coincided with the second anniversary of the inauguration of the Macau

SAR. Public celebrations and cultural performances had been planned for Sunday, 16 December 2001, at the *Lago do Senado*, the centre of the city. These celebrations provided an insight into the new cultural order, which was expected to differ from those under Portuguese rule.

Fieldwork in Macau would have been incomplete without a visit to the Portuguese bookshop *Livraria Portuguesa* in Rua de S. Domingos where one can expect to find the latest publications on Macau. The bookshop is one visible arm of IPOR (*Instituto Português do Oriente* – the Portuguese Institute of the Orient), an important Portuguese government institution based in Macau and charged with promoting the Portuguese language and culture in Asia.⁴⁷ Although most of the books are in Portuguese, they also stock a large selection in English and Chinese. Given the lack of Macau titles elsewhere, the *Livraria Portuguesa* provided an invaluable service. In Hong Kong, I discovered that the bookshops there showed little interest in Macau, unless the titles are carried by Hong Kong-based companies.⁴⁸ This presented a problem as many works on Macau are published by various institutions who are not good in distributing their products. A case in point is the impressive biography of the late Charles R. Boxer by Dauril Alden, published by the Orient Foundation in 2001. When I tried to get hold of a copy in December 2001, it was neither available in Macau or Hong Kong nor over the Internet through *Amazon.com*.⁴⁹ When I met Alden subsequently, he expressed dismay at the lack of circulation of this book. Such neglect suggests ulterior motives in the foundations'

⁴⁷ On 25 April 2003, IPOR's responsibilities were clarified. It is responsible for the management of the Portuguese Cultural Centres in Asia and administration of scholarships and cultural events in Macau. See *MacaU*, June 2000, pp. 30-31. Also see *Oriente Ocidente*, No. 11, May/August 2003, p. 27.

⁴⁸ According to one bookshop proprietor I spoke to in Hong Kong (2001).

⁴⁹ Last checked: 4 August 2003.

publication programs, which have also been alluded to by others.⁵⁰ Irrespective of motives, for a researcher like myself, having something to refer to is better than having none at all. My stopover in Hong Kong allowed visits to the Hong Kong University Library to consult its resources, in particular its excellent audio-visual library. I had a long discussion with Carl T. Smith, a long-term American resident of Hong Kong, who was the Vice President of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. Smith has accumulated a vast amount of knowledge about the Macanese community in Hong Kong and Macau, and he provided insights into the challenges facing them as a result of the transfer of sovereignty.

In January 2002, I visited London to consult the vast resources of the British Library at St. Pancras and their Newspaper Library at Colindale. The British Library deserves its reputation as a key research facility, especially for areas previously ruled by the British such as Malacca and Hong Kong. Being the repository of all books published in the United Kingdom, its vast collection contains many items unobtainable elsewhere. Of particular interest is their collection and documents pertaining to Malacca during the British East India Company period. Its Newspaper Library at Colindale houses microfiche copies of all the English newspapers published around the world. These resources contribute significant background information for Chapter Seven. Based on the research conducted in London, I submitted a paper for the international symposium in Macau, jointly organised by the Macau Ricci Institute and Instituto do Orient (Lisbon) in November 2002. My paper was entitled “The Malaccan Portuguese community and its

⁵⁰ According to Christina Cheng, the plethora of publications emanating from these institutions may be seen as attempting to promote the cultural legacies of Macau and an exercise in nostalgia. See Cheng, *Macau: a Cultural Janus*, pp. 40-41.

relevance to contemporary Macau”. The theme of the symposium was ‘Religion and Culture: past approaches, present globalisation, future challenges’; in all, nineteen papers were presented and publication materialised in late 2004. My presentation at the 2002 conference enhanced my credentials in the eyes of the Macanese community in Macau aiding my research immensely. Utilizing the opportunity, I extended my stay to undertake further fieldwork. Prior to my arrival, I had approached the Rotary Club of Macau to broaden the pool of contacts gained thus far. It was fortuitous that many of the Macanese elite are Rotarians and were most obliging. The facilities of the Sino-Latin Foundation, a private institute formed in 1996 to foster links and promote research in China’s relations with the Latin-based countries, was kindly made available to me, including its newspaper library, and their collection of books and magazines. Through the Foundation, I was introduced to various people, including some with an interest in research.

In December 2003, I made a return visit to Macau for the third successive year to conduct follow-up interviews as well as initiating new ones. This visit was timed to coincide with the commemoration of the fourth anniversary of the transfer of sovereignty, and to see, at first hand, whether the public celebrations would differ from previous occasions. But the recently convened Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries dominated much of the discussions. Supported by the Portuguese and Chinese governments, the Forum is considered as a major achievement for the Macau Government. Undeniably, the choice of Macau as the seat of its Permanent Secretariat has given a major boost to the morale of the Macanese community. Again through *guanxi*, I managed to procure an appointment

with Rita Botelho dos Santos, the head of the Secretariat to discuss its significance for the Macanese community in Macau. The Forum will be discussed in Chapter Four.

There were two limiting factors encountered at the commencement of this investigation: language and statistics. Language could have been a limiting factor but it does not appear so as the investigation progresses. The official languages of Macau are Chinese and Portuguese but English is also widely used. Portuguese is spoken by only two percent of the Macau population who are also fluent in English, due to the impact of Hong Kong and the status of English as the language for international communication and commerce. Most information is available in a trilingual format, and even the international conferences organised by the Macau Ricci Institute in 2001 and 2002, which I attended, was convened solely in English (2001) and in English and Chinese (2002). But as backup, during an exploratory trip in 2001, I sought the services of a professional Portuguese translator who formerly worked for a research institute in Macau. However, he was of the opinion that his services would not be needed due to the availability of information, in English and over the Internet. Yet, he was happy to be of service, if needed. He was proven correct. Accordingly, if the information is available in English, I have chosen to cite the English source for obvious reasons. However, where the story is unavailable in English and is important to cite, it will be cited in the original language of publication.

The second limitation concerns the lack of empirical data on the Macanese community and its diaspora. It is a problem encountered also by other writers, such as Jean Berlie and Herbert Yee.⁵¹ As will be shown later, this is due to a problem of

⁵¹ Berlie, (ed.) *Macao 2000*, p. 23; Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 131.

definition and communal ambivalence. Clearly it is beyond the scope and capability of this investigation to rectify the situation; to do so will involve a mammoth task across various continents and perhaps years to accomplish. One hopes that this investigation will trigger interest from the relevant Macanese organisations to take remedial actions in the future.

MACAU: THE BACKGROUND

This chapter surveys the history of Macau from the end of the Opium War in 1842 to the transfer of sovereignty in December 1999. It is not intended to be exhaustive but is designed to keep the object of this thesis – the survival of the Macanese community in contemporary Macau – in focus. Some developments are ignored or downplayed because in my opinion, their impact on the Macanese community was slight. The purpose of this background is to highlight certain issues and themes that have direct or indirect bearing on the changing fortunes of the Macanese community. The first theme is China's centuries-old struggle against Western imperialism, which defines a complex exteriority for Macau. It is against this backdrop that the recovery of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macau, in 1997 and 1999 respectively, should be seen. Second, the dominating influence of Hong Kong over Macau is an evident reality underscoring the symbiotic relations between the two. For the next fifty years, the time allotted to their status as Special Administrative Regions within China, their futures are likely to remain intertwined — even though it is beyond dispute that Hong Kong will be more important to Macau than vice versa. The third theme of significance to the Macanese community is the decline of Portugal as a pivotal force in Macau, which has emerged over time — long before 1987 when the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration was signed. Together with the dramatic decimation of Macanese political power in the 1980s, which represents the

fourth theme, it will be demonstrated that the Macanese community was in a rather vulnerable position in the run-up to 1999.

There are various reasons for adopting a thematic approach over a conventional chronological narrative. Fundamentally, a chronological survey that focuses merely on what happened in Macau will have ignored the wider picture, which is of critical significance. It is my view that the retrocession of Hong Kong and Macau in 1997 and 1999 respectively, can be better understood from the wider perspective of China's interaction with the West and her emergent status as a world power in the twenty-first century. The overwhelming support given by the Western powers to both transfers of sovereignty attests to that status, despite the lingering shadow of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown and the unmet aspirations of some residents for democratic reforms and civil liberties. Moreover, the conventional approach will not be able to do justice to the close relationship between Hong Kong and Macau —one that exuded sibling-like qualities — which holds profound implications for Macau and the Macanese community. Macau had once succoured the fledgling British enterprises on the China coast before the establishment of Hong Kong. In time, Hong Kong's spectacular growth enabled her to supplant Macau as the commercial hub for southern China providing opportunities for the Macanese community, and others, to earn their livelihood. Undeniably, by the end of the twentieth century, Hong Kong has become the dominant force in Macau's economy and society.

Brief historical sketch

Following the conquest of Malacca, Portuguese traders ventured to China, in 1513, seeking direct trade but were unsuccessful. Consorting with pirates and recalcitrant

local officials, they resorted to illicit trading and established fledging communities until a rapprochement of sorts resulted in their permissive occupancy of Macau in 1557. The founding of Macau marked the beginning of the so-called “golden century” (1550s to 1640s) when it had virtual monopoly of the supply of Chinese silk to the Japanese market, which became the foundation of Macau’s wealth. In conjunction with the Jesuit priests, Macanese traders capitalised on their strategic advantage but fell victim to Japanese political intrigue resulting in their expulsion from Japan in 1639. Barred from Japan, the loss of Malacca to the Dutch two years later and the wars of dynastic succession in China (1650s to 1670s) ushered in a period of lingering poverty in which Macanese traders were relegated to doing marginal business with low profits — “competing with Asian merchants . . . for shares of Asian markets for Asian goods.”¹ As trade declined in the seventeenth century, Macau at times experienced difficulties in generating sufficient revenue to cover its operating expenses and was compelled to borrow from other Asian rulers to finance its obligations.² The economic hardship caused an initial decline in the Macanese population as many sought opportunities elsewhere.³ The arrival of traders from European countries, particularly Britain, in the eighteenth century rejuvenated Macau, restoring its fortunes somewhat. Macanese families found work as principals and employees, and benefited as landlords. Their expertise as clerks and intermediaries was highly valued. As the sole maritime gateway to China, Macau’s

¹ Wills, J. E. Jr., “After the Fall – Macau’s Strategies for Survival, 1640-1690”, paper presented at Portuguese Studies Program Conference on “Macau in Historical Perspective” organised by the Centre for Western European Studies (University of California, Berkeley, USA), 16 March 1997.

² C. R. Boxer, *Portuguese Society in the Tropics* (Milwaukee USA: University of Wisconsin, 1965), p. 55.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-63. The subsequent emigration created a shortage of suitably qualified persons to fill the important positions of the various colonial institutions. The shortage of men during the eighteenth century gave Macau a reputation as “a city of women” because out of the total Christian population of 19,500 from

fortunes revived until the dispute over the importation of opium resulted in the first Sino-British conflict —the so-called Opium War (1839-1842).

For Macau, the impact of the Opium War was profound. An important feature of the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) that ended the war was the opening of six coastal ports to foreign trade and the ceding of Hong Kong to the British thus ending the Canton system of trade which funneled China's foreign trade through that single port. Macau had benefited logistically through its historical links with Canton and its location at the mouth of the river leading to the Chinese city. In the post-Opium War environment, her strategic locale was devalued along with Canton's. The aftermath of the Opium War began a period of painful adjustments as foreign companies deserted Macau for other ports, setting in train the factors that transformed Macau into what it is today. Diminished by the loss of trade and people, it was sapped of its former vitality. The development of modern shipping with larger carrying capacity and deeper draughts made its silted harbour unnavigable, despite several efforts to dredge it in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Survival dictated that it focus on tourism, opium and the gaming industries for much of its revenue; coupled with the traditional production of firecrackers and seafoods, they became the mainstays of Macau's economy until after World War II.

Economically, Macau eked out an existence pandering to the needs of its richer neighbours as a playground for residents from Hong Kong and China. During the Korean War, it thrived on the smuggling of vital commodities to China and a staging point for shipment of gold and narcotics to other territories. Demographically, the past centuries saw record numbers of Chinese moving to Macau for economic opportunities and to

150 Portuguese families, over eighty percent (16,000) were women. Many subsisted out of the proceeds

escape the political turmoil in the Mainland, in the same way as they had flocked to Hong Kong. In Macau their numbers dwarfed that of the Portuguese and Macanese population so that by the end of the twentieth century, the Chinese made up about ninety six per cent of the population. Politically, the overthrow of the Portuguese monarchy in 1910 —a year before China's own republican revolution —promised much but delivered little. A prominent Macanese of the day, Montalto de Jesus, suggested that Macau would fare better if ruled by another foreign power or come under the control of the League of Nations. He was tried and found guilty of treason in 1926. The post-monarchy period in Portugal was dominated by Antonio Salazar who, some believed, was responsible for a lack of progress and development not only in Portugal but also in her colonies. Until the overthrow of the Salazar/Caetano regime in 1974, Macau was ruled with an iron rod from Lisbon and dissidents were sent to exile in East Timor. The collapse of the regime kick started a new period in Macau's political history, which will be discussed presently.

A complex exteriority

It was never just about Macau; other factors were at play. During the past one and a half centuries, Macau existed within an exteriority of exceeding complexity. Chief among these was the struggle by China against the Western powers that sought trading rights and territorial concessions, imposing their collective will through the use of force. This is the backdrop against which Sino-Portuguese relations and the transfer of sovereignty in Macau must be viewed. Despite the platitudes of a long and special relationship, the fact remained that Portugal had taken advantage of China's vulnerability to cement her occupational rights in Macau by concluding the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of

from prostitution.

26 March 1887, which became the corner stone for bilateral relations between the two countries in the twentieth century.⁴ During China's Republican period, various attempts by China to conclude a new treaty was unsuccessful due to the fragmentation of Chinese authority and the collective policy of the imperialist powers.⁵ When anti-Western feelings ran high such as in 1927, Portuguese warships, notably the *Republica*, were dispatched to bolster the Western defence of the International Settlement in Shanghai against the Chinese.⁶ Little wonder then that China came to view the 1887 Treaty with Portugal as one of the "unequal treaties" concluded when she was too weak to resist.

Exactly one hundred years later, to the day, the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration of 1987 indicated how the balance of power had shifted.⁷ Above all, it set the date for the transfer of sovereignty over Macau, which ended four and a half centuries of Portuguese occupation. In his final address as the last Governor of Macau, General Vasco Rocha Vieira advanced the idea of Portugal as an accidental colonial power, thus reinforcing a

⁴ This was done in the wake of the numerous "forced leasing" granted by China to the British, France and Germany. See Armando M. da Silva, "Geographical, Historical and Administrative Backdrop on the Question of Macau", *Townson State Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XXII No. 2, Spring 1988, pp. 98-109.

⁵ On 30 April 1928, the *SCMP* reported that General Hwang Fu, on behalf of the Nanjing Government, proposed a new treaty because after 40 years conditions of both countries very different. In response, Joao Antonio de Bianchi, Portuguese minister to China, said that Portugal proposed to negotiate a treaty with both Beijing and Nanjing as soon as circumstances permit based on the principle of "equality, mutual respect and territorial sovereignty". See "Chinese-Portuguese Treaty 1887 ended on Apr 28", *South China Morning Post*, 30 April 1928 (BMC-NLA, MS 4300, Box 1A <117>). Also see "Nanking has prospect of recognition from Portugal in new Treaty", *Japan Advertiser*, 4 May 1928 (BMC-NLA, MS 4300, Box 1A <119>).

⁶ Photo of the Portuguese warship *Republica* that took part in the defence of Shanghai appeared on 26 March 1927 in *North China Herald*, the Shanghai daily (BMC-NLA, MS 4300 Box 7, BRA/4011 <159>).

⁷ The former Prime Minister Cavaco Silva, who signed the agreement on behalf of Portugal, expressed the sentiment that it was difficult for a small country like Portugal to negotiate with a powerful China. See Harald Bruning, 'Ex-PM confident of unique culture' s continuity", *South China Morning Post*, 20 December 1999.

belief that the Portuguese were reluctant colonisers in Macau. Incorporating a line by the Portuguese poet, Fernando Pessoa⁸, Vieira said:

The first Portuguese to reach Macau were navigators on uncharted seas. ... [What they] always desired was understanding, willing co-operation and the creation of something new. The same poet [Pessoa] threw light on the past and present in the following: ‘Essentially, we were navigators and discoverers and only as a result of this were we conquerors and colonisers. Before the empire, our approach was already universal’.

Ours has always been a universal approach to our experience of meeting the world in its many facets, peoples and cultures ... When the daring of those navigators from the westernmost tip of Europe brought them to the great Middle Kingdom, they were moved solely by a desire to encounter and understand other people.⁹

Some writers have amplified the idea when describing more recent events. Christina Cheng, in *Macau: a Cultural Janus* (1999), wrote that Portugal was predisposed to exit from Macau in the aftermath of the riots on 3 December 1966 (see p. 84 below) when anti-Portuguese feelings in Macau reached a crescendo:

The Portuguese would have readily ‘evacuated’ had China simply requested them to do so. However, Lisbon was informed that China wished Macau to remain as it was, largely because the change in Macau’s status might shock the people of Hong Kong.¹⁰

⁸ Fernando Pessoa is considered by many to be one of Portugal’s greatest poets.

⁹ *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, July 2001, p. 64.

¹⁰ Cheng, *Macau: a Cultural Janus*, p. 35.

And Jill McGivering, in *Macao 2000* (1999), wrote of another missed opportunity for decolonisation in the wake of the 25 April 1974 military coup in Lisbon:

Portugal's revolution and the emergence of a left-wing government led to a complete change in thinking in Lisbon regarding foreign territories. The last outposts of empire, including Angola and East Timor, were returned to local control. Portugal also tried to divest itself of Macao in the mid-1970s, but China refused to accept its return, saying the timing was not right.¹¹

The problem with such portrayal is that it panders to Portugal's national prestige and blurs her self-image. When used in the context of the decolonisation of Macau in 1999, it tends to excuse the relative neglect by the Portuguese in pre-1999 Macau and whitewashes many of the historical errors. Moreover, in the course of this investigation, I discovered that the image – of the Portuguese as reluctant colonisers and custodians of Macau, a role continued under duress and at China's request – has wide currency in Macau, reflected in the comments made to me. But such a portrayal of the Portuguese is open to challenge.

Many questions exist pertaining to why Macau was not decolonised before December 1999. In reference to the offer to relinquish Macau in the 1970s, the point remains whether an offer had really been made to give up Macau, and if so, with what official imprimatur? Who made the offer, when, and who rejected it, have not yet been identified. The exploration of these is beyond the scope of this thesis but a few points pertinent to this thesis may be made.

¹¹ McGivering, *Macao Remembers*, p. 5.

One may begin with the notion of China's rejection. Considering that diplomatic relations between China and Portugal were not normalised until 8 February 1979, any contact in Macau would have been made through the Nam Kwong Trading Company, the de facto representative of Beijing in Macau at the time.¹² Alternatively, the negotiations could have been conducted via their embassies in Paris.¹³ However, in view of what we know about the governmental paralysis in China during the Cultural Revolution and the heightened chaos towards the end of that period, it is unlikely that, in April 1974, the communication reached Beijing or that Macau would have rated high on the Chinese agenda. In his book published in 1996, Steve Shipp suggests —without elaboration — that secret agreements were reached between China and Portugal in 1967 and 1976 for Portugal to continue in control over Macau.¹⁴ He states that the representatives of Portugal's Armed Forces Movement¹⁵ went to Macau with the proposal in 1974 but was directed to return home by Ho Yin, the head of the pro-Beijing Chinese group.¹⁶ Shipp's source was another English writer, Tom Gallagher, who gave the reasons for the refusal as China's need to preserve Macau as a conduit for the importation of precious metals and strategic goods and to earn foreign exchange.¹⁷

Besides, governmental instability continued in Lisbon after the April 1974 coup, accompanied by administrative inertia. This resulted in a decolonisation process largely

¹² Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 17.

¹³ Rosmarie Lamas states that Paris was the neutral ground where negotiations between the two governments took place in 1966, which broke the impasse over the 123 Incident. See R. Wank-Nolasco Lamas, *History of Macau* (Macau: Institute of Tourism Education, 1998), p. 107.

¹⁴ S. Shipp, *Macau, China: a Political History of the Portuguese Colony's Transition to Chinese Rule* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1997), p. 94.

¹⁵ The group that successfully carried out the military coup in Lisbon in 25 April 1974.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

¹⁷ Tom Gallagher, *Portugal: a Twentieth Century Interpretation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983).

determined not by Portuguese governmental planning but by the nationalist forces in Africa, and the Indonesian military invasion in East Timor. Malyn Newitt provided an analysis of the coup and a critical assessment of Portugal's colonial regime during the crisis:

When Caetano's regime collapsed [in Lisbon as a result of the military coup], the whole colonial administration fell with it. Soldiers retreated to barracks and would no longer risk their lives defending a defunct ideology. Still more striking, the authority structure of the regime shriveled up. Officials and their regulations were simply no longer obeyed as people waited to see where the new focus of authority would be. ... There was some talk of a coup by the white settlers [but] the white settlers, unlike their Rhodesian counterparts, had never controlled the administration or the armed forces; they had never had political parties and had no leaders. The [African] nationalists moved quickly into the political vacuum. Within six months, Spínola [the General who led the Lisbon coup and headed up the post-coup government] had gone and Portugal had named the day when she would withdraw from Africa. The withdrawal was hasty and chaotic, and accompanied by a mass exodus of white settlers who left offices unmanned, business incomplete and all the complex affairs of a modern state with no one at the helm.¹⁸

In Africa, the instantaneous nationalisation of private assets and confiscation of property meant that the European and Chinese settlers lost everything they had worked

¹⁸ M. Newitt, *Portugal in Africa* (London: Hurst & Co., 1981), pp. 245-6.

for and were permitted to leave with only the bare minimum. Chung Poi-lame – a former wealthy Chinese from Mozambique, now living in Lisbon – said that there was no warning. He fled Africa with US\$ 4000 hidden in a thermos of hot black coffee and his personal belongings packed into a single suitcase, which was all that he was allowed to take with him across the border.¹⁹ In East Timor, the full-scale invasion by Indonesia in December 1975 pre-empted whatever hopes of autonomy the East Timorese had and rendered the Portuguese position untenable as a result. The human tragedy of governmental paralysis in Lisbon was massive; the descent into civil war in Angola and the massacre of the East Timorese who resisted the Indonesian invasion led to the loss of untold lives. In East Timor alone, Bishop Carlos Belo – Nobel laureate and head of the Roman Catholic Church there – estimated “that by 1979 alone, at least 200,000 people, or about a third of the original population of 688,000 [had perished]”.²⁰

Given such a mammoth fiasco, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Portugal was adrift in Macau and that a concerted diplomatic effort to exit from Macau was highly unlikely, at least in the immediate aftermath of the Lisbon coup. This gains support from the collapse of General Spínola’s regime six months after the 1974 coup, which ushered in a period of sustained political instability in Portugal for over a decade. According to an article in the *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* (1988), Joanne Chang wrote:

In the last fourteen years, [since 1974 coup] there have been sixteen changes of government. One government lasted only sixteen days. No

¹⁹ Diana Lin, *Back to the Motherland III*, TVB 918, broadcast on 28 October 1999, TVB Hong Kong.

²⁰ Arnold S. Kohen, *From the Place of the Dead: Bishop Belo and the Struggle for East Timor* (England: Lion Publishing, 1999), p. 354.

party had managed to gain a clear electoral majority before July 1987. Consequently, no Prime Minister was able to function with any solid parliamentary support. Portugal has been governed by coalition or minority governments for many years with a turnover in government every eleven months on average.”²¹

With such instability at the Executive and Legislative levels of government, one wonders what consideration could have been given to the future of Macau faraway. Aided by a perceptible shift, in Lisbon, from “colonial fundamentalism” to integration with the European Economic Community (EEC) – the forerunner of the European Union – the move for divestment in Macau, if there was one, would likely be fortified by a feeling of fatigue towards her colonial possessions —seen by some as a burden. ²²

The reason why Macau was not “abandoned” might have more to do with the financial gains to be had from staying put, the absence of wars of national liberation and China’s own internal political unrest. Unlike the African colonies, Macau did not have any war raging within her borders and there were no hostile forces threatening to invade it from outside. It was not dependent on Lisbon to fund its colonial edifice. The Macanese largely manned the colonial administration in Macau; their strong attachment to the place meant that they had no wish to leave. As a result, the status quo prevailed, evidenced by the failure to recall Governor Nobre de Carvalho, who was appointed by the pre-coup regime —which disappointed sections of the community and caused “grave tensions within the armed forces in Macau, including problems of discipline and inter-

²¹ Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, “Settlement of the Macao Issue: distinctive features of Beijing’s negotiating behavior”, *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 1988, pp. 253-278.

²² Newitt, *Portugal in Africa*, p. 244.

and intra-service rivalry.”²³ Adding to the incentive to stay was the well-known fact that Macau was lucrative for the Portuguese expatriates — a point that emerged in the looming confrontation between Carlos Assumpção, the Macanese leader of the Macau Legislative Assembly and successive Portuguese governors.²⁴

Furthermore, the much touted Constitutional Law No. 7 of 1974, which acknowledged the right of self determination in all her former colonies, was said to contain a note that the future of Macau would be subject to discussion between the two governments.²⁵ However, this needs to be reconciled with the diplomatic posturing adopted by both Portugal and China at the United Nations —ostensibly to thwart outside interference. In 1951, Portugal under Salazar declared that the colonies were an extension of Portugal —her “overseas provinces”. But this did not prevent India from reclaiming Goa with force in 1961.²⁶ Likewise, in 1972, China asserted in the United Nations that Hong Kong and Macau were China’s domestic territories, not to be subject to the UN’s push for their self-determination.²⁷ These diplomatic posturings formed part of the historical backdrop of Macau under the Portuguese.

Hong Kong, a symbiotic relationship

It was never just about Macau because China wanted first to settle the future of Hong Kong before discussing with Portugal the Macau question. As neighbouring colonies, the relationship between Hong Kong and Macau could be described as symbiotic. Certainly, before the Opium War (1842), British enterprises in China operated

²³ Gunn, *Encountering Macau*, p. 159.

²⁴ *Asia Yearbook 1979*, pp. 232-236.

²⁵ Lamas, *History of Macau*, p. 109.

²⁶ Pearson, *The Portuguese in India*, p. 159.

out of Macau. When Hong Kong was ceded to the British as reparations for the war, Macanese assistants and other personnel went over to established the British colony on a firm footing. As Hong Kong surged ahead commercially, the relationship underwent a spectacular transformation such that by the 1970s, Macau became so dependent on her neighbour for business and investment that the media described it (Macau) as “a colony of a colony” in socio-economic terms.²⁸

The relationship vacillated between competition and co-operation. Macau, hampered by its shallow harbour and small geographical size, could not provide the facilities to meet the requirements of the newer ships with deeper draughts, despite the frantic harbour dredging work commenced in the late nineteenth century. Furthermore, Portugal, whose interest in Asia had long diminished, could not provide the impetus to develop Macau on her own. In contrast, Britain was the dominant economic and colonial power in the region during much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For a brief while, Anglo-American rivalry provided Macau with a glimmer of hope in the race to become the aviation hub in the region. The arrival of the first flying boat to Macau and Pan-American Airways’ decision to select Macau as its base on the China coast enabled the Portuguese colony to steal a march against Hong Kong. The *Canton Truth* newspaper raised the hope that “Macao should now be able to get ahead in the matter of prosperity which it had once held.”²⁹ Despite all the preparations, the outcome was disappointing for Macau. Its aspirations were dashed when Britain and the United States agreed on reciprocal trans-Atlantic landing rights in August 1936 and the Hong Kong Government

²⁷ Lamas, *History of Macau*, p. 108.

²⁸ *Asia Yearbook 1974*, p. 205.

²⁹ *The Canton Truth*, 14 September 1935 (BMC-NLA, MS 4300, Box 2, BRA/3990, <6-7>).

prevailed on the British Colonial Office to permit Pan Am landing rights in the territory for fear of being by-passed.³⁰ The move by Pan Am was a precursor of things to come. In latter decades, companies showed a preference for Hong Kong as a base for doing business in the region and in China. It was not until 1995 with the construction of the new international airport that Macau showed similar ambitions in the aviation field. Their business model is based on Singapore's Changi Airport where eighty percent of the passengers are on transit to somewhere else. Promoting itself as the 'ideal gateway to the emerging markets of Greater China', it takes only 60 minutes by jetfoil to Hong Kong, 15 minutes by road to the Zhuhai Special Economic Zone and only 140 kilometres to Guangzhou.³¹ Since its completion, much of the traffic has been generated by Taiwanese enroute to the Mainland.

Historically, there was more co-operation than competition —noticeably in the suppression of coastal piracy, which plagued coastal shipping until the early twentieth century. The *South China Morning Post* reported that 1926 and 1927 were bad years in which an average of six attacks occurred compared to one or two during normal years.³² Although the report advanced no reason for the escalation in coastal piracy, looking elsewhere, one could point to the mounting anti-Western feelings and lawlessness in the Mainland during the 1920s. According to the British employees of Butterworth & Swire, the pirates were mostly out to kidnap rich Chinese travelling as passengers or to capture

³⁰ *Hong Kong Telegraph*, 14 August 1936 (BMC-NLA, MS 4300, Box 6 BRA/4007 <19-20>) and *South China Morning Post*, 14 September 1936, (BMC-NLA, MS 4300, Box 6 BRA/4007 <21-22>).

³¹ Luis Cunha, "Airport: the Dream took flight", *MacaU*, Special 1994, pp. 6-30.

³² 'Piracy Menace', *South China Morning Post*, 1 October 1928 (BMC-NLA, MS 4300, Box 1A, BRA/3985, <132>).

valuable cargo, which they believed to be on board.³³ With the onset of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1937, piracy was largely suppressed. During World War II, the two enclaves grew even closer when Portugal's neutrality enabled Macau to provide a safe haven for those fleeing Hong Kong, especially for Hong Kong's large Macanese community. In the 1960s and 1970s when Hong Kong's clothing and textile sector sought lower production costs, it turned to Macau because China was in the throes of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1975). During that period, quantitative restraints imposed on textile products from Hong Kong to the United States induced more manufacturers to transfer their operations to Macau. The rush created sufficient concerns such that the Macau Manufacturers' Association lobbied their government for protection against spiraling labour costs and rents.³⁴ Macau provided additional benefits in the form of unhindered access to the European market. These conditions propelled the textile and clothing sector to become Macau's largest export earner, accounting for nearly eighty-four percent of total exports in 2002.³⁵

Hong Kong's economic impact over important sectors of Macau's economy has been highlighted in the *Asia Yearbook 1974*:

Trade flourished, gambling and tourism soared and construction set a hot pace [but] the benefits of the boom also largely bypassed the 300,000 residents of the Portuguese province. The capital came from overseas

³³ C. Cook, *The Lion and the Dragon: British Voices from the China Coast* (London: Elm Tree Books, 1985), p. 87.

³⁴ *Asia Yearbook 1973*, pp. 213-214.

³⁵ *Macau Yearbook of Statistics* (2002), pp. 248-249.

Chinese investors, most of it from Hong Kong... It was a reminder that the futures of the two were inextricably linked.”³⁶

Two years later, the same publication was more scathing when it stated that “for many years Macau has been living parasitically off the prosperity of Hong Kong”, its economy rising or falling according to the fortunes of its richer neighbour.³⁷ Bowing to the inevitable, it was decided in 1977 that Macau would issue its own currency (*pataca*), which would be pegged to the Hong Kong dollar.³⁸ Such close relationship was already observed by the Macanese historian Jack Braga in the 1950s when he wrote:

In the long history of the colony of Macao, no single factor has had a greater influence on Macao and its inhabitants than its relations with the British and the colony of Hong Kong.³⁹

As Braga had acknowledged, Hong Kong’s rise to greatness provided opportunities for his fellow Macanese “to make their way up in the world.”⁴⁰

Decline of Portuguese influence

The emergence of Hong Kong as a major factor in Macau underscores the decline of Portugal’s economic and political significance to Macau. It is difficult to mark the time when Portugal’s economic interests in Macau became relegated to a minor position. When Macau established its own currency in 1977, Portugal accounted for only 5 per

³⁶ *Asia Yearbook 1974*, p. 205.

³⁷ *Asia Yearbook 1976*, pp. 207-211.

³⁸ *Asia Yearbook 1978*, pp. 236-241.

³⁹ *Noticias de Macao*, 27 May 1951 English supplement (BMC-NLA, MS 4300, Box 12 Env. 8).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

cent of Macau's total exports.⁴¹ By 1999, this had dwindled to 0.2 per cent while imports from Portugal were only 0.87 per cent.⁴²

Politically, most writers acknowledged 3 December 1966 —the so-called 123 Incident —as marking the beginning of the end for Portugal in Macau when rioters took to the streets. The trigger was the Administration's refusal to issue an apology over the excessive use of force by the police in quelling an earlier confrontation.⁴³ When no apology was forthcoming, left-wing groups, stirred by the radicalism in the Mainland (in the throes of Cultural Revolution) took to the streets targeting the Portuguese and Macanese members of the community, causing damage to the Government House, Leal Senado and Santa Casa da Misericórdia buildings.⁴⁴ These institutions respectively represented Portuguese colonial authority, Macanese political power and the Catholic Church. Differing views have been expressed over what the riots represent. Gunn sees it as the "spillover" of the Cultural Revolution from the Mainland while Herbert Yee describes it as "the eruption of longstanding grievances against Portuguese rule."⁴⁵ The people who were interviewed by Diana Lin for her television documentary tended towards Yee's assertion, a position with which I also concur. Irrespective of what interpretation one wishes to apply, it is generally accepted that, as a result of the riots, the Portuguese government was weakened considerably. Lisbon placated the rioters by acceding to their demands, which included the sacking of various senior Portuguese officials; the issuance of an official apology and compensation to the families of those

⁴¹ *Asia Yearbook 1978*, pp. 236-241.

⁴² *Macau Yearbook of Statistics 2000*, p. 239.

⁴³ The confrontation between the police and left-wing groups occurred over the unauthorised demolition of an old school building in the locality of Taipa. See Gunn, *Encountering Macau*, p. 156.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

killed in the riots.⁴⁶ A longer-term impact was a shift in political influence in favour of the pro-Beijing groups —a position that has remained unchallenged in the decades since. The disruption to the economy continued for years. Decades later, the Chinese youth who broke off the arm of the Jorge Alvares statue expressed regret for his part in the riots because the disruption meant that members of his family remained unemployed for a long time.⁴⁷ McGivering sums it well when she describes its impact on Macau as ‘a seminal political landmark of the twentieth century.’⁴⁸ Understandably, the riots loomed large in the Macanese psyche, especially among the older generations. Many Macanese, including Jorge Rangel, conceded that the riots caused many Macanese to leave Macau.⁴⁹ The incident made a “strong impression” on José Sales Marques, who described the trauma of being denied the supply of daily necessities at the markets and shops.⁵⁰ It was so traumatic that the then Portuguese Governor Nobre de Carvalho contemplated abandoning Macau.⁵¹

Another marker in the decline of Portuguese political influence in Macau came in the wake of the military coup that toppled the right-wing Salazar-inspired Caetano Government in Lisbon on 25 April 1974. This coup resulted in a change of focus in Lisbon with serious social and political implications for Macau, as for the other Portuguese colonies. According to Malyn Newitt, weariness with empire among the elite in Lisbon had contributed to the fall of the Caetano regime in 1974; an orientation

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 155-158; Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. xviii.

⁴⁶ There were eight fatalities. See Gunn, *Encountering Macau*, p. 156.

⁴⁷ Diana Lin, *Back to the Motherland II*, TVB 906, broadcast on 21 October 1999, TVB Hong Kong.

⁴⁸ McGivering, *Macau Remembers*, p. 3.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 14.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 30-31.

⁵¹ Lo Shui-hing, *Political Development in Macau* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995), pp. 22-23.

towards Europe and the drive for modernisation were priorities over maintaining an empire.⁵² Salazar ruled Portugal for nearly five decades, which M. N. Pearson described as “a long political and social ice age”, due to the anachronistic policies that opposed secularism, women’s rights and trade unionism among others.⁵³ But under Salazar, Portugal’s ties with her colonies were sacrosanct, to be trumpeted at every opportunity.⁵⁴ It was particularly reassuring for her colonial subjects, including the Macanese community. The bond was part of their identity as Henrique de Senna Fernandes, the Macanese literary figure, illustrates:

We fiercely defend our ties with Portugal, the Fatherland we quietly love,
the Fatherland above the insanity, the whims and the errors of men. ... It is
not for vain nostalgia. It is solely the affirmation of an identity.⁵⁵

In the post-1974 political order, weariness with empire led to the withdrawal of the Portuguese armed forces from Macau, which had a negative impact on the Macanese community in the territory. Traditionally, the armed forces provided a ready pool of eligible partners for marriage with Chinese and Macanese women, adding to their numbers and strengthening the Portuguese culture and language.⁵⁶ Although there was an

⁵² Newitt, *Portugal in Africa*, p. 243

⁵³ Marcelo Caetano succeeded Antonio de Oliveira Salazar who was Prime Minister of Portugal from 1932 to 1968. See Pearson, *The Portuguese in India*, p. 157.

⁵⁴ Such as the occasion of the official visit to Hong Kong in 1937 by the Macau Governor Artur Tamagnini de Abreu Barbosa during a time of heightened tension when the Sino-Japanese relations had escalated to open conflict. The bond between empire and subject is evident in Governor Barbosa’s declaration that: “Portugal has to look after her sons in Hong Kong, Shanghai and all other Far Eastern ports. We are all sons of Macao and are working for the honour of Portugal.” See *South China Morning Post*, 10 April 1937 (BMC-NLA, MS 4300, Box 12, Envelope 7).

⁵⁵ Henrique de Senna Fernandes, “Macau, Yesterday”, in L. S. Cunha (ed.), *Macau di nosso coracam* (Macau, Fundacao Macau, 1999), pp. 51-69.

⁵⁶ For this reason, Carlos Marreiros, a prominent Macanese, contended that the withdrawal of the armed forces in 1975 “was one of the greatest political errors contemporary Portugal committed.” See Carlos Marreiros, “Alliances for the Future”, in *Review of Culture*, No. 20, 1994, p. 169.

influx of expatriates seeking work in Macau due to the sustained economic depression in Portugal, their excessive numbers and the disparity in privilege and employment conditions caused a rift between the Portuguese and Macanese communities.⁵⁷ It has been suggested that this resentment led to the increased tendency for Macanese to marry Chinese partners, eroding Portuguese influence within the Macanese community. This resentment developed into a constitutional crisis between the Macanese-led legislature and the Governor to which we shall turn presently —but first, a brief outline of the then political structure is in order.

The 1974 Lisbon coup brought into effect a devolution of political power. While other colonies struggled for self-determination, Macau was granted substantial political autonomy in the form of the *Estatuto Orgânico de Macau* (Organic Law of Macau) — promulgated on 17 February 1976. This was an interim measure, taken unilaterally by Portugal, due to the Cultural Revolution in China and the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The President of Portugal dominated the new structure through his power to appoint and recall the Governor.⁵⁸ It has been said that the appointment of the Macau governor reflected the outcome of partisan politics; the search for a candidate acceptable to the factious ruling coalition invariably resulted in appointees chosen mainly from the military.⁵⁹ The Governor exercised executive power through his

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 170.

⁵⁸ Gunn, *Encountering Macau*, p. 160.

⁵⁹ According to Gunn, this “reflects the complex status of military-civilian relations in metropolitan Portugal in the wake of the 1974 revolution”. But Armando da Silva had suggested that it was due to Beijing’s insistence that the governors of Macau be expatriates and “hold a military title.” See Gunn, *Encountering Macau*, p. 161. Also see Armando M. da Silva, “Geographical, historical and administrative backdrop on the question of Macau”, p. 105.

Under-Secretaries; he shared law-making powers with the Legislative Assembly by having the power to enact laws through the issuing of decrees.⁶⁰

Supporting the Governor was a ten-member Consultative Council, which served as his peak advisory body. Half of its members were appointed – usually from the business and professional elite. The other half were indirectly elected from the municipal councils and a vast array of special interest groups. Although the Council had no executive power, it was observed that it would be wise for ‘a politically astute governor to reach a consensus in the Consultative Council before issuing important decrees and/or policies.’⁶¹

Under the Organic Law, the Legislative Assembly comprised 17 members, five of whom were appointed, six directly elected, and six indirectly elected. Due to their previous involvement and the narrowness of the electoral franchise, the Macanese community had expected to reap much of the benefits of this new structure. Yet, in less than a decade, their position would become severely eroded —reliant on the support of the Chinese community and the goodwill of the Governor to maintain their position within the Legislative Assembly.

Diminution of Macanese political power

Whether it was the deliberate ambiguities instituted within the Organic Law, the drive for self-determination in the other Portuguese colonies or the clash of egos between powerful individuals, tension soon developed between the Macanese-controlled Legislative Assembly and the Governor. Between 1977 and 1984, the Assembly, led by

⁶⁰ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, pp. 22-23.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Carlos d' Assumpção, clashed with successive governors over legislations to re-organise the Government Gambling Inspectorate, to enlarge the size of the Assembly and to limit the Governor's power to veto legislations passed by the Legislature. The Assembly also sought the power to sack the Secretaries — appointees of the Governor who run the various government departments — by way of a vote of “no confidence”.⁶² This last initiative was triggered by Governor Garcia Leandro's appointment of two of his army friends to senior positions in the civil service, which was severely criticised by Macanese interests who stressed that Macau needed more technocrats, not soldiers.⁶³ Governor Leandro had defended such recruitment as a colonial fact of life and due to the shortage of qualified personnel.⁶⁴

Initially, there was media sympathy for the Macanese position. The *Asia Yearbook 1977* stated that:

Not all of them [expatriates] are striving for the best interests of Macau. Some were described as refugees from the Revolution [25 April 1974] who prefer to hang on to well paid jobs rather than face hardship at home.⁶⁵

The following year, the publication changed its tone blaming the Macanese deputies as quarrelsome and acting out of “parochial and selfish” interests.⁶⁶ It supported the Governor's stance on expatriates as serving “the dual purpose of providing Macau with expertise and maintaining a tangible political link with Portugal which was of vital

⁶² *Asia Yearbook 1981*, pp. 185-188.

⁶³ *Asia Yearbook 1979*, pp. 232-236.

⁶⁴ *Asia Yearbook 1977*, pp. 219-224.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Asia Yearbook 1978* pp. 236-241.

importance to the maintenance of the status quo.”⁶⁷ Such a sudden change of attitude deserves further investigation. It appeared that Governor Leandro had waged a successful public relations campaign, evidenced by the amount of space given to the airing of his views. Leandro is still remembered by some Macanese as young and likeable. He was proactive in his attitude towards China, breaking with tradition when he accepted an invitation to attend China’s National Day celebrations — even before diplomatic relations were restored. Furthermore, he permitted his parents and mother-in-law to visit China as guests of Ho Yin, the acknowledged leader of the pro-Beijing business group and father of the current Chief Executive Edmund Ho. Such overtures would have contributed to the normalisation of relations between Portugal and China, which was achieved in the following year (1979). This occurred despite the political instability in Portugal, which saw three changes of government between December 1977 and September 1978.⁶⁸

In February 1979, General Melo Egidio took over from Leandro as governor. Two years later, a new governor, Vasco de Almeida da Costa, was appointed to Macau. By then, it was clear that the Chinese community leaders and the Governor opposed the constitutional reforms, which effectively transferred more power to the Assembly. Undermining the Macanese position was the perception that the political conflict was chiefly cultural, a quarrel among the Portuguese themselves over civil service perks and positions.⁶⁹ It was the new governor, Almeida da Costa, who brought the constitutional struggle to a head. In February 1984, da Costa dissolved the Assembly when it still had

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ *Asia Yearbook 1979*, pp. 232-236.

⁶⁹ *Asia Yearbook 1982*, pp. 191-193.

eight months to run. Prior to the dissolution, he enacted new electoral laws that gave the vote to all Macau residents irrespective of their residency period. In the ensuing election, the mobilisation of Chinese voters by the pro-Beijing groups dealt a crippling political blow to the Macanese, from which they have never recovered. Since then, the community is reliant on the Chinese groups and the graciousness of the Governor (in post-1999, the Chief Executive) to gain representation in the Legislative Assembly.

Several observations can be made concerning this important episode in the history of the Macanese community. One is that the Assembly leader Carlos d' Assumpção appeared to misconstrue the power permitted to Macau by Lisbon and China. Perhaps he was misled by Lisbon's grandstanding in respect to granting autonomy to her overseas provinces. Second, the timing was most unfortunate for entrenched Macanese interests. The period coincided with the normalisation of relations between Lisbon and Beijing, in 1979, and the commencement of Sino-British negotiations over the future of Hong Kong. With such strategic considerations on the horizon, the Macanese challenge to the Governor's powers must be doomed to fail due to the instability they were likely to cause. Third, the Macanese claim that Macau needed technocrats, not soldiers, resonated with the wider community initially but failed to convince it that these concerns were not parochial or self-serving.⁷⁰ In the end, the Macanese legislators were portrayed as "obstructionists", possessing a certain "colonial mentality" that must be crushed and their special status phased out.⁷¹ This did not augur well for the Macanese community in the forthcoming Sino-Portuguese negotiations. Fourth, the calamitous outcome brought about a feeling of feigned resignation within the Macanese community. Indeed, the feeling of

⁷⁰ *Asia Yearbook 1978*, pp. 236-241.

some members was that they had been “cast aside” and that their interests would not be defended when the future of the territory was to be discussed.⁷² Many Macanese reportedly owned properties in Portugal and were Portuguese citizens; it was widely acknowledged that they could re-settle in Portugal and elsewhere, if things did not work out to their satisfaction.⁷³ This widespread belief that the Macanese could always leave continues to dog the community to this day.⁷⁴ Finally, during this period, the tension between the Macanese community and the Portuguese expatriates propelled the community closer to the local Chinese through increased socialisation and marital preferences, accelerating the process of Sinicisation.

Framework for decolonisation

Since the signing of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration in 1987, it has been fashionable in official circles to refer to the end of Portuguese rule as a “change of administration”, “change of sovereignty”, “reversion to China”, “retrocession” or “handover”. The Chinese called it *huigui* — the return of something to its rightful owner.⁷⁵ Certainly, the Joint Declaration avoided the word “colony” to describe Macau, asserting that “the Macau area is Chinese territory [to which China resumes] the exercise of sovereignty over”.⁷⁶ These various terms disguise the true nature of the process and

⁷¹ *Asia Yearbook 1985*, pp. 185-189.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Asia Yearbook 1986*, pp. 182-185.

⁷⁴ In the heat of the confrontation, Governor Almeida da Costa alleged that the smarter Macanese preferred to work somewhere else instead of in Macau. These remarks had a telling impact, even though it was used to deflect criticisms of cronyism that was then rampant in the colony. See *Asia Yearbook 1983*, pp. 190-193.

⁷⁵ Harald Bruning, ‘Year of the jackpot to follow’ mother of all tenders’ *South China Morning Post*, 22 December 2001.

⁷⁶ Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, Para. 1, 2i.

tend to camouflage a fundamental change in Macau after 450 years. In particular, they fail to convey adequately the psychological trauma that the decolonisation process entails for the Macanese minority. As such, the term *decolonisation* represents a more appropriate label. Yet, as I have stated in the Introduction, the decolonisation process in Macau was not set in conventional moulds.⁷⁷ Significantly, Macau was not decolonised to become an independent state. Neither did it achieve its new status through armed struggle by way of a war of independence like that which gave birth to the United States of America in 1778. There was no chaotic exodus as occurred with Portugal's African colonies in the wake of the 1974 coup in Lisbon, and no United Nations intervention, which sanctioned the formation of Malaysia in 1963 and the independent state of East Timor in 2002. Instead it was achieved through an agreement —the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration signed in 1978 —between two sovereign states that sought to set the past behind them in order to forge a new relationship for the future.

To ease the anxiety of the people in Macau, a long transition period of twelve years was instituted to allow for outstanding matters to be settled and differences ironed out. As one writer remarked, there was time for the establishment of institutions, education and the training of skilled manpower and personnel.⁷⁸ In response to widespread international concerns, human rights and the rights of the Macanese minority were addressed. Guided by pragmatism, China undertook to permit Macau a 'high degree of autonomy' and to ensure systemic continuity, through the principle of 'one country,

⁷⁷ Indeed, China refuted the fact that Macau and Hong Kong were colonies. In the United Nations in 1972, China asserted that Hong Kong and Macau are Chinese territories and should not be subjected to the UN's push for self-determination for all colonies. Despite China's assertion, most people regarded both territories as colonies. See Lamas, *History of Macau*, p. 108.

⁷⁸ Mark Bray, 'Decolonisation and Education: new paradigms for the remnants of empire', in *Compare*, Vol. 24, No.1, 1994, pp. 37-51.

two systems”, for fifty years. Like other decolonisation experience, elements of self-determination and self-administration are also present in the Macau model —represented by the Macau Basic Law and the localisation of the civil service. But as the Macau Basic Law was derived from the principles set down in the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, the latter serves as a logical starting point to outline the framework within which decolonisation took place in Macau. Where appropriate, comparisons with Hong Kong will also be made.

The Joint Declaration

A definitive picture has yet to emerge concerning the complex negotiations between China and Portugal over the future of Macau and it is beyond the scope of this investigation to uncover the secret negotiations and web of diplomatic and political intrigue. This was alluded to by Cavaco Silva, the then Portuguese Prime Minister who said that it was difficult for a small country like Portugal to negotiate with a powerful country like China.⁷⁹ Yet, Joanne Chang, who analysed the strategies adopted by China and Portugal, has asserted that China’s domestic political crisis caused by the resignation of Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, in January 1987 meant that Beijing was more anxious than Lisbon to conclude an agreement on Macau.⁸⁰

The Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration (SPJD), signed in 1987, was struck on the Sino-British model adopted for Hong Kong some three years earlier. As such, the similarities are obvious; in many cases the wordings are identical. Both contain a basic

⁷⁹ Harald Bruning, ‘Ex-PM confident of unique culture’ s continuity’, *South China Morning Post*, 20 December 1999.

⁸⁰ Chang, ‘Settlement of the Macao Issue: distinctive features of Beijing’s negotiating behaviour’, *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*.

Declaration supported by annexures on identical subjects such as China's elaboration of its basic policies towards the two enclaves, the formation of a Joint Liaison Group, and guidelines for new land releases. Significantly, the objective is identical: namely the maintenance of economic prosperity and social stability through the establishment of Special Administrative Regions (SARs). Under the principle of "one country, two systems" enunciated by Deng Xiaoping, the SARs will be given "a high degree of autonomy". In practical terms, save for the change of rulers, the SARs will be able to continue more or less in the same manner for another fifty years. Led by a local Chief Executive — "appointed by the Central People's Government based on the results of elections or consultations" — the SAR governments will be responsible for running the affairs of the territories in virtually every sphere except in defence and foreign affairs, which are the responsibility of the Central Government. The SARs are to be given independent judicial powers, including that of final adjudication elevating the SAR's justice system to a level higher than before, especially in Hong Kong's case where previously appeals could be made to a higher authority in England through the Privy Council. A lengthy period of transition has been instituted during which the colonial administrations can continue with minimal interference. To assist with the transition, Joint Liaison Groups are formed to help iron out problems arising. Of significance are the annexures elaborating China's policy towards Hong Kong and Macau — commonly referred to as China's "guarantee" given in respect to the two territories.

While much similarity exists, the differences are distinct. First, there are paragraphs found in one but absent from the other. In the main, these reflect Hong Kong's importance as an international financial centre and a regional hub for aviation and

shipping. Second, the Macau version makes specific mention of the Macanese community, in particular, that their interests “will be protected by law” and their cultural traditions will be respected. In a move seen as a major concession, China declares that Macau residents will be able to keep their Portuguese passports but only as a document for travel outside of China. This provision affects approximately one quarter of the population in Macau. Third, there is a noticeable difference in emphasis that reflects the historical context by which the territories came under the control of the Western powers. The text of Hong Kong’s Declaration contains the emotive words “to recover [the territory as] the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people.” In contrast, Macau’s text is devoid of such strong terminology. Fourth, Hong Kong’s version bears specific mention to the stationing of Chinese troops within the territory after the transfer of power, but this has been left out of Macau’s. The subsequent deployment of Chinese troops in Macau after the transfer of sovereignty —without apparent opposition—gives credence to the belief that Portugal and the residents of Macau are more accommodating and compliant. Fifth, the Hong Kong model is meant as a guide for Macau even though many things have not been finalised in time for the formal transfer, such as the stationing of Chinese troops in Macau and the requirement that principal officials of the SARs must be Chinese citizens. This has been clearly stated in the Hong Kong version but left out of the text for Macau. Yet, when the Basic Laws emerge, Macau has the same citizenship requirement as Hong Kong.⁸¹

Finally, there was a marked difference in the responsibility for the payment of public service pensions. The Hong Kong SAR government will be responsible for

⁸¹ The Joint Declarations are statements of agreement and intent. The Basic Laws spell out in detail what

pensions, irrespective of when public servants retire; in contrast, the Portuguese Government —not the Macau SAR Government —is responsible if the retirement is effected before the transfer. The reason for this remains unclear. Was it a Chinese initiative to place the onerous financial burden on Portugal or a Portuguese initiative to assuage the concerns of the Macanese and Portuguese retirees? My own investigation suggests that it is perhaps the latter due to a general lack of confidence in the future exhibited by some members of the Macanese community, and the modest settlement that the Portuguese government managed to extract from the Chinese to service these entitlements.⁸² Although there is an undertaking by China that the benefits and conditions for Macau civil servants “will be no less favourable than before”, nevertheless there were doubts that the benefits might be tempered with or dissipated by future governmental actions. This will be revisited in the section on localisation of the civil service.⁸³

The Basic Laws

Following the pattern set for Hong Kong, the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration provided the framework for the formulation of the Macau Basic Law (MBL), a process that has been termed the localisation of law.⁸⁴ The MBL was approved by the Eighth National People' s Congress in Beijing on 31 March 1993 and signed into law at 2:15 am on 20 December 1999 following the swearing-in of Edmund Ho Hau-wah as the

was foreshadowed in the JDs.

⁸² In response to questions I put to him, Jorge Rangel —the Secretary for Public Administration, Education and Youth who was charged with the localisation of the civil service in the final Portuguese Administration in Macau —said that the amount of money transferred to the Portuguese Government to service these retirement benefits was sufficient for only eight or nine years. When that runs out, Portugal will have the onerous responsibility to foot the entire bill.

⁸³ Basically, it points to distrust of future governments. Some see the recent government decision to levy income tax of civil servants, teachers and clergy in 2004 —where previously there was none —as a case in point. There were rumours of legal challenges.

inaugural Chief Executive of the Macau SAR.⁸⁵ It mirrors the Hong Kong Basic Law (HKBL) in many respects. Just as the two Joint Declarations are similar, so are the two Basic Laws that evolved from them. Chiefly, the Basic Law codifies the principles laid down in the Joint Declaration but it also contains new elements that have been either deliberately left out or which emerged in subsequent negotiations.

The Basic Law contains clarification of institutions previously mentioned in the Joint Declaration. Among these are the office of the Chief Executive and the powers of Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. MBL Articles 45 to 60 set out the qualifications, term and functions of the Chief Executive. Specifically, he or she can not be younger than 40 years old, must be a Chinese citizen with over 20 years of continuous permanent residence in Macau, and must not have the right of abode in another country. Upon his appointment, which is limited to two consecutive five-year terms, he must declare his personal assets for the record. By way of an annexure, the procedure for the election of the Chief Executive is also described. His powers are also outlined; in many respects, there are no surprises as most of them have been exercised by the colonial governors. The surprise for some is the crucial role reserved for the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress —as the arbiter of all matters pertaining to the Basic Laws. Such a role has not been hinted at in the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration (SPJD) where it is mentioned primarily as a registry of laws enacted by the legislature of Macau (Annex I, Art. III). However, in the Macau Basic Law, its role include that of ultimate interpretation (HKBL Art.158, MBL Art.143), the power to propose amendments (HKBL Art. 159, MBL Art. 144), and to "return" certain laws that

⁸⁴ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 58.

it believes to be not in conformity with the provisions or impinges on the responsibility of the Chinese Central Government. Once these laws are returned by the Standing Committee, they are deemed to have been invalidated. (HKBL Art. 17, MBL Art. 17). In June 1999, this power of interpretation was utilised by the Hong Kong Government to overturn the ruling by Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal in the so-called 'right of abode controversy'.⁸⁶ For the Macanese community, there are other surprises, too. One concerns the municipal councils and district organisations, which are to be restructured. Under the Basic Laws, they are forbidden to be "organs of political power" and its members will no longer be elected as in former times. In the case of Macau, this means the end of the ancient institution, the *Leal Senado* and the *Município das Ilhas*. It has a negative impact on the Macanese community, who hitherto has been prominent at this level of government (see Chapter Four). Their passing has been described as a "major set-back to [Macau's] democratisation process".⁸⁷ Another is the requirement that only "Chinese citizens who are permanent residents [of Macau]" will be permitted to hold the top jobs (MBL Art. 57, 63, 72). This is not mentioned in the Joint Declaration but is specified in the Basic Law.⁸⁸ The nationality requirement has conspired to keep many Macanese from seeking or accepting the top jobs because the Macanese aspirant must

⁸⁵ *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, second edition, July 2001, p. 34.

⁸⁶ In January 1999, the Court of Final Appeal made a ruling granting residency rights to anyone with a Hong Kong parent. This was against the Hong Kong Government's wishes who feared that the decision will allow an estimated 1.67 million mainland residents the right of permanent stay in Hong Kong —thus overwhelming its population of seven million residents and Hong Kong's social infrastructure. Failing to get its way with the Hong Kong courts, the Government appealed to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for an interpretation. On 27 June 1999, the Standing Committee brought down an interpretation that favoured the Government. This controversy is seen as damaging the reputation of Hong Kong judicial independence. See Chris Yeung, 'NPC lays down the law', *South China Morning Post*, 27 June 1999. Also see Glenn Schloss, 'Right of Abode Controversy', *South China Morning Post*, 26 June 1999.

⁸⁷ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 28.

give up his or her Portuguese passport, which is tantamount to renouncing one's Portuguese nationality. This has serious implications for the Macanese community, which will be revisited in Chapter Five.

Differences exist between the two Basic Laws, among them the declaration of personal assets, the right of abode in a foreign country, the goal towards election by universal suffrage, and the protection of Portuguese heritage. Macau's Chief Executive is required to declare his personal assets to the President of the Court of Final Appeal (MBL Art. 49); the same is also required of his principal officials (MBL Art. 63) and members of Macau's Legislative Assembly (MBL Art. 68). In contrast, for Hong Kong, only the Chief Executive was required to do so.⁸⁹ In Hong Kong, the Chief Executive, principal officials and the President of the Legislative Council are barred from possessing any right of abode in a foreign country (HKBL Art. 47, 61, 67, 71). Permanent residents who are not Chinese citizens can serve as Legislative Councilors but their numbers are to be limited to twenty percent of the Council membership (HKBL Art. 67). It is not known how such a limit can be regulated when the membership is supposedly determined by universal suffrage or elected from the functional constituencies. In contrast, for Macau, the right of abode in another country is downplayed and there is no mention of a limit to the number of Councilors who are not Chinese citizens. Clearly, this has been drafted with the Portuguese and Macanese community in mind. Instead, MBL Art.101 requires all to swear allegiance to Macau, and MBL Art.102 requires the Chief Executive, principal officials and the two top legal officers also to swear allegiance to the People's

⁸⁸ Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, Article 2iii.

Republic of China. A further difference, significant to Hong Kong, is the stated “ultimate aim” that all members of the Legislative Council will be elected by universal suffrage (HKBL Art. 68). Until 2007, Hong Kong’s sixty-member chamber would be elected in two ways: half by direct elections, the other half by functionary constituencies.⁹⁰ If there is a push towards the “ultimate aim” described above, it would require a two-third majority vote in the Legislative Council *and* the consent of the Chief Executive. In contrast, no such aspirations exist for Macau. No one knows what will happen if the required majority is attained but the Chief Executive does not give his or her consent.⁹¹ On 18 August 2003, Martin Lee, the pro-democracy activist and Hong Kong Legislative Councilor, told a public meeting at the University of Sydney, which I attended, that based on the large public demonstration in Hong Kong a few weeks earlier, he was optimistic about what would happen after 2007.⁹² Despite Lee’s optimism, HKBL Art. 68 spells out that the changes to the Basic Laws will be guided by the principle of “gradual and orderly progress.” Accordingly, the election of all the members by universal suffrage may take decades to achieve. Finally, Macau’s Basic Law contains particular references to maintaining Portuguese heritage in the enclave. MBL Article 125 obliges the Government to protect historical sites and relics while Art. 42 stipulates that the rights of the Macanese community —seen by many as Portugal’s “living legacy” in the territory —will be protected by law, and their customs and cultural traditions respected. As to

⁸⁹ No one knows the real reason behind this differential treatment. A participant in the Macau negotiations suggests to me that Hong Kong officials are particularly sensitive against disclosure whereas in Macau, disclosure of personal assets were already in place under the Portuguese administration.

⁹⁰ Functionary constituencies represent special interest groups such as commerce, culture and labour.

⁹¹ For Macau, there is a mechanism for adjusting the number of directly elected members after 2009. The requirements for changing the parameters are spelt out in the MBL Annex II.

how this is envisaged has not been spelt out, although many believed that their future in Macau is threatened not by the ambiguities of the constitutional guarantees but by the localisation of the civil service.

Localisation of the civil service

Together with the drafting of the Basic Law, the localisation of the civil service dominated the landscape of decolonisation for the Macanese community. In line with other colonial societies, the civil service in Macau had been controlled by the Macanese, who were close to the ruling elite through an association based on ethnicity, culture, religion, and knowledge of the language. Aiding this proclivity was a general lack of interest among the Chinese to study Portuguese —the language of administration. This enabled the Macanese to monopolise the positions at the middle and senior levels. In 1993, six years before the transfer of sovereignty, it was estimated that of the 7000 permanent positions in the Macau civil service, 5000 were occupied by the Macanese.⁹³ Well-paid jobs are not so plentiful in Macau where the economy remains narrowly based and overly reliant on the casino and textile industries. On average, civil service positions have the highest pay, a situation that prevails in post-1999 Macau.⁹⁴ As it is the major source of employment for the Macanese community, the localisation of the civil service became a contentious issue, a blow-by-blow account of which has yet to emerge.

⁹² On 1 July 2003, over 500,000 took part in a march ostensibly to protest the Hong Kong Government's proposed legislation in respect to Article 23 of the Basic Law but Martin Lee said that the march could be seen as a public demand for a faster pace to reform of the political system.

⁹³ Esther Wachs Book, "Macau: credibility gap", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29 July 1993.

⁹⁴ According to the Macau Government statistics for 1999, civil servants earned an average MOP 13711 per month. In comparison, other sectors are: Education MOP 9444, Wholesale/Retail MOP 4699, Construction MOP 4656, Hotels/Restaurants MOP 401, Manufacturing MOP 2911. See *Macau Yearbook of Statistics 2000*, p. 170.

Significantly, the official responsible for the localisation program in the last Portuguese Administration in Macau was Jorge Rangel, a Macanese, who was the Secretary for Public Administration, Education and Youth. One hopes that it will not be long before he adds his contribution to this important aspect of the decolonisation process.

Localisation in Macau concerns the phasing out of the Portuguese expatriates and replacing them with local people who are either Chinese or Macanese. According to Herbert Yee, there were three contending approaches.⁹⁵ One, preferred by the Chinese, insisted that local Chinese should be promoted to the senior levels to reflect the ethnic composition of the community and to redress the imbalance that had previously favoured the Portuguese and Macanese. The second approach, held by “some radical Macanese”, advocated that they should be given consideration due to their extensive experience, seniority and language ability, in particular their knowledge of Portuguese, English and vernacular Chinese. A third view held that the positions should be allocated on the basis of merit. While Yee’s analysis is helpful, such formulative framework does seem clinical when it is apparent that the eventual outcome owes more to pragmatism than to the existence of a structured “road map”.

Many factors shaped the outcome of the localisation program in Macau. The evidence points to a jumbled outcome of fumbled negotiations that ended in non-renewal of contracts, the scare tactics emanating from their Chinese colleagues, a certain reluctance to utilise personnel who are considered too close to the former Portuguese regime, and the changes within the Portuguese civil service itself, which result in the forced withdrawal of personnel because their period of service in Macau will no longer

⁹⁵ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, pp. 41-42.

count for promotion and seniority when they rejoin the civil service in Portugal in the future. All these deserve investigation but in the section to follow, I choose to scrutinise the slow pace of localisation in Macau and its impact on the Macanese community.

The slow pace of localisation had been caused by complex and multifarious factors —including political machinations, governmental miscalculation and neglect — which combined to produce a civil service labeled by many as inexperienced at the senior levels.⁹⁶ To begin with, China and Portugal contributed to the languor through the delay in formulating the Macau Basic Law, which was only released in 1993, midway through the transitional period. Until the publication of the Basic Law, many of the specifics governing the future were unknown. For example, in the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, there is no mention of the top positions of government, legislature or the judiciary being reserved for Chinese citizens —it merely refers to Macau being run by “local inhabitants”, which is taken to mean people not sent from the Mainland. Such a stringent requirement places the Macanese community in a quandary, whether to renounce their Portuguese nationality and keep their positions or take early retirement. Undoubtedly, the delay and hard-line approach pointed to the changed political environment in Beijing between the signing of the Joint Declaration and the publication of the Basic Law. Notably, there was a power struggle within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party over the rising student and worker discontent within China culminating in the crackdown of protesters in Tienanmen Square on 4 June 1989. This is a crucial point as the significance of this crisis on the framing of the Macau Basic Law

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 52, 60. This manifested in the first month after the handover when the Macau police refused entry to a Hong Kong political activist and was duly criticised by the Hong Kong media as impacting badly

has been under-emphasised.⁹⁷ Tienanmen impacted politically on the formulation of the Basic Law because the hardliners won over the liberal elements represented by the then Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang. According to one observer, Zhao was responsible for the softer approach evident in the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration.⁹⁸ Additionally, the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union appears to reinforce China's fear that the former colonies, Hong Kong in particular, will be used by some as a base to fuel social discontent and destroy communism in China.⁹⁹

Ultimately, as the governing authority, the blame for the slow pace of localisation must be placed at the feet of the government in Lisbon and the Portuguese administration in Macau. Principally, the practice of appointing Portuguese expatriates to the senior positions, which continued well into the sunset years of the Portuguese Administration, had resulted in a lack of opportunities at the director level for local Chinese and Macanese aspirants. Such policy was a feature of the Portuguese colonial experience, supported by successive governors as an essential link between Portugal and her colonies and as a response to the shortage of qualified personnel. Sometimes, their inadequacy for the task at hand suggested that the expatriate recruits were appointed for reasons other than competency. When their numbers became excessive, such as during the depressed

on the application of the principle of 'one country, two systems'. See Harald Bruning, 'Enclave must fit into the big picture', *South China Morning Post*, 14 January 2000.

⁹⁷ Harald Bruning has alluded to a different set of 'power situation' in the drafting of Macau's Basic Law between 1988 and 1993, which comprised 'patriotic' Macao community leaders, mainland Chinese officials and legal experts. See Harald Bruning, 'MSAR Basic Law: ten years', *MacaU*, June 2003, p. 8.

⁹⁸ Chang, 'Settlement of the Macao Issue: distinctive features of Beijing's negotiating behaviour', in *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*.

⁹⁹ John Wong, 'The Legacy of British Rule and its Interaction with Beijing's Objectives', in Brook Barrington (ed.), *Empires, Imperialism and Southeast Asia*, p. 224; Ming K. Chan, 'Introduction: Hong Kong's Precarious Balance — 150 Years in an Historic Triangle', in Ming K. Chan (ed.), *Precarious Balance — Hong Kong Between China and Britain 1842-1992* (Hong Kong: HK University Press, 1994), p. 4.

economic times in Lisbon that followed the 1974 coup, it led to tensions between them and the Macanese. In 1980s, it became an issue in the constitutional struggle between the Macanese-controlled Legislative Assembly and the Macau governors.¹⁰⁰

As late as July 1993 —the midway mark for the transitional period —Manuel Abreu, Chief of Cabinet for Organisation and Information in Macau, confirmed to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* that seventy-one percent of the under-secretaries and department chiefs were still expatriate Portuguese, which was disappointing to Jorge Fâo, a Macanese and the then chairman of the Macau Civil Servants Association. Fao expressed frustratingly that the Portuguese expatriates ‘simply [did] not want to leave.’¹⁰¹ Three years later (1996), the London-based *Economist* periodical pointed out that there were only two Macanese under-secretaries —both of whom did not expect to stay after 1999 —but no ethnic Chinese appointed to take charge of the government departments.¹⁰² In fact, no Chinese was appointed until two months prior to the transfer of sovereignty.¹⁰³ According to Herbert Yee, a Hong Kong academic, this was due to the Portuguese Government’s determination to maintain a strong and effective administration till the very end.¹⁰⁴ And as will be seen later, the refusal to appoint ethnic Chinese was fundamental to the Portuguese approach to localisation at this senior level.

Considering the seriousness of its impact, it is highly probable that the failure to plan may be due to a serious miscalculation on the part of the Portuguese, who anticipated a mass exodus from Macau as what transpired with the decolonisation of the

¹⁰⁰ *Asia Yearbook 1981*, pp. 185-188.

¹⁰¹ Esther Wachs, ‘Macau: credibility gap’, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29 July 1993.

¹⁰² ‘Macau: Another end of empire’, *Economist*, 6 January 1996, (Internet edition).

¹⁰³ Gilberto Lopes, ‘Macau’s new leaders’, *MacaU*, Special 1999, p. 26.

¹⁰⁴ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 49.

former Portuguese colonies after 1974. This point was brought out in December 2000 by Nuno Lima Bastos, a Portuguese judge working in Macau, who blamed this faulty assessment for causing irreparable damage to the Portuguese and Macanese position in post-1999 Macau.¹⁰⁵ As a matter of fact, as early as July 1993, Jorge Rangel, the Secretary in charge of the localisation program for the Macau Portuguese Administration, told the *Far Eastern Economic Review*:

We can only count on some Macanese to stay, and many will leave. The present Macanese civil servants are only concerned with the present, but we must think of the future.¹⁰⁶

But Rangel and the Portuguese government could be forgiven for believing that many Portuguese and Macanese would leave Macau due to decolonisation. According to the evidence gathered in the course of this investigation, many Portuguese and Macanese had harboured doubts concerning Beijing's resolve to respect Macau's autonomy. They believed that China would exert its influence over every sphere of activity in Macau in much the same way that — it is widely believed — it influenced the Legislative Assembly through the pro-Beijing groups.

Having largely written off most of the Macanese civil servants, the government, according to Rangel, focused on training young people, particularly among the local Chinese, even though few had “the training to assume high government positions.”¹⁰⁷ Due to this and the Vieira Administration's preference to promote from within the civil service, the process would take years — a point that is missing from most writings on the

¹⁰⁵ Nuno Lima Bastos, in Gilberto Lopes, “A year of MSAR”, *MacaU*, December 2000, pp. 25-26.

¹⁰⁶ Esther Wachs Book, “Macau: credibility gap”, 29 July 1993.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

subject, but which Rangel emphasised to me in response to issues raised with him over the localisation program under his care. Another factor that might have given rise to the alleged neglect of localisation by the Administration was its determination to allow the incoming Chief Executive to choose his own team. In view of the fact that the election for the Chief Executive designate was not determined until 15 May 1999, many senior positions were left in limbo. The training programs that Rangel alluded to consisted of a medley of courses provided variously in Macau, Beijing and Lisbon — with indeterminate impact. Suffice it to say, the inaugural Chief Executive, Edmund Ho, was confident to select his key officials from within the existing civil service, demonstrating his satisfaction with the quality of the candidates. Of the top eight officials appointed by him in 1999, only two were recruited from outside the civil service.¹⁰⁸

Occupying a significant proportion of the civil service positions at the middle and senior levels, the Macanese community compounded the slow pace of localisation through a paralysis of indecision. Many Macanese preferred to leave their decision till the very last moment, waiting to see how the situation would unravel. Without knowing how many would leave or stay, it was impossible for the Macau government to plan. In an interview I had with him, the Secretary responsible for the localisation program, Jorge Rangel, himself a Macanese, recalled the intense pressure from Beijing and Lisbon to speed up localisation. So as to force the Macanese to make up their minds, a program was offered in 1995. Given only twelve months to decide, the Macanese civil servants had to choose between four options: remain in the Macau civil service, leave the civil service,

¹⁰⁸ Gilberto Lopes, ‘Macau’s new leaders’, *MacaU*, Special 1999, pp. 26-47.

take early retirement, or join the public service in Portugal.¹⁰⁹ As it turned out, not many opted to join the Portuguese civil service but many decided to retire early.¹¹⁰ In the end, some Macanese accused the government of pushing them out and a feeling of animosity still lingers amongst some members of the present community some five years after the transfer of sovereignty. But, as Rangel impressed on me during one of our meetings, there was no other way.

Paradoxically, after the crucial integration plan was offered in 1995, things appeared to improve for the Macanese in Macau, deepening the crisis in decision making. Although it was largely psychological, a major boost came with the smooth transition to Chinese rule in Hong Kong in 1997. Its initial success provided an enormous encouragement to the Macanese community in Macau as they contemplated their individual future, resulting in cautious optimism and a drop in the numbers leaving the civil service and the territory.¹¹¹ Another boost came with the knowledge that the inaugural Chief Executive would be Edmund Ho, considered a friend of the Macanese community. During the course of my investigation, a point was made to me that the outcome of the localisation program would have been somewhat different if it was known earlier that Edmund Ho would be the anointed one. Such remarks referred to his election, on 15 May 1999, which was rather late in the process. While it cannot be ascertained, the evidence suggests that it would not have made much of a difference due to the underlying factors, which ultimately caused many Macanese to leave the civil service.

¹⁰⁹ Yee stated that the plan was clearly targeted at the Macanese to force their decision so that planning for the post-1999 civil service could be further advanced. See Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 55.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 56. According to Yee, of the 6400 civil servants that were qualified to apply, 493 chose to join the civil service in Portugal, and 1435 opted for early retirement and to leave the civil service leaving 4472 deciding to remain in Macau as public servants.

Chief among these was a fear of what might happen to their pension entitlements in the future.¹¹² Although the Basic Law stated that the Macau government would be responsible for the payment of benefits for those who retired after the transfer of power, there were concerns whether there would be sufficient funds and whether the entitlements would be tampered with. Clearly, some were not willing to risk their pension entitlements. The post-colonial decision by the Macau government, in 2003, to levy income tax on civil service pay appears to vindicate these earlier fears.

Another factor could be attributed to a “persecution complex” and the scare-mongering tactics adopted by their Chinese colleagues. Such a mentality conjured up fears of how they would be treated in the future, which I shall return to in a later chapter. According to one observer, such fears are rooted in their socialisation experience with the Chinese during colonial times.¹¹³ Furthermore, Macanese civil servants opted to leave the Macau civil service due to a lack of formal Chinese language skills, even though most of them could speak the vernacular Cantonese. Some, like the retired Macanese businessman, Humberto Rodrigues, blamed the colonial government’s education policy.¹¹⁴ Others pointed to the failure to implement bilingualism earlier and the lack of incentives to study Chinese properly. Yet, one could not escape the saying that where there is a will, there is a way. Ultimately, it is up to the individuals and their families. In this area some Macanese displayed a singular lack of foresight. During one of the interviews, it was revealed that in post-1999 Macau, one young Macanese was refused

¹¹¹ Ibid. In January 1999, the figures showed a drop with 386 joining the Portuguese civil service, and 1099 opting for early retirement and leave for the public service.

¹¹² They have a choice of taking the pension or a lump sum payment. Those opting for business generally chose to take the lump sum as starting capital.

¹¹³ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 138.

employment in the civil service because her Chinese was said to be inadequate. She was only in her late 20s but decided against taking remedial action due to the possibility of going overseas. Such anecdotal evidence suggests that despite the official policy of bilingualism, the important language to have in post-1999 Macau is Chinese, not Portuguese.

In the course of my investigation, a local Chinese suggested to me that the slow pace of localisation was deliberate —in order to ensure that the Macanese will still be needed after 1999. Initially, I thought the comment was made in jest but in time, I recognised it as part of the “colonial complexes” that Edmund Ho later admonished some residents to get rid of.¹¹⁵ But there is some veracity in the claim also. Back in 1993, when Jorge Fâo, a Macanese and Chairman of the Macau Civil Servants Association, accused the Portuguese Administration for neglecting localisation, he saw that – with the decision to retain Portuguese as an official language and the dominance of Portuguese as the working language in legal circles in Macau – there is a continuing role for the Macanese in the transition from Portuguese to Chinese rule. He told the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (29 July 1993):

We [Macanese] are the ones who can serve as a bridge between Portuguese and Chinese rule, but we do not know if we will get the chance. For every day that passes and nothing gets done, it is like a sword hanging above our head.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Diana Lin, *Back to the Motherland IV*, TVB 930, broadcast on 4 November 1999, TVB Hong Kong.

¹¹⁵ Harald Bruning, “Cultural identity”, *South China Morning Post*, 27 December 2002.

¹¹⁶ Esther Wachs Book, “Macau: credibility gap”, 29 July 1993.

Unfortunately for Fão and his colleagues, the decision had already been made for them by the Macau government, as has been discussed above.

Compared to Hong Kong, the process of localisation was slow. Macau's localisation experience differed from Hong Kong's in two significant respects. For Macau, the presence of a large proportion of Macanese civil servants raised doubts whether they would stay after 1999 and be loyal to the post-colonial administration. In Hong Kong there was no entrenched Eurasian community within the civil service to speak of. Devoid of the racial factor, Hong Kong's localisation program was not as problematic as Macau's. Moreover, in Hong Kong, bilingualism has never been an issue because English is widely used and accepted by the local Chinese. In contrast, Portuguese is understood by only a small number of people in Macau, despite four centuries of Portuguese occupation. As Jean Berlie has observed: "In 1999, Macao's society retains its linguistic preference for Chinese and English, with few Chinese students learning and speaking Portuguese."¹¹⁷ Due to this limitation, serious doubt exists over the viability of bilingualism as a practical policy in Macau in the longer term.

Whether Hong Kong's localisation program was more successful than Macau's remains an open question. The approaches between the two former colonial governments were fundamentally different. In Hong Kong, the civil service continued like a through-train under the Chief Secretary Anson Chan, who retained her post. In contrast, in Macau, wholesale personnel changes took place at the senior levels, including the police and the judiciary. Apparently, the Vieira Administration had consciously kept the transfer date as a clear demarcation, thus allowing the Chief Executive-designate to choose his own team

for the period ahead. The resultant team had been charged with a lack of experience, which could only be overcome with the passage of time. But it has been observed that the appointment of senior officers was left too late and did not allow time for the new people to gain experience at the senior level before the transfer of power took effect. Moreover, Jean Berlie highlighted two cases in the Economic Department and the Housing Department (*Instituto de Habitação*) where two senior Macanese personnel, local-born and highly experienced, were not asked to stay despite their willingness to do so — “because they were not Chinese.”¹¹⁸ From the viewpoint of civil service stability after 1999, it can be argued that the Macau approach is the better of the two. The smooth running of the Macau Government since the change of sovereignty stands in stark contrast to the tumultuous first-term experience of Hong Kong, where many senior civil servants, including the Chief Secretary Anson Chan, resigned or left the service amidst insinuations of divided loyalty and a deteriorating working relationship with their boss, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa.

In sum, the localisation experience was a painful experience for the Macanese community, due to their close identification with Portugal and the complexities caused by ethnicity, nationality and language. Historically, they had performed a useful role as an intermediary between Chinese and Westerners, not only in Macau but also at the other centres that emerged in post-Opium War China. As a community, they benefited from the Western penetration of China, becoming inadvertently entangled in the epic struggle between China and the West. For many, the retrocession of Macau and Hong Kong in

¹¹⁷ Jean Berlie, ‘Macao’s Education: a Question of Language – Chinese, Portuguese and English’, in Berlie (ed.), *Macao 2000*, p. 92.

1999 and 1997 respectively marked a closure of sorts. Along the road to decolonisation, the political power and influence of the Macanese have dwindled. With the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Macau, their civil service positions have also been taken over by the local Chinese; whether they could survive the transfer of sovereignty and remain relevant in contemporary Macau form the subject of the following chapters.

¹¹⁸ Jean Berlie, 'Macao's overview at the turn of the century', *American Asian Review*, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, Winter 2000, pp. 34 -35.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN POST-1999 MACAU

The transfer of sovereignty in Macau — as in Hong Kong — has been set within the framework of “one country, two systems”, but there are inherent tensions between the components of this profound principle leading to the question: which is the more important, “one country” or “two systems”?¹ Further, while it is generally acknowledged that the first system represents what exists in the Mainland, it appears that different ideas exist concerning what the second system represents. Most people accept that the second system represents the continuation of the capitalist system as practiced in Hong Kong and Macau. But that clearly is too narrow for in his address delivered at the Ceremony for the Establishment of the Macau Administrative Region on 20 December 1999, the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated:

[After resumption of sovereignty] the existing capitalist system in Macau will continue to be practised, the current social and economic systems will remain unchanged, and so will the lifestyle. The laws will remain basically unchanged and the right of private ownership will be protected by law.²

Accordingly, there are those who wish to emphasise the rule of law and respect for civil rights and liberties, evidenced by the general disquiet in Hong Kong, in 2003, over the government’s intention to enact laws foreshadowed in Article 23 of the Basic Law (same

¹ The disquiet in Hong Kong during 2003 over the Hong Kong Government’s intention to accelerate the enactment of laws foreshadowed in Article 23 of the Basic Law (same article number for both the Hong Kong and Macau versions) illustrated this tension, where civil libertarians accused the government of emphasising “one country” over the need to preserve the integrity of the second system.

² *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, July 2001, p. 83.

article number for both the Hong Kong and Macau versions). These civil libertarians accuse the Hong Kong government of emphasizing “one country” over the need to preserve the integrity of the second system. In Macau, some Portuguese perceive the second system to include also the preservation of their heritage exemplified by the retention of the Portuguese language as one of the official languages and the obligation, under Article 125, to respect and preserve Portuguese historic relics. In this context, even the survival of the Portuguese bookshop in Macau, *Livraria Portuguesa*, which celebrated its eighteenth anniversary in June 2003, is seen as an important element of the second system.³ The Macanese community sees their continuity in Macau as integral to the second system. In fact, Article 42 of the Macau Basic Law stipulates that their interest will be protected and their customs and cultural traditions respected. Thus, with differing perceptions over the meaning of the principle of “one country, two systems”, Macau enters the post-1999 period with many expectations as well as much uncertainty.

This chapter outlines some of the changes that have taken place in Macau since 1999 as a prelude to a discussion of their impact on the Macanese community. As a terminus for this investigation, I have chosen the first five post-colonial years —Edmund Ho’s first term as the Chief Executive.⁴ Many of the changes have evolved over time. It was the recognition that some changes require time that a long period of transition was programmed into Macau’s [and Hong Kong’s] decolonisation process to ensure a smooth transfer of power and to minimise the severity of dislocation, both institutional and psychological. The objective is to safeguard as much as possible the prosperity of Hong

³ Harald Bruning, “Book culture”, *South China Morning Post*, 13 June 2003.

⁴ In all likelihood, Ho will be nominated for a second term due to his popularity with local residents and with Beijing.

Kong and Macau, to preserve their economic worth to China. By their successes, China hopes to advance the cause of national reunification with Taiwan. Accordingly, when the time came for the lowering of one flag and the raising of the other, the elements of change and continuity had become inextricably entwined.

For this discussion, I have adopted a topical approach based on some of the points highlighted in Edmund Ho's first two official addresses and the interview he gave to the *South China Morning Post*, published on that momentous day. The choice of these public utterances is justified by the fact that Macau is a small place where the government has an inordinate influence over every aspect of society, including the direction and pace of change due largely to the concentration of authority within the office of the Chief Executive. Further, as stated in *Macau Focus*, the speeches presented at the changeover ceremonies are not merely "simple acts of protocol" but are carefully crafted documents to suit the historic occasion and with the international media in mind.⁵ More importantly, the evidence suggests that most of the changes that have taken place in Macau since 1999 are ideas embedded in these early utterances. Accordingly, they provide a suitable platform on which to analyse the changes that have taken place since 1999. For the sake of convenience, they are categorised in the following order: changes in government; relations with China, Portugal and the European Union; the economy, and Macau's place in the Pearl River Delta region.

⁵ *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, July 2001, p. 57.

Government

The Chief Executive

Fundamental to the principle of “one country, two system” is the idea of Macau people governing Macau. At the head of government is the Chief Executive, a position held by Edmund Ho Hau-wah. Born in Macau on 13 March 1955, Edmund Ho is the son of Ho Yin, the legendary Macau businessman and leader of the local Chinese community in the 1960s and 1970s.⁶ As a mark of his father’s standing in the community, a park has been named in his memory—an honour he shared with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Chinese Republic, the only other Chinese to be so esteemed. Edmund Ho left Macau in 1969 to study in Canada, eventually gaining a degree in Business Administration from the University of York. Trained as a chartered accountant, he worked in Hong Kong until 1984 when he returned to Macau to help revive his family’s ailing bank — Tai Fung Bank — after his father’s death from cancer. Prior to his election as Macau’s Chief Executive, Ho served on the boards of innumerable business and community organisations — including being the Chairman of the Macau Banking Association, Deputy President of the Macau Legislative Assembly, Vice President of the Macau Chamber of Commerce, Member of China’s Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress, and Vice Chairman of the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce.⁷ His strong business background (similar to Tung Chee-hwa in Hong Kong)

⁶ <http://202.84.17.11/macao/news/200234111.htm> (14-9-03)

⁷ ‘Edmund Ho - Completing his own transition’, *CNN.com Asia Now*, 18 December 1999; Jason Gagliardi and Harald Bruning, ‘Leader looks to future’, *South China Morning Post*, 19 December 1999.

and his consensual style of politics are said to be just what Macau needs in the post-colonial era.⁸

Public Administration

Edmund Ho has picked a young team of technocrats to run Macau, most of whom are tri-lingual (Portuguese, Chinese and English) and with long experience in the Macau civil service.⁹ Unlike the pre-1999 Administration, where all the Secretaries were Portuguese, now they are all local Chinese. But as Ho stressed in his inaugural address as Chief Executive, they are all Macau people who ‘have a profound understanding and personal knowledge of Macau society [and] share a deep sense of mission and commitment ... to Macau’.¹⁰ The team includes Florinda da Rosa Silva Chan,¹¹ then aged 45, Secretary for Administration and Justice, who has worked in the Macau civil service since 1977 and holds an MBA from the Asia International Open University (Macau);¹² Francis Tam Pak-un, 50, Secretary for Economy and Finance, who has an MBA from the University of East-Asia (now Macau University) and a degree in Chinese law. Before his appointment, Tam was running his family’s garment business. The Secretary for Security is Cheong Kuoc-va, whose father and grandfather were policemen in Macau. He was trained at the Security Forces Training College and served in the Riot Squad, the regular Police as well as the Immigration Department. He received additional training in Portugal in the Higher Education Police College in Alcântara, Lisbon.

⁸ Gilberto Lopes, “A Consensus Seeker”, *MacaU* 1999, pp. 21-24.

⁹ Gilberto Lopes, “Macau’s New Leaders”, *MacaU* 1999, pp. 26-47.

¹⁰ *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, July 2001, p. 89.

¹¹ Although Florinda da Rosa Silva Chan has a Portuguese name, she is not a Macanese nor considered as one.

¹² For details of the Secretaries, see Gilberto Lopes, “Macau’s New Leaders”, *MacaU* 1999, pp. 26-47.

Fernando Chui Sai-on, 42, Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture, holds a degree in City Hygiene Administration from the University of California and a Ph.D. in Public Health Management from the University of Oklahoma. Like Francis Tam, he comes from outside the civil service having been the Executive Director of the Kiang Wu Hospital Charitable Association. Ao Man-long, 42, Secretary for Transport and Public Works, graduated in Mechanical Engineering from the National University of Taiwan. Together with Edmund Ho, these Secretaries make up the Executive Branch of government in Macau. None is a Macanese.

In his inaugural address, Edmund Ho pledged to continue with the civil service reforms and to remove the bureaucratic obstacles that inhibited economic growth and investment. He aimed to achieve “a highly efficient, transparent and accountable public administrative system”.¹³ Communications with the public has been given a high priority such that barely two years after decolonisation, the Government “is churning out more press releases in Portuguese than the pre-handover government.”¹⁴ A key element in improving the Civil Service is seen in strengthening the investigative and arrest powers of the Macau Commission against Corruption.¹⁵ The added powers have been utilised in the arrest of seven marine policemen on bribery and corruption charges in August 2001.¹⁶ The Commission’s Annual Report for 2002 boldly claims that “the creation of a corruption-free administration is on course to be achieved”.¹⁷ Yet, there remains much to

¹³ *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, July 2001, p. 89.

¹⁴ Harald Bruning, “Political stability fails to dispel economic woes”, *South China Morning Post*, 15 December 2001.

¹⁵ Gilberto Lopes, “Strengthening the fight against corruption”, *MacaU*, June 2000, p. 17; “CCAC powers increased”, *MacaU*, August 2000, p. 72.

¹⁶ Harald Bruning, “Anti-graft officials rise from ashes with ‘Phoenix’”, *South China Morning Post*, 1 September 2001.

¹⁷ Gilberto Lopes, “Creating A Corruption-Free Administration”, *MacaU*, June 2003, pp. 17-23.

be done — especially in the area of judicial administration. Jorge Neto Valente, the president of Macau's Lawyers Association, refers to these problems in an address in November 2002.¹⁸ Principally, cases are too slow in moving through the system, which is detrimental to local businesses and foreign investors, and there are insufficient judges and prosecutors to cope with the number of cases in the system.¹⁹ What Neto Valente did not mention, out of politeness perhaps, is the lack of experience among some of Macau's judges and prosecutors. Undoubtedly, when the top legal nominees were announced in 1999, alarm was raised by the Hong Kong academic Lo Shiu-hing, who suggested that the lack of experience and the Mainland connections of the judges might compromise Macau's judicial independence. Lo was concerned that the Chief Justice, mainland-born Sam Hou-fai, then only 38, had only two years' experience as a judge in Macau when he was appointed to the top judicial position, having spent most of his time as a lawyer in the Mainland. His fellow Chinese judge on the Court of Final Appeal, Chu Kin, then aged 30, had five years' experience. The Portuguese judge, Viriato Manuel Pinheiro de Lima, aged 45, had 20 years' experience. Additionally, the Macau-born Chief Public Prosecutor Ho Chio Meng also received most of his legal qualifications from Chinese universities.²⁰

¹⁸ Harald Bruning, 'Macau's sleepy law courts lack speed and relevance', *South China Morning Post*, 8 November 2002.

¹⁹ In 2002, when Neto Valente's comments were first publicised there were 22 judges and 23 prosecutors serving a Portuguese-style, three-tier court system. A year later, this number does not appear to have been increased, leading to Neto Valente to repeat his call. See Harald Bruning, 'Judicial review', *South China Morning Post*, 7 November 2003.

²⁰ Although Chief Justice Sam and Chief Public Prosecutor Ho received their legal degrees from Chinese universities, they have also completed courses in local law and Portuguese language in Macau and Portugal and have worked at various levels of judicial administration in Macau prior to their appointment. Without knowing the backgrounds of other candidates that Edmund Ho could have chosen, one is unable to comment on whether it was their Mainland connections that was pivotal in their selection. See Alex Lo, 'Fears raised over young judges' independence', *South China Morning Post*, 10 October 1999. See also "Biodata of the Principal Officials" (<http://safpsql.informac.gov.mo/gcs/>).

There is a severe shortage of trained legal personnel in Macau.²¹ This state of affairs illustrates the shortcoming of the localisation program that continues to impact adversely on the judicial system in Macau, the causes of which has been discussed in the preceding chapter. The reforms engulf the Macanese community, which relies on the public service for the bulk of their employment; their concerns will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

The Executive Council

Giving advice to Edmund Ho is an Executive Council appointed by him. It is a prestigious body whose importance may be seen by the fact that members are paid a salary higher than that received by members of the Legislative Assembly.²² The political change brought about by the transfer of sovereignty is evident in the composition of the inaugural Executive Council. Unlike the previous councils, there is a marked absence of Macanese and Portuguese appointees. Their absence can only be guessed at. Perhaps they failed to gain the confidence of the Chief Executive and it was inexpedient to appoint them due to their close identification with the colonial regime. Equally, they have made themselves ineligible under Article 57 of the Macau Basic Law by being unwilling to renounce their Portuguese nationality. A notable omission is Stanley Ho, the casino magnate, who was a close confidant of past Macau governors. His exclusion can be interpreted as a governance issue —a precursor to the restructuring of the casino industry

²¹ Some believe that this should have been foreseen by the Portuguese government in the mid-1980s when negotiations over the future of Macau commenced. Financial and other inducements could have been offered to students to study law in Portuguese universities. The shortage of legal personnel in the court system in Macau is a reflection of the localisation process discussed in the previous chapter, although to ameliate the situation, the Portuguese administration did send many people including Chief Justice Sam and Chief Public Prosecutor Ho for courses in Portugal and Macau. See “Biodata of the Principal Officials” (<http://safpsql.informac.gov.mo/gcs/>).

then under consideration. However, some local residents suspected that Stanley Ho was dropped because he is too independent, difficult to control, and tainted with the scandal of the Orient Foundation, noted in the following section.²³

The membership of the Council includes the Chief Executive, the five Secretaries, and five appointees: Tong Chi-kin, Leong Heng-teng, Vitor Ng, Liu Chak-wan, and Ma Ioa-lai. The last, Ma Iao-lai, is seen largely as a mouthpiece for his father Ma Man-kei, the doyen of the Chinese community in Macau. Liu Chak-wan, considered one of Edmund Ho's closest allies, is the driving force behind the newly established University of Science and Technology, Macau. Vitor Ng has a power base within the Exporters Association while Tong Chi-kin has links to the Federation of Labour Unions.²⁴ Leong Heng-teng's power base is within the association of *kaifongs* — neighbourhood organisations that rose in political influence when the electoral laws were changed in the 1980s.²⁵

The Legislative Assembly²⁶

Straddling the transfer of sovereignty is a Legislature that has already undergone significant changes in the top two posts. Anabela Ritchie, a Macanese, stepped down from the Presidency of the Assembly in October 1999, a position she had occupied since

²² Gilberto Lopes, "Macau on the same path again", *MacaU*, June 2000, p. 13.

²³ Despite not being appointed to the Executive Council, Stanley Ho remains a member of Macau's Economic Council. Presided over by the Chief Executive Edmund Ho, it comprises 30 representatives from Macau's various industries. See *MacaU*, August 2000, "Economic Council Meeting", p. 68.

²⁴ Lo Shui-hing, *Political Development in Macau*, p. 108 (note 19).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 68. According to Lo Shiu-hing, the *kaifongs* developed out of a need to bridge the gap between the government and the people, particularly under the Portuguese. Without them, the Portuguese "finds it difficult to govern the densely populated Macau."

²⁶ Prior to 1999, the literature has called the Macau Legislature, the "Legislative Assembly". However, the Basic Law document calls it the "Legislative Council", in line with its equivalent organisation in Hong Kong. In order not to confuse the readers, I have adopted the old name "Assembly" when referring to this organisation in Macua, both before and after 1999.

1992. The reason, it is believed, was because she was unwilling to renounce her Portuguese nationality to comply with the requirement of Article 72 of the Constitution. Yet it remains speculative whether she could have held onto the Presidency due to the changed political circumstance. Instead, the position was won by Susana Chow, who became the first Chinese in the history of Macau to do so.²⁷ Chow is a businesswoman with a background in the knitwear industry. Originally from Shanghai, she has been a member of Macau's Legislature since 1976, except for one term (1980-1984) and is known for her outspokenness "even when this ruffles feathers among ultra-conservatives and pro-democracy activists alike."²⁸ This "through-train" Legislative Assembly had five Macanese members, which included Anabela Ritchie, Leonel Alves, Jose Rodrigues and Philip Xavier and Joao Baptista Leao. Alves, Rodrigues and Xavier are lawyers while Leao is in the employ of the casino magnate Stanley Ho.²⁹

The first post-handover elections, held in 2001, were distinguished by the success of the pro-democracy group, *Associação do Novo Macau Democrático* (ANMD). Led by Ng Kuok-cheong and Au Kam-san, the group polled the highest with about twenty-one per cent of the votes.³⁰ Two Macanese members, Anabela Ritchie and Joao Baptista Leao, were not returned but Leonel Alves, Philip Xavier and Jose Rodrigues retain their seats.³¹ The election of Jorge Fão as part of businessman David Chow's team brings the number of Macanese in the current Assembly to four, out of a total of twenty-seven

²⁷ Harald Bruning, "Macau veteran wins top post", *South China Morning Post*, 13 October 1999.

²⁸ Harald Bruning, "Legislature should boost role", *South China Morning Post*, 20 October 2001.

²⁹ Harald Bruning, "Appointed legislators named" *South China Morning Post*, 25 September 1999.

³⁰ "Legislative Assembly Elections", *MacaU*, December 2001, pp. 90-91.

³¹ Leao's omission is understandable in the light of Stanley Ho's omission from the Executive Council and widely seen as a move by the government to distance itself from any casino interest in preparation to the broadening of its franchise to attract new entrants to the industry.

members.³² The success of the ANDM candidates does not appear to lead to a visible increase in political activism although there were street demonstrations over the high level of unemployment the year before.³³ Certainly, the Falun Gong in Macau — ostensibly a group promoting exercise and meditation but banned in the Mainland — believes that the “general political climate does not leave them much leeway to pursue their activities in public”, different to Hong Kong where their public protests have been widely publicised. According to Harald Bruning, Falun Gong has little support in Macau because many residents regard them as “troublemakers from outside”.³⁴

The Municipal Organisation

The Macau Basic Law (MBL Art. 95) foreshadows the overhaul of the municipal councils — *Leal Senado* and *Camara Municipal das Illhas* — so that they are “hot organs of political power”. Such councils, according to C. R. Boxer, were a feature of the Portuguese colonial regime, which provided a platform for settlers such as the Macanese to exercise some influence in the affairs that concern them.³⁵ Macau’s *Leal Senado* had a history dating back to 1583 but in the post-1999 environment, it was seen as a relic of the colonial past.³⁶ The scrapping of these institutions and their replacement by the General Office for Civil Affairs, in October 2001, was viewed by the Portuguese and Macanese

³² ‘Legislative Assembly elections’, *MacaU*, December 2001, p. 90. In selecting Xavier and Rodrigues, Edmund Ho is continuing a past convention adopted by past Portuguese governors to use the appointed seats in the Assembly to balance the ethnic composition within the body — a continuity, which is very much appreciated by the Macanese community.

³³ Gilberto Lopes, ‘A year of MSAR’, *MacaU*, December 2000, pp. 9-28.

³⁴ Falun Gong raised the ire of China’s officialdom when its founder boasted that he has a following in China that is larger than the Communist Party. Banned in the Mainland, it carried on its protest in Hong Kong and around the world. See Harald Bruning, ‘Celebrating tolerance’, *South China Morning Post*, 28 April 2000. Also see Harald Bruning, ‘Falun gong finds few friends in bastion of patriotism’, *South China Morning Post*, 12 May 2001.

³⁵ C. R. Boxer, *Portuguese Society in the Tropics* (Milwaukee USA: University of Wisconsin, 1965).

³⁶ Harald Bruning, ‘Structural ‘ sea change’’, *South China Morning Post*, 27 October 2001.

communities with sadness as a failure to respect their historic legacy.³⁷ With a staff of two thousand, Civil Affairs has a complex structure that includes an Administrative Council of seven, a Supervisory Committee of three, a Consultative Council of twenty-five members, and a Statute Monitoring Committee of nine—all appointed by Edmund Ho, Macau's Chief Executive.³⁸ Initially, the Macanese community has been well represented, in particular at the Administrative Council level where three of the seven members were Macanese. These appointees – Rita Botelho dos Santos, Marcelo dos Remedios and Isabel Celest Jorge – have earned their place through long service with the superseded bodies.³⁹ In my interview with her, Santos described her job at Civil Affairs—where she had responsibility for quarantine, the pig slaughter houses, hawkers and markets—as a mix of administration and politics. Setting aside the historical discontinuity, she believed that the depoliticisation of the organisation was a positive step towards a more efficient local government—a sentiment shared by the veteran Macau journalist Harald Bruning, who wrote:

Most community leaders have welcomed the announced change and hope it will raise the urban administration's managerial efficiency and responsiveness to public grievances, the widely perceived lack of which has been the target of many a complaint by the public.⁴⁰

In April 2003, Rita Santos left Civil Affairs to head the new Secretariat for the Forum of Portuguese Speaking Countries.⁴¹

³⁷ Nuno Lima Bastos, in Gilberto Lopes, "A year of MSAR", *MacaU*, December 2000, pp. 25-26.

³⁸ The board members act as a sounding board to gauge the views of their constituents towards the various programs.

³⁹ "Municipal Council replaced by Civil Affairs", *MacaU*, December 2001, pp. 12-14.

⁴⁰ Harald Bruning, 'Structural ' sea change' *South China Morning Post*, 27 October 2001.

⁴¹ 'Co-operation Forum', *MacaU*, June 2003, p. 92.

External relations: old ties, new focus

This section surveys the relations between Macau and China, and between Macau and Portugal, which are subject to new imperatives due to the transfer of sovereignty. The patriotic euphoria that accompanied decolonisation set in train a conscious effort by the Macau government to emphasise China's national interests. In his inaugural speech, Edmund Ho hinted at China's aspirations and the part that Macau can play in their enhancement. Among these are China's developmental needs, her desire for national reunification with Taiwan, and the consolidation of her international prestige. Unreservedly Ho declared: "We are duty-bound to combine Macau's interests with those of the State. Our goal is to benefit and achieve prosperity for both China and Macau."⁴² Three years later, at a Chinese New Year reception given by the Liaison Office of the Central Government in Macau, Edmund Ho stated that Macau would not disappoint China or lose faith in the principle of "one country, two systems".⁴³ In aligning Macau's interests with China's, Ho also was motivated by contemporary economic realities —as will be discussed presently.

In the aftermath of 1999, Portugal's relationship with her former colony, Macau, has entered uncharted waters because under MBL Art. 13, the Chinese government is responsible for foreign affairs. Yet, there is scope for Macau "to conduct relevant external affairs" within a limited area according to MBL Art. 136:

The Macao Special Administrative Region may, on its own, using the name "Macao, China", maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements with foreign states and regions and relevant

⁴² *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, July 2001, p. 89.

international organizations in the appropriate fields, including the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications, tourism, cultural, science and technology, and sports fields.

In the pursuit of external relations, Macau is required to juggle the “delicate balance between autonomy and coordination with the Central Government”, as Miguel Santos Neves, a doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics, has observed.⁴⁴ Perhaps mindful of this, Edmund Ho made no mention of Portugal in the official speeches on his first day as the Chief Executive.

In the first year, Macau’s relations with her former colonial master was an uneasy one, marred by yet another financial scandal and hampered by the miniscule amount of trade. Barely one month after the end of Portuguese rule, a financial scandal rocked Macau involving the last Governor Vasco Rocha Vieira and the Jorge Alvares Foundation (JAF) based in Portugal.⁴⁵ It appears that on his final day as Governor of Macau, Vieira had authorised several transfers of funds, including one to JAF amounting to one hundred million Macau patacas (equivalent to twenty million Australian dollars). The transfer —although legal and claimed to have been made with the prior knowledge of the Portuguese President and the incoming Chief Executive —was nevertheless seen by many, including one Portuguese judge, Nuno Lima Basto, as unethical, particularly when it was later revealed that JAF is to be presided over by Vieira himself.⁴⁶ Basto felt that Portugal’s reputation had been besmirched by Vieira’s actions and the comments

⁴³ *MacaU*, March 2003, “Hard work”, p. 89.

⁴⁴ Miguel Santos Neves, “Macau and Europe: the Challenges of the Paradiplomacy Game”, a paper presented at the International Conference in 2001 and subsequently published in *Macau on the Threshold of the Third Millennium* (Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 2003), p. 174.

⁴⁵ Harald Bruning, “Mixed signals on \$100m cultural fund”, *South China Morning Post*, 25 January 2000.

⁴⁶ Nuno Lima Bastos, in Gilberto Lopes, “A year of MSAR”, *MacaU*, December 2000, p. 26.

Vieira made to the international media during his last day of tenure, which proved to be untrue. To date, the full story on this scandal has not yet emerged, despite being confined to “the dustbin of history” in the interest of building a constructive relationship with Portugal.⁴⁷ Some believed that Vieira was the victim of political intrigue based in Portugal and that he had also compromised himself by accepting the position with JAF.

This financial scandal carries similar overtones to the one involving the Orient Foundation, which erupted in Macau in the 1990s but the seeds of discord were sown in December 1986, when the Macau Government extended the casino franchise until 2001. As consideration for extending the franchise, the licensee STDM (*Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau*) provided the initial capital of 212 million Macau patacas to establish the Orient Foundation (*Fundação Oriente*) to be based in Lisbon. In addition, a further 100 million was to be paid by 30 June 1990, representing a total of over forty million United States dollars.⁴⁸ According to Article 3 of its By-laws, the Orient Foundation’s objectives are:

[To] pursue activities of a cultural, educational, artistic, scientific, social and philanthropic nature, namely in Portugal and Macao, that shall aim to develop and continue the historical and cultural ties linking Portugal and the Orient, specifically China.⁴⁹

Further, the Foundation was to receive an annual franchise fee from STDM, believed to have amounted to between US\$ 40 million and US\$ 100 million annually.⁵⁰ Carlos

⁴⁷ Harald Bruning, “Macau seeks to reinforce its unique position on world stage”, *South China Morning Post*, 11 October 2002.

⁴⁸ “Fundação Oriente – The Foundation – Bylaws”, Article No. 4, www.foriente.pt/En/estatutos, (accessed 2 April 2004)

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, Article No. 3.

⁵⁰ Lo, *Political Development in Macau*, p. 28

Monjardino, the Macau government official responsible for negotiating the casino franchise extension, left the Macau Government to head up the Foundation. Understandably, the decision attracted much controversy, which marred Sino-Portuguese relations for a while. According to Lo Shui-hing, the Chinese viewed the payments as a misappropriation of Macau's public finances and the Administration's decision, taken a year before the Sino-Portuguese Agreement in 1987, as preempting their own policy towards the future of the casino sector in Macau.⁵¹ The ensuing furore damaged Sino-Portuguese relations until a resolution of sorts was reached in 1995.⁵²

It did not help that Macau's trade with Portugal was abysmally small. In 1999, it accounted for less than one percent of [Macau's] total trade, ranking below Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Sweden —as the following table shows:

Table 3: Macau: Imports and Exports for 1999

	<u>Imports</u>		<u>Exports</u>	
Total (million MOP)	16300	100	17580	100
China (Mainland)	5809	35.64	1617	9.2
France	281	1.72	920	5.23
Germany	864	5.3	1547	8.8
Hong Kong	2945	18.07	1195	6.8
Italy	185	1.13	125	0.71
Portugal	141	0.87	35	0.2
Sweden	65	0.4	175	1.0
Taiwan	1550	9.51	214	1.22
United Kingdom	384	2.36	1302	7.41
United States	831	5.1	8249	46.92
European Union [♥]	2103	12.9	5304	30.17

♥This includes the figures given for the EU countries above.

Source: Macau Statistics and Census Service, *Yearbook of Statistics 2000*, pp. 239-240.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 27-28. Lo makes a forceful argument that the controversy over the Orient Foundation was targeted at Stanley Ho and STD M, not the Foundation itself.

⁵² Ibid., p. 49 (note 42). Stanley Ho, the controlling shareholder in STD M proposed to pay the Orient Foundation out of STD M's earnings while the casino franchise fee would be paid to a new foundation agreed to by the Chinese.

Portuguese investments in Macau have been described as “very limited”, confined to the infrastructure sector, where monopolistic conditions existed, and the banking sector.⁵³ Further aggravations exist when the Portuguese community in Macau felt that the new government had encroached upon their sensitivities through various acts, which were perceived as anti-Portuguese. Nuno Lima Basto, a Portuguese judge in Macau, illustrates thus:

From a Portuguese point of view, the Macau Special Administrative Region did not get off to a good start: removing or, as in most cases, covering Portuguese official symbols on public buildings and even monuments (such as the coat of arms of the *Portas do Cerco*⁵⁴) immediately after the transfer of sovereignty ... were not the best augury ... of any feelings of respect for our country’s legacy and, subsequently our presence in these lands. Let’s confess that this attitude shocked us ... [For us] certain extremes were reached as was the case of changing the old name of *Leal Senado*⁵⁵ (Loyal Senate) to the insipid designation ‘Provisional Municipality of Macau’ that covers the lettering on the building.⁵⁶

Such expressions of shock and hurt feelings indicate how out of touch some Portuguese were with the aspirations of the majority of the local populace who welcomed the reunification with China. Moreover, the Portuguese perspective of their past in Macau

⁵³ Neves, “Macau and Europe: the Challenges of the Paradiplomacy Game”, p. 154.

⁵⁴ The historic gate between Macau and the Zhuhai that delineated the border with China.

⁵⁵ *Leal Senado* – Macau’s municipal council founded in 1583 (see p. 125 above).

⁵⁶ Nuno Lima Bastos, in Gilberto Lopes, “A year of MSAR”, *MacaU*, December 2000, p. 25.

differs somewhat from the Chinese. This became evident in April 2002, when anti-Portuguese sentiments were raised in a local Macau newspaper, which claimed that:

[Portugal had] left little more behind than outdated laws and an economy in a bad state ... that Lisbon had [in the 1990s] used Macau's financial resources to subsidise Portuguese organisations overseas, and that Portuguese construction and engineering enterprises had taken 'bags full of money' from Macau without doing much for its technical development.⁵⁷

The criticism was a veiled reference to the financial scandals over the Orient Foundation and Jorge Alvares Foundation, mentioned previously, as well as to the massive construction projects undertaken in the final decade of Portuguese rule, not all of which were appreciated by the residents. According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (24 December 1998):

Many among the territory's Chinese people are convinced that the departing Portuguese ... are squeezing Macau dry before December 20, 1999.⁵⁸

Indubitably, a Portuguese judge in Macau — Nuno Lima Basto — conceded, in December 2000, that some of the projects were of questionable value:

When there was the opportunity to cement, in a figurative sense, our presence in Macau, we opted for the easier choice: we cement it literally.

We built monument after monument, many in questionable taste, in the

⁵⁷ Harald Bruning, 'Free press weathers storm over attack on Lisbon rule', *South China Morning Post*, 12 April 2002.

⁵⁸ Bertil Linter, 'End of an Empire', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 December 1998.

name of a friendship that was not always very mutual, while the human factor was neglected.⁵⁹

With such uneasy relationship, it surprised many that Edmund Ho chose Portugal as the destination for his first overseas trip in May 2000. The following year, in September 2001, Ho visited Portugal again. By then it had become clear that the purpose of these trips was to enlist Portugal's help across a range of areas —including health, public administration, training and the provision of legal personnel —to fill an urgent need in Macau.⁶⁰ The transfer of sovereignty had serious repercussions for the expatriates on secondment from the Portuguese civil service. It triggered a sudden departure of medical specialists and judicial personnel from Macau, provoking a crisis in health care and slowing down the courts. According to *MacaU*:

Lisbon has been accused of abandoning the Portuguese living in Macau, who considered it inadmissible that Portugal should present problems regarding the continued presence of qualified professionals in an area as delicate as healthcare.⁶¹

Ho's visits have improved the bilateral relations; together with visits at the ministerial level, a new relationship has been forged between Macau and her former colonial master.⁶²

Although it has been observed that fewer Portuguese are visible on the streets of Macau, they remain a significant presence.⁶³ The Macau Census 2001 reveals that over

⁵⁹ Nuno Lima Bastos, in Gilberto Lopes, "A year of MSAR", *MacaU*, December 2000, p. 26.

⁶⁰ "MSAR and Portugal sign framework cooperation agreement", *MacaU*, June 2001, p. 85; "More doctors", *MacaU*, March 2002, p. 87.

⁶¹ "MSAR and Portugal sign framework cooperation agreement", *MacaU*, June 2001, p. 85.

⁶² *Ibid.*; "Co-operation", "Agreement", *MacaU*, September 2001, pp. 85-86.

⁶³ Gilberto Lopes, "A year of MSAR", *MacaU*, December 2000, pp. 9-28

1,700 Macau residents listed Portugal as their place of birth.⁶⁴ They continue to be prominent in the areas of health care, the legal profession, architecture, and engineering. Macau's oldest banking institution, Banco Ultramarino, the major utilities such as the electricity and telephone companies, where Portuguese interests retain a significant stake, are largely managed by Portuguese personnel. In the arena of sports, the two-week long sojourn by the Portuguese national soccer squad in Macau as they prepared for the 2002 Soccer World Cup competition in South Korea, was a master-stroke in public relations for both Portugal and Macau.⁶⁵ In scheduling a friendly match between the Chinese and Portuguese national teams, Macau enhanced her image as having contributed something useful to China. For the duration of the World Cup competition, a swell of pro-Portugal frenzy was evident among the local Chinese in the grip of World Cup fever.⁶⁶

In 2003, Portugal boosted Macau's image further by using her considerable influence to ensure that the territory became the venue for the Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (FETCPC) in October of that year. This Forum brought together the eight Portuguese-speaking countries of the world: Portugal, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, East Timor and the Atlantic island state of Sao Tome and Principe. With a combined population of 220 million, their trade with China is not insignificant, and the diplomatic repercussions are positive for China among the smaller members of the United Nations. In the first six months of 2003, China imported US\$3.53 billion from these Lusophone countries while exports reached US\$1.2 billion.⁶⁷ To put these figures in

⁶⁴ Isabel Castro, "Who we are and how many we are", *MacaU*, June 2002, p. 16.

⁶⁵ in May 2002

⁶⁶ Gilberto Lopes, "Football takes Macau to the World Cup", *MacaU*, June 2002, pp. 5-14.

⁶⁷ Harald Bruning, "China to trade on Macau' s heritage", *South China Morning Post*, 13 October 2003.

perspective, Guangzhou, the largest export centre in southern China (excluding Hong Kong) exported US\$ 9.5 billion worth of goods in 2000 (see Table 4 below). Annualised, China's export to the Forum countries is equivalent to a quarter of Guangzhou's export figures —a substantial level indeed.⁶⁸

The decision by the Chinese Government to convene the forum in Macau triennially has multilateral impact.⁶⁹ For Portugal, it is the culmination of efforts over the past four years to define a new triangular relationship with China and Macau. Locally, the decision vindicates the stand taken by Edmund Ho when he urged the residents of Macau 'to rid themselves of 'colonial complexes' and to take advantage of the enclave's unique characteristics, created by its four-century long history.'⁷⁰ It signifies Beijing's endorsement for Macau to act as a bridge between China and the Portuguese-speaking world as well as Europe —a role foreshadowed by Ho in 1999. But there is no denying that Macau deserves this honour. Since 1999, Macau has hosted official delegations from the Portuguese-speaking countries, such as from Cape Verde in 2000.⁷¹ Macau is also home to various groups of people from the Portuguese-speaking world. Every year, a festival —the *Festa da Lusofonia* (Lusophone Festival of Macau) —is organised by the Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau at Taipa.⁷² The three-day event includes musical performances, traditional games, handicrafts and foods from the various Portuguese-

⁶⁸ Source: *Statistical Yearbook, Guangdong Socioeconomic Monthly*, quoted in *South China Morning Post*, 23 February 2002.

⁶⁹ Harald Bruning, 'China to trade on Macau' s heritage', *South China Morning Post*, 13 October 2003.

⁷⁰ Harald Bruning, 'Cultural identity', *South China Morning Post*, 27 December 2002.

⁷¹ "Cabo Verde and MSAR", *MacaU*, August 2000, p. 71.

⁷² 'Festival', *MacaU*, June 2001, pp. 86-87. Organised annually in June.

speaking communities around the world. At the 2002 event, Edmund Ho was photographed sampling one of the many foods on offer.⁷³

Regarding the European Union (EU), Macau's interests have traditionally been promoted by Portugal. In 1999, the EU countries accounted for 21.8 percent of Macau's total trade, ranking third behind the United States (26.8 percent) and Mainland China (21.9) — see Table 3 above. European investments in Macau are mainly in the infrastructure sector: electricity and water supply, telecommunications and airport — attracted, according to one observer, by the opportunity to capture monopoly profits.⁷⁴ European banks, which include the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation domiciled in London, are also prominent —holding nine out of the twenty-two licenses and accounting for approximately twenty five percent of the sector's activities. Since 1999, Macau has upgraded its representative office in Brussels, indicative of the importance of its links with the EU.⁷⁵ The appointment of the former Hong Kong governor Christopher Patten as EU's External Relations Commissioner has been a welcome development in view of his familiarity and past connections with Macau. Patten's first official report in 2001 was warmly praised by the media in Macau.⁷⁶ Despite the above, as an entity, EU's relations with Macau —initiated through the existence of the EU-Macau Trade and Co-operation Agreement in 1992 and the annual EU-Macau Joint Committee meetings —have not lived up to the latter's expectations. In

⁷³ “Lusophone Festival”, *MacaU* June 2002, pp. 78-79.

⁷⁴ Neves “Macau and Europe: the Challenges of the Paradiplomacy Game”.

⁷⁵ Gilberto Lopes, “Brussels Trade Delegation”, *MacaU*, August 2000, p. 15.

⁷⁶ European Commission, “Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, First Annual Report by the European Commission on the Macao Special Administrative Region”, 25 July 2001, COM (2001) 432 final; Harald Bruning, “Patten nods official approval to his former getaway”, *South China Morning Post*, 18 August 2001.

fact, a local journalist has described the oft-touted closeness as ‘hot air’.⁷⁷ As others have also observed, EU member countries have tended to focus on the major centres such as Hong Kong, Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou — to the detriment of Macau — reflecting the reality that half of Europe’s trade with China pass through Hong Kong, where many European companies locate their regional headquarters.⁷⁸ With the latest expansion on 30 April 2004, the EU —with 25 countries and over 450 million people — has become the world’s largest trading bloc.⁷⁹ The enlarged EU has also become China’s biggest trading partner, which the *Far Eastern Economic Review* magazine sees as forming “a counter weight to the United States”.⁸⁰ Such a role was already foreseen by Edmund Ho, in 2001: “It is of great importance for geo-strategic harmony in Asia that the European Union play a greater economic and political role in the region.”⁸¹ In making that statement, Ho may have breached protocol because the Basic Law does not permit him to engage in such geo-political concerns. The fact that his remarks are published in a government publication indicates the confident relationship that exists between Ho and the Chinese Government and underscores his desire to align Macau’s interests with those of China, which holds similar views.⁸²

Clearly, such focus externally resurrects the idea of Macau acting as a ‘bridge’, which had become a cliché in the final decade of Portuguese rule. In 1996, it led to the

⁷⁷ Harald Bruning, ‘Enough hot air, the EU must deliver the goods’, *South China Morning Post*, 23 June 2001.

⁷⁸ Miguel Santos Neves and Brian Bridges, ‘From Bilateralism to a Common Approach? The EU, China, Hong Kong and Macau’, in Neves and Bridges (eds.), *Europe, China and the Two SARs: Towards a New Era* (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 259-279.

⁷⁹ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, ‘Europe United At Last’, *The Sun-Herald*, 2 May 2004, p. 67.

⁸⁰ ‘European Union: Best Friends’, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 167, No.18, 6 May 2004. (internet edition).

⁸¹ *MacaU*, June 2001, ‘Partnership’, p. 87.

formation of the Sino-Latin Foundation, a private organisation chaired by Gary Ngai, a regular participant in conferences on Macau.⁸³ In the same organisation is Fok Kai-cheong, the Macau historian from Hong Kong. Their idea has resonance in the Mainland from Liu Ji at the China Social Sciences Institute.⁸⁴ But it is Edmund Ho's endorsement that proves pivotal.⁸⁵ In the interview with the *South China Morning Post* cited at the beginning of this chapter, Ho responded to skepticism that the idea of 'Macau as a bridge' is mere symbolism:

I think we have more to offer than a symbolic role. Of course, when it comes to the big multi-national companies, they don't need our help. They can go and speak to people in Beijing themselves, they have the connections. ... Macau would not cater for the big companies, but for medium sized and even the small businesses, I think we can cater for them, and we can work closely within the delta region.

We cannot provide this kind of service for Shanghai or Beijing, but I think we can pave the way for projects in this region [Pearl River Delta]. So we will be positioning Macau as a point of entry for the delta region. ... So it's a matter of knowing what role we can play and by using our

⁸² It is widely believed that China desires to counter the over-bearing dominance of the United States in the Asian region. This view is the thrust of the cover report, 'China's love affair with Europe: driving business and trade', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 167, No. 6, 12 February 2004. (internet edition).

⁸³ Gary Ngai, 'Macau – an Ideal Base to Develop Sino-Latin Ties', *Macau Focus*, Vol. I, No.3, December 2001, pp. 47-57.

⁸⁴ Liu Ji, 'Strategic Analysis in Macau's post-handover of Sino-Portuguese relations', *Journal of Macau Studies*, No. 13, December 1999.

⁸⁵ Harald Bruning, 'Tiny Macau increasingly reliant on Beijing to play big role', *South China Morning Post*, 2 August, 2002.

resources to maximum effect, targeting ourselves to the right people in the right industries.⁸⁶

Looking back over the past five years, one can see that Ho has been unwavering in his conviction that this is a role that Macau can play in post-1999 era.

Economy: same business, different prospects

In his inaugural address, Edmund Ho set economic recovery and growth at the top of his government's agenda.⁸⁷ Macau's economic sluggishness has been blamed on the lingering effect of the 1997 Asian financial crisis but much of it is also structural, underscoring the ongoing challenge to diversify its economic activities. This section surveys two aspects of Macau's economy — diversification of its industrial base and economic integration within the Pearl River Delta region. Industrial diversification is constrained by Macau's small physical size and limited population. There are only 26.8 square kms of land, which includes the latest reclamation; in contrast, Zhuhai —the Chinese City adjacent to Macau — is 90 times larger while Hong Kong is 50 times larger. Population wise, Macau had just over 400,000 (2000 statistics); in comparison, Hong Kong, Shenzhen and Zhuhai had 6.8 million, 7 million and 1.2 million, respectively.⁸⁸ Diversification is also constrained by ideas, uncertain about what new industries to create and how to attract them. He stated thus:

⁸⁶ Jason Gagliardi and Harald Bruning, 'Leader looks to future', *South China Morning Post*, 19 December 1999.

⁸⁷ *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, July 2001, p. 87.

⁸⁸ *Statistical Yearbook, Guangdong Socioeconomic Monthly*, cited in *South China Morning Post*, 23 February 2002.

In terms of economic diversification, there is no point in jumping the gun. First, we need to make sure the industries that are successful remain successful and healthy. Then, the next stage would be to use the resources generated to create one or two new industries and at the same time look at industries facing problems, how to assist them, or at least how they can make a transfer. It won' t be easy. But the most important thing is to focus on the ones that are working, and help them to work better. Otherwise, we will be facing some big problems.⁸⁹

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Macau's economy has been dominated by four sectors — tourism, casinos, real estate and clothing and textiles.⁹⁰ Tourism has been savaged by the Asian economic crisis of 1997 and the triads turf wars of the late 1990s, which kept visitors away in droves. Concerns over crime laid waste Macau's aspirations to become a financial centre for, as one observer remarked, if Macau cannot rein in crime and control corruption in its casino sector, there is little chance of her doing so in the finance sector.⁹¹ Diversification in the tourism sector —beyond casinos —is largely a three-pronged approach: getting tourists to stay a little longer, diversifying the tourism products on offer and broadening the sources of tourists visiting Macau. The Macau governments have achieved moderate success in promoting culture, museums and events such as the Macau Grand Prix and the Macau International Music Festival. Since 1999, sports tourism has been added to the list, vigorously pursued by Manuel Silvério, a

⁸⁹ Jason Gagliardi and Harald Bruning, 'Leader looks to future', *South China Morning Post*, 19 December 1999.

⁹⁰ Berlie (ed.), *Macao 2000*, p. 37.

⁹¹ According to Robert Haney Scott, the level of crime and corruption in the casino sector has negative repercussion on Macau's financial system. See R. H. Scott, 'Macao's Financial System and its Future', in Jean Berlie (ed.), *Macao 2000*, pp. 162-181.

Macanese and former President of the Macau Sports Institute. Silvério is unceasing in promoting Macau as a venue for international games and has succeeded in capturing the prize of hosting the 2005 East Asian Games.⁹²

The expansion of tourism products is transparent in the decision, in 2002, to grant two out of the three gaming licences to operators from Las Vegas hoping to replicate their successes in promoting family-style attractions in tandem with casinos. To compete, even Stanley Ho, the veteran casino magnate, feels compelled to incorporate family attractions, including an artificial volcano and a ‘Fisherman’s Wharf’ in his winning submission.⁹³ Notably the casino sector escaped mention in the official addresses delivered by Edmund Ho on his first day of office but some guarded comments were made in the interview, cited at the beginning of this chapter, in which he foreshadowed reforms to the gaming sector.⁹⁴ This is arguably the biggest change in Macau since 1999. The three successful syndicates were announced in February 2002 together with their ambitious developmental plans. Stanley Ho’s new syndicate Sociedade de Jogos de Macau (SJM) plans to invest MP\$4.7 billion (equivalent to US\$ 600 million) in new gaming facilities and tourist attractions. The second syndicate, associated with Wynn Resorts in Las Vegas, pledges to spend a similar amount while the third, the Galaxy Casino syndicate, associated with Las Vegas’ Venetian Group, proposes to spend MP\$

⁹² Gilberto Lopes, ‘Thinking ahead to the mini-Olympic games’, *MacaU*, December 2001, pp. 29-48.

⁹³ Gilberto Lopes, ‘The new gaming lords’, *MacaU*, March 2002, pp. 4-19.

⁹⁴ Edmund Ho stated: ‘Everybody is expecting that the gaming industry needs reform. Whether 2001 is the right time or it should be a bit later, well, we don’ t want to rush into things. The gaming industry is and I think always will be an important part of Macau’ s economy, so any government must take a responsible course in view of an issue like this.’ See Jason Gagliardi and Harald Bruning, ‘Leader looks to future’, *South China Morning Post*, 19 December 1999.

8.8 billion (equivalent to US\$ 1.1 billion).⁹⁵ With such spending, it is expected that a construction boom will ensue that will revitalise Macau in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the Macau tycoon Henry Fok Ying-tung, one of Stanley Ho's former casino partners, said, in April 2002:

I think what the Chief Executive has to fret about is not where to make more money but how to spend the large amount of money now that three companies are [in the gambling business].⁹⁶

The future of Macau's clothing and textile industry —its largest exporter by far —appears under threat due to the scheduled elimination of export quotas to the United States in 2005. In that eventuality, suppliers in lower cost locations in the Mainland will have a competitive edge, raising fears of job losses as companies relocate. The push by Macau to develop, jointly with Zhuhai, a cross border industrial zone in 2004 has been seen as offering a viable alternative to the current manufacturers in Macau.⁹⁷ In addition, Macau sees opportunity for its firms in China's accession to the World Trade Organisation. Accordingly, the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), concluded with China in October 2003, offers Macau (and Hong Kong) based firms an advantage through earlier access to the Mainland markets.⁹⁸ The Agreement provides duty free access to the Mainland and preferential treatment for an extensive range of goods and services from Hong Kong and Macau.⁹⁹ According to Francis Tam, Secretary

⁹⁵ Harald Bruning, "Third casino licence winner unveils \$8.8 billion plans", *South China Morning Post*, 22 February 2002.

⁹⁶ Shirley Lau, "Tycoon still friends with Stanley Ho", *South China Morning Post*, 2 April 2002.

⁹⁷ Harald Bruning, "Opportunity knocks", *South China Morning Post*, 24 October 2003.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ In Macau's case, the product categories (not including the trade in services and investments) represent 96 percent of her total exports in 2002. See Isabel Castro, "Mainland and Macao Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement", *MacaU*, December 2003, p. 53.

for Economy and Finance, CEPA ‘[opens] up a market of 1,300 million to MSAR’s businessmen, [broadens] the horizons of our local industrialists, [and encourages] foreign businessmen to use Macau as a platform to enter the Chinese market.’¹⁰⁰ If Macau firms respond to the opportunities, her economy will be further integrated with that of the Mainland.

Few doubt that Macau’s economic future will become inexorably intertwined with that of the Mainland, in particular, the Pearl River Delta area —an economic region of fifty million inhabitants and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of over US\$ 250 billion, as the following table shows:

Table 4: Economic statistics for the Pearl River Delta area (Year 2000)

	GDP (US\$bn)	Per Capita GDP (US\$)	Population (m)	Exports (US\$bn)
Macau ♥	6.4	14,868.80	0.435	2.3
Hong Kong	163	24,100.00	6.8	203
PRD	89.2	2179.30	39.4	73.4
Guangzhou	29.7	2,945.90	9.9	9.5
Shenzhen	20.8	2919.60	7	30.4
Foshan	11.9	2,216.40	5.3	5.2
Jiangmen	7.1	1,743.00	4	2.1
Dongguan	6.2	945.5	6.4	15.6
Huizhou	5.5	1,687.70	3.2	3.9
Zhuhai	4.3	3,375.50	1.2	3.1
Zhongshan	3.9	1,600.80	2.4	3.6

♥Source for Macau figures: Macau Statistics and Census Service, *Yearbook of Statistics 2000*, using a conversion rate of MOP 7.7 to US\$1.0. For other figures, the source is *Statistic Yearbook – Guangdong Economic Monthly*, cited in *South China Morning Post*, 23 February 2002.

Although Edmund Ho has, in his inaugural address, described further integration as inevitable, there is little argument that the process had commenced long before

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

1999.¹⁰¹ But economic integration means different things to different people within the Pearl River Delta region. For Hong Kong and Macau, a key component is the ready access to cheaper land and labour resources for their new and expanding industries. This has prompted Macau to join Zhuhai to develop Hengqin Island for tourism and to reclaim the land adjoining Green Island for a cross-border industrial zone.¹⁰² Another essential element concerns the dismantling of rigidities that hampered the flow of people, goods, services and investments within the region. Hence, Shenzhen looks at further relaxation of its joint venture rules and Hong Kong is considering the issue of twenty-four hour border crossings and multiple entry visas for people from the Mainland.¹⁰³ Officials in Mainland cities tend to view economic integration as an opportunity to gain access to expertise and foreign investment to develop their industrial capabilities, often with little regard for their impact on Hong Kong or Macau. The competitiveness of some officials such as the Guangzhou mayor Lin Shusen – who appears intent to recapture the city’s former economic supremacy over Hong Kong – has been reported in Hong Kong media with a certain sense of alarm.¹⁰⁴ Such a competitive spirit has contributed to the apparent duplication and competition in infrastructure facilities. As a result, in 2002, there were five international airports and seven container terminal ports within the Pearl

¹⁰¹ *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, July 2001, p. 88.

¹⁰² Gilberto Lopes, “Cross-border industrial zone to get underway by mid-2003”, *MacaU*, March 2003, pp. 24-26.

¹⁰³ Antoine So and Ella Lee, “Shenzhen relaxes joint-venture rule”, *South China Morning Post*, 20 March 2002; Chow Chung-Yan and Peggy Sito, “Multiple-entry visas for mainlanders”, *South China Morning Post*, 10 April 2002.

¹⁰⁴ Mayor Lin said: ‘Even in the 1950s Guangzhou’s economy was better than Hong Kong’s. Lots of people were unemployed in Hong Kong then and we hired them to work in Guangzhou. But during the Cultural Revolution we closed our doors and Hong Kong took the opportunity to develop labour-intensive industries. Since our reform and opening, Hong Kong has transferred its labour-intensive industries to the Pearl River Delta. In the early 1980s, Hong Kong factories employed about 800,000 workers in the delta. Now they employ millions of workers, which has contributed to the prosperity of Hong Kong and its

River Delta region.¹⁰⁵ The airport at Zhuhai, bordering on Macau, is struggling for economic viability and is reportedly seeking foreign investment to help solve its gross under-utilisation.¹⁰⁶ Macau's airport, also under-utilised, is threatened by the prospect of direct air-links between Taiwan and parts of the Mainland.¹⁰⁷

Moreover, economic integration assumes different roles for different participants. What these entail for Hong Kong and Macau —as for the others —has yet to emerge.¹⁰⁸ Hong Kong is being challenged by the revitalisation of Mainland cities like Shanghai. Research published in 2001 by the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC) shows that Shanghai is home to over 15,000 foreign-funded enterprises and that over half of the top 500 global companies are represented there.¹⁰⁹ Little wonder then that many foreign firms are bypassing Hong Kong in favour of the Mainland due to the lower costs and “an incredible deep pool of high quality human resources.”¹¹⁰ Nearly five years after the transfer of sovereignty, Hong Kong is troubled by her growing marginalisation as a trading and financial entrepot, and an element of self-doubt has crept in.¹¹¹ Increasingly, it is widely believed that orchestration and a moderating influence is required of the Chinese Government if economic integration is to be beneficial to all. Accordingly, in

citizens.” See Tom Mitchell, ‘SAR rivalry ' good for Guangzhou' ’*South China Morning Post*, 23 March 2002.

¹⁰⁵ Ambrose Leung, ‘Tsang starts Pearl River Delta tour to promote closer ties’, *South China Morning Post*, 25 March 2002.

¹⁰⁶ Tom Mitchell, ‘Zhuhai airport seeks foreign cash’, *South China Morning Post*, 30 March 2002.

¹⁰⁷ Harald Bruning and Joseph Lo, ‘Macau airport throughput soars’, *South China Morning Post*, 4 April 2002.

¹⁰⁸ The developmental mantra is to “strengthen co-operation in the areas of infrastructure development, tourism and trade.” See ‘Edmund Ho: Co-operation with Guangdong’, *MacaU*, August 2000, p. 69.

¹⁰⁹ Hong Kong Trade Development Council, *The Two Cities: Shanghai – Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: HKTDC Research Department, March 2001), p. 5.

¹¹⁰ ‘Waking dragon attracts tigers’, *South China Morning Post*, 17 December 2001, p. 4.

¹¹¹ Simon Pritchard, ‘Dose of reality looks like being a bitter pill to swallow’, *South China Morning Post*, 26 December 2001. Pritchard writes: ‘Where only foreign journalists once sang the ‘death of Hong Kong’ tune, the same mantra is today heard from worn-out local businessmen.’

meetings with the Beijing leadership, the Macau Chief Executive Edmund Ho reminds the Central Government to keep in mind the needs of Hong Kong and Macau in the development of infrastructure projects in the Pearl River Delta region.¹¹² For Macau, the Delta Region appears poised to supplant Hong Kong as a dominant factor in her economic future in the twenty-first century. It is widely believed that Macau [and Hong Kong] will prosper if Beijing wants them to. Accordingly, Edmund Ho's resolve – as mentioned earlier in this section – to align Macau's interests with those of China and to strive for the prosperity of both is no mere rhetorical patriotism but holds enormous implications for Macau's economic future.

Society

In this section, I shall focus on some changes in the society, in particular the improvement in law and order and the maintenance of cultural and ethnic diversity. These issues dominated much of the initial discussions I had with various people in Macau. As such it is necessary to include them in this chapter, which purports to record the changes in Macau since December 1999.

Law and Order

By all accounts, the final years of the Portuguese administration were marred by triad turf wars and “an explosion of violence”, which damaged Macau's economy and tarnished its international image.¹¹³ Many blamed the decline of law and order in Macau on the depressed economic situation, but Lo Shiu-hing saw it as the outcome of a

¹¹² “Edmund Ho receives full support”, *MacaU*, March 2002, p. 88.

¹¹³ Bertil Linter, “End of an Empire”, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 December 1998.

decentralisation of power by the casino patriarch Stanley Ho to his younger subordinates.¹¹⁴ Edmund Ho, aware of its ramifications for Macau, made public security an urgent priority on his domestic agenda.¹¹⁵ Ho believed that the triad turf wars “reflect on the effectiveness of the SAR government as a whole, and on whether ‘one country, two systems’ is working well in Macau.”¹¹⁶ It is against such a backdrop that Macau residents welcomed the stationing of Chinese troops in the enclave upon the transfer of sovereignty, and since 1999, crimes of all sorts appear to have subsided. In the first year, dramatic reductions were recorded. Compared to 1999, homicide fell by 72.5 per cent, kidnappings by 66.7 per cent and robberies by 18.25 per cent.¹¹⁷ The reasons given for the dramatic improvement are more policing at the street level, the veiled presence of Chinese troops and greater co-operation between the law-enforcement agencies in Macau, Hong Kong and the Mainland.¹¹⁸ In 2001, Macau’s police force was re-organised and streamlined. From four separate independent forces they were merged into two: the Customs Office, headed by Choi Lai-hang, aged 36, and the Unitary Police Force headed by Chief Commander José Poença Branco, 43 years old.¹¹⁹

Since the retrocession to China, public sentiment has improved perceptibly as Harald Bruning, the veteran Macau reporter, has observed:

¹¹⁴ Lo Shiu-hing, “Macao’s Political System”, in Jean Berlie (ed.), *Macao 2000*, p. 63.

¹¹⁵ In his inaugural address, Edmund Ho stated: “I maintain that our crackdown on crime should be raised to the political level. We shall mobilise the whole government and public resources to protect the safety and stability of Macau.” See *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, July 2001, p. 88.

¹¹⁶ Jason Gagliardi and Harald Bruning, “Leader looks to future”, *South China Morning Post*, 19 December 1999.

¹¹⁷ “Crime”, *MacaU*, June 2001, p. 82.

¹¹⁸ Harald Bruning, “All but few bets riding on passage of casino legislation”, *South China Morning Post*, 4 August 2001.

¹¹⁹ Previously, there were four separate police forces, covering Judiciary, Public Security, Marine and Customs. See “Macao SAR Officials take oath of office”, <http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200109/17>.

Two years after its 'return to the Chinese Motherland', Macau is experiencing a period of political content and economic concern. ... Politically, Macau' s 440,000 residents seem to be quite content with their status. Unlike in Hong Kong, anti-Beijing sentiment is virtually non-existent, and there is little, if any, nostalgia for the old colonial times. ... Statistically, Macau' s gross domestic product per capita of US\$14,185 (HK\$110,500) corresponds to approximately 60 per cent of that of Hong Kong. Macau residents are, however, able to enjoy a better standard of living than their counterparts in Hong Kong, due mainly to much lower property and living costs. Little wonder that, unlike in the recent past, hardly any Macau residents seem interested in seeking employment in Hong Kong which is widely seen in Macau as a prohibitively expensive and excessively stressful city.¹²⁰

What Bruning did not mention, but which the evidence suggests, is that the decline in Hong Kong's appeal may also be attributable to a changed perception regarding employment prospects in Macau. Before 1999, the upper echelons of the public service were reserved for the expatriates from Portugal and a few select Macanese. However, localisation and a shortage of trained personnel provide opportunities for speedy advancement. In this regard, the selection by Edmund Ho of a youthful bilingual executive team sends a positive message that opportunities for advancement exist in Macau if they have the right qualifications and mental aptitudes.

¹²⁰ Harald Bruning, 'Political stability fails to dispel economic woes', *South China Morning Post*, 15 December 2001.

Ethnic and cultural diversity

Although overwhelmingly Chinese, Macau's population is by no means homogeneous. The ethnic Chinese consist of many different subgroups such as Cantonese, Fujianese, Shanghainese, Kejia and Chaozhou and is further stratified by places of birth.¹²¹ Macau's Census 2001 indicates that 43.9 per cent were local-born, 47.4 per cent were born in China, while the others were born in Hong Kong or Southeast Asia —such as Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam.¹²² Although their backgrounds are diverse, it is the Portuguese and Macanese minorities – who have been associated with Macau for centuries – that have made Macau unique and contributed to its cultural and ethnic diversity. Realistically, no one doubts that after 1999, there will be greater emphasis on the promotion of Chinese culture at the expense of other minority groups. In fact, Edmund Ho stated in his inaugural address: ‘we shall strengthen our national identity and foster patriotic ideals’.¹²³ This slant was abundantly clear during the second anniversary commemoration activities. On Sunday 16 December 2001, I was present throughout the day and night at the *Largo do Senado*, arguably the most significant public venue in Macau. All the performances emphasised Chinese culture. Except for two pairs of young women attired in some pseudo-Portuguese outfits to frame the entrance to the VIP area and the Portuguese words on the backdrop of the elevated stage, there was no obvious reference to Portuguese or Macanese culture —

¹²¹ Jean Berlie, ‘Macau: a Multi-Community Society’, a paper presented at the International Conference in Macau (2001) and subsequently published in *Macau on the Threshold of the Third Millennium*, pp. 243-256.

¹²² Isabel Castro, ‘Who we are and how many we are’, *MacaU*, June 2002, pp. 15-22.

¹²³ *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, July 2001, p. 89.

something that would have been unthinkable during colonial times.¹²⁴ On the actual day of the anniversary, the local dignitaries that attended the flag raising ceremony at Golden Lotus Flower Square were entertained by a choreographed performance by hundreds of gymnasts reminiscent of celebrations on the Mainland. Later, at the civic reception attended by several hundred local VIPs, Edmund Ho was photographed delivering his address in front of a mural featuring architectural icons from Beijing —Tien Tan (the Temple of Heaven) and the facade of the Forbidden City. During the evening concert at the Cultural Centre, traditional Chinese and national minorities dances were featured while the major musical event of the evening was the orchestral performance of a composition from Shanghai entitled the “Motherland and I”.¹²⁵ The whole experience reinforced a comment made to me by one of the overseas students at the Institute for Tourism Studies that the Macau Government was keener to emphasise Chinese culture than to promote cultural diversity.

Understandably, there have been calls from within the Macanese community for programs to reinforce Macau’s cultural diversity —not just Macanese culture. In a paper delivered at the Ricci Conference in 2001, Luis Sá Cunha, a Macanese writer and Secretary of the Board of the Macau International Institute, advocated the need to promote Macau’s traditional Chinese communities, especially the Tanka and Fujianese communities, who were the early inhabitants of Macau. He also stressed that Macanese

¹²⁴ The wording: “Comemoração do 2º Aniversário do Estabelecimento da R.A.E.M. —Organizador de Associação de Divulgação da lei Básica de Macau.” [Second Anniversary Commemoration of the Establishment of Macau, organised by the Macau Association for the Promotion of the Basic Law]

¹²⁵ “Celebrating the MSAR’s second anniversary”, *MacaU*, December 2001, pp. 4-11.

culture and links with other Latin-based countries should be encouraged.¹²⁶ To other Macanese, preservation of Macau's cultural diversity extends to its architectural heritage. Carlos Marreiros, a Macanese architect, has been at the forefront of educating the public concerning some of these.¹²⁷ Under Article 125 of the Macau Basic Law, the Macau government is obliged to protect its heritage buildings, as outlined in Chapter Three. So far, around 120 buildings have been classified as heritage sites and an application has been lodged with UNESCO for their inclusion in the World Heritage Listing.¹²⁸

Conclusion

The above investigation supports the assertion that in the case of Macau, the elements of change and continuity had become inextricably intertwined by the time of the transfer of power. Many changes are beneficial like the marked improvement in public security and the opportunities derived from being part of a larger economic entity. Externally, the triangular relationship with Portugal and China, which gave birth to the Forum of Portuguese Speaking Countries, has added to Macau's international profile. Domestically, the harmonious transition, the rejuvenation of the casino sector and the modest economic recovery augur well for Macau. The popularity of its inaugural Chief Executive —locally and with the Central Government —is the envy of Hong Kong. Yet some of the changes are causes for concern to the Macanese community struggling for

¹²⁶ Luis Sá Cunha, "A Project of Identity: Macau in the world Unity", a paper presented at the International Conference in Macau (2001) and subsequently published in *Macau on the Threshold of the Third Millennium*, pp. 291-300. [No editor]

¹²⁷ Carlos Marreiros, "Macau Mixed Architecture and Urbanisation", a paper presented at the International Conference in Macau (2001) and subsequently published in *Macau on the Threshold of the Third Millennium*, pp. 205-242. [No editor]

¹²⁸ Carolina Rita, "Macao's heritage: a melting pot of cultures", *MacaU*, March 2003, pp. 4-23.

relevance in the new environment. The challenges they face and the transformation they are undergoing form the subject of the following chapter.

THE MACANESE COMMUNITY: SURVIVAL OF AN ENDANGERED SPECIES

The transfer of sovereignty on 20 December 1999 marks a cataclysmic change for the Macanese community. Figuratively speaking, the community has come to a crossroad — a choice between two perplexing options. One involves a decision to leave and join the ranks of family and friends in the diaspora; the other, to hang around a little longer to see whether Macau will remain attractive as a place of residence. Either way, they face a struggle for survival and relevance. Before that historical moment, concerns were expressed that the Macanese community was in danger of extinction. The Macau Portuguese paper, *Ponto Final*, on 24 January 1997, carried the headline “*Morte Anunciada*” (A Coming Death) to describe the impending change of sovereignty.¹ Nina Lichtenstein, the Macanese singer, told *CNN Asia*:

We are very few to begin with and, in future, there's going to be very few Portuguese people to intermarry. So perhaps we are a dying race.²

Like many, Lichtenstein saw the decline of Portuguese ethnicity as a crisis for her community. Some might suggest that with fewer Portuguese around, the next generation would marry more local Chinese or other nationals. Living in Macau, they will likely learn Chinese and English, with little or no Portuguese. Moreover, the bright and

¹ Paulo Rego, “Morte Anunciada”, *Ponto Final*, 24 January 1997, pp. 4-5 (in Portuguese).

² Mike Chinoy, “Macanese population fears loss of identity”, *CNN.com Asia Now*, 18 December 1999.

successful ones will become more globalised, more mobile, and perhaps also less Macau-conscious. The less successful have fewer options, and will likely become more Chinese. Such suggestion is open to question. As I shall argue later, the Macanese community has survived the change of sovereignty in a robust way and has not become extinct, as some had feared, at least not during this initial period.

Instead, this chapter demonstrates the survival and initial transformation that has overtaken the community in Macau. Setting the scene for that transformation, I shall outline the pressure that caused some Macanese to leave Macau and some of the reasons why many have decided to remain. Various threads, woven into the earlier chapters, are pulled together to illustrate their impact on the community during the first five years under Chinese rule. As such, the findings are tentative and may need to be reviewed as developments unfold and new information comes to light.

The pressure to leave

Nicholas Van Hear, in his book *New Diasporas: the mass exodus, dispersal and regrouping of migration communities* (London: UCL Press, 1998), has identified some factors that fueled human migration throughout history. Among them are the perceived disparity in socio-economic circumstances, perceptions of life-chances, and human security.³ Certainly, such factors are relevant to Macau during the final decade of Portuguese rule. Recalling that Macau was in the grip of lingering economic depression since mid-1990s, the transfer of power projected on uncertain economic times. Despite the prospect of economic integration within the Pearl River Delta region, many Macau residents, including the Macanese, sought better opportunities elsewhere due to the

failure of the Portuguese administrations to attract new industries and to diversify from its over-reliance on the gaming industry. Public security was also clearly lacking in Macau during the 1990s, caused largely by the turf wars between rival triad groups within the casino sector, resulting in Macau being labeled “a freewheeling, lawless and dangerous place.”⁴ But some Macanese, such as the doyen of the community Henrique de Senna Fernandes, did not feel particularly troubled by this problem because it was confined to the casinos. He believed that the problem had been grossly exaggerated by the news media in Hong Kong.⁵ Yet one cannot deny the adverse impact that the triad wars had on the casino and tourism industries, which resulted in a decline in visitor numbers that compounded Macau’s economic malaise. Moreover, Cheng Kit-keong, a restaurant owner now living in Portugal, gave the lack of security — not the change of government — as his reason for leaving Macau.⁶ Organised crime rocked the Macanese community, in March 2001, when the high-profiled lawyer Jorge Neto Valente was abducted outside the residence of the Portuguese Consul-General at night.⁷ Said to be the richest person among the Portuguese/Macanese community, Neto Valente was rescued within a week due to the joint efforts of the Macau, Hong Kong and Mainland law enforcement agencies.⁸ Born in Portugal, Neto Valente has lived in Macau since

³ Van Hear, *New Diasporas*, pp. 2-6.

⁴ Lynne O’Donnell, ‘Triads dog Macau’ s bid for independence’, *The Australian*, 21 December 1998.

⁵ McGivering, *Macao Remembers*, p. 99.

⁶ Cheng suffered a home invasion. See Diana Lin, *Back to the Motherland IV*, TVB 930, broadcast on 4 November 1999, TVB Hong Kong.

⁷ ‘Macau arante ‘todos os meios possíveis’ para localizar Neto Valente’, <http://www.cphrc.org.uk/news/ptu.040301.htm> (in Portuguese).

⁸ His prompt rescue was trumpeted by the Macau Chief Executive Edmund Ho as indicative of the government’s determination to safeguard the life of its citizen. Nevertheless, the local community believed that it was bad publicity for the territory when its most prominent lawyer could be abducted in such a manner. See ‘Edmund Ho: polícia tem capacidade para garantir a protecção da vida e dos bens dos cidadãos 6 March 2001’, <http://www.macau.gov.mo/news.phtml> (in Portuguese).

1970 and is married to a Macanese. Their son and daughter attend Chinese schools. As President of the Macau Lawyers Association and a former member of the Legislative Assembly, he is arguably the most powerful lawyer in Macau.⁹ The reason for his abduction and the story behind his rescue have yet to emerge but the speed of his rescue indicates what can be achieved in Macau if the political will is there.¹⁰

Herbert Yee, in his book *Macau In Transition* (2001), cites four reasons that may also have caused the Macanese to leave: the fear of being marginalised, distrust of the Chinese Government, an uneasy historical relationship with the Chinese community in Macau, and the localisation of the public service. On marginalisation, Yee states:

The scenario of becoming a *national* minority in a Chinese-dominated society shocked the Macanese community, leading many to consider leaving the colony for good.”¹¹

This statement can be challenged on two counts. One is that since Macau was settled, the Macanese community has always been overwhelmed numerically by the Chinese. Moreover, the Macanese community has been politically marginalised for decades, as noted in a previous chapter. Another count is that the use of the term *national minority* in reference to the Macanese community is inappropriate because under the Chinese Constitution, national minorities are narrowly defined, and are determined by the State Nationalities Affairs Commission. In all, only fifty-five national minorities have gained

⁹ ‘Macau arante ‘todos os meios possíveis’ para localizar Neto Valente’, <http://www.cphrc.org.uk/news/pu.040301.htm>, (in Portuguese).

¹⁰ “Neto Valente: Todos tinham antecedentes criminais”, *Jornal Tribuna de Macau*, 3 April 2001, <http://www.jtm.com.mo/news/topic/valente/todos/htm> (in Portuguese).

¹¹ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 130.

recognition, the largest of which are the Zhuangs in Guangxi, in south-west China.¹² The Macanese community in Macau is unlikely to gain such recognition as there are insurmountable political difficulties, even if a case can be mounted on an anthropological basis.¹³

On the lack of trust that the Central Government will not interfere in the running of Macau, Yee refers to an empirical survey conducted in 1995, two years before the Hong Kong handover and four years prior to Macau's.¹⁴ As such, it may not reflect the situation in Macau in 1999, when such fears are likely to have moderated due to the immediate post-handover success of Hong Kong. As a matter of fact, in November 1999, four years after Yee's survey, a prominent Macanese told the *South China Morning Post*:

I think there was more uncertainty here a few years ago, during all the arguments about Hong Kong's handover, but now I think the Macanese community feels reasonably comfortable, having seen 'one country, two systems' working quite well [in Hong Kong].¹⁵

¹² Because they enjoy special status under the Chinese Constitution, including considerable autonomy in their particular regions, it is an honour to be accorded such recognition from the Central Government. According to Colin Mackerras, an authority in this area, in the 1980s several groups failed to gain recognition from the Commission. See Colin Mackerras, *China's Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.143.

¹³ By granting the Macanese this special status —hence the special privileges attached to them such as representation at the People's National Assembly —the move might be interpreted as an intrusion by Beijing into affairs that are rightly the domain of the Macau government. Furthermore, the issue of nationality that engulfs the community at present, which is discussed later in this chapter, poses a serious difficulty at this stage of the community's evolution. Given the fundamental principle of 'one country, two systems' that defines Beijing's relationship with Macau, it is difficult to see how the political implications can be set aside.

¹⁴ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, pp. 144-145.

¹⁵ Gabriela Cesar, President of the Foundation for the Co-operation and Development of Macau. She also said told the reporter that some families who had decided to leave for Portugal around the time of Hong Kong's handover were now (November 1999) planning to stay. See Jason Gagliardi, 'Bridge between two worlds', *The Sunday Post*, 28 November 1999.

Yee points to the disposal of property as a sign of distrust. In particular, he singles out the venerable Macanese institution, Santa Casa da Misericórdia.¹⁶ In the course of my investigation, I raised the subject with a member of its governing board who stressed that the disposal was part of a property rationalisation program to raise funds for other restoration projects. Other than the former San Raphael Hospital building, which was sold for use as the Portuguese Consulate, the other rationalisations were small and insignificant.¹⁷ Moreover, its governing principles obliged the Santa Casa to use its resources in Macau for the benefit of the community, so the suggestion that properties were disposed of to repatriate money off-shore has been strongly refuted. Based on the vitality of the organisation after 1999, to which I shall return in a later section, Yee's interpretation of the Santa Casa's actions appears unfounded. Despite the foregoing, Yee is not necessarily amiss in pointing to a sense of distrust within the Macanese community. In Macau during March 1999, I was privy to a conversation in which some members of the Macanese diaspora discussed the possibility of exhuming ancestral graves for re-burial overseas due to concerns that the burial plots might, in some future date, be compulsorily resumed by the government for other purposes. Moreover, when the prominent Macanese José Rosario passed away on 26 January 1997, his family consigned his body for burial in Canada, prompting one observer to remark that the move was indicative of "the deep psychological uncertainties of the Macanese community."¹⁸

¹⁶ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 146.

¹⁷ The San Raphael building was sold to the Portuguese Government for use as the Portuguese Consulate.

¹⁸ Berlie (ed.), *Macao 2000*, p. 24. But in my opinion, it is quite likely that the extreme shortage of good burial plots and the imposition of a time limit for the use of burial sites —after which the remains must be exhumed and the plot recycled for new occupants —provides an inducement for some people from Hong Kong and Taiwan to bury their family members in places like Sydney and Toronto where family members

Yee asserts that the uneasy relationship between the Macanese and the local Chinese community was rooted in a colonial era that prompted “feelings of superiority and even mistreatment or exploitation of the local Chinese [by the Macanese].”¹⁹ This assertion has validity and echoes the comments expressed by some local Chinese, in Diana Lin’s TV documentary.²⁰ Edmund Ho alluded to such problems when he responded to a question during an interview with the *South China Morning Post* published on Handover Day, December 1999. It appears that Edmund Ho read more into the question put to him but his response does support the assertion that Yee has made:

SCMP: Among the Macanese community and of course the remaining expatriates, there are fears that they may be marginalised or pushed out of their jobs after the handover. Should they be worried?

Ho: The first thing I would say is that the Basic Law protects the citizens of Macau, and as the incoming chief executive officer, I will do my utmost to uphold the Basic Law. As a human being, I fully recognise the anxiety and perhaps I shouldn’t use the word uncertainty, but definitely when a group of people for historical reasons are in a certain class or category of society and no matter how fairly they would be treated, for some of them there will always be some sense of anxiety [about the handover]. And of course some Chinese citizens may react in the way that, well, now we are boss, and all this. But this is not a legal matter, this is human consequences and human nature, and I think we have to deal with it with

reside. The attractions of open lawn cemeteries coupled with the cultural preference to observe proper final resting-places and ancestral rites have led to a significant growth in the migration of human remains.

¹⁹ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 134.

tact and sensitivity and some human compassion. Definitely we will not encourage any racial discrimination. We will be watching. Macau is a very small place and I personally would be very concerned to make sure everybody is treated fairly and in a fully acceptable social environment.²¹

The findings of my investigation support the view that Edmund Ho is sincere in his concern for the interests of the Macanese and with the powers at his disposal, he has sought to turn Macau's colonial heritage into a plus for the future. This is evident in his call to his fellow citizens to rid themselves of "colonial complexes" and utilise Macau's advantages to promote trade and co-operation with the FETCPC (Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries), which will be mentioned again in this chapter. If "colonial complexes" exist in segments of the Chinese population in Macau, a persecution complex can also be detected within the Macanese community—which is equally damaging. In the course of this investigation, I sought comment on the establishment of FETCPC—in particular the appointment of Rita Santos as head of the permanent secretariat in Macau.²² I was surprised by one Macanese' response, namely that the appointment of Santos is a ploy to get rid of her from the Civil Affairs Bureau where she had a powerful position and thousands of people under her—in effect, a kind of demotion.²³ The majority of Macanese I spoke to, including Santos herself, do not share that sentiment. Santos believes that her trilingual

²⁰ Diana Lin, *Back to the Motherland II*, TVB 906, broadcast on 21 October 1999, TVB Hong Kong.

²¹ Jason Gagliardi and Harald Bruning, "Leader looks to future", *South China Morning Post*, 19 December 1999.

²² For a detailed treatment of FETCPC, see Gilberto Lopes, Jose Carlos Matais & Rodolfo Ascenso, "New paths to co-operation", *MacaU*, December 2003, pp. 36-51.

²³ As described in the previous chapter, Santos had responsibility for quarantine, the pig slaughterhouses, hawkers and the markets.

ability and bravado in tackling projects have singled her out for the position, which, to her, carries a higher status than her previous role at Civil Affairs.²⁴ Indeed, as Francis Tam, the Secretary for the Economy and Finance, has stated, she is the ideal person for the position.²⁵

Finally, Yee's notion that localisation of the public service is a factor in the Macanese departures from Macau appears to have credence. As mentioned in Chapter Three, localisation is an inevitable process of decolonisation but in the case of Macau, added complications arise due to issues of race, language and China's uncompromising nationality policy. Further, many former Macanese civil servants believed that under Chinese rule, a form of "glass ceiling" would be imposed on them. Those who left Macau, such as Teresa Nolasco, now resident in Portugal, resented the fast-trekked promotions given to the Chinese over the Macanese who had been in the service longer.²⁶ Such resentment had caused tensions in her former work place. In deciding to leave Macau, she saw better "life-chances" —to use Van Hear's expression —for her and her family. Yet one should not exaggerate localisation as a factor for Macanese emigration because the statistics show that most of those who left the civil service did so because they were concerned about their future entitlements —they did not leave Macau.

Besides the factors identified by Van Hear and Yee, there are other factors that impacted on the Macanese community. Foremost was the process of decolonisation, which generated a kind of separation anxiety —feelings of uncertainty and uneasiness — at the prospect of being detached from Portugal after all those years. Edmund Ho alluded

²⁴ In this new position, she is the co-ordinator between the member countries and will likely be part of government delegations on overseas visits.

²⁵ "Co-operation Forum", *MacaU*, June 2003, p. 92.

to this in his response to a question put to him, which has been quoted in its entirety earlier in this section. Diana Lin, the reporter for Hong Kong's television station TVB, highlighted personal and familial reasons in her TV documentary *Back to the Motherland* (1999). The prospect of being separated from children and grandchildren was too heart-wrenching for some elders to contemplate. In Lin's documentary, Albertina Dias do Rosario said she was leaving Macau to join her children who were already settled in Portugal.²⁷ Lin also documented the issue of affordability, especially among the civil service retirees. Rodrigo Leal de Carvalho, a retired Portuguese judge, said that without access to free government housing and other entitlements, he and his wife could not afford to continue on in Macau in the manner to which they had been accustomed. Hence, they would have to leave.²⁸

In sum, the reasons for leaving were multifarious reflecting individual circumstances. More often, it was a family decision made on the basis of communal feedback and the availability of good jobs and support groups. This contrasts greatly with the earlier emigres who left Macau without the promise of job and support; they left due to the political upheavals represented by the Communist takeover in the Mainland and the spillover of the Cultural Revolution from China in December 1966. Also, unlike the decolonisations of an earlier era, the end of colonialism in Macau occurred in an age of globalisation characterised by speedy transportation and telecommunications. This enabled information to be collected and evaluated as part of the decision-making process.

²⁶ Diana Lin, *Back to the Motherland IV*, broadcast on 4 November 1999, TVB Hong Kong.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

The outcome of these deliberations has been a decision —by many —to remain in Macau for the time being.

The reasons to stay

As has been stated repeatedly, there are no accurate figures on the Macanese community that remains in Macau. The raw figures for the Macau Census 2001 suggest a number as low as 4352.²⁹ However, in 2002, Harald Bruning, the veteran correspondent for the *South China Morning Post*, estimated the number of ‘local-born Macanese – people of mixed Portuguese and Asian parentage’ at 7000 or 8000.³⁰ These numbers suggest that the feared mass exodus arising from the transfer of sovereignty has not materialised.³¹ The reasons for staying are many. To begin with, their sense of belonging is genuinely deep —a feeling expressed in various ways. An unnamed Macanese told the *Hong Kong Standard* that he has decided to stay in Macau with his family provided that the lifestyle will not change too much, adding:

Macau is the fountain of our existence, if we all leave Macau after 1999, the Macanese diaspora would soon lose its roots and our identity would vanish for good. ... Macau without the Macanese would be like a soup without salt.³²

Maria Jose Jorge has expressed stronger sentiments in a television documentary, *Back to the Motherland*. Jorge, a direct descendant of Jorge Alvares —acknowledged as the first

²⁹ Isabel Castro, ‘Who we are and how many we are’, *MacaU*, June 2002, pp. 15-22.

³⁰ The Portuguese expatriates were estimated at about 2,000. See Harald Bruning, ‘Portuguese community only as good as its word’, *South China Morning Post*, 8 March 2002. Also see Harald Bruning, ‘Electoral zest’, *South China Morning Post*, 7 March 2003.

³¹ Nuno Lima Bastos, in Gilberto Lopes, ‘A year of MSAR’, *MacaU*, December 2000, pp. 25-26; Eduardo Tomé, ‘The thriving Chinese community of Portugal’, *MacaU*, September 2002, p. 14.

Portuguese to land on Chinese territory —says in Cantonese: ‘I was born in Macau. I am Chinese, not a Westerner. I have many Chinese friends.’ Her son, Pedro Jorge asserts: ‘The heritage [identification with Macau] is part of my body. ... Jorge Alvares was involved with the Chinese, he stayed and never returned to Portugal.’³³

Besides, not all Macanese view the future with trepidation. As Herbert Yee points out, generational differences exist within the Macanese community —each perceiving the future differently. The older generation, those in their 60s and 70s, grew up in an era ‘when the Macanese monopolised government positions and enjoyed a much higher social status than the local ethnic Chinese.’ The middle generation, those in their 40s and 50s, are better educated and experienced Macau in the boom years of the 1980s. Able to fraternise and compete with the Portuguese expatriates, they are capable of tackling the middle-class Chinese. The younger generation, those in their 20s and 30s, has grown up in an era when they experienced no special privilege over the Chinese; they may see ‘that the future lies in their adaptation to the Chinese-dominated society and Chinese culture.’³⁴

Moreover, not all Macanese possess the means and the qualifications to emigrate. Contrary to widespread belief, the majority of Macanese in Macau are not rich —a point to which I shall return presently. As will be seen in the following chapter, those Macanese who have left for Portugal tended to possess the means to buy a house there, had a job to go to, or the means to retire on. Needless to say, those who aspired for

³² Harald Bruning, ‘Macanese reaffirm their roots’, *Hong Kong Standard*, 13 August 1996.

³³ Diana Lin, *Back to the Motherland I*, broadcast on 14 October 1999, TVB Hong Kong.

³⁴ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, pp. 137-139.

destinations such as Canada and Australia have to satisfy stricter immigration criteria regarding skills, qualifications and financial assets.

Furthermore, they stay because they have no compelling reason to leave and because the lifestyle available to them in Macau out-weighs the risks and disruptions of new beginnings. Some are like Julie de Senna Fernandes who still has her job as an Executive Assistant to Stanley Ho, the Macau casino magnate. Others, like Rita Santos, manage to retain their senior positions in the civil service. Architects like Carlos Marreiros and José Maneiras are in professions with good prospects. Henrique de Senna Fernandes, the renowned literary writer, has a thriving legal practice, which he maintains with the assistance of his son, Miguel. An incentive for staying is the comfort and quality of life available to them in Macau compared to elsewhere. Macau's attractiveness is seen in the compactness of the place, the ease of obtaining domestic helpers and the familiarity of old habitudes. As Senna Fernandes told a Western reporter:

I am used to this life [in Macau], it suits me. It would be difficult to adapt to life anywhere else. I can go to Portugal, I have a house and some properties there, but to change the way of living, the style of life, would be difficult.³⁵

Perhaps due to the value they place on maintaining the family unit, many Macanese do not look kindly to the prospect of the *astronaut* lifestyle so prevalent among the Hong Kong Chinese. Additionally, although monumental in scope, 1999 was not considered as personally traumatic as World War II in Macau or the riots of December 1966 were. The transition to Chinese rule in Macau has been smooth and the success of

post-colonial Hong Kong is reassuring. In contrast, the ‘fear of facing possible greater uncertainties in Portugal and elsewhere’ is a real concern for the community.³⁶

Likewise, some are clearly excited by living in such a dynamic region, sustained by a belief that their services will still be useful in the new environment. Undoubtedly, the restructuring of the casino industry will provide some MP\$17.5 billion worth of building projects on top of the legal services expended during the tender process.³⁷ Such prospects tend to support the assertion of one observer that ‘those having the courage to stay will succeed because no other community can better play the role of middlemen between all the communities in the Macau SAR.’ Exactly what kind of middlemen role is envisaged for the community in post-1999 Macau remains undefined because the conditions requiring such a role have largely disappeared.

Just as there are practical reasons to leave, there are equally practical reasons to stay put. In the course of this investigation, in December 2001, I paid a visit to the offices of *Associação Promotora da Instrução dos Macaenses* (APIM), the venerable Macanese institution (see pp. 171-172 below), which coincided with their Annual General Meeting. The aged look of many of the attendees suggests that many of the elderly have chosen to remain because they feel too old to start afresh in strange lands —preferring to live out their days in familiar surroundings amongst friends and neighbours whom they have known for decades. This echoes the experience in nearby Hong Kong where most of the Macanese who remain after 1997 are elderly and still frequent their Lusitano Club.

³⁵ Jason Gagliardi, ‘Bridge Between Two Worlds’, *The Sunday Post*, 28 November 1999.

³⁶ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 146.

³⁷ Harald Bruning, ‘Third casino licence winner unveils \$8.8 billion plans’, *South China Morning Post*, 22 February 2002.

Transformation

In his handover address, the President of Portugal, Jorge Sampaio, placed an enormous responsibility on the Macanese community by unwittingly naming them, along with the Portuguese language, as the living vestige of Portugal's colonial heritage and Portuguese culture in Macau.³⁸ The past that Sampaio wished to stress is one of heroes and the prestige that they had brought to Portugal. What has not been mentioned are the institutions that, with the change of government, can be expected to undergo significant transformation. One colonial institution in particular, the *Leal Senado*, the old municipal council with a history dating back to 1583, had already been designated for the scrap heap, as discussed in the preceding chapter. Others are expected to come under pressure due to the need for massive injection of funds if their activities are to be maintained with a degree of credibility.

Institutions

After 1999, there is a felt need for a new institution to represent the interests of the Portuguese and Macanese community in areas considered inappropriate for the Portuguese Consulate to dabble in. The developing bond between the two communities culminated in the formation of *Casa de Portugal em Macau* [House of Portugal in Macau] in June 2001. Its club facilities are housed in premises rented from the Macanese

³⁸ President of Portugal, official speech delivered at the Cultural Event, 19 December 1999: 'Let it be said, however, that although the Portuguese administration comes to an end, Portugal itself will not leave. It will remain under different conditions ... by means of the Portuguese community born here throughout the centuries and so attached to this land ... [and] through the Portuguese language which, as one of the official languages, will continue by the will of all to be an instrument of culture and communication.' See *Macau Focus*, Handover issue, July 2001, p. 60.

institution, the Santa Casa da Misericórdia, and was officially opened on 25 April 2003.³⁹ Situated opposite the Consulate, the location is suggestive of their proximity in more ways than one.⁴⁰ *Casa de Portugal em Macau* seeks to unite the Portuguese and Macanese who have drifted apart due largely, according to Harald Bruning, to ‘the deliberate divide-and-rule policy’ of past governors.⁴¹ Envisaged as more than a social club, the Casa de Portugal aims at:

Defending and promoting the interests of the Portuguese community in Macau; contributing towards the development of MSAR⁴²; safeguarding the cultural identity and heritage of the Portuguese community; ... [promoting] a sense of solidarity between members of the Portuguese community in Macau [and] closer relations and ties between Portugal, Europe and Portuguese-speaking nations and the People’s Republic of China.⁴³

Its activities include cultural tours to China. In 2001 three cultural visits were arranged to Shanghai, Xi’an and Shangchuan island.⁴⁴ This was encouraged by its President João Manuel Costa Antunes, the Director of the Macau Government Travel Office. The following year, visits were made to Hangzhou and again to Shangchuan Island. I participated in this last visit in December 2002 as part of an international conference to

³⁹ *MacaU*, June 2003, p. 90.

⁴⁰ The role of the Portuguese Government —as represented by its Consul in Macau—in the formation of the association had been much conjectured. Indeed, the initial meetings of the association took place in one of the rooms of the Portuguese Consulate at Rua Pedro Nolasco da Silva.

⁴¹ Harald Bruning, ‘Portuguese ‘ house’ seeks to promote solidarity’*South China Morning Post*, 2 June 2001.

⁴² Macau Special Administrative Region

⁴³ ‘A new association’, *MacaU*, June 2001, p. 84.

⁴⁴ *Casa de Portugal em Macau*, N°1, Julho-Dezembro 2001, news bulletin of the Casa de Portugal, Macau.

commemorate the 450th anniversary of the death of Francis Xavier, who died in Shangchuan. Due to its integrative work in Macau and the support of the Portuguese government, the *Casa de Portugal* has become an important institution for the Macanese community, who represents only one third of its 600 membership.⁴⁵ Membership is also open to ethnic Chinese who hold a Portuguese passport and reside in Macau.⁴⁶ It has become a compulsory port of call for visiting dignitaries from the Portuguese world, including Xanana Gusmão, President of East Timor, and Maria José Ritta, the First Lady of Portugal.⁴⁷

Another new initiative is the Macau International Institute (*Instituto Internacional Macau — IIM*), presided over by Jorge Rangel, the former Secretary for Public Administration, Education and Youth in the last Portuguese Administration. Its inclusion here as a Macanese institution may seem odd to some given that IIM is seen largely as the personal preserve of Rangel —something to keep him occupied after 1999 —even though it has over two hundred paid-up members, largely Portuguese and Macanese from around the world. While the dominant role of Rangel cannot be denied, it is beyond dispute that within a short space of time, IIM has managed to champion Macanese causes in Macau and published important books pertaining to the Macanese identity and language.⁴⁸ In terms of contact with overseas dignitaries and local Macanese identities, its record is unsurpassed in contemporary Macau, even by the *Casa de Portugal em Macau*

⁴⁵ Harald Bruning, ‘Portuguese community only as good as its word’, *South China Morning Post*, 8 March 2002.

⁴⁶ Isabel Castro, ‘Preserving the Portuguese Language’, *MacaU*, December 2002, p. 96.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Senna Fernandes, Miguel, and Alan Norman Baxter, *Maquista Chapado* (Macau: Macau International Institute, 2001); Da Silva, Renelde Justo Bernardo, *The Macanese Identity* (Macau: Macau International Institute, 2001).

referred to in the preceding paragraph. This is evident in a comparison between their two magazines.⁴⁹ Further, it has maintained close contacts with the Macanese diaspora organisations and, through agreements signed, have become their representatives in Macau.⁵⁰ Moreover, during the past decade or so, Rangel has occupied a leadership role within the Macanese community and is still prominently involved in the community and its diaspora.⁵¹ In my view, such stature and the solid record of IIM justifies its inclusion as an important Macanese institution of the post-1999 era. IIM was established in the final days of the Portuguese administration in Macau — in June 1999. As Rangel explained to the *Aomen Ribao (Macao Daily News)*, 13 May 2003, IIM has the objective of “promoting Macau in the world and developing academic and cultural exchanges, with similar institutions abroad, especially in the Portuguese speaking countries.”⁵² It seeks to carry out its mission through publications, close cooperation with institutions in other countries – thirty protocol agreements are in place – and the work of its two research centres: Research Centre for the Macanese Diaspora and Identity and the Centre for Strategic Studies of the Asia-Pacific Region.

Not all the social institutions survived the change of government. The *Clube de Militar*, once the proud bastion of colonial rule favoured by the Portuguese and Macanese elite, now has a majority of Chinese members.⁵³ Another institution, the *Clube de Macau*, has become largely irrelevant due to ongoing squabble with the Lisbon-based Orient

⁴⁹ IIM’s *Oriente Ocidente* is published three times a year.

⁵⁰ Two agreements were signed between IIM and Casa de Macau, Australia and Club Amigu di Macau, Canada (Toronto) in November 2003. See *Oriente Ocidente*, No. 12, October-December 2003, p.12.

⁵¹ For example, Rangel has been asked to be the Honorary Chairman of APOMAC (Associação dos Aposentados, Reformados e Pensionistas – the Macau Association of Retirees and Pensioners). He is also the Honorary President of Macau Polytechnic Institute. See *Oriente Ocidente*, No. 12, October-December 2003, pp. 13, 29.

⁵² Reprinted in *Oriente Ocidente*, No. 11, May-August 2003, p. 4.

Foundation over the ownership of its heritage building. Some locals believe that the Macau Government may intervene to rescue the historic building, which housed the heritage-listed Dom Pedro V theatre built in 1858, from falling into disrepair.⁵⁴

Two Macanese institutions that remain prominent after 1999 are APIM — *Associação Promotora da Instrução dos Macaenses* (Association for the Promotion of Macanese Education) —and the *Santa Casa da Misericórdia*. Founded in 1871, APIM was set up by the local Macanese elite to provide technical and vocational training for Macanese youths to enable them to find gainful employment in the workplace.⁵⁵ At the time of the handover, education was still APIM's main focus. It runs the D. José da Costa Nunes kindergarten, which, together with the Portuguese School (*Escola Portuguesa*) now run by the Portuguese Government, provides an outlet for families seeking an education in the Portuguese curriculum for their children. The *Escola Portuguesa* is the post-1999 successor to the Pedro Nolasco School (also known as the Commercial School) formerly controlled by APIM. Meanwhile the Macau Government continues to have responsibility for the teaching of Portuguese as a language in the regular schools.⁵⁶

Since 1999, APIM's role has evolved when it assumed responsibility for organising the Fourth International Reunion of the Macanese Communities – *Encontro IV* – in Macau in November 2001. This involvement with the Macanese diaspora is clearly a departure from its traditional role. APIM's President, José Rodrigues a member of Macau's Legislative Assembly was guarded when I asked him about the extra

⁵³ Near the Lisboa Casino Hotel, Macau.

⁵⁴ Graça Marques and Veiga Jardim, 'Opera in Macau', *MacaU*, September 2002, pp. 67-75.

⁵⁵ Olivia Vaz, 'The Commercial School: a Victory for Macau', *MacaU*, Special 1996, pp. 134 – 145.

responsibility. However, inquiries made elsewhere suggest that it is logical for the government to single out APIM for this honour, being a Macanese organisation with a representative in the Legislative Assembly. Accordingly, the scope for APIM to expand its role in the post-1999 environment is fettered only by its imagination. There are suggestions that APIM's kindergarten may be handed over to the Portuguese Government and be incorporated into the Escola Portuguesa, which has survived the transfer of power with a surprising stability in students numbers —totaling 930 in the 1999-2000 school year.⁵⁷ Its vibrancy confounds the gloomy predictions made by a former headmaster of the school, prior to 1999, that enrolment would drop drastically due to emigration and the perception that its students face academic disadvantages in attending the school.⁵⁸ For a community coping with post-colonial stresses such as the Macanese in Macau, the success of the school provides an encouragement concerning their future also.

The *Santa Casa da Misericórdia* (Holy House of Mercy), the oldest charitable institution in Macau, was founded in 1569 by Melchior Carneiro (1516 - 1583), a Jesuit priest who later became bishop and governor of Macau.⁵⁹ Its original objective was to help the poor and the orphans but in time, it branched out to health services in the form of a leprosarium and a hospital – the San Raphael.⁶⁰ As a beneficiary and trustee of wills, the *Santa Casa* became one of the wealthiest institutions in Macau, with a large portfolio of property and other investments. Its benefactors have been Macanese and Chinese

⁵⁶ Rui Fernando Almeida Simões, 'Education and Change in Macau's Portuguese Community', paper presented at the International Conference in Macau (2001) and subsequently published in *Macau on the Threshold of the Third Millennium*, Macau Ricci Institute, 2003, pp. 257-272 [No editor].

⁵⁷ Gilberto Lopes, 'Escola Portuguesa attended by hundreds', *MacaU*, June 2000, p. 32.

⁵⁸ João Bosco Basto da Silva, 'The School of the Future', *MacaU*, Special 1996, pp. 146-147.

⁵⁹ *MacaU* (Chinese edition), August 2002, pp. 4-14 (in Chinese).

⁶⁰ Gunn, *Encountering Macau*, pp. 39, 45.

businessmen — among them Ho Yin, the father of the Chief Executive Edmund Ho. Their pictures hang prominently in the reception hall of its landmark building fronting the Leal Senado Square. Inside the building, accessible to the public, is a collection of religious relics associated with the Catholic Church in Macau. In adjacent buildings are the offices, a public library, and a canteen where local residents can come to read the newspapers and purchase a subsidized meal. There is another canteen reserved for its members — known as the Santa Casa Brotherhood, a group of some three hundred persons, mostly Macanese, who controls the affairs of this august institution. Elsewhere in Macau, the Santa Casa has an aged care facility that caters for about 125 people, a rehabilitation centre for the visually impaired, as well as a crèche. Additionally, they provide low-rent housing to needy families and assistance with tuition fees for needy children attending the Portuguese school.⁶¹ Contrary to the experience of other Macanese institutions, since 1999, the *Santa Casa* has received an increase in government funding to help with its work. According to António José Freitas, its chief operating officer (*providor*), this is in recognition of the Santa Casa's social welfare work and its policy of giving assistance to people regardless of race or religion. It is also due to financial pressures caused by the low interest-rate regime and poor investment returns experienced in recent years. Even the Chinese residents that I talked to admit that the Santa Casa is doing good things in the community. Recognizing its important role, Edmund Ho has appointed Freitas to the Supervisory Committee of the General Office for Civil Affairs,

⁶¹ João Costeira Varela, 'Santa Casa da Misericórdia', *MacaU*, September 2003, pp. 13-16.

Macau's revamped municipal organisation. In 2003, in the Chinese New Year's honour list, Ho has also awarded Santa Casa a Merit Medal.⁶²

In contrast to the Santa Casa, the Macanese organisation *Associação dos Macaenses* (ADM) is little known outside of official circles. Their premises are on the fourth floor of a non-descript office cum residential building along a major downtown thoroughfare, Rua do Campo —unlike the salubrious premises of Casa de Portugal, APIM and the Santa Casa. ADM was founded in the mid-1990s at a time when the Macau government was seeking to establish a network of Macanese organisations around the world. Much of the funds that have been provided during the colonial years were squandered with little trace. Yet ADM manages to hold on to the premises, which is provided rent-free by the Macau government, but with the change of regime, their funding was terminated —a move that can be interpreted as a combination of an anti-Portuguese backlash and the financial scandal over the Jorge Alvares Foundation mentioned in Chapter Four.

I first met with several of ADM's office bearers in December 2002 to discuss their post-colonial dilemma. They had just recently published their October 2002 newsletter, which showed that they made various courtesy visits to the Chief Executive Edmund Ho, to the President to the Macau Foundation, Victor Ng, and to Carlos Monjadino, President of the Orient Foundation.⁶³ Beyond protocol, these visits also pave the way for future approaches to funding from the government and the foundations.⁶⁴

⁶² "MSAR Government grants awards to outstanding individuals and organisations", <http://www.macau.gov.mo/news.phtml> (posted 24 January 2003, 17:08).

⁶³ *A Voz*, news bulletin of Associação dos Macaenses, Macau, October 2002 (in Portuguese).

⁶⁴ "A new foundation", *MacaU*, June 2001, pp. 85-86. The Macau Foundation, directly under the control of the Chief Executive, received 1.6 percent of the gross profits from the casino licensees, a condition for the

The ADM Committee impressed on me that their association represents the poorer Macanese, who lack the means to emigrate or the skills to command good positions in society. One member lamented that in Macau today, it is easier for Filipinos than Macanese to get a job because Chinese shopkeepers prefer them as they are cheaper to hire. A stroll in the shopping precinct of the *Largo do Senado* suggests there is an element of truth in their grumble. Although the Committee was uncertain whether financial assistance would be forthcoming, Edmund Ho encouraged ADM to be more active in social work —such as visiting the sick and the elderly. From Ho’s comment one can infer that ADM has to become more than just a social club for its members. Accordingly, the next ADM bulletin (March 2003) contained reports of visits to two homes for the elderly, and one to a rehabilitation centre for those with toxic dependencies.⁶⁵ On a return visit to Macau the following year (December 2003), I met with some of the Committee members again who reported that since our last meeting, the Macau Foundation has provided modest funding to ADM. One cannot know for sure whether the funding is in response to their community work or the upgraded recognition given to Portuguese and Macanese institutions following Edmund Ho’s November 2002 comment in which he urged Macau residents to rid themselves of their “colonial complexes” so that Macau can utilise its past to serve the present.⁶⁶ Although ADM may not have a powerful voice and does not feature on the program for visiting Portuguese

granting of the licence. It is the vehicle through which the government supports the activities of the various social, cultural and educational organisations that abound in Macau. In contrast, the Orient Foundation is an independent organisation based in Lisbon with a controversial past in Macau, as we have seen in Chapter three.

⁶⁵ *A Voz*, news bulletin of Associação dos Macaenses, Macau, March 2003 (in Portuguese).

⁶⁶ Harald Bruning, “Cultural identity”, *South China Morning Post*, 27 December 2002.

dignitaries, nevertheless it is an important part of the Macanese community.⁶⁷ Its existence in Macau testifies to the fact that the Macanese community, like other social groups, is stratified along socio-economic lines, a point hardly mentioned in writings about Macau where the focus has, in the main, been centred on the elite.⁶⁸ But its status may be about to get upgraded with the admission to membership of several high-profiled and influential figures, announced in March 2004. Its club bulletin, *A Voz*, reveals that the latest group of new members include Noémia Lameiras (senior public servant, Dept. for Labour and Employment Affairs), Fatima Ferreira (formerly Director, Social Services Dept., now head of a charity group (see p. 186 below), Rita Santos (head of the Secretariat, FETCPC (see p. 160 above), and Harald Bruning (correspondent for *Reuters* and *South China Morning Post*).⁶⁹

Identity

Jean Berlie, in *Macao 2000*, remarks that “those who wish to remain after the handover naturally and implicitly tend to identify themselves as Chinese.”⁷⁰ His assertion appears to be supported by the comments of Maria Jorge and her son Pedro, cited in an earlier section of this chapter. Yet Berlie’s statement is simplistic, if not also erroneous. After 1999, very few Macanese have adopted Chinese nationality; those who do cite

⁶⁷ Such as Feliciano Duarte, “the Secretary of State Assistant to the Minister of the Presidency”, who visited Macau in June 2002 as the official representative of Portugal for celebration of Portugal Day. Duarte reportedly visits all the various Portuguese and Macanese institutions but not the *Associação dos Macaenses*. To my knowledge, the other VIPs who visited *Casa de Portugal em Macau* like Xanana Gusmao and the First Lady of Portugal did not visit this Macanese association, which indicates the stratification that exists within the Macanese community in Macau. See “The Portuguese community is part of the large Macau family”, *MacaU*, June 2002, pp. 80-81.

⁶⁸ For example: Jill McGivering.

⁶⁹ “Novos Sócios Admitidos”, *A Voz*, March 2004, p. 8 (in Portuguese).

⁷⁰ Berlie (ed.), *Macao 2000*, p. 23.

work-related reasons.⁷¹ In the main, the vast majority remains confused or has no intention of renouncing their Portuguese nationality. Judging by the numbers of local Chinese visiting the Portuguese Consulate in Macau, Chinese holders of Portuguese passports have also largely refused to give them up. The *Macau Yearbook 2002* records that between January 2000 and December 2001—in the first two post-colonial years—only one person applied to the Identification Department to renounce his/her Chinese nationality and twenty-two persons have registered to affirm their Portuguese nationality. But there are no figure given for the number of people giving up their Portuguese passports.⁷²

In a place with an estimated 100,000 Portuguese passport holders, such low registration figures deserve comment. First, people are allowed to keep their Portuguese passports as a travel document for outside China—unless their positions bar them from having the right of abode in another country. Second, the low registration figures indicate the level of confusion and ambivalence in the community concerning the need to register when there appears little benefit to be gained by doing so. Third, although singled out for special treatment, the Macanese community does not want to be forced to make a choice to adopt Chinese nationality. There has been an attempt by stealth to elicit a decision during the conversion of the Identity Card in 2000.⁷³ The Macau residents' reluctance to give up their Portuguese passports is understandable given the recent history. Unlike

⁷¹ Such as Manuel Gonçalves, Executive Chairman of TDM, Macau's television broadcasting entity, and João Manuel Costa Antunes, the Director of Macau Government Tourist Office. Gonçalves has reportedly opted for Chinese citizenship and Attunes has been rumoured to have followed his lead. See Gilberto Lopes, 'Getting into the PNA', *MacaU*, June 2000, p. 15.

⁷² *Macau Yearbook 2002*, p. 443.

⁷³ As part of the process, the application form contained a column where one is asked to state one's nationality where previously it was not required. The Identification Department regarded this as

Britain who took pre-emptive measures to strip Hong Kong's British passport holders of their residency rights in Britain, Portugal — perhaps due to the small numbers — resolutely refused to follow suit. This contributed to a strong sense of loyalty towards Portugal, especially amongst the Macanese elite who considered Portuguese nationality as an integral part of their identity.⁷⁴ Therefore, it seems incomprehensible that with the transfer of sovereignty, such a sense of identity can be so easily discarded, as Berlie seems to suggest. Moreover, once they discard their Portuguese passport, their replacement will be a Macau passport, which many consider to be an inferior travelling document —hence their reluctance.

Nevertheless Berlie's assertion does set the spotlight on the contending identities that comprise the Macanese psyche, referred to in Chapter Two. After 1999, it has become more complex due to the impact of the nationality issue, causing confusion as different identities are emphasised by different people even within the same context. This was illustrated during the election, in 2000, of members for the Electoral College, which in turn elects Macau's representatives for the National People's Congress in Beijing. Carlos Marreiros, the Macanese architect, did not participate citing his Portuguese nationality:

compulsory information. It provoked a protest from the Macanese-led Civil Servants Association resulting in an Administrative back-down by making the provision of information optional.

⁷⁴ Such was the feeling expressed by Henrique de Senna Fernandes, the doyen of Macau's Macanese community: "We fiercely defend our ties with Portugal, the Fatherland we quietly love, the Fatherland above the insanity, the whims and the errors of men. Hence our refusal to be absorbed by the larger community that lives and works side by side with us. It is not for vain nostalgia. It is solely the affirmation of an identity." See Senna Fernandes, "Macau, Yesterday", in L. S. Cunha (ed.), *Macau di nosso coracam*, pp. 51-69.

I am a Macau Portuguese and I intend to remain so. If Chinese nationality is a pre-requisite for participation in the Electoral College, I am no longer a candidate.⁷⁵

However, another Macanese, Rita Botelho dos Santos, head of the Secretariat of the Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries, insists on her right to participate by declaring:

I am Macau-born, I have Portuguese nationality and I represent the [uniqueness] of this Special [Administrative] Region. I have the right to participate actively in the social and political life of this territory.⁷⁶

Part of the confusion over the Macanese identity is caused by the official terminology used to describe them. Officially, they are known as “local-born Portuguese”, a term derived from the Macau Basic Law. Such a simple label connotes three perspectives of the Macanese identity: “Portuguese” suggestive of ethnicity and nationality, and “local-born” denoting a Macau geographic identity. The first – ethnicity perspective – has been heavily featured in the literature concerning the Macanese where it has been fashionable for writers to observe a “deepening crisis of ethnic identity” within the community.⁷⁷ Many believe that due to the departure of the Portuguese, a further dilution of their identity is inevitable.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Gilberto Lopes, “Macau: on the same path again”, *MacaU*, June 2000, p. 15.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Such as by Yee, *Macau in Transition*, pp. 136-139. Yee lists five factors as contributing to the crisis: a decline in the level of “Portugueseness” within the Macanese genetic pool; the loosening grip of Roman Catholicism on the community; that they no longer live in identifiable districts; the generational gaps; and the lack of community leadership.

⁷⁸ Renelde Justo Bernardo Da Silva, *The Macanese Identity* (Macau: Macau International Institute, 2001), pp. 183-184.

On the question of ethnicity, short of forced or arranged marriages, there is nothing that the community can do. In other areas, however, some members of the community have, since 1999, been unceasing in their efforts to keep the Macanese cultural identity alive, achieving moderate success. Two groups deserve special mention: the *Dóci Papiaçam di Macau* and *Tuna Macaenses*. Formed in 1993, the Macanese patois drama group, *Dóci Papiaçam di Macau* (The Sweet Language of Macau), is seen as an expression of their identity.⁷⁹ It celebrated its tenth anniversary on 9 October 2003 with a huge party attended by past and present members during which a video of the highlights of all past performances was shown.⁸⁰ Macanese *patois* is a derivative language comprising a mixture of Portuguese, Malay and Cantonese vocabularies, which emerged over the past centuries due to the dominance of Cantonese and the lack of good Portuguese teachers.⁸¹ During colonial times, Macanese patois was frowned upon by the Portuguese elite as a language of communication. Its subsequent neglect consigned it to the status of a dying language, despite the efforts of José (Adé) dos Santos Ferreira, the *patois* poet, whose death galvanised the formation of the *patois* drama group.⁸² Miguel de Senna Fernandes, a lawyer, son of the literary figure Henrique, currently leads *Dóci Papiaçam di Macau* as its chief playwright. Since 1999, the group has been performing plays in patois, achieving prominence as a regular fixture of the annual Macau Arts Festival.⁸³ Inspired by the popularity of these performances, Senna Fernandes has

⁷⁹ Paulo Coutinho, “*Dóci Papiaçam: the Art of Survival*”, *MacaU*, Special 1994, pp. 68-72.

⁸⁰ *Oriente Ocidente*, Vol. 12, October-December 2003, p. 28.

⁸¹ Arana-Ward, Marie, “A Synchronic and Diachronic Investigation of Macanese: the Portuguese-based Creole of Macao”, Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1978.

⁸² Paulo Coutinho, “Adé, ad Aeternum”, *MacaU Special*, 1994, pp. 73-74.

⁸³ Isaac Pereira, “Siará Zinha, a drama in Macanese patois”, *MacaU*, June 2001, pp. 76-78.

collaborated on a glossary of the language, which was published in 2001.⁸⁴ An offshoot of the drama group is the *patois* singing group, again, led by Senna Fernandes. Each December, they perform at a special Macanese mass in the San Domingos Church; the one I witnessed in 2002 was well attended by all the prominent members of the community, including special representatives from Hong Kong. Undoubtedly, this Macanese mass was an important occasion for the community, signified by the fact that a special reception was held afterwards at the APIM (*Associação Promotora da Instrução dos Macaenses*) headquarters.

The other group, *Tuna Macaenses*, hails from a tradition steeped in Macanese folklore. Modelled on their Portuguese counterparts, *tunas* are “spontaneous groupings” of musicians who perform at festivals, parties and other social occasions.⁸⁵ In Macau, their heydays were the 1930s when the *Carnivale* festival dominated the Macanese social calendar and there were various *tuna* groups.⁸⁶ The festival has long disappeared but is still remembered by the older generation.⁸⁷ Compared to the *Tuna* group that performed in March 1999 —at the function hosted by the Portuguese Governor during the Third International Reunion of the Macanese Communities (*Encontro III*) —the current *Tuna Macaenses* has shrunk somewhat but it is the nature of such a group, as indicated earlier.⁸⁸ As part of this investigation, I paid a visit to one of their performances in

⁸⁴ Miguel Senna Fernandes, Alan Norman Baxter, *Maquista Chapado* (Macau: Macau International Institute, 2001).

⁸⁵ Veiga Jardim, “Tunas in Macau: Hay get-togethers”, *MacaU*, Special 1993, pp. 124-132.

⁸⁶ When the Macanese community – in fancy dress and colourful costumes – revelled for days in singing, dancing, street parades and parties at the four clubs: the Macao, the Military, the United Sports, and the Argonaut. See *South China Morning Post*, 14 February 1936 (BMC-NLA MS 4300, Box 2, BRA/3990, <23>).

⁸⁷ Senna Fernandes, “Macau, Yesterday”, pp.51-69.

⁸⁸ Due to the flexible structure of the *Tuna* groups, if an important host (like the Macau government) is willing to pay, they can rustle up more musicians to join them for the performance.

December 2002 — at the restaurant run by the Institute for Tourism Studies.⁸⁹ They expressed sadness at the loss of some members due to emigration. Despite that, they are involved with the Macau Government Tourism Office in promoting Macau tourism throughout the Asian region. Together with other cultural troupes from Macau, they have visited Taiwan, Manila, Seoul and other parts of Mainland China. Their type of music requires a reasonable sized group to sound right; as such, they can no longer compete with the more streamlined professional outfits from the Philippines. Stressing their semi-professional status, they struggled with their regular day jobs when in Macau. Thus in company with the *patois* drama group, the *Tuna Macaenses* represents a conscious struggle to maintain their identity. In the process, they are transformed as visible symbols of the Macanese identity and a representation of cultural diversity in Macau.

The second perspective —identity based on nationality —has been modified by the transfer of sovereignty. Before, all the Macanese were considered as Portuguese nationals. Since 1999, a wedge has been lodged firmly between the two, such that it is possible to be a Macanese but not have Portuguese nationality — much like the Portuguese Americans, Canadians and Australians, or closer to home, the Malaccan Portuguese community in Malaysia. The gap can only grow wider due to the pressure on the Macanese to adopt Chinese citizenship and the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, which appears to deny future descendants of the Macanese from automatic entitlement to Portuguese citizenship despite their ethnic ties.⁹⁰ Accordingly, the official terminology

⁸⁹ Attached to the *Pousada de Mongha*.

⁹⁰ The last sentence of the memorandum by Portugal states: ‘no person may acquire Portuguese citizenship as from 20 December 1999 by virtue of his or her connection with Macau.’

for Macanese —local-born Portuguese —can no longer reflect the new reality for the Macanese in post-1999 Macau.

Understandably, the third perspective —the geographic or Macau identity —has a broader appeal as it transcends ethnicity, race and religion. This approach is increasingly favoured by some Macanese elite including Jorge Rangel. As early as 1999, Rangel stated:

I think we have to revise the whole concept of Macanese. Not only those who see themselves as having a Portuguese heritage are Macanese, but the Chinese people who belong here are too. If we don't keep that sense of belonging, that something special, which is peculiar to Macau, there's no reason to maintain one country, two systems; this might as well all be China. ... We need younger generations to think of being a new Macau community.⁹¹

For such Macau-centricity to take root, it will require community leadership and changes to the education curricula. According to Keith Morrison, an educator in Macau, issues of identity and community should be of concern for a city where almost half the population was born elsewhere and the majority is looking for opportunities to resettle somewhere else.⁹² Moreover, it appears that the local Chinese are ambivalent in this regard as João Guedes, a producer with Macau's Portuguese television channel, had told the *Far Eastern Economic Review*:

⁹¹ McGivering, *Macau Remembers*, p. 19.

⁹² Keith Morrison, 'Towards an educational agenda for Macau at the start of the New Millennium', a paper presented at the International Conference in Macau (2001) and subsequently published in *Macau on the Threshold of the Third Millennium* (Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 2003), p. 275.

In Hong Kong, people feel very strongly about being Hong Kong Chinese. No one feels 'Macau Chinese'. And most people here actually look forward to the handover.⁹³

But Guedes' comment is shallow as Chinese voices are being heard in various arenas. Cathryn Clayton, in her essay (1999) on the changes in the heritage preservation movement in Macau, identified a sense of Macau Chineseness on the part of a young and growing middle class who were concerned that Macau's identity, in particular its heritage buildings, be preserved.⁹⁴ Undoubtedly, the most vocal of all has been Gary M.C. Ngai, the chairman of the Sino-Latin Foundation (see p. 138 above). Ngai argued for the development of Macau's "spiritual or cultural identity, ... formed along Macau's history of over four centuries, and it involves two main aspects: the indigenous one, which is Chinese; and the alien one, which is Western, or more exactly, Latin."⁹⁵ He issued a terse warning for the future:

In short, shortsightedness, factionalism and ethno-centric ideas and feelings among the local population could erode, jeopardize and eradicate our identity, undermining the 'one country two systems' policy, destroying the future of our own survival and development.⁹⁶

Therefore, if the Macanese community can infuse the general community with their strong sense of identification with and attachment to Macau, it will represent an inestimable contribution to the society at large.

⁹³ Bertil Linter, "End of an empire", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 December 1998.

⁹⁴ Cathryn Clayton, "Macau, Notes from the Field: On Belonging and the City", *Portuguese Studies Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring-Summer 1999, pp. 93-111.

⁹⁵ Gary M. C. Ngai, "Macau's Identity: The Need for its Preservation and Development into the Next Century", *Portuguese Studies Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring-Summer 1999, pp. 112-128.

Relevance

In promoting their identification with and sense of belonging to Macau, the Macanese community may be defining a new relevance for themselves in the post-1999 environment. During the course of investigation, in the remarks made to me, the term *relevance* has been frequently used to explain the many endeavours that some Macanese embarked on following the change of government. Maria M. R. (Manuela) de Sales da Silva Ferreira took early retirement from the public service in 1994 and, in partnership with others, invested her lump sum to start the *Restaurante Litoral* serving Macanese cuisine — an initiative described as remaining relevant in a different way.⁹⁷ Her gastronomic reputation is widely recognised. According to her husband, she was featured on Mainland Chinese television (CCTV) as one of the fifty select women of China.⁹⁸ In January 2003, the Macau Government awarded her an Order of Merit for services to tourism.⁹⁹ Macanese restaurants such as *Litoral* and *Néu*, represent the largest single group of Macanese entrepreneurs, according to a University of Macau study, followed by trading services and florists.¹⁰⁰ As has been observed, the restaurants are significant as a statement of ethnic identity, “[asserting] to outsiders the existence and identity of this

⁹⁶ Ibid., p.124.

⁹⁷ Maria M. R. (Manuela) de Sales da Silva Ferreira

⁹⁸ The other woman featured from Macau was Susanna Chow, President of the Legislative Assembly.

⁹⁹ “MSAR awards honours”, *MacaU*, March 2003, p. 92.

¹⁰⁰ Restaurant *Néu*, located at Rua Cidade de Braga, NAPE, Macau. See Nelson António Santos, Y. W. Khong, Virgínia Trigo, S. H. Kong, Fanny C. K. Vong (Faculty of Business Administration University of Macau), “Macanese Entrepreneurship: Past, Present and Future” in Rufino Ramos, D. Y. Yuan, John E. M. Barnes, Wong Hon (eds.), *Population and Development in Macau* (Macau: Macau Foundation, 1994), available on Internet at www.macaadata.com/macauweb/book214/.

community... (and) show that they want to stay on in Macau ... and to play a role there.”

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Another Macanese, Fátima Ferreira, took early retirement in 1998 because she is not literate in Chinese and the integration scheme in the Portuguese civil service could not guarantee her the senior position that she once held.¹⁰² Since then, she has started a new charity helping children with mental disabilities and their families in Macau. A fellow Macanese refers to her work as demonstrating her relevance in contemporary Macau. When she invited me to attend the 2003 Christmas party for the children and their families, sponsored by the Rotary Club of Macau, it was clearly evident that the career she has undertaken since her retirement from the civil service is relevant to contemporary Macau. Some may argue that Rotary, the respected community service organisation, is the relevant party here and not individuals like Ferreira. But Rotarians will tell you that the strength of Rotary is its members. Certainly, through their participation in Rotary, Ferreira and her fellow Macanese Rotarians are making their contributions to the betterment of Macau. And due to the cosmopolitan nature of its membership, the Rotary Club of Macau serves as a model of good citizenship in a society delineated by issues of race, culture, and history.

The mention of Manuela da Silva Ferreira and Fátima Ferreira serves to expose a weakness in the literature that generally confines the discussion of Macanese relevance to their numerical presence within government, commerce, the professions and the civil service. This thesis holds that such a traditional perspective is too narrow and ignores the significant contributions made by individuals in areas such as culture, education, religion

¹⁰¹ Louis Augustin-Jean, *Macanese Identity and Food*, in Berlie (ed.), *Macao 2000*, pp. 105-119.

and the arts.¹⁰³ Adopting the traditional approach will have disregarded the successes of the two Ferreiras mentioned above, which is clearly wrong in view of the high regard in which the wider community holds them. After all, Manuela da Silva Ferreira's work has been honoured with an award by the Macau Government. Arguably, public recognition —represented by the honours and awards conferred by the government of the territory — is an indisputable validation of the relevance of individuals and organisations. Accordingly, the framework on which the relevance of a minority community —like the Macanese —is evaluated needs to be reviewed because, in their case, the traditional approach proves inadequate in detecting the virility of a community in relegation. For the Macanese in the post-1999 era, this is largely due to the impact of decolonisation and the nationality issue; it is no longer permissible for them to participate at the level at which their relevance has traditionally been measured. Despite their absence from the conventional positions of significance, the new regime has acknowledged their contributions as important. Since 1999, medals and honours have been awarded to members of the Macanese/Portuguese community in their relevant fields. In 2002, awards were presented to Leonel Alves (Profession – Law), Henrique Senna Fernandes (Culture), Rui Martins (Education), Amâncio da Silva Nunes (Public Entities), and André Couto (local sports hero, winner of 47th Macau Grand Prix).¹⁰⁴ And in 2003, to Carlos Marreiros (Profession – Architecture), Maria M. R. de Sales da Silva Ferreira (Tourism), Santa Casa da Misericórdia (Philanthropy), and D. M. N. Siqueira das Dores

¹⁰² Maria de Fátima Salvador dos Santos Ferreira.

¹⁰³ Individuals such as João Manuel Costa Antunes, the Director of Macau Government Tourist Office and Manuel Silvério, President of the Macau Sports Institute have documented achievements in their respective fields. Antunes has promoted Macau tourism widely, while Silvério succeeded in attracting many sporting events to the territory that enhanced its international profile —described in the preceding chapter.

(Distinguished Service).¹⁰⁵ In all, thirty-nine awards were presented each year; of these, the community received five in 2002 and four in 2003 — indicating that they have continued to make an impact that far exceeds their numerical size.

Despite the foregoing —for the record —I shall persist to discuss their relevance in the traditional manner. At the governmental level, their struggle for relevance has been undermined by their continued political decline. At the first post-1999 elections for the Legislative Assembly, in September 2001, the Macanese political group *Macau Sempre-Eleitonal* failed, yet again, to win any seat, polling only 1.94 per cent of the votes.¹⁰⁶ Formed in October 1999, *Macau Sempre-Eleitonal* adopted a Chinese slogan —literally “roots in Macau” —that emphasised their sense of belonging but it failed to impress the electorate.¹⁰⁷ More successful was *Nova Esperança*, another Macanese-led group, which was headed by José Coutinho from the Civil Service Employees Association. It polled 5.62 per cent and narrowly missed out on capturing the last seat.¹⁰⁸ The evidence suggests that Macanese support has drifted to the CODEM¹⁰⁹ group led by businessman David Chow and his running mate, Jorge Fâo, the Macanese co-founder of the Civil Service Employees Association. Unable to win selection on their own, the Macanese continued to rely on the support of the Chinese community and the Chief Executive. Leonel Alberto Alves, the lawyer, was re-elected to represent the professions while Jose Rodrigues and Philip Xavier, both lawyers, have been re-appointed by the Chief Executive.¹¹⁰ Although

¹⁰⁴ “MSAR Awards Honours”, *MacaU*, March 2002, pp. 90-92.

¹⁰⁵ “MSAR Awards Honours”, *MacaU*, March 2003, pp. 92-94.

¹⁰⁶ “Legislative Assembly Elections”, *MacaU*, December 2001, p. 90.

¹⁰⁷ Cheng, *Macau: a Cultural Janus*, p. 204.

¹⁰⁸ “Legislative Assembly Elections”, *MacaU*, December 2001, p. 90.

¹⁰⁹ *Convergência para o Desenvolvimento de Macau*.

¹¹⁰ “Legislative Assembly Elections”, *MacaU*, December 2001, p. 90.

the current number of four Macanese members represents a reduction from previous levels, there are positives in the situation.¹¹¹ First, although overshadowed by the Chinese, the Macanese community is no longer eclipsed politically by the expatriate Portuguese, as was the case in the past. Second, having regard to the fact that the community represents only about two per cent of the population, to gain 4 of 23 seats in the Legislative Assembly represents a significant gesture by the Chief Executive Edmund Ho, seeing that he appointed two of their number. Whether the current rate of representation will continue in the future remains to be seen. In the event that Leonel Alves decides to retire from politics – as he told *Ponto Final*, the Macau Portuguese daily, that he will – whether a Macanese replacement will be able to capture his seat in the Professions category remains conjective.¹¹² Similarly, the number of Macanese appointed to serve on the Legislative Assembly will depend largely on the how supportive future Chief Executives are towards this community.

To date, the Macanese community has survived the first five years of Chinese rule but has diminished in other ways. Their numbers are down as a result of emigration, which has been discussed in Chapter Four under the section ‘Cultural and ethnic diversity’. As well, they suffer an appreciable reduction in public profile due largely to localisation at the governmental level. There are no Macanese among the Secretaries in charge of the various departments—a position open to Chinese citizens only. Before the transfer of power, Jorge Rangel, the Secretary for Public Administration, Education and

¹¹¹ This is a big reduction from the previous levels, which admittedly was artificially maintained due to the practice of former Portuguese governors who resorted to their powers of appointment in order to balance the racial mix among the members. In the last three Legislative Assemblies—formed after the elections of 1988, 1992 and 1996—this meant giving *all* the 7 appointed seats to the Portuguese/Macanese community to maintain their representation at around 9 (1996) or 10 (1988, 1992) of the total 23 members. See Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 111.

Youth was the highest-ranking Macanese —sometimes serving as Acting Governor.¹¹³ The reason why he does not retain a senior position after 1999 will have to wait until his biography is written. Some intoned that Edmund Ho might have approached him to be a member of the Executive Council but that would entail a renunciation of his Portuguese nationality. Given his publicly expressed feelings on the nationality issue, this was clearly something he was unwilling to countenance.¹¹⁴ In a meeting I had with him, Rangel was reticent about the subject but did say that he could do more for the government and the Macanese community by being “on the outside”. Since 1999, Rangel has expressed his relevance in different ways —by remaining in Macau, as chairman of the Macanese institution APIM, President of Macau International Institute, Honorary Chairman of APOMAC (Associação dos Aposentados, Reformados e Pensionistas – the Macau Association of Retirees and Pensioners), and Honorary President of the Macau Polytechnic Institute.¹¹⁵

As we have noted in a previous chapter, there is no Macanese representation in the current Executive Council, a body that advises the Chief Executive on matters of policy. In the Legislative Assembly, the post of President, which until 1999 was the preserve of the Macanese community, is now occupied by a Chinese — Susanna Chow.¹¹⁶ During colonial times, if the President of the Assembly was a Macanese, political convention dictated that the Vice President should be a Chinese. However, after the transfer of sovereignty, no Macanese has been elected as the Vice President, due

¹¹² “Interview: Leonel Alves not to stand for re-election”, *Ponto Final* (posted 28-3-2003, 11:37 am).

¹¹³ McGivering, *Macau Remembers*, p. 10.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹¹⁵ *Oriente Ocidente*, Vol. 12, October-December 2003, pp. 13, 29.

¹¹⁶ Harald Bruning, “Macau veteran wins top post”, *South China Morning Post*, 13 October 1999.

perhaps to the numerical shift in favour of the Chinese and the nationality issue. Clearly the nationality requirement presents a major hurdle for the Macanese aspirants to overcome.

In commerce, Macanese businesses had been in decline long before 1999. Intrigued by the decline, a group from the University of Macau undertook a study in 1993.¹¹⁷ It found that the lack of Macanese entrepreneurs can be attributable to a shortage of capital, an aversion to risk-taking and the relative ease with which they could gain employment within the civil service. Further, their indecision over the transfer of sovereignty —brought about by concerns over how Macau will be governed but at the same time, unsure whether Portugal will provide them with a satisfactory lifestyle —has meant that they missed out on the economic growth experienced in Macau in the early 1990s.¹¹⁸ Among the old venerable firms, only Rodrigues & Company and H. Nolasco & Company remain; they operate in the trading services sector, which they dominated in a bygone era. However, it has been suggested that ownership of H. Nolasco & Company has now passed to a powerful local Chinese although a member of the Macanese family remains in charge of the day to day operations.¹¹⁹ If true, it illustrates one of the survival strategies that Macanese businesses utilise to adapt to the new environment. While

¹¹⁷ A field survey of Macanese entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs was carried out by students of the University of Macau who took the course "Organisational Behaviour" during the academic year 1992-1993. The students conducted interviews based on questionnaires. A total of 147 questionnaires were completed, out of which 50 were the entrepreneur questionnaires and 97 the non-entrepreneur questionnaires. These findings were published as Nelson António Santos, Y. W. Khong, Virgínia Trigo, S. H. Kong, Fanny C. K. Vong (Faculty of Business Administration University of Macau), "Macanese Entrepreneurship: Past, Present and Future" in Rufino Ramos, D. Y. Yuan, John E. M. Barnes, Wong Hon (eds), *Population and Development in Macau* (Macau: Macau Foundation, 1994), available on Internet at www.macaudata.com/macauweb/book214/.

¹¹⁸ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 134.

¹¹⁹ An effort was made to contact one of its directors but within the limited time available to me in Macau, this was unsuccessful.

Rodrigues & Co. is acknowledged as the oldest surviving commercial agency in Macau, Vodatel Networks, a telecommunications company controlled by José Manuel dos Santos, represents the new breed. Santos was an unsuccessful bidder in the recent casino tendering process.¹²⁰ Born in Portugal and married to a Macanese, Santos is arguably the Macanese businessman with the highest public profile in post-1999 Macau.¹²¹ His company, Vodatel, holds a ten per cent stake in Timor Telecom (East Timor) and is listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.

Within business circles, the Macanese are perceived as having a competitive edge due to their cultural and linguistic skills. They are seen as particularly effective in the various “bridge organisations” that have sprouted in Macau since the transfer of sovereignty. Among these are the Euro-China Entrepreneurs Club,¹²² the Portuguese-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry,¹²³ the Forum of Portuguese-speaking Entrepreneurs in Macau,¹²⁴ and the Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (FETCPC).¹²⁵ Undoubtedly, this last

¹²⁰ “Vodatel”, *MacaU*, June 2002, p. 82; “Telecommunications”, *MacaU*, September 2002, p. 78.

¹²¹ Gilberto Lopes, “World’s largest companies interested in Macau’s gaming industry”, *MacaU*, December 2001, pp. 15-18.

¹²² The Macau branch of the Euro-China Entrepreneurs Club hosted the second Euro-China Business Meeting in Macau in June 2002. Attended by 200 companies from China and 100 from the seven EU countries, the three-day event has been described as a matchmaking exercise to promote business partnerships. See “Cooperation”, *MacaU*, June 2002, p. 76.

¹²³ The Portuguese-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCILC), an initiative of the Portuguese Government with 110 member firms, seeks to open an office in Shanghai aimed at providing information for businesses and to improve the perceptibly poor economic relations between China and Portugal. See “Agreement”, *MacaU*, March 2002, p. 87.

¹²⁴ The Forum of Portuguese-speaking Entrepreneurs in Macau has been proactive to develop business relations with the newly independent East Timor. Even before the establishment of the East Timor republic, it hosted Xanana Gusmao to Macau. Subsequently, in May 2002, it sent a delegation to the inauguration of the new Democratic Republic of East Timor. See Harald Bruning, “Gusmao fails to impress”, *South China Morning Post*, 3 November 2001. Also see Harald Bruning, “More action needed to put newest nation on its feet”, *South China Morning Post*, 17 May 2002.

¹²⁵ Gilberto Lopes, Jose C. Matias and Rodolfo Ascenso, “New paths to co-operation”, *MacaU*, December 2003, pp. 36-51.

is the most significant. The importance of FETCPC to Macau is obvious in the governmental strategies for 2004, on par with CEPA (Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement between Macau, Hong Kong and China), outlined in Chapter Four.¹²⁶ It is hard to over-estimate the boost to Macanese morale that the FETCPC decision brought. The involvement of the Chinese Government in FETCPC and the establishment of a permanent secretariat in Macau elevated the status of the Portuguese and Macanese communities in the territory. As Edmund Ho has stated: ‘Macau is the only city in Asia that has the strategic advantage of a historical connection with Portuguese-speaking countries.’¹²⁷

In the professions, the attractive opportunities in post-1999 Macau are behind the unrealised fear that the transfer of sovereignty will result in a mass exodus of Portuguese and Macanese personnel. As yet, the official policy of bilingualism has not been fully implemented, especially in the legal profession that remains a bastion of the Portuguese and Macanese lawyers.¹²⁸ This is where the impact of bilingualism will be most noticeable in future. Moreover, the existing certification system, which controls the recognition of qualifications and allows their holders to practice in Macau, is under pressure due to the severe shortage of qualified professionals especially in the legal and medical fields. Easier entry, in particular for graduates trained in the Mainland will lead to greater competition.¹²⁹ In regard to the legal profession, the issue of certification placed Jorge Neto Valente, the president of the Macau Lawyers Association, on the horns

¹²⁶ Harald Bruning, ‘China to trade on Macau’ s heritage’, *South China Morning Post*, 13 October 2003.

¹²⁷ Gilberto Lopes, ‘Government Strategies for 2003’, *MacaU*, December 2002, p. 8.

¹²⁸ For example, Wynn Resorts, one of the successful tenderer was represented by the lawyer Correia da Silva in Macau. See Victoria Button, ‘US Casino Mogul in Macau for Contract Signing’, *South China Morning Post*, 19 June 2002.

of a dilemma. Confronting Neto Valente and his colleagues is the new University of Science and Technology (UST), which offers courses — taught in Chinese — in its Faculty of Law.¹³⁰ The popularizing of legal studies in Chinese and an increase in Chinese lawyers has the potential to break the stranglehold that Portuguese and Macanese interests have on the profession. In the past, this Association has been a launching pad for the political careers of many Macanese lawyers; three out of the four Macanese in the Legislative Assembly formed after the 2001 elections are lawyers. When I commenced my research, it was suggested to me that a move to recognise law graduates from UST is likely to be strongly opposed by Neto Valente and his colleagues from the Macau Lawyers Association. However, this must now appear less likely as the UST has pre-empted any potential conflict by attracting a powerful group of business and political luminaries to its Board —including Neto Valente himself. He joins fellow Macanese lawyers, Leonel Alves and Jose Manuel Rodrigues, Stanley Ho (the casino magnate), Ma Man Kei (the head of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce), Liu Chak-wan, Vitor Ng and Tong Chi-kin, the last three being members of the Executive Council.¹³¹ With such an array of powerful men and the serious shortage of qualified professionals, the recognition of these legal graduates from the UST must be seen as a foregone conclusion. Although Neto Valente continues to criticise the proliferation of substandard legal courses offered in Macau, as he did in November 2002, it is not clear which course and institutions he is targeting.¹³² Significantly, the diplomacy of UST illustrates the co-option of the elite,

¹²⁹ Article 129 of the Basic Law makes the Macau government the ultimate arbiter in this regard.

¹³⁰ Gilberto Lopes, ‘New University’, *MacaU*, June 2000, p. 27.

¹³¹ Gilberto Lopes, ‘A university next to the airport’, *MacaU*, June 2001, pp. 16-17.

¹³² Harald Bruning, ‘Macau’ s sleepy law courts lack speed and relevance’, *South China Morning Post*, 8 November 2002.

which remains a feature of Macau society after 1999. For the Macanese community, a willingness to be co-opted —to bend and engage with the wider community for the common good —is an essential tool in their continuing struggle for relevance. In sum, the first five post-colonial years in Macau held much promise for the legal profession and the business community. The tender process for the casino licences kept many lawyers, architects and engineers busy. Implementation of the various investment programs is expected to induce a modest economic recovery in Macau.¹³³ Moreover, the inauguration, in October 2003, of FETCPC; the cross-border industrial zone scheduled to commence construction in 2004; and the implementation of CEPA, (Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement between Macau, Hong Kong and China) —discussed in the preceding chapter —will provide a cornerstone for Macau’s economic development for the decade ahead.¹³⁴

Turning to the perspective of Macanese relevance in the public service, the localisation process has certainly reduced their numbers, but not their relevance. This is due largely to the policy of bilingualism and the continued utilisation of Portuguese and Macanese personnel on contract. Accordingly, it has been observed that six months after the transfer date, quite a few had remained at the head of ‘some of the most important government departments, such as the Finance, Health, Tourism, Education, and Public Works departments, the town councils and Foundations.’¹³⁵ Four years on, the picture remains largely the same although the evidence suggests that some have been transferred

¹³³ When the successful tenderers were named in early 2002, they planned to invest in excess of MOP \$ 18 billion (equivalent to 3.3 billion Australian dollars) in gaming, hotels and tourist facilities. See Harald Bruning, ‘Third casino licence winner unveils \$8.8 billion plans’, *South China Morning Post*, 22 February 2002.

¹³⁴ Harald Bruning, ‘Opportunity knocks’, *South China Morning Post*, 24 October 2003; Harald Bruning, ‘Step by step’, *South China Morning Post*, 28 November 2003.

sideways for reasons that have nothing to do with their competency level. Some felt that they were disliked by their Chinese superiors and isolated by their peers who gave only lip service to the official policy of bilingualism in the work place. The massive restructuring that has taken place within the public service —such as with the Police forces and the municipal councils —has also caused a great deal of dislocation. Despite the personnel and systemic problems, the Macanese community remains well represented in the public service. By all acclaim, the government service is still the largest employer for the community. Some Macanese civil servants enjoy high public profiles such as João Manuel Costa Antunes, the Director of Macau Government Tourist Office; Manuel Silvério, President of the Macau Sports Institute; and Jose Maria Pereira Coutinho, the head of the Macau Civil Servants Association. Others work for organisations in which the government is a substantial shareholder, such as Manuel Gonçalves, Executive Chairman of TDM, Macau’s television broadcasting entity. For Jose Coutinho in particular, the Government’s decision, in July 2003, to levy income tax on the public servants, teachers and clerics, placed his association in a bind.¹³⁶ Confronted with what appeared to be a popular decision due to a widely held view that civil servants are grossly overpaid, the Association is in the invidious position of deciding whether to fight the Government — because the decision, in their view, breached the provisions of Basic Law Article 98, which guarantees that the civil servants recruited before the transfer will enjoy a level of pay and benefits “no less favourable than before.”¹³⁷ However, the government’s decision

¹³⁵ Gilberto Lopes, “Macau: on the same path again”, *MacaU*, June 2000, p. 12.

¹³⁶ For the first time, income tax will be paid by public servants, political office-bearers, teachers, and religious practitioners. See Harald Bruning, “Fiscal bliss”, *South China Morning Post*, 4 July 2003.

¹³⁷ The Government justified its decision thus: “Civil servants and other people who have benefited from income tax exemption in the past will now have to pay this tax so that everyone in our society may share

appears to have the support of the prominent Macanese lawyer Leonel Alves, a member of the Legislative Assembly, who has said that the income tax on civil service salary is “a measure of social justice”.¹³⁸

Reflections

Sinicisation

As foreshadowed in the introductory remarks at the beginning of this chapter, strong comments have been made suggesting that in the post-1999 era, the Macanese would become a dying community. Yet no one has indicated when this death will occur or what “dying” means in the post-1999 era. As have been noted, the community has survived the first five years in robust form, and better than most people expected —there is no death to speak of. Short of mass emigration, the greatest danger facing the community is posed by the process known as *Sinicisation*, a cliché with no clear definition. The term Sinicisation has been applied broadly to describe the spread of Chinese influence in various spheres such as in culture, economics and government. Some saw the formal resumption of sovereignty by China in 1999 as a distinct form of institutionalised Sinicisation.¹³⁹ But for the Macanese in Macau, the application of the term may not be that helpful and should be used with caution.

the principle of same duty.” See Gilberto Lopes, “Government Strategies for 2003”, *MacaU*, December 2002, p. 6.

¹³⁸ Harald Bruning, ‘Macau is full of promise with ' the Mandarin' at the helm’, *South China Morning Post*, 22 November 2002.

¹³⁹ Gary Ngai, ‘Localization means Sinicization’, *Ponto Final*, 25 September 1998, pp. 6-8, cited in Berlie, ‘Macau’s overview at the turn of the century’, *American Asian Review*, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, Winter 2000, pp. 30-31.

What is Sinicisation and when did it become a prominent feature in the Macanese community? Jean Berlie has advanced one definition:

Sinicization is a social process — sometimes in opposition to Westernization —by which a mixed society or a minority is integrated into a Chinese-dominated society.¹⁴⁰

It may seem strange to some that one can talk of Sinicisation in a society where ninety-five percent of the population are ethnic Chinese, which suggests that the term is largely one describing a Western —and according to Berlie, a minority’s —perspective. But it is justified because the focus is the Macanese minority, which is seen largely as more Western [Portuguese] than Chinese. Specifically for the Macanese community, Sinicisation describes the decline of Portuguese ethnic traits and cultural practices among the community in Macau —indicated by an increased enculturation with the dominant Chinese culture, a decline in the usage of Portuguese as a language in the home, and increased marriages between Macanese and Chinese. With its emphasis on Portuguese traits, I believe an appropriate descriptive for Sinicisation in the Macanese context may be encapsulated in the phrase: “being less Portuguese, becoming more Chinese”.

Sinicisation suggests a transition between two polar centres — in this case, Portuguese and Chinese. It suggests three nebulous elements. The first concerns the process, which connotes progression or degrees of Sinicisation. Clearly, some Macanese and their families are more Sinicised than others —in ethnicity, lifestyle, outlook and socialisation experience. The second is the notion of a Macanese community sodden with Portuguese traits and culture (or *Portugueseness*), which is open to challenge. It has been

¹⁴⁰ Berlie, “Macau’s overview at the turn of the century”, *American Asian Review*, p. 30.

argued that Portuguese culture is itself indeterminate while its representation in Macau has also been called into question. According to Teotonio R. de Souza, head of the Department of History, and Director of the Centre for Asian Studies at the Universidade Lusófona de Humanidades e Tecnologias (Lisbon), Portuguese culture is not that distinctive:

But could we ask now what is Portuguese culture? The Portuguese sociologist [Boaventura de Sousa Santos] considers the Portuguese culture as a frontier-culture, with some shape, but with no definite contents. Hence, the Portuguese culture is not very distinct from other national cultures, and has always maintained a strong internal heterogeneity. While Portugal looked at its colonial populations as primitive and backward, it was in turn looked as backward by the north European colonial powers. The Portuguese were both colonisers and emigrants in their colonies, at least in Brazil and in Africa. In Asia they merged into local societies in the so-called 'shadow-empire', shedding perhaps more sperm than blood! They were too close to the colonies to be considered fully Europeans, and too distant from Europe to be regarded as serious colonizers.¹⁴¹

Moreover, Jean-Pierre Cabestan, the director of the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China based in Hong Kong, has observed that what passes for Portugueseness in Macau lacks authenticity:

Today's [2001] remains of the traditional Portuguese and Macanese culture look like an oversimplified, sterilised and a historical caricature of

Macau's past aimed at attracting hordes of ignorant tourist groups more interested in gambling and prostitution than in the territory's heritage.¹⁴²

Cabestan's statement is provocative because it reflects the problem, previously mentioned in the Introductory Chapter (see p. 19), which assumes an imagined ideal and considers deviations from that ideal as mutative, deformed and generally less desirable. If Cabestan is describing what he has been exposed to publicly in Macau, then there is validity in his statement, as all public exhibitions are highly stylised. However, it is inappropriate to describe as "caricature" a communal reality that has evolved over past generations — because such derivatives are what make the Macanese community distinctive, of which they feel proud.

If Sinicisation is the spread of "Chinese" influence in different spheres, how is "Chineseness" defined? What does "being Chinese" mean? This is the third element embedded in the term Sinicisation. Writing in *The Chineseness of China*, Wang Gungwu, an authority on China and the Chinese diaspora, suggested that:

Our understanding of Chineseness must recognise the following: it is living and changeable; it is also the product of a shared historical experience whose record has continually influenced its growth; ... and it should be related to what appears to be, or to have been, Chinese in the eyes of non-Chinese.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Teotonio R. de Souza, "Goan Identity: One, Many or None", *Goa Now*, January 2001, a paper released at the International Goan Convention in Panjim-Goa on 30 December 2000 (www.goacom.com/goanow).

¹⁴² Jean-Pierre Cabestan, "Macau Still Exists! But Will It Survive?", in *Macau on the Threshold of the Third Millennium* (Macau: Macau Ricci Institute, 2003), p. 7.

¹⁴³ Wang Gungwu, *The Chineseness of China — Selected Essays*, p. 2.

Elsewhere, Wang has asserted that different manifestations of Chineseness exist around the world and that they are evaluated differently, even among the Chinese.¹⁴⁴ One can therefore surmise that “being Chinese” [Sinicised] can mean different things to different people — even in Hong Kong and Macau. In a context in which almost the entire population is made up of ethnic Chinese, a perceptible difference is their willingness to cooperate with Beijing, as the Macau journalist Harald Bruning has observed:

Hong Kong' s recent political troubles have led many commentators to heap generous praise on Macau' s relatively smooth political and economic development since its 1999 handover. ... Funnily enough, some of the eulogies are being expressed by Hong Kong' s pro-democracy camp, which is not only highly critical of Mr. Tung but also the central government. Some of the rather lame comparisons seem to be founded on little more than blithe ignorance or sheer self-flagellation. The point is that Macau' s successful post-handover situation is diametrically opposed to what Hong Kong' s pro-democracy activists demand. Chinese patriotism permeates every level of Macau' s civil society and political system, which continue to function rather well without western-style party politics. Public opinion in Macau is not shaped by a handful of political parties but by some 2,000 community, business and labour associations, a process that one may describe as “associative democracy”. Consensus politics continues to reign

¹⁴⁴ According to Wang: “Those in China measure this [quality of Chineseness] in terms of how much the Chinese outside are still like those in China and remain loyal to what China stands for. Those who have settled abroad are normally content if they speak the language, observe certain customs, and are able to employ Chinese ways and connections effectively. It is however important that their Chinese origins be respected and there is no discrimination against them as Chinese.” See Wang Gungwu, “A Single Chinese

supreme in Macau, where it is generally accepted that in case of conflict between the two elements of the "one country, two systems" principle, the former should prevail. Macau has succeeded in maintaining its Portuguese-style civil liberties without being affected by Taiwan and Hong Kong-type political volatility.¹⁴⁵

These issues notwithstanding, it remains unclear when Sinicisation first became a matter of concern for the Macanese community because it is bound up with the debate on when Chinese ethnic traits became prominent in the Macanese genetic pool. Carlos Estorninho, a Portuguese anthropologist, writing in 1952, believed that before the opening of the treaty ports in 1842, the Portuguese did not inter-marry with the Chinese due to Chinese xenophobia and cultural pride and that it was only in the early twentieth century when cohabitation became common.¹⁴⁶ A contrary view has been adopted by the eminent Macau historian Manuel Teixeira, who stated that cohabitation between Portuguese settlers and Chinese women was already a feature of early Macau.¹⁴⁷ Teixeira is supported by C. R. Boxer, an authority on the Portuguese empire, who had written: "the considerable mixture of Chinese blood ... derives largely from the co-habitation of Portuguese and Eurasian male householders with their [Chinese female slaves]."¹⁴⁸ While not challenging that Chinese ethnic traits stemmed from an earlier period, Jorge Morbey,

Diaspora? Some Historical Reflections", in Wang Gungwu and Annette Shun Wah, *Imagining the Chinese Diaspora: Two Australian Perspectives* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1999), p. 9 fn.

¹⁴⁵ Harald Bruning, "Smooth operator", *South China Morning Post*, 25 July 2003.

¹⁴⁶ Carlos A.G. Estorninho, cited in Teixeira, "The Macanese", *Review of Culture*, No. 20, 1994, p. 88.

¹⁴⁷ Teixeira, "The Macanese", *Review of Culture*, No. 20, 1994, pp. 157-161.

¹⁴⁸ C. R. Boxer, *Women in Iberian Expansion Overseas 1415 – 1815* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 87-88. For a comprehensive discussion, see Koo, "In Search of a Better World: a social history of the Macaenses in China", pp. 48-52.

a former President of the Cultural Institute of Macau, considers that it has accelerated since World War II, due to the emigration of the traditional Macanese families who were “predominantly of non-Chinese Eurasian origin”.¹⁴⁹ Further, Morbey sees the December 1966 riots in Macau and the April 1974 coup in Lisbon¹⁵⁰ as significant markers in the decline of Portuguese traits generally —due to Portugal’s desire to retreat from Macau. In this last observation, he is supported by the Macanese architect, Carlos Marreiros, who stated that the removal of the Portuguese garrison from Macau, in December 1975, which eliminated a group of eligible marriage partners for the young Macanese women, was “one of the greatest political errors contemporary Portugal committed.”¹⁵¹

The recent popularisation of the term Sinicisation calls into question the rationale for the debate. If miscegenic liaisons between the Portuguese and Chinese have existed for centuries, and it was not considered an issue back then —why is it an issue now? I believe the timing is symptomatic of a bipolar disorder: an acute fear of extinction and a defective corporate memory that dwells nostalgically in the past but refuses to acknowledge a reality —that the process of Sinicisation had begun centuries ago. Therefore, to describe the Portuguese withdrawal in 1999, as, *ipso facto*, accelerating the process of Sinicisation is overly simplistic. In the pre-1999 era, the Macanese were renown for their part-Chinese ethnicity, their familiarity with the Cantonese dialect, and their partiality towards things Chinese, such as the use of herbal medicine and observance of certain festivals. But in post-colonial Macau, they also have to gain the practical skills needed to prosper in the new era. These may include a keenness to learn *Putonghua* and

¹⁴⁹ Jorge Morbey, “Aspects of ‘ethnic identity’ of the Macanese”, *Review of Culture*, No. 20, 1994, p. 205.

¹⁵⁰ See Chapter Three, “Decline of Portuguese influence”.

¹⁵¹ Carlos Marreiros, “Alliances for the Future”, *Review of Culture*, No. 20, 1994, p. 169.

be better informed about developments in China —in short, to be China-conscious. In the process, some may become more sympathetic towards China, while others may take greater pride in their Chinese ethnicity even as they cling to their Portuguese heritage and emphasise their identification with Macau. It is therefore open to debate whether such conditioned responses can be interpreted as accelerated Sinicisation because they are the skills of adaptation honed through centuries of settlement on the China coast, which continues till the present. Taking a lead from Wang Gungwu, perhaps it is more appropriate to view them as the manifestation of yet another form of Chineseness developed generations ago. Accordingly, it is timely to reiterate a basic assertion of this thesis, noted in the Introductory Chapter (see p. 19 above), that 1999 should not be viewed as a great divide or a water shed but as a *continuity* in which the outcome of transformation, which takes generations to accomplish, remains to be seen.

Leadership issues

It is not uncommon for writers to point to the lack of strong leadership as a weakness that the Macanese community must overcome, if it wishes to remain relevant. At the commencement of this investigation, I might have been swayed by such a proposition. However, my view has been moderated by the findings of my research. Herbert Yee states that ‘the poor performance of the Macanese in the 1992 and 1996 [Legislative Assembly] elections suggest that the Macanese community without d' Assumpção has become both disunited and weak.’¹⁵² As Yee has also nominated Pedro Lobo (1940s and 1950s) as another example of a former strong Macanese leader, a brief profile of each is in order.

Pedro Lobo was born in Portuguese Timor but left for Macau at an early age.¹⁵³ In the early decades of the twentieth century, he rose to prominence as head of the Macau government's opium franchise. During World War II, as the Director of the Economics Department, he controlled the procurement and distribution of essential foodstuffs. In that capacity, he distinguished himself by ensuring that Macau's supply of these items were maintained despite being isolated by the Japanese. During his illustrious career, Lobo was credited with helping some of the prominent Chinese in contemporary Macau, among them Stanley Ho, Ma Man-kei and Ho Yin, the father of the present Chief Executive.¹⁵⁴ Also connected with Macau's gold monopoly, Lobo became exceedingly rich. According to a newspaper report in 1958:

[Lobo] is certainly Macao's most colorful character ... the old city's most picturesque story of local boy makes good. Today, Pedro Jose Lobo heads an empire that covers most of big business in Macao. His interests extend to Hong Kong and from there, to other parts of the Far East. As his wealth is inestimable so is the extent of his philanthropy. ... No institutions in charity-prone Macao is completely independent of the Lobo handout.¹⁵⁵

In contrast, Carlos d' Assumpção, a lawyer, rose to prominence in the political reforms that followed the 1974 Lisbon coup. From 1976 until his death in 1992, he presided over the Legislative Assembly, making him the second most powerful figure in Macau after

¹⁵² Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 139.

¹⁵³ It is difficult to identify the year of his birth. In 1959, when the novelist Ian Fleming met him, he was said to be in his early 70s, which places his birth in the 1890s. Ian Fleming, "The Enigmatic Doctor Lobo", in Donald Pittis and Susan J. Henders (eds), *Macao: Mysterious Decay and Romance* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 61-66.

¹⁵⁴ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, 191n.

the Governor. During his presidency, he was the bane of successive governors and his confrontations with them marked him out as a strong leader.

As models of leadership, Lobo and Assumpcao shared some common features. First, they occupied positions of considerable power and influence with respect to the government of their day. Second, their positions and wealth enabled them to command respect from members of their own community and the key members of other communities. Third, they both had strong personalities and were feared as adversaries. Since d' Assumpção's death in 1992, several Macanese leaders have achieved prominence but none possess the combination of power, influence and wealth that characterised Lobo and d' Assumpção. Indeed, the conditions for such a convergence may never be repeated. In contemporary Macau, wealth gravitates to those who control the gaming licences and those heavily involved in real estate while power and influence tend to be measured in terms of *guanxi* — connections and access to the decision-makers who, in post-1999 Macau, are the Chinese.

José Manuel dos Santos, the owner of the telecommunications company Vodatel Networks, was, in 2002, the highest profiled Macanese businessman. But despite his apparent wealth and profile, no one suggests that he is a leader of the Macanese community. This illustrates an observation, made by Joaquim de Carvalho, former president of the defunct Camara Municipal das Ilhas, that:

The absence of a strong leader may be good for the community as a whole

... The Macanese community has become more mature after the death of

¹⁵⁵ These words may also be used to describes Stanley Ho, the casino magnate in contemporary Macau. Accordingly they give a sense of what Lobo was to his generation. See 'Special Supplement: Macao Today', *Hong Kong Standard*, 18 January 1958 (BMC-NLA, MSS 4300, Box 12, Envelope 2).

d' Assumpção. It no longer relies on a single leader to make important decisions but does so collectively.¹⁵⁶

Accordingly, the obsessive search to identify a leader in their mould appears unrealistic and futile.

But Yee's view that the post-1999 community leadership is weak and disunited can be challenged as simplistic. First, post-1999 Macau is vastly different from the 1950s and 1980s, and so is the Macanese community, which, as a whole, has become more intricate since the days of Lobo and d'Assumpção. Second, Yee's assertion of disunity and fragmented leadership seems to have developed from the increased numbers of Macanese candidates aspiring to electoral office. But it is a measured response to Macau's electoral system, which favours small groups, as Lo Shui-hing has explained in *Political Development in Macau* (1995).¹⁵⁷ Ironically, the current system is the brainchild of Carlos d' Assumpção when he was President of the Legislative Assembly. According to Lo, d' Assumpção had intended to curb the growing influence of the liberal forces to enable the Macanese to gain at least one directly elected seat. This did not eventuate due to the resultant multiplication of groups and candidates and the changed electioneering strategy of the Chinese groups who had previously supported the Macanese.¹⁵⁸

If disunity existed within the Macanese community in the immediate post-colonial period, it is not apparent. Instead, almost three years after the transfer of power, they have gathered unitedly "to discuss development, challenges and opportunities" facing their

¹⁵⁶ Joaquim de Carvalho's comment to Herbert Yee. See Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 192 n.

¹⁵⁷ Prior to 1992, the list system of representation ensured that the directly elected seats are allocated according to the proportion of votes won by a group. The changes, which reduced the weighting given to the candidates lower down in the group's list, made it extremely difficult for the third or fourth candidates to be elected. See Lo, *Political Development in Macau*, pp. 83-85.

community and are positive about their status as a minority and their continuing presence in Macau.¹⁵⁹ In the course of field research, I have been present at various functions during which members of the community have gathered. Three observations may be made. One is that the various leaders of the community continue to talk congenially with one another, which would not have been the case, if disunity —as alleged —were rife. Another is that seating protocols are clearly observed during these functions in which the doyen of the community is clearly the literary figure Henrique de Senna Fernandes. Although wielding no political power and holding no important civic positions, he has been accorded genuine respect. Not surprisingly, he has also been honoured, in February 2002, by the new Macau regime with a Medal of Merit (Culture).¹⁶⁰ The last is the idea of a strong single leader to represent the Macanese, which does not sit well with them. Currently group leadership is shared between the heads of the various Macanese institutions and the members who are elected or appointed to the Macau Legislature. Since 1999, there has been a transition in community leadership to a younger generation. Former leaders, such as Jorge Rangel and Anabela Ritchie who have been closely identified with the colonial regime, now share the limelight with a younger group represented by José M. de Oliveira Rodrigues, Jorge Fâo, José Coutinho and João M. Costa Antunes, while Leonel A. Alves continues to attract attention as the most senior and longest serving Macanese deputy in Macau.¹⁶¹ Although group leadership has its merits, the structure gives rise to a perception of divisiveness and intra-communal rivalry,

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁵⁹ ‘Macanese and future’, *MacaU*, December 2002, p. 86.

¹⁶⁰ ‘MSAR Awards Honours’, *MacaU*, March 2002, p. 91.

an image that has dogged the community in the past. If there is a reversion to the traditional style of strong personal leadership, which I consider unlikely, Alves — a lawyer and former associate of Assumpção — has been identified by Herbert Yee as a possible candidate to assume the mantle.¹⁶²

Conclusion

The Macanese in post-1999 Macau is a community in flux. Having been closely identified with the colonial elite that has recently departed, decolonisation has ushered in a period of unprecedented change and painful adjustments during which their identity is evolving even as individuals continue to express their relevance in a diversity of ways. It is a mistake to describe their transition in terms of a crisis of identity. At this early stage, there does not appear to be any crisis in that direction while there are grounds to believe that their sense of belonging and identification to Macau will prevail into the future and that their centuries-old settlement in China will continue. In surviving the cataclysmic change of 1999, the community has demonstrated a degree of resilience and is adapting to the new situation. In the humdrum of daily routine, they —like the other residents of Macau —seek to live useful lives in interesting times. Along with the local Chinese, some try to master *Putonghua* and be literate in Chinese also. The Macanese continue to tend to the needs of their institutions and attempt to preserve their culture and language. Festivals, weddings and funerals continue to provide occasions to meet old friends from home and abroad. Should the need arise and circumstances permit, overseas visits will be

¹⁶¹ José M. de Oliveira Rodrigues and Jorge Fão are both members of the Legislative Assembly. José Coutinho is head of Macau's Civil Servants Association and an elected member of the Portuguese Communities Council, and João Manuel Costa Antunes is the president of the Casa de Portugal em Macau.

¹⁶² Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 139.

undertaken for familial, recreational and health reasons —as in times past. In line with past practice, Macanese youths continue to leave Macau for further education abroad; at the end of their studies, they face the familiar heart-wrenching dilemma whether to return or to remain abroad. If they choose to return, the opportunities for qualified tri-lingual personnel are good, due to the Ho Administration's desire to appoint young and dedicated local people to the senior positions. If some choose to remain overseas, they will swell the ranks of the Macanese diaspora, which retains formal and familial links with the Macanese community in Macau. These links, and the nature of the diaspora, will be explored in the next chapter.

ONE COUNTRY, TWO DIASPORAS

Nineteen ninety-nine will be remembered by some Macanese as a year of farewells during which family, friends and colleagues said goodbye to Macau and to each other. Diana Lin has captured the mood well in her documentary series *Return to the Motherland*, broadcast on Hong Kong television during the months of October and November 1999. One episode suggests that Macanese farewell parties were a regular occurrence but they were not the only ones leaving. Official statistics reveal that between 1991 and 1996, more than 13,000 residents — predominantly Chinese — left Macau for Australia (580), Canada (3,900), Hong Kong (5,300) Singapore (140) Taiwan (1,700) and the United States (1,800).¹ These figures do not include those who have gone to Portugal; no statistics are available on those because they are not considered as migrants.² In leaving, the Macau Chinese added to the already significant profile of the overseas Chinese communities while the Macanese joined the small — compared to the Chinese diaspora — band of Macanese communities scattered around the globe, becoming in essence, two diasporas from the one country.

¹ Berlie (ed.), *Macao 2000*, p. 48.

² There were about 107,000 Macau residents who were holders of Portuguese passports; potentially the exodus could have been substantial. Evidently, the number of Macau Chinese in Portugal was small compared to those from Mozambique and East Timor, when colonial rule ended in 1974. Portugal has an indeterminate number of Macanese residents and a thriving Chinese community comprising of some 11,000 members, 1,100 Chinese restaurants and two Chinatowns. Eighty percent of the Chinese population hailed from Shanghai and Zhejiang. See Eduardo Tomé, “The Thriving Chinese Community in Portugal”, *Macao*, September 2002, pp. 10-31.

This chapter is a study of the two diasporas: the Macanese diaspora and the modern Hong Kong Chinese diaspora, which comprises the latest wave of Chinese from Hong Kong and Macau who emigrated due to the uncertainties created by the transfers of sovereignty. The Macanese diaspora is studied for its links, both formal and informal, with the community in Macau and the significance that such links hold for those who remain behind. Positioning the small Macanese community in Macau in a global context, I seek to demonstrate that the links between the Macanese community and its diaspora are important to both. In doing so, I reaffirm a basic assertion of this thesis —that the community in Macau should not be studied in isolation but is best done in conjunction with its diaspora because they form parts of a composite picture. As a basis for comparison, the modern Hong Kong Chinese diaspora is pertinent because for statistical and policy considerations, receiving countries have grouped the Macanese immigrants from Macau in the same broad Hong Kong category, and because similar concerns appear to have driven both diasporas from their homelands. Indeed, both have emerged from the same region and due to the Macanese hybridity and acculturation with Chinese ways, the Macanese in the diaspora are often mistaken for Hong Kong Chinese. But as I have stated in the Introductory Chapter, this is a misconception, which this chapter will seek to illuminate.

Analytical issues

Earlier in Chapter Two, I raised some general issues regarding the study of the Macanese diaspora, namely whether one can apply the term *diaspora* to the overseas Macanese communities, and if so, where is the *centre* (homeland) from which the Macanese diaspora may be said to have emerged. Here, I shall mention other issues that

have relevance to the study of the Macanese diaspora. These ideas are derived from the works of Wang Gungwu, an authority in the field of Chinese diaspora studies. Wang has published numerous articles and books on the subject during an illustrious academic career, including the collection of essays *China and the Overseas Chinese* (1991) and *Community and Nation* (new edition 1992). His tenure as the vice-chancellor of the University of Hong Kong witnessed the publication of Ronald Skeldon's edited volume, *Reluctant Exiles? – Migration from Hong Kong and the New Overseas Chinese* (1994), to which Wang contributed the Foreword, and the volume has become an indispensable resource for the study of the modern Hong Kong Chinese diaspora. Since Wang embarked in this area of scholarship, so many changes and advances have been made that it is daunting to attempt a summary of his views, let alone to encapsulate a lifetime of ideas. In 1999, he delivered the Inaugural Lecture at the Centre for the Study of the Southern Chinese Diaspora at the Australian National University, Canberra, in which he presented a distillation of his thoughts on the subject of Chinese diaspora studies.³ Here, I shall focus on three observations that have particular relevance to the study of the Macanese community.

The first concerns Wang's observation that there are numerous Chinese communities who are cultivating different kinds of "Chineseness" within their own localities.⁴ Such diversity has produced a "complex phenomenon" where "it may not be so difficult to say that there is no single Chinese diaspora but many different Chinese

³ Wang Gungwu, "A Single Chinese Diaspora? Some Historical Reflections", Inaugural Lecture, Centre for the Study of the Chinese Southern Diaspora, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University. Published in Wang Gungwu and Annette Shun Wah, *Imagining the Chinese Diaspora: Two Australian Perspectives*" (Canberra: Australian National University, 1999).

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

diasporas.”⁵ If different qualities of *Chineseness* can be said to exist within the Chinese diaspora, the same complexity exists within the Macanese diaspora, where people tend to define themselves as Macanese from Macau, Hong Kong or Shanghai. Accordingly, one can expect that among the main Macanese diaspora communities, different representations of *Macanese*ness exist. Moreover, these Macanese communities exhibit varying degrees of acculturation to the host societies resulting in further dilution of their Macanese ethnicity. As the generations lengthen, on what basis can these diasporic communities be identified as Macanese? Is it their Portuguese names, their observance of Macanese customs and festivals, membership of the Macanese diasporic organisations, or their links to their ancestral homeland of Macau? Such issues are by no means stretches of the imagination; they have relevance for the contemporary Macanese communities where memberships, financial subsidies and bursaries are allocated on the basis of whether one is accepted as Macanese by the community or not —as we shall see later in this chapter.

Secondly, Wang stresses the fragile triangular relationship that exists between the Chinese diasporic communities, their homeland and the national governments. Within this boundary, the communities have to negotiate the sensitivities of national governments that view some diaspora communities with varying degrees of suspicion and distrust. In the case of the Macanese, this is not an issue for the diaspora because they are well assimilated into the host communities. But it remains problematic for the Macanese in Macau where their loyalty can come under question due to the lingering presence of “colonial complexes”, discussed in the preceding chapter, and the activities of the

⁵ Ibid., p. 17.

Portuguese Government in post-1999 Macau. A case in point is the Portuguese Communities Council elections held in Macau on 30 March 2003, in which Portuguese nationals in Macau, which include all Macanese and Chinese holders of Portuguese passports, voted to elect three representatives for Lisbon.⁶ The elections, won by the group headed by Jose Pereira Coutinho, President of the Macau Civil Servants Association, reveals that of the 66,720 registered voters, only 3,674, representing 5.5 per cent bothered to vote.⁷ The low voter turnout may be attributable to public apathy, but it perpetuates a perception that the Macanese community has contending loyalties.⁸ As such, it is an unnecessary intrusion they can well do without; perhaps, this is the message underscored by the low voter turnout.

Thirdly, given the diversity of the Chinese diaspora communities and the delicate political tight rope that they must negotiate, Wang believes that it is best for the study of the diasporic communities to be conducted within the context of their national environments and not their homeland. Wang's concern is mainly political but his suggestion has merit for the Macanese communities, if only to illustrate the differences between them and to document their histories. There is scope for the Macanese diaspora to be analysed along this theme —but not here, because to do so would require in-depth studies of the various Macanese communities around the world. Such undertaking is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead in this chapter, I shall confine myself to

⁶ Consisting of 100 members, the Council acts as a consultative body representing the interests of Portugal's four million overseas citizens. See Harald Bruning, 'Electoral zest', *South China Morning Post*, 7 March 2003.

⁷ The other successful candidates on Coutinho's ticket are Silveira Machado, a retired teacher, and Mario Gabriel, a nurse. See 'Council of Communities', *MacaU*, June 2003, p. 95.

⁸ The Macau Portuguese daily, *Ponto Final*, suggests that the voter turnout in Macau for the last Portuguese general elections was even lower. See 'Two lists contest result of Portuguese Communities Council election', *Ponto Final* (posted 31-3-2003 10:37 am).

the community in Australia and will comment briefly on the other countries, based on the available information and where appropriate.

The Macanese diaspora

The Macanese diaspora, as we know it today, is the product of successive waves of emigration that began in earnest soon after World War II, peaking during periods of heightened political tensions such as in 1949, 1966-67 and 1999.⁹ Political instability was only one of many factors that spurred the Macanese to settle in Western countries in droves. Looming large was a search for better prospects for themselves and their families. But the seeds of the Macanese diaspora were sown in 1842 when the Opium War ended and Hong Kong was established as a British colony, ushering in a new era for the Macanese community. As foreign traders re-located to the newer ports, many capable young Macanese joined in. From Macau, the exodus appeared relentless. In the census of 1896, one could almost hear the stampede of Macanese feet as they headed for distant shores.¹⁰ Of the 2,371 Macanese recorded as having left Macau, fifty five per cent (1309) went to Hong Kong, thirty five per cent (819) left for China (Guangzhou 68, Fuzhou 13, Shanghai 738) and the rest went to Japan (Yokohama 88, Nagasaki 10) and Southeast Asia (Singapore 71, Surabaya 3, and Bangkok 71). The departees represented a

⁹ The Communist takeover in China; the anti-Portuguese riots in Macau; and the Macau handover, respectively.

¹⁰ Da Silva, Pedro Nolasco, "Macau", in Wright, A. (ed.), *Twentieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai and other Treaty Ports* (London: Lloyd, 1908). The 1896 Macau census figures were contained in the publication *Twentieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai and other Treaty Ports*, which was a monumental survey of the treaty port world at the height of the British imperial experience at the turn of the twentieth century. Covering 850 pages, it contained a segment on Macau contributed by the renowned Macanese educator, Pedro Nolasco da Silva.

staggering sixty per cent of the total Macanese population in Macau.¹¹ Wherever they have settled and the numbers permit, the Macanese set about establishing diasporic institutions in their new localities to meet the needs of their communities. Hong Kong has the oldest Portuguese cum Macanese institution outside of Macau — the Lusitano Club formed in 1865.¹² After Hong Kong, Shanghai had the most vibrant Macanese community. A recent (2000) study of the Portuguese/Macanese¹³ community in Shanghai listed some fifteen organisations, before emigration and forced repatriations made them all redundant.¹⁴

The emigration of Macanese to the newer ports, and later transcontinentally, transformed the community totally. For a start, the Macanese dispersed out of economic necessity. Their survival instinct and pursuit of economic gains – goals common to all – propelled their move out of Macau. For them, it was not easy being crowded into the

¹¹ We do not know for sure whether the numbers of the Portuguese garrison were included in the census. It was likely that they were and if their numbers were deducted from the Portuguese segment of the statistics, the percentage would be much higher. In the treaty ports, the Chinese from Macau could be registered with the Portuguese consulate for the purposes of consular protection but in Macau, they were not considered as Portuguese while the Macanese were. So the figures given in the census could be taken as Macanese who left Macau for other ports in the course of trade or employment. Although care should be exercised in the interpretation of these figures due to the lack of information concerning the nature of the relevant census questions and the lack of comparable data over a relevant period of time, nevertheless, it could be safely concluded that a major proportion of the population did leave Macau and that they dispersed to a vast geographical area.

¹² Today in Hong Kong, it owns a 27 storey building in Central, Hong Kong Island. It has 400 members, of which only about 200 are active. For the first time in its history, it is considering admitting female and foreigners as Associate members. See ‘Club Lusitano vows to stick to Portuguese blood vote’, *Ponto Final* (posted 9-4-2003 12:07pm). Also see Teresa Paiva, ‘A home shared by Hong Kong’s Portuguese community’, *MacaU*, Special 1996, pp. 56-69.

¹³ Under the law of extraterritoriality that existed between the Western powers and Chinese, the Macanese were considered Portuguese nationals, though some may claim the status as British subjects by virtue of their birth or residence in Hong Kong.

¹⁴ Among them are Club Portuguez, also known as Club União (founded in 1882), Club de Recreio (1893), the Sports Club Passa-Leão (1910), Club Lusitano de Shanghai (1910) which later changed its name to the Portuguese Sporting Association before changing back to Lusitano in 1929. See Wang Zhicheng, *Portuguese in Shanghai*, (Macau: Macau Foundation, 2000). Available on the Internet via www.macaudata.com/macauweb/ebook001/.

tenements of Hongqiao (Shanghai) and central Hong Kong.¹⁵ Yet they persevered, becoming for a time a part of the Western expansion in China and Hong Kong.¹⁶

As the generations lengthened, and roots became established, the notion of *home* became increasingly blurred for these Macanese re-settlers. When the Macanese communities fled China in 1949, even Macau did not feel like home to most of them. Many moved to Hong Kong and farther, when opportunities availed. Those who were left behind in Macau were mainly the older generation, women and the younger children. Nine years later, in 1958, they appeared so displaced that a *Hong Kong Standard* reporter described them as “exiles” who had become “strangers in their fathers’ home”.¹⁷

The blurred notion of *homeland* suggests a complex identity that appears multi-layered. This is illustrated by Felisberto C. Roliz’s self description, in 1997:

Today I am an American citizen, I love my heritage ... and am proud of being a Macanese from Shanghai. ...Racially mixed, we are not the same, but we are one united Macanese family for more than 400 years. Macau is our ancestral home... and we consider Portugal to be our mother country.¹⁸

¹⁵ J. P. Braga described the early decades in Hong Kong where the majority of Macanese emigrated to: “Those conditions were far from easy. The hours of work were long, and the salaries paid to the Portuguese clerks were meager, and it was only by dint of unremitting thrift that they were able to provide for the maintenance of their families. ... Housing accommodation seemed always insufficient for the demands of the growing population of early Hong Kong [and they] had to be content with living in quarters which were close and uncomfortable ... In their homes, the Portuguese migrants in Hong Kong must have led drab lives. There was little outside entertainment to be had after the day’s work. ... They had little in common with the British community, and lived very much among themselves.” See José P. Braga, *The Portuguese in Hongkong and China*, (first published in 1944, this edition (Macau: Macau Foundation, 1998), pp. 158-159.

¹⁶ Koo, “In Search of a Better World: a social history of the Macaenses in China”, pp. 82-160.

¹⁷ “Special Supplement: Macao Today”, *Hong Kong Standard*, 18 January 1958 (BMC-NLA, MS 4300, Box 12, Envelope 2).

¹⁸ F.C. Roliz, “We Macanese”, *UMA News Bulletin*, September-October 1997, p. 12.

Roliz inadvertently declared that he had at least four identities: American, Shanghai, Macau and Portugal. This multiple simultaneous identity has been discussed previously in Chapter Two, in the section “Who are the Macanese?”

The dispersion brought the Macanese out of its Portuguese cultural cocoon transforming them irrevocably. Although links were maintained with Macau, these new Macanese communities became acculturated in other Western mores, in language, lifestyle and thinking —exhibiting different kinds of *Macaneness*. In the past, their transformations have led to differentiation between those who left Macau and those who remained, giving rise to a form of rivalry between the various communities exemplified by the nicknames they gave each other, and the pronounced competitiveness on the sporting fields. Their Macau compatriots called the Shanghai Macanese by the sobriquet *Shanghaiistas*¹⁹ while Hong Kong Macanese were called *ton-tons*.²⁰ More hurtful to those born outside Macau was an attempt to exclude them by classifying them as “not legitimate Macanese”.²¹ At the time, the rivalry reflected the stratification largely drawn along language and residency lines. The Shanghai and Hong Kong Macanese tended to consider themselves progressive, speaking English and having better-paid jobs. In contrast, the Macau Macanese were Portuguese-educated and largely employed in the Macau civil service. Such differentiation caused friction within the Macanese communities that lingered until 1996, when the late Joaquim Morais Alves — then member of Macau’s Legislative Assembly and Chair of the Organising Committee for the

¹⁹ The Portuguese equivalent of the English term, *Shanghaianders*, used to describe the European settlers in Shanghai. For the latter, see Robert Bickers, *Britain in China* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 15.

²⁰ Derived from the Cantonese term for “buckets”, which make a lot of noise when empty.

²¹ F.C. Roliz, “We Macanese”, *UMA News Bulletin*, September-October 1997, p. 12.

Second International Reunion of Macanese Communities (*Encontro II*) — settled the issue decisively and in an inclusive manner.²² Addressing the participants of *Encontro II*, Morais Alves said:

So what does it mean to be Macanese? Physically, that you are the product of the miscegenation that characterised the spread of the Portuguese people around the globe is clear for all to see. But there also exists another type of Macanese; the one who left the land of his roots to start a new life in this small but bewitching and charming corner of the world that we preside over; the one who is here before you today – the Macanese ... from Trás-os-Montes.²³

In fact, at Alves' passing in March 2003, the doyen of the Macanese community Henrique de Senna Fernandes described him as "one of Macau's greatest friends ... a true Macanese."²⁴

The growth of the Macanese communities outside Macau expanded the reach of the community in ethnological terms by accepting and absorbing other Eurasians into their midst whether they be English, Danish or Russian. Through marriage, the Macanese community has become enriched by genealogical offshoots bearing such non-Portuguese names as McDougall, Danenberg, Yvanovich, Yeung, McConkey and Karaoglu.²⁵ In this,

²² "Joaquim Morais Alves dies after short but serious illness", *Ponto Final* (posted 27-3-2003 3:29pm). Morais Alves came to Macau when he was only sixteen, in 1924. The article described him as "one of the most emblematic figure in Macau's tiny Portuguese community."

²³ Isabel Meneses, "Returning Home", *MacaU*, Special 1996, p. 9.

²⁴ "Macao's Portuguese Community Loses Leading Light", *MacaU*, June 2003, p. 94.

²⁵ "New Members", *Casa Down Under*, June 2002, 11. Regarding names, undoubtedly, there are Chinese men who have married Macanese women and their offspring may bear both family names. It is not uncommon in Macau for Chinese to have a Portuguese name, such as the current Secretary for Administration and Justice, Florinda da Rosa Silva Chan, who, despite the name, is not Macanese. Often,

they mirrored the Luso-Malay community in Malacca where the Portuguese Eurasians, wrote Chan Kok-eng in 1979, ‘not only dominate the Eurasian population of [Malacca] but also have contributed most of its basic characteristics, while absorbing those who were originally distinguishable as Dutch or Anglo-Eurasians.’²⁶

They had prospered because they demonstrated their usefulness to the broader community in socio-economic ways. As clerks, bookkeepers and translators, the Macanese facilitated Western expansion and influence in China and continued to do so until 1949 when they were forced out. The ubiquitous presence of Macanese employees and civil servants was a feature of Hong Kong, Shanghai and the other treaty ports. Their service to Hong Kong was documented in J. P. Braga’s *The Portuguese in China*.²⁷ In the early twentieth century, they were associated with the prominent business tycoons of the day, such as the Kadoorie family who owned prestigious hotels in Hong Kong and Shanghai – including the famous Peninsula Hotel in Kowloon – and China Power and Light Company, a major provider of electricity in Hong Kong.²⁸ Even the legendary Hong Kong businessman Sir Robert Ho Tung, whose empire traversed both Hong Kong and Macau, had Macanese such as Jack Braga in his employ in Macau.²⁹ In banking, the Macanese community’s contributions to the establishment and growth of the Hong Kong

Portuguese names are assumed at christenings and conversion to the Christian religion. See the church registry sample in Teixeira, ‘The Macanese’, *Review of Culture*, No. 20, 1994, pp. 120-121.

²⁶ Chan Kok-eng, ‘The Eurasians of Melaka’, in Sandhu & Wheatley, *Melaka, the Transformation of a Malay Capital c1400-1980*, Vol. II (Singapore: Institute of SE Asian Studies, 1983), p. 265.

²⁷ José P. Braga, *The Portuguese in Hongkong and China*.

²⁸ ‘China Light and Power- Company meeting’, *South China Morning Post*, 1 January 1934 (BMC-NLA, MS 4300, Box 4, BRA/ 4000, <1-2>). ‘Attendance at the meeting: J.P. Braga is noted as director together with Horace Kadoorie. Braga’s son, Noel was noted as the Company Secretary. Macanese shareholders at the company meeting include P.M.N. da Silva, Snr, P.M.N. da Silva Jnr, C.A. Braga, C.M. da Silva’

²⁹ The exact nature of Jack Braga’s services to Ho Tung is unclear but the reference to his employment was referred to in a letter of condolence sent by Ho Tung on hearing the news of the death Jack Braga’s father. See Koo, ‘In Search of a Better World: a social history of the Macaenses in China’, p. 227.

and Shanghai Banking Corporation remain under-assessed. At the opening of the Bank's new head office building in Hong Kong, in 1935, it was revealed that the building had dedicated toilet facilities for its Macanese staff.³⁰ The provision of separate conveniences indicated the numerical significance of the Macanese staff as well as the social stratification in the British colony where the Macanese were considered socially below the Europeans but above the local Chinese. As bookkeepers and accountants, the Macanese had been an important part of the history of many of Hong Kong's largest professional firms, such as the venerable accountancy firm Lowe Bingham & Matthews — founded in 1902 but later absorbed into the global accounting practice of Price Waterhouse Coopers.³¹

Today, in the vastness of the Macanese diaspora, their news bulletins are dotted with references to the old China and Hong Kong communities; escaping the military conflicts and political upheavals, they represented the first wave of transcontinental migration by the Macanese.³² The United States has been a favourite destination because it offers the prospect of a bright future and was relatively unscathed by World War II. For those with Portuguese language skills and who failed to gain immediate entry to the United States, Brazil became a popular alternative. Not all who opted for Brazil stayed there permanently. Some, like Felisberto C. Roliz and Helena D'Aquino Barcia, later succeeded in re-migrating to the United States.³³

³⁰ The building was described as a 'Palace of Finance'. See *South China Morning Post*, 3 October 1935 (BMC-NLA, MS 4300, Box 4, BRA/ 4000, <180>).

³¹ John Graham, *The Lowe Bingham Story 1902-1977* (Hong Kong: Lowe, Bingham & Matthew, 1978?).

³² Although some Macanese did leave during World War II, these earlier departures were sporadic.

³³ Felisberto C. Roliz, 'We Macanese', *UMA News Bulletin*, Sept-Oct 1997, p. 12; Helena D'Aquino Barcis, 'A Jaguar and Two Girls From Brasil', *UMA News Bulletin*, Sept-Oct 2002, p. 13.

The dispersion of the Macanese community was sustained by economic opportunism and spurred by the socio-political upheaval of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), which spilled over to Macau and Hong Kong causing fear and creating havoc. In June 1989, the Tienanmen crackdown and the looming transfers of power caused many Hong Kong and Macau residents to review their plans for the future. As a result, many Chinese and Macanese succumbed to migrative pressures. A popular self-image of the Macanese diaspora was the one presented by Cecilia Jorge in 1993, in an article written for *MacaU*:

Wherever they [Macanese] went, they took with them the pride of being Portuguese; a pride in the traditions and culture of a community; and everlasting emotional link with Macau which had roots in centuries past. New lives were built abroad. Many were successful, proving that they had made the right decision.³⁴

The Hong Kong Chinese diaspora

In diaspora studies, the term *modern Hong Kong Chinese diaspora* refers to the exodus following the Sino-British Agreement on the future of Hong Kong, concluded in 1982. The looming transfer of sovereignty triggered sufficient concerns for many to seek a safe haven, which was facilitated by the changes in the immigration policies of some Western governments. This group of Hong Kong migrants differentiates themselves from the earlier ones due to their business and professional skills, and affluence; they have considered themselves “more genteel, more literate”.³⁵ During 1988–1989, in Australia,

³⁴ Cecilia Jorge and Beltrão Coelho, ‘Strengthening the Macanese Diaspora’, *MacaU*, Special 1993, p. 6.

³⁵ Bernard Wong, ‘Hong Kong Immigrants in San Francisco’, in Skeldon (ed.), *Reluctant Exiles?*, p. 241.

over two-thirds of the Hong Kong migrants fell into the professional, skilled and business migrants categories.³⁶ In contrast, the previous group of Hong Kong immigrants was, in the main, family reunion candidates or those employed in the food services area.³⁷ However, the Hong Kong Chinese diaspora —whether old or modern —represents but a small segment of the larger Chinese panorama.

The modern Hong Kong Chinese diaspora dwarfs its Macanese counterpart in size, extent and impact. Yet, there are similarities between the two, not least of which is a shared history. Through centuries of living amongst them, the Macanese community has become acculturated in Chinese ways. Many have Chinese ethnicity, which causes them to be mistaken as part of the Hong Kong Chinese diaspora —a misconception that this section seeks to redress. In comparing the two, I have relied heavily on various studies of the modern Hong Kong Chinese diaspora where certain themes caught my attention. First, the Hong Kong Chinese are said to have experienced a crisis of confidence over the transfer of sovereignty in 1997. Second, their emigration appears to have been motivated by their children's education and a desire to secure a future for their family. Third, they possess a set of criteria in selecting their destination countries; they do not necessarily opt for any country just because they have residency entitlement there. Fourth, when they get there, their settlement patterns are seen as distinctive. Finally, at their destinations, many have experienced difficulties in adjusting to their new environment, prompting a pragmatic response —the phenomenon called the *astronaut* family structure. I shall draw on these themes to make a comparison with the Macanese diaspora communities.

³⁶ Kee Pookong and Ronald Skeldon, "The Migration and Settlement of Hong Kong Chinese in Australia", in Skeldon (ed.), *Reluctant Exiles?*, p. 185.

Similarities and differences

A crisis of confidence

Between 1987 and 1989, surveys conducted in Hong Kong indicated a crisis of confidence among those aged between 25 and 39 years who were earning above average incomes. It was stated that ‘the desire to emigrate was directly proportional to income levels’ due to concerns that Hong Kong would lose its economic attractiveness as a place for making money, and competition from the emergent cities like Guangzhou and Shanghai.³⁸ These worries were heightened following the Tiananmen ‘massacre’ on 4 June 1989. Out of sympathy for the Beijing demonstrators and concerned for their own civil liberties and democratic aspirations, about a million Hong Kong residents marched through the streets to protest the actions taken by the Beijing authorities. The impending change of sovereignty, the Tiananmen crackdown and on-going tensions between Governor Patten and Beijing have led some observers to conclude that the primary reason for emigration was largely political.³⁹ Certainly, this was the finding of a study by Diana Lary and Bernard Luk in Canada.⁴⁰ Lawrence Lam’s finding was more forthright. He stated that his respondents ‘did not trust the ‘promises’ made by China’ concerning the

³⁷ Such as in Britain and Australia. See Ibid. Also see Hugh D.R. Baker, ‘Branches All Over: the Hong Kong Chinese in the United Kingdom’, in Skeldon (ed.), *Reluctant Exiles?*, p. 295.

³⁸ Josephine Smart, ‘Business Immigration to Canada: Deception and Exploitation’, in Skeldon (ed.), *Reluctant Exiles?*, p. 303.

³⁹ The political backdrop has been described by John Wong, a Hong Kong-born academic at the University of Sydney, who, writing in 1996 appeared pessimistic about Patten’s political reforms: ‘The problem began, not with the Chinese leaders refusing to accept the status quo [as at 1984 when the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed], but with the British authorities attempting to change it after 1984. ... The reality is that Patten’s reforms will come to naught on 1 July 1997.’ See John Wong, ‘The Legacy of British Rule and its Interaction with Beijing’s Objectives’, in Brook Barrington (ed.), *Empires, Imperialism and Southeast Asia*, pp. 212-234.

⁴⁰ Lary and Luk, ‘Hong Kong Immigrants in Toronto’, p. 161.

future of Hong Kong.⁴¹ An underlying fear — acutely felt but rarely voiced — was whether they would be able to travel internationally with the same ease and freedom as before? The latent fear touched on the future status of passports issued by the Hong Kong Government and whether important countries would continue to recognise it. Many Hong Kong people felt trapped, thus triggering a search for a safe haven and a foreign passport — to secure an escape route in case things deteriorated beyond their expectations.

In the Macanese experience, the crisis of confidence has manifested itself in other areas. Their Portuguese passports will remain valid as a travel document after 1999; consequently their right of abode in Portugal has not been an issue. However, because they were closely identified with the Portuguese colonial elite, they felt vulnerable to anti-colonial reprisals and recriminations. Their lack of literacy in the Chinese language also threatened their careers in the professions and the public service. One respondent has viewed the dilemma also in racial terms:

There was a saying among our people that one day we'll have to leave ...
We are not totally Chinese. If you are pure Chinese, yes, you gain, but being half-and- half, there was a feeling that you were caught in between just like the Anglo-Indians in India.⁴²

⁴¹ Lawrence Lam, 'Searching for a Safe Haven: The Migration and Settlement of Hong Kong Immigrants in Toronto', in Skeldon (ed.), *Reluctant Exiles?*, p.166.

⁴² Formerly from Hong Kong, now residing in the United States. Although he was speaking about his own Hong Kong background, his comments reflect a general feeling within the Macanese community.

Securing the future

Another reason propelling the exodus from Hong Kong was to secure the future for their families and their children's education.⁴³ Indeed, education is the most cited factor but it seems to have been over-stated because it is not a recent phenomenon. For much of the twentieth century, students from Hong Kong have been part of the academic landscape in Western institutions. Given this fact, these case studies appear deficient in not being more precise. It remains unclear whether the respondents are concerned about deterioration in the educational standards in Hong Kong after 1997, or that future governments may restrict the numbers of students being allowed out. Equally, whether the concern is about their ability to fund tuition fees in the future in view of the expressed concern regarding the economic future of Hong Kong. For those emigrating to Australia, there are substantial savings to be had in regard to tuition fees. A well-to-do Hong Kong businessman told me that by opting for Australia, he saved having to pay the overseas student levy and fees for his four children resulting in savings of hundreds of thousand of Australian dollars in the long term. Moreover, his children were entitled to funding via HECS (Higher Education Contributions Scheme). Although he had the resources to fund the children's education, the opportunity of gaining residency rights for his family coupled with the attendant benefits was an offer too good to miss. Until more is known about why education played such an important role in the decision to emigrate, it is my contention that the issue of education may have masked other underlying concerns.

⁴³ Lam, "Searching for a Safe Haven", p. 167; Christine Inglis and Chung-tong Wu, "The Hong Kong Chinese in Sydney", in Skeldon (ed.) *Reluctant Exiles?*, p. 210; Graham E. Johnson, "Hong Kong Immigration and the Chinese Community in Vancouver", in Skeldon (ed.) *Reluctant Exiles?*, p. 134.

In the Macanese experience, education also plays a part in the formation of the diaspora. For much of the twentieth century, Macanese families have sent their children for studies overseas.⁴⁴ Those seeking a Portuguese education were sent to Portugal while others went to the United States, England or Australia. As early as 1951, in Australia, there were at least seventeen Macanese students enrolled as boarders at the Sacred Heart College in Adelaide as well as an indeterminate number at St. Ignatius College in Sydney.⁴⁵ It is not known what percentage of students have returned to Macau after their studies but most of the seventeen Sacred Heart College boarders settled in Australia at the completion of their studies.

Destinations

In selecting their destination countries, the Hong Kong Chinese migrants are said to have their own set of criteria. According to one observer, they have sought countries that offered “political and economic stability, an internationally recognised education system, and a social linguistic milieu that [is] compatible with the Anglo-Chinese culture of Hong Kong.”⁴⁶ Other observers cite further factors such as the existence of established Chinese communities;⁴⁷ their prior experience as an overseas student;⁴⁸ family and business connections, and the herd mentality.⁴⁹ Language, in particular English, is seen as an important consideration because it eases the process of adjustment and rebuilding their

⁴⁴ Sales Marques said that it was common for people like him to go to Portugal to study. See McGivering, *Macau Remembers*, p. 31.

⁴⁵ Antonio Guterres, “Life in the Fifties in Adelaide, Australia”, *UMA News Bulletin*, January-February 1999, p. 17.

⁴⁶ Smart, “Business Immigration to Canada: Deception and Exploitation”, p. 103.

⁴⁷ Wong, “Hong Kong Immigrants in San Francisco”, p. 243.

⁴⁸ Kee and Skeldon, “The Migration and Settlement of Hong Kong Chinese in Australia”, p. 185.

⁴⁹ Lam, “Searching for a Safe Haven”, p. 164.

careers. Accordingly, it was found that many who gained entry to Canada via the French-speaking province of Quebec eventually move to Toronto because of the language issue.⁵⁰ But surprisingly, while Hong Kong Chinese were happy to be governed by the British, Great Britain was not a preferred destination in spite of the limited and belated offer of British residency rights aimed at stemming the “brain drain” from Hong Kong.⁵¹ A reason advanced for this state of affairs was the lack of links with Britain and the people there.⁵² Therefore not everyone who qualifies for one of the popular destinations will end up there, as the experience of the Macau Chinese also demonstrates.⁵³ This is because through the immigration consultants and their own networks, the Hong Kong migrants are arguably the best informed.⁵⁴ Moreover, they are sufficiently affluent to undertake pre-migration trips to check out their respective targets.⁵⁵ Based on what they have discovered, they prefer Canada, Australia, and the United States—in that order.⁵⁶ However, this general perception of being the best-informed group has been contradicted in the case of business migrants. One study has shown that they were ignorant about the businesses they bought into and the social and legislative environment they have to operate under. Being desperate to get out, they are said to have been preyed on by “unethical opportunistic sharks”.⁵⁷

In the Macanese experience, a strong social network exists – of friends and relatives – through whom they are kept abreast of conditions in their target destinations.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

⁵¹ Baker, “Branches All Over: the Hong Kong Chinese in the United Kingdom”, p. 305.

⁵² Ronald Skeldon, “Hong Kong in an International Migratory System”, p. 36.

⁵³ For although they can go to Portugal, very few actually did.

⁵⁴ Inglis and Wu, “The Hong Kong Chinese in Sydney”, p. 206.

⁵⁵ Lam, “Searching for a Safe Haven”, p. 164.

⁵⁶ Smart, “Business Immigration to Canada: Deception and Exploitation”, p. 103.

A herd mentality has been identified also in the formation of the Macanese diaspora. There is evidence to suggest that a large part of the diaspora community in Toronto chose Canada because of the influence of friends, but it may reflect also their social cohesiveness both at their place of origin and country of destination.⁵⁸ Like the Hong Kong Chinese, the Macanese prefer the same three countries, namely Canada, United States and Australia but Portugal and Brazil are highly thought of due to the language, family and historical ties. Portugal has the oldest established Macanese community outside of Macau; the Macanese elite has owned property there for generations.⁵⁹ Although the change of government has induced fear and anxiety among the Macanese in Macau, the fear of a mass exodus has not materialised.⁶⁰ Brazil is a favourite destination for Macanese from Macau due mainly to the fact that Portuguese is the official language also. A respondent, part of a family of eight who emigrated to Brazil in 1967, remarked:

We had a chance of going to Canada. It was easy and would have only taken a couple of days to get a visa. The United States took years, and there was a waiting list. So we decided on Brazil because we had studied Portuguese all our life. We liked the country and they received us well. The Brazilian people are warm, and spoke the language and we received help to start a new life.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁵⁸ Frederic Silva, *All Our Yesterdays* (Macau: Livros do Oriente, 1996), p. 56.

⁵⁹ He declared that he has two houses in Portugal. See McGivering, *Macau Remembers*, p. 97.

⁶⁰ Eduardo Tomé, "The Thriving Chinese Community in Portugal", *MacaU*, September 2002, pp. 10-31; Anna Isabel Dias "The return home", *MacaU*, Special 1999, pp. 51-57.

Patterns

In the receiving countries, the Hong Kong Chinese diasporic pattern is definable, and remarkable similarities are observed in Australia and Canada, which comprise the top two destinations.⁶¹ Generally well educated, they tend to be over-represented in the managerial, professional and para-professional areas.⁶² Perceived as wealthy, some engage themselves in developing trade between their new countries and their former homeland.⁶³ During the 1980s, many have transferred their assets from Hong Kong; this flight of capital has been blamed for a steep increase in property prices in the major destinations, especially in the area surrounding the traditional Chinatowns. However, such real estate activities have not been universally welcomed.⁶⁴ In New York, such speculative activities have been blamed for undermining the traditional economy of Chinatown. One study of the impact of Hong Kong Chinese in New York has painted a dismal picture of ‘raw exploitation’, ‘Dickensian conditions’, organised crime and a dumping ground for illegal immigrants.⁶⁵ Elsewhere, in Vancouver (Canada), a ‘fissure’ existed between the newcomers and the old-timers.⁶⁶ As in Toronto, their pattern of conspicuous consumption, which extends to food, expensive European cars and mega-houses, are frowned upon as ‘flaunting their wealth’.⁶⁷ Those unable or unwilling to succumb to such consumptive pressures tend to favour the minor centres and regional

⁶¹ Inglis and Wu, ‘The Hong Kong Chinese in Sydney’, p. 213.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 205; Kee and Skeldon, ‘The Migration and Settlement of Hong Kong Chinese in Australia’, p. 192.

⁶³ Inglis and Wu, ‘The Hong Kong Chinese in Sydney’, p. 210.

⁶⁴ Wong, ‘Hong Kong Immigrants in San Francisco’, p. 240; Johnson, ‘Hong Kong Immigration and the Chinese Community in Vancouver’, p. 131.

⁶⁵ Peter Kwong, ‘New York Is Not Hong Kong: The Little Hong Kong that Never Was’, in Skeldon (ed.), *Reluctant Exiles?*, pp. 256-268.

⁶⁶ Johnson, ‘Hong Kong Immigration and the Chinese Community in Vancouver’, p. 127.

cities.⁶⁸ In Australia, the search for better living and housing conditions has drawn the Hong Kong Chinese to the middle class suburbs, resulting in the transformation of the shopping precincts of Chatswood, Hurstville and Carlingford in suburban Sydney. A visible sign of the spread to the suburbs are the ubiquitous Chinese restaurants, some of which are rated as better than the traditional Chinatown establishments.⁶⁹ As one writer has stated, there is one in every town in regional Australia.⁷⁰ The popularity of Chinese and Asian cuisine has encouraged the spread of Asian grocery shops beyond the traditional Chinatowns and has prompted the major retail chains such as Woolworths and Coles to feature Asian groceries more prominently in their supermarkets. Another indication of the impact of the Hong Kong Chinese has been the proliferation of Chinese Christian churches and Buddhist temples.⁷¹ The abundance of locally published Chinese newspapers, which are mainly geared to the selling of real estate, and Chinese language radio and television programs add to their diasporic profile.⁷²

While there are many Chinese organisations in their destination countries, none seems to cater to the “emotional and pragmatic needs” of the modern Hong Kong Chinese. In an attempt to fill that void, several organisations formed along old school and friendship ties have emerged in San Francisco but are confined to sporting and social

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 125; Lam, “Searching for a Safe Haven”, p. 170.

⁶⁸ Smart, “Business Immigration to Canada: Deception and Exploitation”, p. 113.

⁶⁹ Kee and Skeldon, “The Migration and Settlement of Hong Kong Chinese in Australia”, p. 188; Johnson, “Hong Kong Immigration and the Chinese Community in Vancouver”, p. 130.

⁷⁰ Bearup, Greg, “There’s one in every town”, *Good Weekend (Sydney Morning Herald)*, 8 March 2003, pp. 33-36.

⁷¹ Lary and Luk, “Hong Kong Immigrants in Toronto”, pp. 156-7; Kee and Skeldon “The Migration and Settlement of Hong Kong Chinese in Australia”, p. 208; Wong, “Hong Kong Immigrants in San Francisco”, p. 250.

⁷² Lary and Luk, “Hong Kong Immigrants in Toronto”, p. 147; Kee and Skeldon, “The Migration and Settlement of Hong Kong Chinese in Australia”, p. 209.

interests.⁷³ And in Sydney, in 2002, an informal group calling itself the Hong Kong Connection was formed for networking purposes in the central business district; they meet sporadically and any one who has a connection with Hong Kong is welcome to join.⁷⁴ As yet, there appears to be no officially recognised organisation to represent the interests of the Hong Kong diaspora community —not even in Toronto, which has the largest concentration of Hong Kong Chinese.⁷⁵ Such lack may be due to the local political environment and the preference of government – both state and federal – to deal only with peak organisations that represent the majority. But the Hong Kong Chinese immigrants have managed to overcome these obstacles, particularly in Australia. Since the study by Inglis and Wu in 1994, the Hong Kong Chinese community in Australia has achieved prominence in the political arena unimaginable a decade ago. Certainly, of the political aspirants from Asian backgrounds, the most successful are the Hong Kong Chinese, as a survey of the three major states indicates. In Victoria, in 2003, two out of the nine councilors of the Melbourne City Council are Hong Kong Chinese. Councilor John So, a restaurateur, arrived from Hong Kong as a seventeen-year-old and made his mark as Melbourne’s first popularly elected Mayor.⁷⁶ Another Councilor, Catherine Ng, a businesswoman, came from Hong Kong in 1987.⁷⁷ In state politics, in the same year, an ethnic Chinese from Cambodia, Hong Lim, has succeeded in capturing a seat in the

⁷³ Inglis and Wu, “The Hong Kong Chinese in Sydney”, pp. 208-9; Lam, “Searching for a Safe Haven”, p. 170; Wong, “Hong Kong Immigrants in San Francisco”, p. 247.

⁷⁴ Their chief organiser is an acquaintance of the writer.

⁷⁵ Lary and Luk, “Hong Kong Immigrants in Toronto”, p. 155.

⁷⁶ <http://www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/index.cfm?CategoryID=4andTopicID=42andInfoPageID=543andContentFile=infopage.cfm> (accessed on 11-9-2003).

⁷⁷ <http://www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/index.cfm?CategoryID=4andTopicID=42andInfoPageID=550andContentFile=infopage.cfm> (accessed on 11-9-2003).

Legislative Assembly.⁷⁸ In the State of New South Wales, Helen Wai-har Sham-Ho, a lawyer, distinguished herself by becoming the first Chinese parliamentarian in Australia when she was elected to the New South Wales Legislative Council in 1988, serving until 2003. Also born in Hong Kong, Sham-Ho came to Australia in 1961.⁷⁹ Her retirement from state politics does not mean that the Hong Kong Chinese influence has waned. In fact, the number of Chinese members doubled with the election, in 2003, of Henry Tsang and Peter Wong to the Legislative Council in NSW.⁸⁰ Tsang, an architect from Hong Kong, represents the Labour Party and made the transition from city politics after serving as the Deputy Lord Mayor of Sydney. Wong, a medical doctor, was born in China but came to Australia via Indonesia. He represents the Unity Party, an independent political group.⁸¹ In the Sydney City Council, Robert Ho, a Hong Kong Chinese businessman who has lived in Australia since 1959, was the only Chinese on the Council before it was dissolved by the State Government in February 2004.⁸² In the subsequent election held on 27 March 2004, he was not returned. Consequently, there is now no Chinese member in Sydney City Council. In the State of Queensland, Michael Wai-man Choi, from Hong Kong, was elected to the Legislative Assembly in February 2001.⁸³ He was returned

⁷⁸ www.hongmp.com and www.parliament.vic.gov.au/mlcs.

⁷⁹ <http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/Parliament/Members.nsf/9f44ed570bade256ca256ac4000d41de/bc83f47fefc3937b4a25672e0002e1d6> (accessed on 11-9-2003).

⁸⁰ [http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/Parliament/Members.nsf/0/fb94f634aafb1e044a2567850014c37c/\\$FILE/531-79.pdf](http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/Parliament/Members.nsf/0/fb94f634aafb1e044a2567850014c37c/$FILE/531-79.pdf) (accessed on 11-9-2003).

⁸¹ Peter Wong's maiden speech to Parliament, see www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/Parliament/Members (accessed on 12 September 2003).

⁸² http://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/myc_your_councillors.asp (accessed on 11-9-2003).

⁸³ Ilsa Sharp, "The Choi factor", *South China Morning Post*, 26 April 2001.

again for another term in the elections of 2004.⁸⁴ But as yet, no Chinese has been elected to the council of its capital city, Brisbane.

The political achievements of the Hong Kong Chinese in Australia underscores what has been observed in the United States —that political successes are likely to be gained by Western-educated elite with long-term experience of the local conditions.⁸⁵ It indicates an influence that far exceeds their numerical significance in Australia, and one that is without parallel among the Asian groups that have settled here. This political achievement may have allayed the concern expressed by Christine Inglis and Chung-tong Wu in 1994 that the Hong Kong Chinese in Sydney were in danger of losing their distinctive identity. On the contrary, that identity has been somewhat enhanced.⁸⁶

In comparison, the Macanese communities in Sydney and North America have not achieved the level of impact as the Hong Kong Chinese. There is no ‘little Macaus’ to speak of. In Sydney, where the majority of Macanese Australians live, they may, on occasions, venture to Marrickville, which is considered as the Portuguese enclave of Sydney. There, a Macanese doctor has established his surgery and there are Portuguese restaurants, bakeries and a Portuguese Club. Once a year, a Portuguese Street Fair is held featuring Portuguese dancers, food and music.⁸⁷ Although Macanese food is famous in Macau and gaining popularity in Hong Kong, there are no Macanese restaurants in Sydney to speak of, which may explain the preponderance of recipe sharing among the

⁸⁴ www.qgd.qld.gov.au/nma/nma003.html (accessed 4 May 2004).

⁸⁵ Wong, ‘Hong Kong Immigrants in San Francisco’, p. 249.

⁸⁶ Inglis and Wu, ‘The Hong Kong Chinese in Sydney’, p. 207.

⁸⁷ In Marrickville, the retail centre has been encroached upon by Vietnamese immigrants since the late 1970s.

Macanese community by way of emails and in their club bulletins.⁸⁸ Being predominantly Roman Catholics, those who still attend worship services tend to go to their local churches but, like elsewhere, the impact of secularism is taking its toll, especially among the young. Accordingly, church attendance has lost its cultural significance for many members of the Macanese diaspora. In terms of media profile, the Macanese community hardly rates a mention. In contrast, the Hong Kong Chinese communities draw sporadic references due to the annual Chinese New Year celebrations, the popularity of Hong Kong style yum cha restaurants and the interest shown in Hong Kong movie stars like Jackie Chan. On the negative side, there is a criminal element within the Hong Kong Chinese, which has also been portrayed as being involved in illegal immigration, extortion rackets, illicit drugs and money laundering.⁸⁹ In general, the Macanese diaspora is under-represented in owning businesses due, some say, to a traditional aversion to risks. Like the modern Hong Kong Chinese, the Macanese are mainly employed in the professional and managerial areas; some have distinguished careers such as Professor Henrique Antonio D'Assumpcao AO, who was the Chief Defence Scientist and Head of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation for five years before taking the post as Director of Research and Development at the University of South Australia. In 1992, he was awarded the Order of Australia for service to science and technology.⁹⁰ Another is David Anthony De Carvalho AM, a distinguished lawyer

⁸⁸ 'Easy Portuguese Chicken Curry', *Casa de Macau Australia*, Vol. 4/3, 1998; 'Tacho (Chau Chau Pele)', *Casa Downunder*, June 2002.

⁸⁹ Kwong, 'New York Is Not Hong Kong: The Little Hong Kong that Never Was', p. 266 ; Ko-lin Chin, *Chinatown Gangs: extortion, enterprise, and ethnicity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

⁹⁰ <http://members.ozemail.com.au/~ooa/> (accessed 3 May 2004).

and former President of the Law Society in New South Wales, who was made a Member of the Order of Australia in 1994.⁹¹

Broadly speaking, the Macanese appear better organised and more cohesive, due largely to their smaller size and the interest shown by the Portuguese government in Macau during the 1990s. Spurred by the generous funding from Macau, they have started their own social clubs to cater to their communal needs —and the number of clubs is increasing.⁹² On the web page of the Casa de Macau in Portugal, accessed in July 2003, they listed twelve Macanese clubs in the diaspora, which is incorrect because four months earlier (March 2003), a new association – Club Amigu di Macau – has been established in Toronto.⁹³ Accordingly in the Macanese diaspora, there are now thirteen such organisations: five of these are in Canada, three in the United States, two in Brazil and one each in Portugal, Australia and Hong Kong. A distinguishing feature of the Macanese Canadian scene is the differentiation between the younger and older generations. The younger members have set up their own club, encouraged by the Orient Foundation, whose charter, in part, is to look after the interests of the Macanese communities world wide.⁹⁴ In California, there are three clubs. The oldest and largest is UMA (*União Macaense Americana*), which has been organised into five “chapters” due to the vast geographical distances. Founded in 1959, the name chosen reflected an essential characteristic of Macanese diaspora organisations. According to one of its founders:

⁹¹ www.itsanhonour.gov.au/ (accessed 3 May 2004).

⁹² The *UMA News Bulletin* (Mar-April 1998) boldly announced on its front page the following: ‘MACAU SUBSIDIES: UMA thanks Governador Vasco Rocha Vieira and the Macau Government for the generous subsidy checks of US\$ 31,305.34 dated November 11, 1997 and US\$ 31,268.92 dated February 10, 1998, the receipt of which we gratefully acknowledge.’

⁹³ www.casademacau.com.pt/casas.htm, “Casa de Macau no Mundo”, (accessed 26 July 2003); *Oriente Ocidente*, No. 11, May/August 2003, p.27.

“This was the right time for [Macanese] from Hong Kong, Macau and Shanghai to discard their divisiveness and competitiveness and to unite as ‘one’ ... Also the word ‘Macaense’ would stress the pride of its members in their origins.”⁹⁵ With over a thousand members, UMA has the most informative club bulletin; their September 2002 issue is twenty pages long.⁹⁶ Brazil has two clubs; one in Sao Paulo, the other in Rio de Janeiro. Sao Paulo —where over eighty percent of the Macanese community lives —is the larger of the two, with its own impressive club premises.⁹⁷ Founded in 1991, it has about 500 members of whom a third are from Macau. The rest originated from the other Macanese communities, principally Shanghai and Hong Kong.⁹⁸ They have a sprinkling of engineers, dentists, lawyers and doctors but many members work in trading companies where, according to one respondent, their English-language ability has proven to be an asset.

Diaspora communities, such as the Casa de Macau in Australia, are still looking for ways to express their relevance in contemporary times. Australia has only one Macanese club, despite the vast geographic distances. In the past, the Casa de Macau in Australia has managed to resist attempts to splinter its membership, which stands at over 400. Its activities and concerns are not dissimilar to the other Macanese clubs around the world. Headquartered in Sydney, it has adopted a decentralised structure similar to UMA in the United States. But it was fortunate that on the final day of the Portuguese regime in

⁹⁴ The Orient Foundation was thanked for helping to meet the web expenses. The Foundation attracted a lot of public controversy in the run-up to the Macau handover, which has been referred to elsewhere.

⁹⁵ Anthony J. Gonsalves, ‘Reflections on the Founding of UMA, Inc.’; *UMA News Bulletin*, May-June 1998, p. 10.

⁹⁶ *UMA News Bulletin*, Vol. 25 No. 5, September-October 2002.

⁹⁷ Sheila Kaplan, ‘This has to be a Macanese house’; *MacaU*, Special 1993, pp.16-21.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

Macau, Governor Vieira approved a grant of six million patacas (approximately 1.2 million Australian dollars) for the purchase of a clubhouse in Sydney.⁹⁹ This decision became entangled in the controversy over a simultaneous decision to grant one hundred million patacas (equivalent to twenty million Australian dollars) to the newly established Jorge Alvares Foundation, noted in Chapter Four. It has taken two years for the scandal to subside and for Sydney to receive its money. For Australia, funding is no longer an issue. With over two million Australian dollars in its bank account, courtesy of the generosity of Governor Vieira, it seems the Casa de Macau in Australia has sufficient financial resources to pursue its objectives (see next section). While the search for suitable premises continues to claim the attention of the Executive Committee, part of the funds have been applied to provide educational bursaries for its younger generation.¹⁰⁰ In October 2002, the club also subsidised a cultural tour of Portugal by eighty of its members.¹⁰¹ While in Portugal, a visit was made to its affiliated organisation *Casa de Macau em Portugal*, which has a membership of 650 and a magnificent clubhouse that impressed the Australians greatly.¹⁰²

In Portugal, where the well-to-do Macanese families have had residences, some for generations, a Casa de Macau has been in existence informally since 1966 and did not gain official recognition as a public association until 1988.¹⁰³ Despite its long history, it has difficulty attracting the interest of the Macanese community in Portugal, in particular

⁹⁹ *Casa Downunder* May 2000.

¹⁰⁰ *Casa Downunder* June 2002.

¹⁰¹ *Casa Downunder* December 2002.

¹⁰² Stuart Braga, 'Reminiscing on a trip to Portugal', *Casa Downunder*, December 2002, pp. 4-8.

¹⁰³ Cecilia Jorge and Beltrão Coelho, 'Strengthening the Macanese Diaspora', *MacaU*, Special 1993, p. 13.

the young people —probably due to its unique membership structure.¹⁰⁴ Unlike other Macanese clubs around the world, the *Casa de Macau em Portugal* has a membership dominated by the Portuguese expatriates who were in Macau for work reasons. The existence of such a large and influential block has caused disquiet within the local Macanese community, reflecting the uneasy relations between the two communities during colonial times. Accordingly, the report published in *MacaU* — stating that the Macanese community “congregate very little” and that the younger generation of Macanese “are completely uninterested” in visiting the Club —seems to have missed the mark.¹⁰⁵

The existence of these social organisations places the Macanese diaspora in a special category from the Hong Kong Chinese. Every three years or so, they are made to feel even more special by way of an international reunion (*Encontro*) organised for them in Macau. For the Macanese community, these reunions have significance as a litmus test of the new regime’s attitude towards the community. In contrast, the Hong Kong Government has never treated its diaspora in the same preferential manner.¹⁰⁶ These reunions highlight another distinguishing feature of the Macanese diaspora, namely the fervour with which they maintain social contacts with each other, particularly among the older generation. Their bulletins include news (and obituaries) of friends and families from around the globe, and they travel frequently to visit each other and to attend weddings and anniversaries. At Walnut Creek in the outskirts of San Francisco, a group

¹⁰⁴ Ana Isabel Dias, “The Return Home”, *MacaU*, Special 1999, p.52.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹⁰⁶ The overseas Chinese community in Macau, who now outnumbers the Macanese in Macau by at least five to one, also convened a separate reunion in the same month, accessing government subsidies in line

of Macanese has purchased condominium units in the same development so they can live in close proximity and enjoy tennis and card games together. Another group, former students of Hong Kong's KGV (King George V) School, regularly holds reunions at various international locales, including Hong Kong. In 2002, a contingent of over 100 persons converged on Sydney and booked the entire top floor of a major Chinese restaurant in the city for their reunion dinner. Whether such strong friendships will survive the generational change is hard to say; and what the future holds for these Macanese social clubs —when the older generation passes on and the club funds run out —can only be conjectured.

But the governmental involvement represents a further point of difference. The relationship between China and its diaspora has been a complex changing one. In a sense, it is a triangular relationship between China, the Chinese communities and their national governments. Within this triangle, the Chinese diaspora communities struggle to balance between three competing loyalties —to the survival of their families; to China, their ancestral home; and to their adopted countries. According to Wang Gungwu, for much of the twentieth century, it was China's "wish to see all Chinese abroad ... as members of one extended Chinese family whose loyalty and patriotism they could count on when really needed."¹⁰⁷ This perception may explain the fervor with which China, under Deng Xiaoping, courted her overseas communities to help modernise her economy in the 1980s.¹⁰⁸ In turn, China's growing status as a world superpower and her increasing

with the Macanese. See Harald Bruning, "Political stability fails to dispel economic woes", *South China Morning Post*, 15 December 2001.

¹⁰⁷ Wang Gungwu, "A Single Chinese Diaspora? Some Historical Reflections", p. 9.

¹⁰⁸ In a conversation with the writer in mid 1980's, a former Australian ambassador to China remarked that of all the developing nations, China was indeed fortunate to have an economically powerful diaspora to call on.

economic clout has undoubtedly enhanced the status of her overseas communities, conferring upon them the prosperous role of mediating between China and their adopted countries. Such relations have not been risk-free. The anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia that followed the fall of Suharto from power in May 1998 served as a reminder of the fragility that afflicted some Chinese diasporic communities in South East Asia. Within their national context, the Chinese communities must navigate the sensitivities of their host societies, which regard them with varying degrees of suspicion and mistrust. Thankfully for the Macanese diaspora, an implied lack of commitment to their place of re-settlement has not been part of their diaspora experience.

Adaptations

A distinctive —though not unique —feature of the modern Hong Kong Chinese diaspora is the phenomenon of the so-called *astronaut* family. This is where, post-migration, one parent (usually the mother) stays with the children while the other returns to Hong Kong to continue with career or business, commuting frequently between the two places. In some families, both parents return to Hong Kong leaving their children behind. The resultant lifestyle has been described as a “two-legged existence” —one in their home country, the other in the country of their adoption.¹⁰⁹ As a social phenomenon, it has been much maligned with astronauts sometimes being branded as “emigrants-who-never-were”,¹¹⁰ as unscrupulous abusers of the migration system,¹¹¹ and as people who possessed “a deep sense of tentativeness, ambivalence and duality” towards their host

¹⁰⁹ Chan Kwok Bun, “The Ethnicity Paradox”, in Skeldon (ed.), *Reluctant Exiles?*, p. 319.

¹¹⁰ Skeldon, “Hong Kong in an International Migratory System”, p. 41.

¹¹¹ Smart, “Business Immigration to Canada: Deception and Exploitation”, p. 117.

countries.¹¹² It has been suggested that this tentativeness is largely because many perceive themselves as “reluctant migrants”.¹¹³ However, some observers have also depicted the phenomenon as a pragmatic response to the problems confronting individual families. These include the inability to find suitable employment commensurate with the level of seniority and remuneration that they have been accustomed to getting in Hong Kong.¹¹⁴ It is also a strategic response to the lingering economic depression encountered in some destinations, which diminishes their employment and business opportunities.¹¹⁵ For others, it stems from a reluctance by one or both parents to give up a high paying job in Hong Kong for possible unemployment in the new land.¹¹⁶

Business migrants, it has been found, are particularly vulnerable due to the “opportunistic sharks” that prey on them and inherent contradictions in the business migration programs.¹¹⁷ As one writer observes:

The assumption that immigration is conditional upon an immigrant’s commitment to run or invest in a business in Canada is short of being exploitive because it runs contrary to the wisdom of good business practice. Immigrants cannot be expected to go into investments that local Canadians avoid for reasons of high risk.¹¹⁸

In some cases, the astronaut family structure is a premeditated strategy in risk management —minimising political risks by gaining residence in a more stable country

¹¹² Chan Kwok Bun, “The Ethnicity Paradox”, p. 316.

¹¹³ Lam, “Searching for a Safe Haven”, p.168

¹¹⁴ Johnson, “Hong Kong Immigration and the Chinese Community in Vancouver”, p. 134

¹¹⁵ Inglis and Wu, “The Hong Kong Chinese in Sydney”, p. 210.

¹¹⁶ Smart, “Business Immigration to Canada: Deception and Exploitation”, p. 110.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

and spreading economic risks through access to job and business opportunities in both.¹¹⁹ Some see parallels with the old-style Chinese immigrants, the single-male sojourner of yester years.¹²⁰ It has also been suggested that the astronaut strategy represents the genesis of “new forms of population mobility [and] family and business linkages ... that will ultimately transform both communities of origin and destination.”¹²¹ Understandably, the astronaut family pattern has exacted a high toll in strained and severed relationships.¹²² In the single astronaut families, the mother often suffers from loneliness and boredom, shocked by the cultural changes taking place among the children. Moreover, she suffers the loss of amenities that they used to enjoy in Hong Kong, such as domestic servants and the support network that has been built up over the years. In the new lands, lifestyle changes are incumbent such as learning to drive, coping with household chores, and being housebound in the severe winter weather.¹²³

The Macanese, in adapting to their new countries, differ significantly from the Hong Kong Chinese, although astronaut households are not unknown in the Macanese diaspora. During the course of this investigation, I have come across three Macanese families that fitted the description of the astronaut households. All have emigrated from Hong Kong and have settled variously in the United States, England and Australia. They are all of the single-astronaut variety where the wives and children have been deposited overseas while the husbands return to Hong Kong to resume their careers. One stayed in Hong Kong until the business he was employed in suffered a change of ownership; the

¹¹⁹ Skeldon, “Reluctant Exiles or Bold Pioneers: An Introduction to Migration from Hong Kong”, p. 11; Edgar Wickberg, “Overseas Chinese Adaptive Organisations, Past and Present”, p. 76.

¹²⁰ Skeldon, “Reluctant Exiles or Bold Pioneers: An Introduction to Migration from Hong Kong”, p. 11.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹²² Lam, “Searching for a Safe Haven”, pp. 163-179.

other commutes as frequently as his projects permit while the third may be said to have had no intention of leaving Hong Kong at all. Admittedly, these examples are rare because most of the Macanese I interviewed said that they have “no regrets” in leaving Hong Kong and Macau. As justification, they pointed to the outcomes achieved for their children who are well educated and have settled into good jobs. They believed that it could not have been achieved had they not emigrated. Moreover, they do not see themselves as *reluctant* immigrants believing that the departure of the British from Hong Kong presaged a difficult future for them. Equally it is difficult to determine whether the Macanese who left Macau due to the transfer of power are *reluctant* emigrants either — because the issues, as we have seen in the previous chapter, are complex. Some, such as Maria Antonio Espandinha, saw the retrocession to China in philosophical terms, like an episodic ending of a long historical saga or a birth mother reclaiming her lost child.¹²⁴ For others, such as Teresa Nolasco, it remains intensely personal, like justice denied because they felt pushed out. Their contracts have not been renewed, and supplanted by those they considered less qualified than they were.¹²⁵ Such complications merely serve to underscore my assertion that the Macanese diaspora does not fit the mould of its modern Hong Kong Chinese counterpart. Moreover, my findings suggest that the Macanese diaspora has not experienced the adjustment traumas common among the Hong Kong Chinese. Wherever the Macanese have settled, their easygoing outlook and their cultural skills enable them to integrate and assimilate into their new countries. As Helene Osório Roffey wrote in 1994:

¹²³ Ibid., pp. 170-71.

¹²⁴ Maria Antonio Espandinha interview, in Diana Lin, *Back to the Motherland IV*, TVB 930, broadcast on 4 November 1999, TVB Hong Kong.

Many *Filhos Macao* [sons/daughters of Macau] have settled successfully all over the world. My family's Portuguese blood, leavened with Chinese, Japanese, German and Filipino, has enabled us to assimilate and prosper in a foreign environment.¹²⁶

But it is precisely this ease of adjustment that exercises the minds of the older generation who expresses concerns about the dilution of their ethnicity and identity. In contrast, the Hong Kong Chinese diaspora —due to its assimilative resilience and the injection of new arrivals —appear better able to maintain its distinctive identity in the longer term.

The Macanese diaspora and Macau

As noted earlier in this chapter, the Macanese diaspora that exists today is the product of successive waves of emigration from Macau, which can be traced to the aftermath of the Opium War (1842). Through it all, they have retained their links with each other as well as with Macau. In fact, in the 1990s – the final decade of Portuguese rule – the Macau government was pivotal in organising the Macanese diaspora and shaped it into the form it is today. Various factors helped usher in the current prototype. One was the establishment of the Orient Foundation in 1986 (see Chapter Four), as a source of funding for the diaspora communities. It provided the funds for a community centre in São Paulo (Brazil), which was dedicated in March 1992.¹²⁷ Accordingly, during the First International Reunion of Macanese Communities (*Encontro I*) in Macau on 5 November 1993, a sense of great expectations can be detected when their representatives met with the President of the Orient Foundation, Carlos Monjardino. In the words of one

¹²⁵ Teresa Nolasco interview. See Ibid.

¹²⁶ Forjaz, *Familias Macaenses*, Volume I, p. 9.

of the club presidents: “this was an opportunity all the representatives were waiting for with respect to projects and funding”—a wish list that included scholarships, the establishment of libraries for the preservation of Macanese culture, a community centre for each club, and assistance for the elderly and the unemployed.¹²⁸ But the Foundation was only prepared to deal with each on their merit and on a club by club basis—a policy of divide and rule, which has persisted to this day.

Another factor in building up the Macanese diaspora was the signing of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration in 1987, which created a sense of urgency because, it was widely believed that the looming transfer of sovereignty would have a devastating impact on the Macanese communities, in particular their culture and identity as a people. They were badly in need of leadership and organisation. Moreover, the Tienanmen crackdown in June 1989 heightened concerns for the future of civil liberties in the post-1999 period. In the wake of Tienanmen, international pressure was needed to remind the Chinese Government of their undertakings in regard to Hong Kong and Macau. According to the last Governor of Macau, General Vasco Rocha Vieira, the Macanese diaspora had a responsibility to publicise Macau and to lobby the Australian government if they considered that China had breached its undertakings after 1999. Vieira made that point succinctly at a luncheon for members of the Casa de Macau in Sydney, on 22 August 1999, at which I was present. Certainly, the Governor had grounds to believe that such tactics could be effective, seeing that in August 1996, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, had sent a reference to the Joint Standing Committee on

¹²⁷ Sheila Kaplan, “This has to be a Macanese House”, *MacaU*, Special 1993, pp. 17-21.

¹²⁸ “Primeiro Encontro das Comunidades Macaenses”, *Lusitano News Bulletin*, 15 December 1993.

Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade of the Parliament of Australia to investigate the impending transfer of power in Hong Kong. Specifically the Committee was asked:

To inquire into and report on: the future of democratic political structures in Hong Kong after the transfer of sovereignty; the protection of human rights in the territory ... ; the impact on the implementation of human rights protection of the [Sino-British Joint Declaration] ...; the condition of the remaining asylum seekers ... ; the future status of those whose citizenship of China or a third country, or the right of abode in Hong Kong might not be assured; and the implications for Australia of the transfer of power [from Britain to China.]¹²⁹

The Committee's 216-page report was subsequently published in May 1997. A glimpse of the report reveals that written submissions were received from opposition parties in Hong Kong, from Emily Lau, representing the Frontier, and from the Democratic Party.¹³⁰ In addition, international organisations such as Amnesty International, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Commission of Jurists had made submissions during the public hearings.¹³¹ Therefore it would benefit Macanese interests in post-1999 Macau to have an informed, organised and well-funded diaspora.

A further factor in strengthening the Macanese diaspora was the fortuitous convergence, in the early 1990s, of powerful people who were concerned enough for

¹²⁹ Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, *Hong Kong: the Transfer of Sovereignty: Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade* (Canberra: Government Printing House 1997), p. xv.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 123-4.

their welfare to do something about it. The appointment, in April 1991, of General Vasco Rocha Vieira as the last Governor of Macau provided the Macanese community with one of its strongest allies of the twentieth century.¹³² Under his leadership, the Macau government provided generous financial support unprecedented in Macau's history. During Vieira's term, the international reunions of the Macanese communities became a regular fixture in Macau, heavily subsidised by the government and other private sponsors. It was also under Vieira that the links between the Macanese diaspora and Macau were formalised. Since 1999, these linkages have continued unabated through two Macanese institutions, the Macau International Institute, presided over by Jorge Rangel, the former Secretary for Public Administration, Education and Youth, and APIM (*Associação Promotora da Instrução dos Macaenses*), presided over by Jose Manuel Rodrigues, a lawyer and member of the Macau Legislative Assembly. Hovering in the background is the Orient Foundation, presided over by Carlos Monjardino (see Chapter Four). The Foundation's website boasts its cultural and philanthropic credentials and that it "makes efforts to bring the Macanese communities worldwide into closer contact."¹³³

There is little doubt that Vieira, Monjardino and Rangel – the highest-ranking Macanese in the Vieira Administration and close confidant of the Governor – have been pivotal agents in the consolidation of the Macanese diasporic communities. Other prime movers include the late Joaquim Morais Alves, then a member of Macau's Legislative

¹³² Another strong supporter of the Macanese community was Governor Artur Tamagnini de Sousa Barbosa, who was governor of Macau for three terms: 1918-1919, 1926-1930 and 1937-1940. His generosity to the Macanese institution Santa Casa da Misericórdia, was described to me by an old Chinese curator who pointed out his picture hanging on the wall of its formal meeting room. Barbosa was instrumental in securing the future of the Lusitano Club in Hong Kong through an interest-free loan provided by the Portuguese Government at a time of dire financial crisis. For another aspect of Barbosa's governorship, see Luís Andrade de Sá, "Macau Money to Salazar's Enemies", *MacaU*, December 2002, p. 40.

Assembly and President of the Leal Senado, Macau's municipal council, and Arnaldo de Oliveira Sales, the doyen of the Hong Kong Macanese community.¹³⁴ As always, discretely in the background is Julie de Senna Fernandes, representing her boss, Stanley Ho, the casino magnate, whose generosity to the Orient Foundation and the Macanese community has been acknowledged by the Lusitano Club of California in 1993.¹³⁵ Among her many achievements, Fernandes has been credited as the prime mover for the formation of the Macanese patois drama group *Dóci Papiaçam di Macau*.¹³⁶

Within a few short years, Macanese associations sprouted in the diaspora. Among them is the Casa de Macau in Australia, incorporated on 20 May 1994, whose Memorandum of Association states:

1D. OBJECTIVES OF "CASA DE MACAU"

- a) The primary objective of "Casa de Macau" is to become a gathering place for all Macanese people from around the world and more in particular for all those who have made Australia their home.
- b) Other objectives [are] the creation of a Macanese Studies/Cultural Centre ... to enable the study of all aspects of Macanese culture. A Recreation Centre complete with Restaurant, Bar, Conference, Ballroom ...

¹³³ www.foriente.pt, "Fundação Oriente – The Foundation" (accessed 2 April 2004).

¹³⁴ Sales was born in Shameen (Canton) in 1920 and lived there until the age of nine before going to Hong Kong for his education. He has an illustrious career as a Sports Administrator and was elected President of Hong Kong's Urban Council for four consecutive terms between 1973 and 1981. In 1998 he was honoured by the Hong Kong Government led by Tung Chee-wah with the inaugural award of the Grand Bauhinia for his contribution to sports in Hong Kong. His profile has been documented in Ribeiro Cardoso, "Sales, the Portuguese Godfather", *MacaU*, Special 1993, pp. 60-68.

¹³⁵ "Primeiro Encontro das Comunidades Macaenses", *Lusitano News Bulletin*, 15 December 1993.

- c) To take appropriate action to promote the Macanese culture, language (patois), gastronomy as well as the maintenance of an ethnic identity after 1999.
- d) ‘Casa de Macau’ will attempt to divulge the cultural identity of the Macanese people through ... conferences, seminars, study visits and pilgrimages to other Macanese communities around the world.

[The remaining clauses refer to funding, the provision of services to its members and future accommodation facilities for visitors.]¹³⁷

Not surprisingly, these objectives mirror the agreement reached at the business meetings of the First International Reunion of the Macanese Communities convened in Macau, just six months prior.¹³⁸ Chaired by Arnaldo de Oliviera Sales, the head of the Lusitano Club of Hong Kong, the Macanese Communities agreed to adopt a united front towards the Orient Foundation and the Portuguese Government aimed at securing funds for all the Macanese communities, including the one in Macau. The parallels – between the stated objectives of Casa de Macau Australia and the consensus position reached in the First International Reunion in 1993 – are not coincidental but underscore the point I made earlier that a high level of orchestration was involved in establishing these diaspora organisations.

The impact of the diaspora on the Macanese community in Macau is a story waiting to be told. In some quarters in Macau, the general feeling is that the diaspora has

¹³⁶ Harald Bruning, ‘Preservar o patuá’, *A Voz*, March 2004, p. 2 (in Portuguese).

¹³⁷ See ‘Memorandum and Articles of Association’, Casa de Macau Incorporated Australia, 20 May 1994.

contributed little. But such assessment is harsh considering that the triennial International Reunions (*Encontros*), held regularly since 1993 in Macau, have continued in the post-1999 era, and add to the profile of the Macanese in Macau in three areas.¹³⁹ Primarily, the Reunions have been reported in well-regarded forums such as the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, the *Hong Kong Standard* and the *South China Morning Post*.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, the Macanese diaspora is featured prominently in the Macau Museum and their club emblems are also displayed. Elsewhere, the spherical Macanese Diaspora Monument has been erected at a prominent position at the approach to the old waterfront district of Barra.¹⁴¹ Designed by the Macanese architect, José C. S. Maneiras, it was officially unveiled during the Fourth International Reunion in November 2001.¹⁴² Contrary to what some people in Macau believe, the reunions are costly for members of the diaspora to attend; the expense can be prohibitive for family groups. But as Yvonne Herrero, President of Casa de Macau in Australia, stated, they came “to show solidarity” with the community in Macau.¹⁴³ It is comforting for the Macanese in Macau that the International Reunions have value in the eyes of the current Macau government, evident by the continued subsidy and the attendance by Edmund Ho, the Macau Chief Executive. At the Fourth International Reunion, in November 2001, Ho addressed the opening ceremony, declaring that “since December 1999 the Macanese had not only kept their sense of

¹³⁸From 1 to 5 November 1993. See “Primeiro Encontro das Comunidades Macaenses”, *Lusitano News Bulletin*, 15 December 1993.

¹³⁹The following *Encontros* were held: (I) 1-5 November 1993, (II) 19-25 October 1996, (III) 21-26 March 1999, and (IV) 28 November – 5 December 2001.

¹⁴⁰Harald Bruning, “Macanese reaffirm their roots”, *Hong Kong Standard*, 13 August 1996; Jane Camens “Home Again - Macau Terra Minha!”, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 December 2001; Harald Bruning, “Political stability fails to dispel economic woes”, *South China Morning Post*, 15 December 2001.

¹⁴¹Last visited December 2003.

¹⁴²Gilberto Lopes, “Fewer people but the same feelings”, *MacaU*, December 2001, pp. 19-27.

belonging to Macau but had committed themselves wholeheartedly to the public cause ... [and] that the Macanese diaspora is a bridge that brings Macau closer to the international community.”¹⁴⁴

Besides boosting their local profile, the diaspora communities had been helpful in forcing the Portuguese Government to change its ruling on Portuguese passport renewals in the early 1990s. The requirement that renewal would require proof of Portuguese nationality severely impacted those Macanese who could not provide the necessary paperwork due to the ravages of war and other upheavals. Born elsewhere, many of them came to reside in Macau.¹⁴⁵ Unless the passport regulations were overturned, there was a distinct possibility that they might become stateless.¹⁴⁶ Consequently, during *Encontro I* (November 1993), the Macanese communities petitioned the President of Portugal, through the Macau Governor. They reminded the President that ‘Portugal has a moral obligation ... [and] an enduring responsibility to its glorious history.’¹⁴⁷ Made aware of the problem, Portugal was set to resolve it.¹⁴⁸ What the passport issue indicates is that a coordinated approach by the Macanese communities can make a difference. In a sense, the Macanese diaspora and the Macanese in Macau need each other —if only to ensure that Portugal does not forget them in the future.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴³ Official program: *Encontro das Comunidades Macaenses do novo milénio ‘Macau 2001’* (in Portuguese).

¹⁴⁴ Gilberto Lopes, ‘Fewer people but the same feelings’, *MacaU*, December 2001, p. 22.

¹⁴⁵ Julie de Senna Fernandes, a prominent Macanese and assistant to Stanley Ho, the casino magnate, was mentioned as one of those affected. See Cecilia Jorge and Beltrão Coelho, ‘Strengthening the Macanese Diaspora’, *MacaU*, Special 1993, p. 11.

¹⁴⁶ ‘Macanese Appeal for Portuguese National Status’, *Lusitano News Bulletin*, 15 December 1993.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ Cecilia Jorge and Beltrão Coelho, ‘Strengthening the Macanese Diaspora’, in *MacaU*, Special 1993, p. 8.

¹⁴⁹ ‘Senna Fernandes bewails that Portugal has ‘forgotten’ Macau’, *Ponto Final*, 5 March 2003 (posted 11:14 am).

Certainly, there is more that the Macanese diaspora can do for the Macanese in Macau —and the expectation is there. Indeed, during *Encontro II* (1996), there was a segment in the program, described as “a special moment”, in which all the presidents of the diasporic organisations presented gifts from their various countries. According to one observer, Fr. Luis Sequeira, a Jesuit priest, it was “a symbol of the fruits of emigration. Moving abroad to seek their fortunes, the emigrants were now ... offering a little of what their new lives had brought them.”¹⁵⁰ And in the post-1999 period, it is encouraging to find that with each return visit to Macau, some community leaders are exploring fresh ways to involve the Macanese diaspora. During my last visit, in December 2003, ideas were floated to bring the younger generation back to deepen their cultural heritage by incorporating a refresher course in the Portuguese language. In such endeavours, as in the triennial international reunions, support from all sides is essential for their successful implementation.

Conclusion

As can be seen, two diasporas have emerged from the one country — the Macanese and the Hong Kong Chinese diasporas. They share some similarities due to a common geo-political context, yet the differences between them are also profound. They differ in patterns of settlement and have vastly contrasting diaspora profiles. Their adaptations are also a study in contrast. Perhaps most different is their probable future. The Hong Kong Chinese appear to be able to maintain their distinctiveness due in part to the low rate of assimilation and the influx of newer arrivals from Hong Kong. In contrast, the future of the Macanese diaspora as a distinctive community appears less certain. They

¹⁵⁰ Isabel Meneses, ‘Returning home’, *MacaU*, Special 1996, p. 10.

will likely marry white Australians more readily than the Hong Kong Chinese and will retain some sort of Portuguese culture as long as there is a local Portuguese community. In this respect, it is encouraging that the Casa de Macau in Australia invited, in June 2002, its members to a civic reception hosted by the Mayor and Councilors of the Municipality of Marrickville in recognition of Marrickville's Portuguese community.¹⁵¹ What the future holds for the Macanese diaspora will, as always, depend on the leadership within the communities. For the community in Macau, the formal departure of the Portuguese in 1999 has confined them to a status on par with the other Luso-Asiatic communities that are scattered around the Asian region, which form the subject of the next chapter.

¹⁵¹ "Look Here!"; *Casa Downunder*, June 2002, p. 11.

THE LUSO-ASIATIC COMMUNITIES

In the preceding chapter, the Macanese community in Macau was discussed in a global setting — in the context of its diaspora. Here, the focus is on the Luso-Asiatic communities, the multifarious groups of Portuguese descendants around Asia. Their existence is well known but they have been under-studied, both individually and comparatively. The recent withdrawal of the Portuguese from Macau provides an opportune time to look at these communities, and to see what parallels, if any, can be derived for the Macanese in Macau. In this chapter, I shall focus on the Portuguese communities in Goa and Malacca. Along with the Macanese, these communities have similar vintages, being established in close chronological proximity to each other — if one dates the Macanese origins to 1513 when Jorge Alvares arrived (from Malacca) in China. A comparative study of these communities poses several difficulties due largely to context and the relative lack of work carried out in this area. Contextual difficulties arise because of the varying times and different circumstances under which Portugal relinquished control over these territories. Malacca was lost to another European colonial power (the Netherlands) in 1641 while India reclaimed Goa in 1961. For Macau, Portuguese occupation straddled the beginning and end of Western colonisation in the Far East, intersecting with the modern phenomenon of globalisation in all its myriad forms. Further, the area of Portuguese Eurasian communities in Asia remains under-explored.

Beginning with the first expedition of Vasco da Gama, in 1497, the Portuguese were the earliest Europeans to venture by sea to the Indian Ocean and forged a sea-borne

empire. In this chapter, the term “empire” is loosely applied. Some scholars consider it misleading to describe the Portuguese overseas expansion in the sixteenth and seventeenth century as an empire in the formal sense due to the lack of territorial and political hegemony across such a big stretch of water. J. Villiers, in his essay “The Estado da India in Southeast Asia” (1986), described the Portuguese empire as “an enormous commercial network connecting various points at which trading posts (*feitorias*), fortified strongholds (*fortalezas*) or, more rarely, fully fledged urban settlements with their own institutions of municipal government (*ciudades*) had been established.”¹ At its height, Portuguese governance encircled the globe. There were fifty such establishments, ranging from major settlements like Macau and Malacca to small river outposts such as Sena on the Zambesi River (in Africa), and large landed areas such as in Ceylon and Goa.² Additionally, numerous unofficial settlements were known to exist in various corners of Portuguese Asia, some of which had a population of two to three hundred Portuguese.³ Across such a vast network, the official settlements were controlled and protected in varying degrees of effectiveness by the Portuguese Crown, out of its administrative centre in Goa, India.

At the frontline of empire were the traders, missionaries, adventurers and soldiers. Among the last group, the rate of desertion was high because many of them were ex-

¹ J. Villiers, “The Estado da India in Southeast Asia”, in M. Newitt (ed.), *Exeter Studies in History* (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter, 1986), pp. 37-58.

² Sena in 1630 did not even have a fort or cannon. In contrast, George Winus has claimed that Portuguese Ceylon was “the largest and richest single possession” of the Crown in Asia and that its fall to the Dutch in 1650s was the most calamitous event in the decline of Portugal’s empire in the East. See George Winus, *The Fatal History of Portuguese Ceylon* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), Preface.

³ Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese empire in Asia, 1500 – 1700: a political and economic history* (London: Longman, 1993), p. 71.

convicts or political exiles pressed into military service.⁴ Some deserted in order to advance themselves socially and economically; some were mercenaries in the employ of local chiefs.⁵ Today in Myanmar, a community called the *baiyingys* are descended from these Portuguese “soldiers of fortune”; their legacy has been illustrated by Joaquim M. de Castro in 2002.⁶ From the outset, Portuguese men showed little inhibition to form liaisons with indigenous women wherever they happened to be. For pragmatic reasons the settlers were officially encouraged to marry local women who had converted to the Christian faith. Such miscegenation through successive generations has produced the offspring known as the Luso-Asiatic communities.

Goa

The island of Goa, captured by the Portuguese in 1510, is situated on the western coast of India – at 14° 53′N and 73° 45′E – and is approximately 375 kilometres southeast of Bombay.⁷ M. N. Pearson, in *The Portuguese in India* (1987), stressed that the conquest of Goa was due to its strategic location, which facilitated control of “the crucial northwest sector of the Arabian Sea” and the coastal trade along the western seaboard of India.⁸ Within the first few decades, Portugal established a fort on the island

⁴ Disney estimated that in 1627 when the Dutch were pressuring Portuguese Goa, there were about 5,000 such Portuguese mercenaries in the employ of Indian chieftains when they could be fighting the Dutch. See A. R. Disney, *Twilight of the Pepper Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 21.

⁵ Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia*, pp. 249-261.

⁶ J. M. de Castro, *Os Bayingyis do vale do mu: luso-descendentes na birmânia* (Macau: Macau International Institute, 2002). This book is mainly pictorial with text in Portuguese and Chinese. An article in English was published earlier as J. M. de Castro, “The Portuguese of Myanmar”, *MacaU* 1998, pp. 106-121.

⁷ B. G. D’Souza, *Goan Society in Transition* (Bombay, India: Popular Prakashan, 1975), p.8.

⁸ Pearson, *The Portuguese in India*, p. 89.

of Diu (1535); they conquered the adjacent *talukas*⁹ of Bardez and Salsete (1543) and the coastal town of Daman (1559), north of Bombay. Together with the island of Goa, these territories were referred to, by Goans, as the ‘Old Conquest’. Over the next two centuries, various wars of attrition between the Portuguese and neighbouring kingdoms led to annexations of another seven *talukas*, completed in 1788, two hundred seventy eight years after the initial conquest of the island of Goa. These latter territories are known as the New Conquests. All together, the enlarged territory of Goa, Daman and Diu comprised an area totaling 3,814 square kilometres, which remained under Portuguese rule until 18 December 1961 when it was ‘liberated’ by Indian forces.

The differentiation between the Old and New Conquests in Goa represents more than just a chronological and geographical demarcation; it marks a social and cultural divide, which Bento G. D’Souza attested in *Goan Society in Transition* (1975):

The historical, political, social and cultural differences between the Old Conquests and the New Conquests have given rise to the idea of ‘Two Goas’. This idea exists in the minds of Goans and there are historico-social reasons for this.¹⁰

Primarily, early missionary zeal and the terrors of the Inquisition, which gripped Goa from 1560 to 1812, resulted in mass conversions to Christianity in the Old Conquests.¹¹

⁹ In pre-Portuguese Goa, *talukas* or *mahals* were administrative regions ruled by a governor appointed by the king (maharaja). See D’Souza, *Goan Society in Transition*, p. 21.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

¹¹ D’Souza described the Inquisition thus: ‘The Inquisition was introduced in Portugal mainly for dealing with the tendency on the part of the new Christians, who had been forcibly converted from Judaism, to revert to the practice of their old faith. The Inquisition of Goa had to play a similar role in relation to new converts. It has been generally agreed that the conversions in Goa were brought about by the lure of material rewards, threats of violence and force. ... The activities of the Goa missions and the Inquisition were directed towards coercing and indoctrinating the converts in order to make the new order work.’ See D’Souza, *Goan Society in Transition*, pp. 129-130. In D’Souza’s book, Chapter VI ‘Introduction of

By the time of the New Conquests, the Inquisition was petering out and Portuguese wealth and power had declined greatly. This, according to D'Souza, 'had a sobering effect on their proselytising activities.'¹² Moreover, Portugal also guaranteed the people of the New Conquests the right to follow their own religions and customs.¹³ These factors resulted in a population finely balanced between the Christians and the Hindus. By the time Portuguese rule ended in 1961, the population of Goa comprised approximately sixty percent Hindus and forty percent Christians.¹⁴ The 1960 Goan census also indicated that nearly 96 per cent spoke Konkani while only 1.14 per cent spoke Portuguese, the balance being made up of other Indian tongues.¹⁵

The low level of Portuguese capability is significant, and requires comment, in view of the four and a half centuries of Portuguese rule. First, it is comparable to Macau where Portuguese is spoken by only two percent of the population. Further, the low figure was due to the failure of Portugal in promoting Portuguese education to the Goan masses and the impact of emigration — both of which have parallels in Macau. Like the relationship between Portuguese Macau and British Hong Kong, Goa was overshadowed by British India, notably Bombay, to which 80,000 Goans were said to have emigrated. This estimate, given in 1954, was just six years before the census figures noted above. Other places also attracted the Goans: 20,000 went to other parts of British India; 30,000

Christianity in Goa" outlines the edicts and structure of the Inquisition in Goa as well as the method of proselytisation.

¹² Ibid., p. 97.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ 1960 Census showed that Goa's population totaled 595,569 of which 355,615 were Hindus; 228,344 were Christians; and 11,529 were Muslims and other religions, cited in D'Souza, *Goan Society in Transition*, p. 13.

¹⁵ Ibid.

to Pakistan; 30,000 to Kenya and Uganda; and 20,000 to the Persian Gulf countries.¹⁶ These figures, totaling 180,000, represent thirty per cent of the Goan population — a significant proportion indeed. The emigration to British India, Africa and the Persian Gulf resulted in more Goans being educated in English than Portuguese.¹⁷ But the low level of Portuguese usage may also be indicative of the small size of the Luso-Indian [Portuguese Eurasian] community in Goa itself because as the experience in Macau indicates, Portuguese is spoken mainly in families that are ethnically – fully or partially – Portuguese. Their small size has been variously recognised. According to a Canadian report (1986), ‘[the Luso-Indians] have long since ceased to exist in any significant number.’¹⁸ Their small size has been confirmed by Teotonio R. de Souza, a Goan and Head of the Department of History at the Universidade Lusófona de Humanidades e Tecnologias, Lisbon:

They [Luso-Indians] were insignificant in numbers but retained a high profile and bossed over the natives with display of colour, language and pretending to be more patriotic than the metropolitan Portuguese!¹⁹

Further, de Souza claims that most of them have left Goa and that some of them have also anglicized their names:

After 1961 almost all the Luso-Indians emigrated to Portugal. ... It is to be admitted that many Luso-Indians who had settled themselves in the so-called Portuguese spontaneous settlements in various parts of coastal

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 203.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 172.

¹⁸ L. G. Daniels’ review of Peter Nazareth, *The General Is Up* (Calcutta: The Writers’ Workshop, 1984), in Canadian Association for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies. (www.unb.ca/CACLALS/chimo12.html).

India, Bay of Bengal, and as far as Southeast Asia and Far East, since early 16th century, their descendants chose to adopt the designation of Anglo-Indians in more recent times of British Empire, in order to benefit from the reservation of jobs in certain services, such as railways and postal services. They changed their names, and Coutos / Coutinhos became Coutts, Dias became Days, etc.

As for Luso-Indians in Bombay, there were some of the above category, but most are Goan natives, who have nothing to do with Luso-Indians. Many of those who entered the British East India Company service belonged to this group, but also to native "kolis" who were Christianized by the Portuguese while Bombay belonged to them till 1663-1665. These converts came to be known as East Indians (not Luso-Indians) because of their association with the East India Company.²⁰

De Souza draws a distinction between "Goans" and "Luso-Indians". The indeterminate size and nature of the Luso-Indian community limits the scope for comparison with the Macanese. There is little information concerning the Portuguese descendants of Goa, which may be remedied when Jorge Forjaz, the Portuguese genealogist who chronicled the Macanese families of Macau, completes his survey of the Portuguese descendants in Goa, Damão and Diu, which is commissioned by the Orient Foundation in Lisbon.²¹ However, Bento D'Souza, in *Goan Society in Transition*, has described the Luso-Indians as a distinct community who, under the Portuguese colonial

¹⁹ <http://www.mail-archive.com/goa-research-net@goacom.com/msg00049.html>.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ http://www.foriente.pt/Pt/actividades_2.asp.

regime, received preferential treatment in government jobs and better educational opportunities. They were preferred over the “native Christians”. Consequently, Luso-Indians enjoyed a higher standard of living than the local inhabitants.²² In this regard, they were similar to the Macanese under Portuguese rule.

The current debate over the “Goan identity” serves to underscore the obscurity into which the Luso-Indian community had fallen. Nowadays, it is the dichotomy between Christians Goans and non-Christians Goans which attracts attention. Loraine Nazareth, a Goan in Canada, illustrated this in 2001:

For my family, religion has overlapped both our class and race identity to the point that the three are almost indistinguishable. ... Both my parents were born in Goa, now a state on the southwestern coast of India. However, my parents, like other Goans, do not consider themselves Indian, but Goan. Perhaps the easiest way to explain this phenomenon to a Westerner is to use the analogy of Quebec and the Québécois. ...

As a result of mass conversion of the indigenous population, Goans, though they don' t look much different, have a separate language, culture, and most significantly, a separate religion from most other Indians. In my experience, Goans are fervently Catholic. While the majority of Goa' s population is not Catholic, the Hindus and Muslims of Goa do not consider themselves Goan, but Indian. This gives Goans a separate identity.²³

²² D'Souza, *Goan Society in Transition*, p. 148.

²³ Loraine Nazareth, “Reflections: Of Race, Class, Gender and Religion?”, *Goa Now*, April 2001(www.goacom.com/goanow).

Significantly, Nazareth's view made no mention of Portuguese ethnicity —it was based purely on religion. Her family presents a view that defines *Goans* rather narrowly, confined to those who are Christians only and who have assimilated Portuguese culture and perhaps also the language. But others prefer a broader definition, which is implicit in Bento D'Souza's book, *Goan Society in Transition*. In their view, Goans are residents of Goa, irrespective of religion and ethnicity; their identity is more Konkani than Portuguese —they are Indians.²⁴ Here I have adopted the broader definition when using the term *Goan* and will refer to the miscegenic descendants as Luso-Indians.

The Goan diaspora, which include the Luso-Indians, left Goa in search of better prospects. It was easier for Goan Christians to find employment with the European colonialists, compared to their non-Christian counterparts due to the absence of class and caste taboos.²⁵ They gravitated to areas controlled by the British, notably the bustling metropolis of Bombay and the African colonies of Britain and Portugal. When nationalist sentiments overtook Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, the communities re-emigrated re-establishing itself in Britain, Canada and Portugal. According to a study by Cliff Pereira (Black and Asian Studies Association):

The majority of Goans in Britain and Canada are Catholics and originally hail from the three Goan provinces (Bardez, Ilhas and Salsette) of the Old Conquest in Goa. Most of them had lived in British East Africa, while a minority had formerly lived in Aden, Pakistan, Malawi and Zimbabwe. By contrast the majority of Goans in Portugal, which actually form the second

²⁴ <http://www.goacom.com/goanow/99/dec/index.html>.

²⁵ Teresa Albuquerque 'Looking Back: Early Female Emigration', *Goa Now*, Jan-Feb 2000.

largest population of Asian origin in Europe were formerly from Mozambique, Angola and Goa.²⁶

In Britain, there is a Goan Musical Society, formed in 1997, a Goan Oral History Group, and a Goan Cultural Society, founded in 2000.²⁷ During the weekend of 26 July 2003, the Goan Overseas Association in Toronto (Canada) conducted its Sixth Viva Goa Festival.²⁸ In Portugal, a *Casa de Goa* was formed in 1987 on a non-political, non-profit basis. Its objectives include “activities that help to preserve the identity of the cultures of Goa, Damão and Diu; [and] the investigation of the Luso-Indian culture.”²⁹ Although open to Goans from any religious background, most of these diaspora members are Christian Goans who see themselves as distinct from the non-Christian Goans, as Cliff Pereira has pointed out previously.

Like the Macanese, they also have their Goan International Convention, which is revealing. In one convened in Goa in December 2000, the diaspora was challenged to contribute to the betterment of its former homeland and urged to keep in touch with the mother country:

Do not forget the country of your birth or in which your parents were born. If you wish to contribute to the improvement of your own village, for instance, do not hesitate to do so. ... [The diaspora] have knowledge, funds and science and technology, besides their love of Goa. ... their

²⁶ Cliff Pereira, “The history of Goan Communities in Britain”, (Black and Asian Studies Association) Article 2, November - December 2001 (www.casbah.ac.uk/newsarticle2.stm).

²⁷ Goan Musical society (http://geocities.com/g.m.s/founder_members.html); Goan Oral History project (www.goacom.com/overseas-digest/Archives/GOH); Goan Cultural Society (www.goanculturalsociety.com).

²⁸ www.goanvoice.ca/2003/issue15/.

²⁹ http://www.goacom.com/casa-de-goae_index.html.

children should know their roots and if a generation goes without this knowledge, the ties with their motherland may be snapped forever.³⁰

As in Macau, the activities of the Orient Foundation also attracted attention in Goa. On 19 April 1995, it established an office in Fontainhas, Goa, by acquiring and restoring an old mansion, which once belonged to the Goan aristocrat Francisco da Paula e Fonseca.³¹ Its funding for restoration projects breached some Goans' sensitivity and has been criticised by the Goan Chief Minister, Manohar Parrikar:

I am proud of my heritage, whether it is Hindu heritage or Catholic heritage...If it is an old church, old mosque, it is mine, and when it belongs to me, I should be proud to spend from my own pocket. Would you like your house to be repaired by your neighbour? ... I am not against Fundacao Oriente per se because they are spending money; there a lot of other things they can do with that money in Goa. It is not that because they are Portuguese I am against them but I don' t want someone else supporting my issues of pride. From what I see, we have lost that pride and until that pride comes back to the State and the country, I do not think we can make any real progress.³²

Similarities and differences exist in the decolonisation experiences of Goa and Macau. India recovered Goa through military force nearly forty years ago; in contrast, China reclaimed sovereignty over Macau through negotiations. There was a long period of transition to Chinese rule during which Macau developed its own defacto Constitution

³⁰ "Goan International Convention", *Goa Now*, Jan 2001(www.goacom.com/goanow).

³¹ [www.goacom.com/goanow/2003/jan/CoverStory\(Jan2003\).htm](http://www.goacom.com/goanow/2003/jan/CoverStory(Jan2003).htm)

³² "Goan International Convention", *Goa Now*, Jan 2001(www.goacom.com/goanow).

(the Basic Law) while Goa came under the Indian Constitution virtually overnight. In Goa, English was introduced as the official language of administration in place of Portuguese, and officials were brought in from outside to take charge; this has not been the case with the Macanese. Following its reintegration, Goa had to fight for its autonomy while the neighbouring states mounted their case for a merger with them. The struggle, which pitted the Christian population against the Hindus, stirred communal tensions in Goa, rooted in centuries of inequalities in which the Christians, favoured by the Portuguese, ‘had treated the Hindus as second class citizens’.³³ In the end, the anti-merger forces prevailed and on 30 May 1987, Goa became the twenty-fifth state of the India Union.³⁴ In contrast, Macau was guaranteed a high level of autonomy for fifty years on the resumption of sovereignty by China, and in the first five years, there has been a marked absence of social and religious unrest.

Malacca

One year after the conquest of the island of Goa, the Portuguese had wrested control of Malacca (1511).³⁵ Before then, the Malay kingdom of Malacca was already an important mercantile centre, frequented by thousands of Arab, Indian, Chinese and Malay

³³ D’Souza, *Goan Society in Transition*, p. 317.

³⁴ Goa’s separate identity had the support of India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru who declared, in 1963: “Goa has a distinct personality and we have recognised it. It will be a pity to destroy that individuality ... With the influx of time, a change may come. But it will be gradual and it will be made by Goans themselves. We have decided to preserve the separate entity of Goa in the Union of India and we hold to it firmly. No agitation against it will be to any purpose.” Cited in D’Souza, *Goan Society in Transition*, p. 330.

³⁵ It needs to be stated that much of the following material has already been presented as a paper to the International Conference organised by the Macau Ricci Institute in November 2002, which has been noted in Chapter Two.

traders.³⁶ It was a formidable regional power that commanded the respect of many rulers, exacting tribute from some.³⁷ Tomé Pires – one of the earliest Portuguese settlers in Malacca, in 1512, where he served as the official accountant, the recorder and apothecary – could see its benefits for Portugal. Addressing the religious imperative of his day, Pires highlighted its strategic importance as a base for countering Islam.³⁸ In the burgeoning trade surrounding it, Pires imagined untold riches:

Who can doubt that in Malacca bahars of gold will be made, and that there will be no need for money from India. ... Men cannot estimate the worth of Malacca, on account of its greatness and profit. Malacca is a city that was made for merchandise, fitter than any other in the world; the end of monsoons and the beginning of others.”³⁹

Pires’ observations were to prove correct; for one hundred and thirty years, until it was lost to the Dutch, Malacca was a crucial link between Macau and Europe — a compulsory port of call in the trade with the Malay world as well as with China and Japan.

Portuguese rule sprouted a distinct miscegenic community that has been called *Luso-Malays* but they are also known as *Portuguese Eurasians*. The latter term recognises the fact that over past centuries, the community had welcomed and absorbed the miscegenic offspring of other Europeans, the legacy of the myriad nationalities that

³⁶ For a background on the Malaccan kingdom, see J. Kennedy, *A History of Malaysia*, third edition (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Abdul Majeed, 1993), pp. 1-19.

³⁷ Tributes were received from Pahang, Kampar and Indragiri as well as from “friendly vassals” such as Menangkabau, Aru, Pase, Pegu, Siam, Moluccas and Brunei. Around the time when the Portuguese took over Malacca, Pires estimated that there were about four thousand foreign merchants there. See Tomé Pires, *The Suma Oriental*, Series II, Vol. II, pp. 282-283.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 286.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 285-286.

came to peninsular Malaya in the service of the various East India Companies.⁴⁰ According to Chan Kok-eng, an authority on the Malaccan Eurasian community, the Portuguese subgroup had emerged as the largest, accounting for no less than eighty percent and maybe as high as ninety percent of the Eurasian population in Malacca. Due to this numerical dominance, they also exerted the greatest cultural influence.⁴¹ The term Portuguese Eurasians also acknowledges their current representative organisation, the Malacca Portuguese Eurasian Association (1997), which replaced the Malacca Eurasian Association of earlier decades.⁴²

These Portuguese Eurasians had extensive links with the Macanese in Macau. In a sense, the communities are linked by blood for it was from Malacca that the early Portuguese pioneers ventured to China and settled with their women, many of whom were brought over from Malacca.⁴³ In the area of food, Macanese cuisine reveals some Malayan influences.⁴⁴ Their *patois* languages have attracted international scholars fascinated by some of the similarities.⁴⁵ During Portuguese Malacca, these multifarious

⁴⁰ According to C. R. Boxer, during the days of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), a great number of men from other parts of Europe, particularly Germans, Swiss and Danes, were recruited to work in the East Indies. They too had miscegenic liaisons. Even Sweden had its own East India company, which in the mid-eighteenth century accounted for ten to fifteen percent of Sweden's foreign trade. See C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800* (London: Penguin Books, 1990). Also see B. Johansson (ed.), *The Golden Age of China Trade*, (Hong Kong: Standard Press, 1992).

⁴¹ Chan Kok-eng, "The Eurasians of Melaka", in Sandhu & Wheatley, *Melaka* (Vol. II), p. 265.

⁴² See "Eurasian Association Meeting", *The Malacca Guardian*, 24 December 1934, p. 10. See also <http://www.geocities.com/TheTropics/Paradise/9221/>. The Malacca Portuguese Eurasian Association (1997) is affiliated with the Secretariat of Portuguese/Eurasian Malaysian Associations in seven states of peninsular Malaysia aimed at uniting and promoting common interests.

⁴³ One could observe that in the antiquated Macanese ethnicity debate, a point was made that those with Malay roots were more "original", perhaps "purer", than their more sinicised compatriots. See Cabral, "The 'ethnic' composition of the Macanese", pp. 229-239.

⁴⁴ Most notably is the use of *blachan*, a paste made from shrimps that has also gained wide acceptance in Cantonese cuisine.

⁴⁵ The Malaccan Portuguese creole language is the subject of a Ph. D dissertation by Alan N. Baxter. He also co-authored a glossary of Macanese *pátua*, published in Macau in 2001. See A. N. Baxter, *Kristang*

links were so intimate that the fall of Malacca to the Dutch in 1641 represented a severe blow to both communities. As a result, Macau's trade with India and Europe was severely disrupted and concerns were raised for the remnant in Malacca. Against the odds, they managed to survive and the links continued through to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, bolstered by frequent visits of dignitaries from Macau and the practice of sending trained clergy from Macau to serve in the Malayan peninsula.⁴⁶ These ecclesiastical links lasted until May 1981 when the Vatican ended the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Macau over Malacca and Singapore.⁴⁷ Since this thesis concerns the transformation of the Macanese community in post-1999 Macau, I shall focus on the post-1641 period, which is after the defeat of the Portuguese. This period represents a span of over three and a half centuries in which the Malaccan Portuguese community came under three different regimes – Dutch, British, and Malaysian – not counting the Japanese occupation during World War II. Considered as one of the ‘least known’ corners of the former Portuguese empire, it is necessary to build a profile of the community in the intervening centuries before outlining its relevance for the Macanese in Macau.⁴⁸

(*Malacca Creole Portuguese*), Ph. D. thesis, Australian National University, 1984. See also Miguel Senna Fernandes, Alan Norman Baxter, *Maquista Chapado* (Macau: Macau International Institute, 2001).

⁴⁶ “The Portuguese Convent: a successful concert”, *The Malacca Guardian*, 25 June 1928; “Visit of Church Dignitaries”, *The Malacca Observer*, 10 November 1924, p. 3; *Rally*, Vol.2, No. 11, November 1948. *Rally*, the monthly publication of the Portuguese Mission in Singapore and Malacca, announced the arrival of Fr. Manuel Joaquim Pintado in 1948 to serve at St. Peter's, Malacca. Fr. Pintado was educated at St. Joseph's Seminary, Macao and became a noted historian on Malacca. The legendary Macau historian Fr. Manuel Teixeira served for a time at the Malaccan Mission after his training in Macau, and Fr. Lancelote Rodrigues, well known in Macau for his jovial personality and his charity work during the late twentieth century, hailed from Malacca and represented a tangible link between the two communities.

⁴⁷ Ribeiro Cardoso, “The Portuguese in Malacca: descendants of nostalgia”, *MacaU Special*, 1992, p. 60.

⁴⁸ Brian J. O'Neill, “Forgotten Malacca”, *MacaU Special*, 1997, pp. 114-121.

Under the Dutch

Following the Dutch seizure of Malacca, the wealthy Portuguese who survived were allowed to leave with their treasures and slaves for Goa, Macau or elsewhere.⁴⁹ Yet many chose to remain, permitted to do so after they had taken an oath of “loyal obedience” to the new regime.⁵⁰ Indeed, it has been suggested that the Dutch administration encouraged the Portuguese Eurasians to stay so that Malacca would not become “a white elephant.”⁵¹ In the following year, 1642, the Portuguese who remained were numerous enough to warrant the appointment of three of their numbers to administer justice together with four Dutchmen — the near numerical equilibrium is indicative of the significance and size of the Portuguese community.⁵²

Not only did many Portuguese Malaccans remain in Dutch Malacca but Portuguese ships also continued to call voluntarily and under duress in order for the Dutch to exact their customs tolls.⁵³ Moreover, Portuguese traders were permitted to purchase resin and Japanese copper from the United Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* or VOC) in Malacca and even had credit facilities extended to them.⁵⁴ Contrary to popular belief, the remnants of the Malaccan Portuguese community were by no means insignificant. Thirty-six years after the Dutch conquest,

⁴⁹ G. Fernandis, “Some historical aspects of the Portuguese in Malacca”, in Fernandis G. (ed.), *Save Our Portuguese Heritage Conference 95* (Malacca, Malaysia: 1996), pp. 91-103.

⁵⁰ Bort, *Report of Governor Balthasar Bort on Malacca 1678*, p. 79. Governor Balthasar Bort ruled Malacca from 1665 to 1677 on behalf of the United Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* or VOC).

⁵¹ Bernard Santa Maria, *My People, My Country* (Malacca, Malaysia: M.P.D.C., 1982), p. 69.

⁵² Fr. Manuel Teixeira, *The Portuguese Missions in Malacca and Singapore (1511 – 1958)* Vol. I (Lisbon, Portugal: Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1961), p. 299.

⁵³ In Bort’s report, copious attention was given to custom levies and how to deal with the ships that tried to sneak by without paying dues. Bort, *Report of Governor Balthasar Bort on Malacca 1678*, pp. 110-11.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 123-125.

Governor Bort listed the Portuguese community as the largest segment of the settlement population. They owned the largest number of houses and cultivated most of the market gardens. Of the 720 houses within the VOC jurisdiction, the Portuguese Malaccans owned 31.5 per cent of the total.⁵⁵ Next were the Malays with 18.75 per cent, Chinese 18.33 and Dutch 18 per cent. Moors, Indians and the Bugis occupied the balance.⁵⁶ The settlement population at the time totaled 4884 inhabitants including slaves; of these the Portuguese comprised the largest number at 41.4 per cent, followed by Malays, Arabs and Chinese with around 15 per cent each. The Dutch and their slaves represented only 10.1 per cent.⁵⁷ As slave ownership was an indicator of wealth, all communities were recorded as owning slaves but the Portuguese accounted for the most number.⁵⁸ While some Malaccan Portuguese were engaged in agriculture as market gardeners, most made a living from harvesting the seas.⁵⁹ Therefore it seems fair to conclude that in the first few decades of Dutch rule, there were some wealthy Portuguese Eurasians who had

⁵⁵ 137 were of brick construction and 583 were *adap* houses. *Adap* houses are traditional Malay dwellings built of wooden frames on stilts utilising woven coconut leaves for lining as well as roofing.

⁵⁶ If only brick dwellings were counted, the largest number (81) were occupied by the Chinese, followed by the Arabs (27), Dutch (23). Only 6 brick houses were occupied by Portuguese Eurasians. This indicated the dominance of Chinese and Arab traders in Malacca's economy. The ground floor of these brick dwellings were generally used for commerce and warehousing while the upper floors housed the living quarters. See Bort, *Report of Governor Balthasar Bort on Malacca 1678*, pp. 39-41.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ The slave population numbered 1,607 representing nearly a third of the total population; of these the Portuguese owned almost one third with 551 slaves, the Dutch 349, the Chinese 290 followed by the Indians, Arabs and Malay in declining order.

⁵⁹ Surrounding the settlement were gardens and orchards. Nine of these belonged to the VOC who leased them out to the poor. Of the privately owned plots, the Portuguese presence was noticeable. On the northwest bank of the river, fifteen owners were listed of which eight were Portuguese. Of the seven lots listed as owned by non-Portuguese, four was leased to Portuguese farmers from their Dutch, German and Swiss owners. Portuguese names such as Pinto, Cardosa, de Costa, de Monte, Texera, Correa, Rodrigues, Swaris, de Fretis and Ferdinandes featured prominently as owners and lessors. See Bort, *Report of Governor Balthasar Bort on Malacca 1678*, p. 50.

remained in Malacca by choice and that for a time they made up the largest segment of the population.⁶⁰

While the VOC was prepared to do business with the Portuguese and valued the continued presence of the Portuguese Eurasians in Malacca, in matters of religious affiliation, the Protestant Dutch were unwilling to countenance Roman Catholicism and made serious attempts to break its hold on the Malaccan Portuguese community. Initially, public worship by Roman Catholics was permitted but was withdrawn in 1646, following the Portuguese-led rebellion against the Dutch in Brazil.⁶¹ In May of that year, the VOC's board of directors, the *Heeren XVII*, issued a directive to rid Malacca of "all the half breeds and other Portuguese adherents, who refuse to reside there without the right to practice the Romish faith".⁶² In the following month, a proclamation forbade Roman Catholic priests to land in Malacca and current priests must leave within one month unless they refrained from wearing their clerical attires and stop practising Roman Catholicism openly. Persons permitting religious worship also faced the same punishment as the priests. Despite the threatened consequences, Bort admitted to a singular lack of success as priests and followers went into hiding and conducted religious services outside of Dutch jurisdiction.⁶³ Nevertheless, religious persecution did force some Portuguese families to leave Malacca; according to Bort, their departure had an

⁶⁰ As in the case of Macau, one should view the population figures from the perspective of a massive influx of population and an extension of the territorial limits under colonial jurisdiction. The massive influx of Chinese from China with the growth of tin mining in later decades and expansion of the geographical area conspired to give an impression of a massive decline in the population of Malaccan Portuguese despite their high fertility rates.

⁶¹ Bort, *Report of Governor Balthasar Bort on Malacca 1678*, p. 79.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 80. "*Heeren XVII*" —literal meaning: The Seventeen Gentlemen.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

adverse impact on the settlement.⁶⁴ In spite of persecution and attempts to convert them to Protestantism, the Malaccan Portuguese community survived and remained staunchly Catholic such that, in 1695, an Italian visitor recorded that there were about 5,000 Catholic souls ‘better instructed in matters of faith than any in Europe’. In 1702, the Dutch authorities gave a piece of land to a Dutch Catholic on which St. Peter’s Church was built —thus signaling an end to the persecution.⁶⁵

Under the Dutch, Malacca suffered sustained economic decline being constrained by Batavia – modern day Jakarta where the VOC’s regional headquarters were located – and overshadowed by her success. Locally the diversion of the tin trade away from Malacca and the continuous harassment by the Bugis damaged her economically.⁶⁶ Competition from the British, who founded Penang in 1786, added to her woes. Malacca became a losing proposition for Batavia who complained about having to remit financial assistance to prop it up.⁶⁷ Admittedly, for the VOC, Malacca was a money-losing proposition right from the start.⁶⁸ Out of the 150 years of VOC rule in Malacca, only 25 were profitable —the first profitable year coincided with the arrival of Balthasar Bort in 1665. Of the 25 profitable years, 7 were achieved under Bort’s tenure as governor.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 86. “The prohibition of the exercise of the Romish religion has notably reduced the population of this town, by reason of the departure of many Portuguese families and their dependants to other places. They have taken with them a good number of black fishermen and would have carried off the rest, if they had not been prevented.”

⁶⁵ Teixeira, *The Portuguese Missions in Malacca and Singapore (1511 – 1958)* Vol. I, pp. 322-3.

⁶⁶ Barbara Watson Andaya, ‘Melaka under the Dutch 1641-1795’, in Sandhu & Wheatley (eds.), *Melaka* Vol. I, pp. 195-241.

⁶⁷ Brian Harrison, *Holding The Fort: Melaka under two flags, 1795 – 1845*, Monograph No. 4 (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Royal Asiatic Society, 1985), p. 101.

⁶⁸ Reinout Vos, *Gentle Janus, Merchant Prince — the VOC and the Tightrope of Diplomacy in the Malay World, 1740 –1800* (Leiden, Netherlands: KITLV Press, 1993), p. 3. According Reinout Vos who studied the VOC during its Malaccan period, success was the exception rather than the rule due to the simultaneous commercial and political role performed by the VOC.

⁶⁹ Lewis, *Jan Compagnie in the Straits of Malacca 1641-1795* (Ohio, USA: University of Ohio, 1995),

Abraham Couperus was the Dutch governor when Malacca surrendered to the British without a fight. The surrender provoked anger and bewilderment and a Portuguese trader testified that he saw some residents harassing Couperus and calling him a traitor.⁷⁰ There was further confusion when the novel post-surrender administrative details became known. It enabled the British to take control of the government property, and matters pertaining to shipping and the military while leaving the civil administration to the Dutch. This was considered a pragmatic outcome in view of the developments in European politics and the difficulty for Britain to defend Malacca on her own.⁷¹ Thus began a period of nearly thirty years when Malacca was ruled intermittently by the British and the VOC personnel until 1825 when the British assumed total control. During this period, Malacca, which had languished under Dutch rule, was ordered to be razed and the population to be evacuated to Penang but this was averted through the personal intervention of Stamford Raffles, the founder of Singapore.⁷²

Under the British

British rule in Malacca, initially exercised through the British East India Company, held major implications for the Malaccan Portuguese. In particular, it sealed Malacca's fate due to the British preference for Penang and later, for Singapore.⁷³

appendix II, pp. 135-139.

⁷⁰ Andaya, citing Graham Irwin, *Governor Couperus and the surrender of Malacca*.

⁷¹ Harrison, *Holding the Fort*, pp. 26-27. The British attack on Malacca was to prevent it falling to the French when the latter overran the Netherlands following the declaration of war in February 1793. In their struggle for European hegemony, Anglo-French rivalry did not end until 1815 when Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo.

⁷² Santa Maria, *My People, My Country*, p. 83.

⁷³ Established in 1819, Singapore's strategic potential alarmed even the British East India officials in Penang such as John Anderson who, barely one year before had written about its potential to impact negatively on Penang. Anderson was proven correct for between 1826 and 1859, the trade at Singapore sometimes exceeded Penang's by five fold. See John Anderson, *Observations on the Restoration of Banca*

Decades later, in 1867, together with Singapore and Penang, Malacca became part of ‘the Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements’ and came under the direct control of the Colonial Office. Such an administrative upgrade masked the fact that the Malayan peninsula was a low priority for the British and had not fired their imagination as much as India or China did.⁷⁴ For a time, Malacca achieved moderate success as a centre for the tin industry in peninsular Malaya and although her trade increased five-fold between 1833 and 1863, as much as half of it was with Singapore.⁷⁵ Dwarfed commercially by its more successful neighbour, Malacca’s economy became so dependent on the latter that she was described as a ‘mere suburb of Singapore’.⁷⁶

Malacca’s relationship with Singapore echoed the connectedness between Hong Kong and Macau. The growth of Singapore as a commercial centre and its dominance over Malacca mirrored Hong Kong’s relationship with Macau. Like Macau, Malacca’s harbour became silted up making it unattractive as a port of call for larger vessels.⁷⁷ The growth of tin mining led to an influx of Chinese that changed dramatically the demography of the settlement so that by 1853, the Chinese ‘owned all the valuable property in the Settlement, and have taken the place and reside in the houses of the great Dutch merchants.’⁷⁸ Another parallel is in the area of emigration. Like the Macanese who flocked to the fast growing centres of Hong Kong and Shanghai, the Portuguese Eurasians in Malacca were increasingly attracted to the opportunities in Singapore and

and Malacca to the Dutch, as affecting the Tin Trade and General Commerce of Pinang (Prince of Wales Island: 1824).

⁷⁴ Margaret Shennan, *Out in the Midday Sun: the British in Malaya 1880-1960*, first published 2000, this edition (London: John Murray, 2002), pp. 14-15.

⁷⁵ Harrison, *Holding the Fort*, p. 136.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

Penang. Official figures estimated that as many as 5,000 Malaccans had left for Singapore by 1823, less than five years after the latter's establishment.⁷⁹ As in Macau, although many had left, there were also many who chose to remain behind. The latter numbered approximately 2,620 according to the first British census in 1826. This represented just over ten per cent of the population.⁸⁰ The exodus continued well into the twentieth century with a large proportion of the Eurasian population making the move.⁸¹ The loss was more than quantitative for it depleted the Portuguese Eurasian community of its more capable members, those with better education and skills. Despite Malacca's boom years, the flow never reversed.⁸²

Under British rule, Portuguese shipping continued to call at Malacca in an activity largely dominated by the English and the Dutch. It was also under British rule that a class of better-educated and affluent Portuguese Eurasians emerged. This group tended to monopolise the intermediary role in the civil service, which became their main source of employment. According to Bernard Santa Maria – a former community leader who wrote a history about the Malaccan Portuguese – they were sorely needed:

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 134. T. Braddell, cited in Harrison.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 99.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 123.

⁸¹ The 1911 census for the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States showed that of the departees from Malacca for other centres in the Malayan peninsula, Malaccan Eurasians made up 31 per cent of the total. Most ended up in Singapore, Selangor and Negri Sembilan. In the 1947 census, the Eurasians still accounted for a sizeable proportion of Malacca-born residents in Singapore, Selangor and Johore. See Table 7-9, in Chan Kok-eng, "Aspects of Population Change in British Colonial Malacca", Ph.D dissertation, University of Aberdeen 1980, pp. 248-249.

⁸² Chan, "The Eurasians of Melaka", in Sandhu & Wheatley, *Melaka* (Vol. II), p. 268.

Everywhere that the British got themselves involved ... the administrative pioneers that accompanied the British came from the descendants of [the] Malacca Portuguese.⁸³

They were the ‘solid wheels to carry out the affairs of the Government’ and served as nursing staff in the hospitals and as teachers in the schools.⁸⁴ Such compliments masked the fact that in reality, they were confined by the British to the lower grade jobs – as clerks, typists and mechanics – in a scheme designed ‘to protect the prestige of the white men.’⁸⁵ Despite the existence of this important segment of the Malaccan Portuguese community, there is little mention of them in the meager literature except in passing. This affluent group, typified by R. S. de Sousa, a community leader, was instrumental in persuading the British to set up the Portuguese Settlement in 1933 for the poorer members of their community.⁸⁶

The role – as ‘imperial auxiliaries’⁸⁷ – performed by the better-educated segments of the Malaccan Portuguese community was typical of European colonial societies elsewhere, and was particularly true of the Macanese in Hong Kong and Macau. During the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth, the Macanese assisted the British in Hong Kong and China, providing the administrative backup for many of the mercantile firms along the China coast.⁸⁸ The cordial relations between the Macanese and the British on the China coast would have had a positive impact on the Malaccan Portuguese and it therefore came as no surprise to discover a benevolent British attitude

⁸³ Santa Maria, *My People, My Country*, p. 122.

⁸⁴ B. A. Skelchy, cited by Santa Maria, *My People, My Country*, pp. 124 -126.

⁸⁵ Shennan, *Out in the Midday Sun*, p. 70.

⁸⁶ ‘Portuguese Settlement Malacca’, *The Malacca Guardian*, 2 October 1933, p. 7.

⁸⁷ The term ‘imperial auxiliaries’ is used by Van Hear. See Van Hear, *New Diasporas*, p. 52.

towards them right from the start. This is evidenced from the British East India Company records, which show that it paid the salary for a Roman Catholic priest in Malacca, an act that would largely benefit the Portuguese Eurasians who were predominantly Catholic. For the period in question, in the other British possessions of Singapore and Penang, the Company had paid for the Protestant chaplains only.⁸⁹

The twentieth century

The period between the First and Second World Wars is particularly worth noting, for it represents the “golden years” for the British in Malaya.⁹⁰ During this period, the persistent and prominent coverage given to the Malaccan Eurasians by the *Malacca Observer* and the *Malacca Guardian* suggest that the community had a high standing within the colonial society. The *Malacca Observer*, in particular, regurgitated past Portuguese glories.⁹¹ It gave publicity to the visits of ecclesiastical dignitaries, such as by Dom Mateus D’Oliveira Xavier, the Archbishop of Goa and his brother Monsignor Sebastian D’Oliveira Xavier, the Bishop of Macau, in 1924.⁹² The visit of Bishop José da Costa Nunes of Macau, in 1928, was extensively covered including the songs and dances performed at the special concert given in his honour. There was mention of the Portuguese Convent and the Portuguese school at Tranquerah, part of the educational

⁸⁸ Koo, ‘In Search of a Better World: a social history of the Macaenses in China’, pp. 125-128.

⁸⁹ See table 17 (The List of Establishments at Pinang, Singapore and Malacca for 1827 and 1828), in T. Braddell, *Statistics at the British Possessions in the Straits of Malacca with explanatory notes*, (Pinang: 1861), p. 4. [Publisher unknown]

⁹⁰ Shennan, *Out in the Midday Sun*, p. 107.

⁹¹ ‘Our Forgotten Past – Albuquerque The Great – The Conqueror Of Malacca’, *The Malacca Observer*, 3 November 1924, p. 5; ‘In Old Malacca – St. Francis Church’, *The Malacca Observer*, 1 December 1924; ‘Malacca Conquistada’, *The Malacca Observer*, 3 August 1925, p. 4.

⁹² ‘Visit of Church Dignitaries’, *The Malacca Observer*, 10 November 1924, p. 3.

facilities accessible to the community, which had been described elsewhere by Bernard Santa Maria.⁹³

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the community appeared to be fragmented along socio-economic lines and between the English-speaking and the non-English speaking. An article in the *Malaccan Guardian* described three general groups. The first was the ‘Bandar Praya’ people who were mostly fishermen without much ambition except for a good catch and who were content with their lot in life. The second group comprised those who had adopted a Western style of living and speaking, who were or whose forefathers were government officers and clerks. The third group was the in-between group, consisting of those who ‘aspired high’ hoping to make it with the help of education.⁹⁴ Progress and prosperity rubbed off on the better-educated Eurasians who ‘occupied an intermediate position in the colonial hierarchy, lower than the politically and economically powerful Europeans but somewhat higher than the Asians’.⁹⁵ Despite their command of English and their Western lifestyle, they suffered social stigmatisation and marginality. According to Margaret Shennan:

The British in the early twentieth century tended to be dismissive of Eurasians ... In some quarters there was strong disapproval of Eurasians passing as pure whites. ... Malacca, in particular, symbolized to the British the heritage of two failed colonial societies. ‘Portuguese and Dutch rule

⁹³ ‘The Portuguese Convent: a successful concert’, *The Malacca Guardian*, 25 June, 1928. Details of the education system available to the Portuguese Eurasian community had been elaborated in Santa Maria, *My People, My Country*, pp. 112-120.

⁹⁴ ‘The Future of Malacca Eurasians’, *The Malacca Guardian*, 9 May 1932, p.3. Different terms were used to describe different groups in the community such as ‘A1 Eurasians’, ‘high class Eurasians’, ‘low class Eurasians’, ‘Tranquerah Eurasians’, and ‘Praya people’.

⁹⁵ Chan, ‘The Eurasians of Melaka’, in Sandhu & Wheatley, *Melaka* (Vol. II), p. 275.

have passed away, leaving as their chief monuments ... a race of half breeds' and a population who were indolent and poor.⁹⁶

In 1934, this better-educated group met to form the Eurasian Association in Malacca following the lead set in Singapore.⁹⁷ Met with initial apathy, the *Malacca Guardian* called on the community to wake up for 'if a community has no association of their own, no progress will ever be made.'⁹⁸ Before the year's end, the Association had come into being and the inaugural meeting took place on 23 December. The Chairman H. M. de Sousa emphasised the need for unity and to improve the community's prospects to earn a living in the trades and professions.⁹⁹ When the Association presented its first annual report, it was featured on the front page of the *Malacca Guardian*. From the report, we learnt of their sporting activities and musical endeavours, and that ten of their members had been accepted by the Malaccan Police Force and sent to Singapore for training. Indicating the importance of the community, the Association was granted the privilege of nominating a representative to the Malacca Municipal Council and F. A. de Witt was duly elected as its first delegate. The Association also participated in the King George V's Silver Jubilee and organised a lantern procession that was judged an 'unqualified success'. They showed concern for their 'needy brethren' by successfully urging Governor Thompson to provide better facilities and cheaper rents at the

⁹⁶ Shennan is quoting H. N. Ridley, a scientist. Shennan, *Out in the Midday Sun*, p. 69.

⁹⁷ By 1919, Eurasian Associations had already been formed in Singapore, Penang and Selangor. Malacca was at least fourteen years behind. According to Bernard Santa Maria, it was due to a lack of capable leadership resulting from emigration. See Santa Maria, *My People, My Country*, pp. 166-167.

⁹⁸ 'The Eurasian Association', *The Malacca Guardian*, 22 October 1934, p. 8.

⁹⁹ 'Eurasian Association Meeting', *The Malacca Guardian*, 24 December 1934, p. 10.

Portuguese Settlement.¹⁰⁰ Three months later, they added their weight to fight against the government ban on the unrestricted hawking of fish by some fishermen, many of whom were Luso-Malays.¹⁰¹

The activities of the Malaccan Volunteer Corps and its Eurasian unit drew frequent mention in 1927, which was a tense period for the British presence in Southeast Asia due to the anti-British riots in China that touched Hong Kong and Macau —and, some feared, might spread to the Chinese communities of South East Asia.¹⁰² As a precaution, the British targeted the Eurasian community to recruit a special Eurasian unit for the Volunteer Corps where they excelled in regimental sports.¹⁰³

Sports featured prominently in the newspapers and in the life of the community at large; being open to participation by all races, they helped to break down racial and social barriers.¹⁰⁴ For the Portuguese Eurasians, sports were a prime factor in the formation of the St. Francis' Association, which consisted of the former pupils of the St. Francis Institute, a Catholic school popular with the Malaccan Portuguese families.¹⁰⁵ The Association fielded many sporting teams against other clubs. A popular game was cricket in which members of the de Souza, de Vries and Perera families featured prominently.

¹⁰⁰ "Malacca Eurasian Association – first annual report", *The Malacca Guardian*, 23 March 1936, Front page.

¹⁰¹ "Malacca Fishermen Petition", *The Malacca Guardian*, 29 June 1936. Unrestricted hawking impacted adversely on the business of fishermen who had to pay rent for a stall at the municipal markets. In opposing the ban, it was claimed that the public was in favour of unrestricted hawking because it was the traditional way of trade and it made possible for fresh fish to be bought cheaper.

¹⁰² The formation of Volunteer Defence Corps in British outposts like Malacca, Hong Kong and Shanghai had been dubbed "military protection on the cheap". They augmented the police and army personnel during periods of civil strife and had to undergo regular training exercises. See Robert Bickers, *Britain in China*, p. 14.

¹⁰³ It was actually formed in 1902, disbanded in 1906 but was reorganised in 1923. See Santa Maria, *My People, My Country*, pp. 170-172. See also "MVC Regimental Sports" *The Malacca Observer*, 8 June 1925, p. 5, and "Malacca Volunteer Corps", *The Malacca Observer*, 10 January 1927, p. 6.

¹⁰⁴ Shennan, *Out in the Midday Sun*, p. 124.

They competed against the team fielded by the colonial elite from the Malacca Cricket Club and participated in mock international competitions with teams representing Australia and Ireland.¹⁰⁶ In latter years, it was through the St. Peter's Brigade, associated with St. Peter's Church, that the community continued its active participation in team sports including hockey, soccer and volleyball.¹⁰⁷

Music has always been a feature of the Portuguese Eurasians in Malacca. The *Malaccan Observer* reported that the band of musicians who performed in 1927 were only 'illiterate Portuguese who have learnt to play by ear, and who earn their livelihood in various ways; fishing one day, white-washing or job-carpentering the next, and as occasions offer, playing at weddings and Chinese funerals.' This, the paper added, was a far cry from the group organised by Padre Manuel Gomes, a Goanese priest and accomplished musician, four decades earlier. The Gomes band was of such repute that it scored invitations to perform at official functions from as far afield as Penang with travelling expenses paid by their hosts.¹⁰⁸

A newsworthy topic was the localisation of the civil service or 'Malayanisation', as it was called in Malacca. In Macau, it was the lack of localisation at the senior levels that led many Macanese to complain bitterly about the Portuguese expatriates. If the Malaccan Eurasians shared similar antipathy towards their British superiors, it was not documented. Instead they felt threatened by the preferential treatment shown by the British towards the Malays. A newspaper editorial, in 1925, declared that preferential employment of Malays should not be implemented in the Straits Settlements (Penang,

¹⁰⁵ 'St. Francis' Association', *The Malacca Observer*, 6 July 1925, p. 5.

¹⁰⁶ 'Cricket', *The Malacca Observer*, 2 February 1925, p. 6.

¹⁰⁷ *Rally*, a monthly Catholic Review, Vol. 2, No. 11, November 1948.

Singapore and Malacca) because it was ‘unjust to the thousands upon thousands of Eurasian, Chinese and Indian youths ... who see the door of the Civil Service banged, barred and bolted against them.’¹⁰⁹ In fact, the editorial argued that it was the Portuguese Eurasians who merited special assistance:

We see, in Malacca, the spectacle of a fallen people, whose forefathers were the conquerors of Eastern Asia and the pioneers of European civilisation in this Great Continent. ... The descendants of the Great Albuquerque and his valiant men deserve well of the State but, alas, today, some of them, to our eternal shame it shall be said, lie creeping and groveling in the dust at Bandar Praya, forsaken of God and Government, illiterate beyond comprehension, and eking out the miserable living of fishermen, and existing in circumstances of utmost destitution and extreme degradation, altogether unworthy of their glorious past.

But for the assistance rendered to them by the Fathers of the Roman Catholic Church, the Convent Sisters and by the Christian Brothers, they would ... have sunk to the lowest ... depths of indigency. We survey this prospect at Bandar Praya with profound shame and extreme disgust at the inactivity of Government and its failure to stretch out a helping hand to these hapless descendants of the former conquerors of Malacca. ...

The editorial concluded that opportunities in British Malaya should not be given on the basis of race. Such public display of a sense of social justice was lost on the British

¹⁰⁸ *The Malacca Observer*, 17 January 1927, p. 3.

administration due to the geo-political realities of the day and the emergence of nascent nationalism throughout Asia. The message was perhaps also blunted by its anti-Malay undertones.¹¹⁰

One could not overstate the importance of the Roman Catholic Church and its impact on the Portuguese Eurasian community; undoubtedly its priests had played a pivotal role in sustaining the community during the Dutch period. The relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the community remained intimate such that adherence to Roman Catholicism became “an important identifying cultural trait of the Portuguese Eurasian community.”¹¹¹ In the 1930s, Catholic priests – Fr. Jules P. Francois and Fr. Alvaro M. Coroado – were instrumental in the establishment of the Portuguese Settlement; they championed the rights of the Luso-Malay fishermen when local authorities banned the unrestricted hawking of fish.¹¹² Over time, St. Peter’s Roman Catholic Church became the focal point for their community, reinforced by the sporting activities accessible through the St. Peter’s Brigade. Catholic schools nurtured and educated the community and Catholic periodicals, such as *The Rally*, helped to define their place in the global Portuguese community.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ “The Editorial Office”, *The Malacca Observer*, 31 August 1925, p. 4.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. For it also stated: “The Malay is a lovable person, but we cannot be blind to the fact that he is, in the main, we say it without offence, but a drone in the general scheme of things in Malaya, spoon-fed by the Government at every turn and corner. He toils not and like the drone he makes no honey, except Government honey, which comes to him in free Education, (both vernacular and English), free hostels and an open entry into Civil Service without fear of competition.”

¹¹¹ Chan, “The Eurasians of Melaka”, in Sandhu & Wheatley, *Melaka* (Vol. II), p. 267.

¹¹² “Malacca Fishermen Petition”, *The Malacca Guardian*, 29 June 1936.

¹¹³ *Rally*, a monthly Catholic Review, carried many items of Portuguese news. One issue, Vol. 2, No. 4, April 1948, reported on the canonisation of St. John de Britto and the reception that the Portuguese delegation had with the Pope. This delegation included members from the Malaccan church. This particular issue also contained snippets on history such as the settlement of Macau before 1557; the church buildings that used to exist in Portuguese Malacca; the imprisonment of two Malaccan priests at the hands of the Japanese; a statement by Portugal’s Minister of Colonies regarding Portuguese policy towards its present and former colonies as well as an address delivered by the visiting Portuguese Minister to China in

The Malaccan Portuguese Settlement

Today, the Malaccan Portuguese Settlement – being a village of 117 houses and about a thousand inhabitants in Ujung Pasir, 3 kms from the town centre – remains the most tangible sign of the community and a major tourist attraction.¹¹⁴ But back in 1930, the poorer Portuguese Eurasians were scattered throughout the town and it was felt that their living conditions could be improved and their culture preserved if the majority were brought together within a settlement. The move was in response to overtures from the Portuguese Eurasian community led by the French priest, Fr. Jules P. Francois.¹¹⁵ In setting aside some 28 acres of land, the British administration appeared to have acted in accordance with public sentiment.¹¹⁶ According to the *Malaccan Guardian*:

A Portuguese Settlement will be in keeping with the historical tradition of this old city. In the past the Portuguese have played no mean part in the civilisation of Malacca. The descendants of such a virile race ought certainly to be preserved from the on-slaught of time. A Settlement of this kind is the only practical way of doing it.¹¹⁷

Singapore concerning the domestic political situation in Lisbon. [The story of the two priests imprisoned by the Japanese, Fr. A. V. Corado and Fr. F. M. Massano, had been told in Santa Maria, *My People, My Country*, pp. 178-182.] Another issue (Vol. 2, No. 11, November 1948) revealed further links with Macau when it announced the arrival of Fr. Manuel Joaquim Pintado who was trained at St. Joseph's Seminary in Macau. Fr. Pintado arrived to take charge of the Portuguese Eurasian congregation at Malacca and later make a significant contribution to the study of Malaccan history. Other notable clergy links with Macau were through Fr. Manuel Teixeira who served for a period in the Portuguese Mission before returning to Macau, and Fr. Lancelote Rodrigues who was born in Malacca but went to Macau for training to enter the priesthood. Fr. Lancelote later became known for his work amongst the refugees that flocked to Macau after 1949 and in the wake of the Indo-Chinese wars in the 1970s.

¹¹⁴ <http://www.geocities.com/TheTropics/Paradise/9221/>.

¹¹⁵ The impact of French priests in teaching English to the poorer Eurasians had been blamed for their accent, disparagingly described by the British as 'chi-chi'. See Shennan, *Out in the Middy Sun*, pp. 69, 363.

¹¹⁶ This original area had been subsequently cut back to satisfy the needs of the religious and government institutions. See Santa Maria, *My People, My Country*, pp. 128-135.

¹¹⁷ 'Portuguese Settlement', *The Malacca Guardian*, 30 October 1933, p.10.

Before tourism overtook the Settlement in the latter decades of the twentieth century, the Settlement was distinguished by its abject poverty and overcrowded living conditions. Under-employment was rife, literacy levels were low and fertility rates were high due to the lack of family planning.¹¹⁸ Some believed that this depressed socio-economic environment had contributed to its strong identity such that the Settlement, with its sense of community and the continuity of their unique language and social customs, had been regarded as “*the* cultural core area” of the Portuguese Eurasian population.¹¹⁹ This status had emerged through self-promotion and the impassioned speeches delivered by Bernard Santa Maria, who was the first member from the Portuguese community to be elected to the State Legislative Assembly, in 1969.¹²⁰ A public manifestation of that cultural heritage are the dances and songs performed by the Settlement residents, which has been the subject of a study by Margaret Sarkissian, an American academic. She finds that their public performances – music, dance routines and costumes – bear little resemblance to those performed during communal festivities. Instead, they have been modulated from the performances given by the affluent Portuguese Eurasians for a visiting dignitary in 1952. Such dichotomy, she asserts, merely reflects the two facets of the Settlement: one, a regular version where the daily struggle to make a living takes precedent; the other, a touristic version pampering to

¹¹⁸ Chan Kok-eng, “The Eurasians of Melaka”, in Sandhu & Wheatley, *Melaka* (Vol. II), p. 270.

¹¹⁹ Santa Maria, *My People, My Country*, pp. 139-140.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-149, 193. An example of his impassioned speeches: “[A] community can only claim to be a community if it possesses a culture, a heritage and an identity. For this to exist we must live in a homogeneous environment and the Portuguese Settlement is the only area where such an environment exist. You cannot perpetuate a community if they have nowhere to organise their festivals, their language is not used in dialogue and their numbers dwindle with the passage of time. ... We are a peace loving community ... We will surrender our pride; we will bow our heads in servitude, but we will not allow them to destroy us, trample on our heritage and exterminate the continuance of our community.”

stereotype images with “shadows from the past”.¹²¹ Nevertheless, Sarkissian believes that their contributions to Malaccan tourism permitted the small and politically powerless community to achieve “a measure of national prominence that far outweighs their actual number.”¹²²

Revived by tourism, the Portuguese Settlement boasts a profitable production of music tapes in *Kristang*, their unique *patois* that has been passed down orally through the generations.¹²³ The Settlement has been featured on commemorative postage stamps, and public recognition also came through the construction of a Portuguese Square. Other key achievements are the revival of the dormant *Festa de San Pedro* held annually since 1966 on 29 June, the formation of the Portuguese Cultural Society in 1967, and the permission – granted in 1984 – for Portuguese Eurasians to invest in the *Amanah Saham Nasional*, a Government Investment Fund restricted to indigenous citizens only.¹²⁴ The latter achievement represents a significant development in the continuing campaign to persuade the Malaysian Government to accord full indigenous rights to these Luso-Malays.

As part of the vibrant Malaysian economy, the Settlement has been threatened by the encroachment of urban development and the foreshore reclamation scheme of 1995,

¹²¹ Sarkissian, *D’Albuquerque’s Children*, pp. 11,17.

¹²² Sarkissian, “The Contribution of Portuguese Culture to Tourism in Malacca”, in Fernandis, G. (ed.), *Save Our Portuguese Heritage Conference 1995*, pp. 31-39.

¹²³ Alan Baxter, “General Comment on my research on the Malacca Portuguese language”, in Fernandis, G. (ed.), *Save Our Portuguese Heritage Conference 1995*, p. 11. Locally referred to as *Kristang*, its proper term is “Malacca Malayo-Portuguese creole”, according to Baxter who undertook a study of the language. Baxter later co-authored a glossary of the Macanese *patua*, which was launched in Macau in November 2001 during the Fourth International Reunion of the Macanese Communities.

¹²⁴ In 1995, over 5000 Portuguese members had participated in the Fund, many from outside Malacca. See Joseph Santa Maria, “Leadership in the Malacca Portuguese Community towards the year 2000”, in Fernandis, G. (ed.), *Save Our Portuguese Heritage Conference 1995*, pp. 13-19.

prompting several public campaigns to save it.¹²⁵ In one of the early campaigns, Santa Maria described what the place symbolised for the Portuguese Eurasians:

The Portuguese Settlement is the last bastion where our cultural heritage can continue to be preserved and perpetuated. It has already been acknowledged as the Mecca of our community. It acts as [a] psychological bridge, binding our brethren from as far as Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Seremban and those in other states through cultural and blood ties.¹²⁶

In claiming such cultic status for the Settlement, Bernard Santa Maria was unique. His brother, Joseph, was more circumspect about what the Settlement represented when he acknowledged, in 1996, that there were some who did not wish to associate themselves with the Malaccan Settlement or to acknowledge their Portuguese roots.¹²⁷ However, this may have changed with the subsequent establishment of the Secretariat of Portuguese/Eurasian Malaysian Associations in seven of the ten peninsular states, which aimed to unite and promote their common interests.¹²⁸ Yet the dominant profile of the Settlement remains and the tendency to focus on this aspect of the community presents a rather distorted image that fails to account for its diaspora.

¹²⁵ To garner support against the land reclamation project and to draw publicity to its plight, an international conference was held at the Portuguese Settlement Hall on 19 February 1995. The community believed the proposal would impact negatively on their traditional fishing grounds affecting other reliant cottage industries. Elimination of their seaside setting would also affect its touristic appeal and their restaurant business undermining its economic viability. See G. Singho, 'Reclamation and the Portuguese Settlement', in Fernandis, G. (ed.), *Save Our Portuguese Heritage Conference 1995*, pp. 22-30. Sarkissian, considered the reclamation as a serious threat because fishing and the sea remained central not only to their economy but their sense of identity: 'To take away the sea is not simply to take away a livelihood, but to destroy one of the core elements of their heritage. ...[The] removal of their historical connection with the sea, the very core of their existence, may well prove insurmountable, causing the dispersion of this unique and irreplaceable community.' See Sarkissian, 'The Contribution of Portuguese Culture to Tourism in Malacca', in Fernandis, G. (ed.), *Save Our Portuguese Heritage Conference 1995*, pp. 31-39.

¹²⁶ Santa Maria, *My People, My Country*, pp. 147-148.

¹²⁷ Santa Maria, Joseph, 'Leadership in the Malacca Portuguese Community towards the year 2000', in Fernandis, G. (ed.), *Save Our Portuguese Heritage Conference 1995*, pp. 13-19.

Relevance for the Macanese in Macau

In the wake of decolonisation in 1999, the Macanese community in Macau is confronted with a struggle for survival and for relevance. Their culture is under threat through natural attrition and emigration; their past privileges and advantages are displaced by the transfer of power. As they seek to redefine their role in the light of the changed circumstance, the post-colonial experiences of Goa and Malacca may hold lessons of interest. But in drawing relevance for Macau, the exercise is fraught with difficulties. Among them are the vastly different social, economic and political contexts that existed —and currently prevail —in these former Portuguese colonies. Further, the indeterminate nature of the Luso-Indian and Luso-Malay communities make the exercise hazardous and the lessons tentative. But having located the Macanese community within the Luso-Asiatic communities —which is indisputable —it is incumbent on me to pursue such a line of inquiry. In doing so, I shall dwell mainly on their post-colonial experiences, in view of the focus of my thesis.

There are lessons to be drawn from the experiences of Goa and Malacca. One is an appreciation of the impact of global trends on communities living in fringe localities. The dominance of the major centres – Bombay over Goa, and Singapore, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur over Malacca – has implications for the Luso-Asiatic communities. Globalisation encourages emigration, particularly of the younger and better skilled members to the larger centres. In this respect, Macau is better situated than Goa and Malacca. As part of a dynamic region of China, Macau is well placed to benefit from the economic reforms taking place in the Pearl River Delta area and China's transformation

¹²⁸ <http://www.geocities.com/TheTropics/Paradise/9221/>.

as a trading and manufacturing colossus. Under such a scenario, some Chinese in Macau believe that the Macanese are better equipped to face the challenge of economic transformation due to their international connections, linguistic skills – especially their mastery of English and Portuguese – and their Western ways. Further, Chan Kok-eng, a Singaporean academic, has observed that “with increased industrial development [in Malacca], the out-migration of young Eurasians ... have been reduced to some extent.”¹²⁹ Similarly, the Macanese community can look forward to opportunities for its younger generation in post-1999 Macau created by the frenetic development within Macau and the Pearl River Delta Region. Certainly, Macanese professionals, such as architects and engineers, are crossing the borders to the Mainland for projects located in Zhuhai and Guangzhou. This is likely to increase due to the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) between Macau, Hong Kong and China concluded in October 2003 (see p. 142 above).

Another is the realisation that the small size of the community and the compactness of the locality can be beneficial. In the case of Malacca, Chan Kok-eng has observed:

The smallness of the Eurasian community and its concentration mainly in the town ... have further ensured a considerable degree of coherence within the group. ... Their common adherence to Roman Catholicism has also provided points of convergence in churches and related religious

¹²⁹ Chan Kok-eng, “The Eurasians of Melaka”, in Sandhu & Wheatley, *Melaka* (Vol. II), p. 274.

activities where members have been able to meet each other, to the exclusion of other ethnic groups.¹³⁰

This has relevance for the Macanese in Macau although Herbert Yee has contended that the loosening grip of Roman Catholicism on the Macanese community and the fact that they no longer live in identifiable districts have contributed to a crisis of identity within the community.¹³¹ My own observation, however, does not totally accord with Yee's because by and large the Macanese are still staunchly Roman Catholic, although like the rest of society, secularism is fast gaining hold. Further, their numbers are indeed small and Macau is compact enough for the Macanese to find one another and congregate with ease. Admittedly, they no longer reside in enclaves such as the one described by Henrique de Senna Fernandes, but their current places of convergence – to borrow Chan Kok-eng's term – are clearly identifiable.¹³² These include the prominent churches in the old districts, the various Macanese institutions, in particular the Casa de Portugal and Santa Casa cafe in the middle of the city, and the prominent Macanese and Portuguese restaurants.

Moreover, the mention of churches and institutions underscores a further reality—that institutions have a certain resilience, which many corporations lack. Indeed, in Malacca, one cannot deny the significant contributions of the Roman Catholic Church, the Portuguese Settlement and the Portuguese Eurasian Association, to the survival of the Portuguese Eurasian community there. And in China, the Christian churches have

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 267.

¹³¹ Yee, *Macau in Transition*, pp. 136-139.

¹³² According to Senna Fernandes, before World War II, Macau was broadly divided into two sections: Chinese and Christian. He believed there were no Portuguese families inside the Chinese city but there was

demonstrated that they can survive decades of religious persecution and political upheavals to emerge vital and relevant. This is encouraging for Macanese institutions in Macau, such as APIM (*Associação Promotora da Instrução dos Macaenses*) and the *Santa Casa da Misericórdia* —but it is essential that they continue to adapt to the changing times. Transforming Macanese institutions to serve contemporary needs will not only ensure their survival but may evolve as shining beacons for the community as indicated by the role currently assumed by the Portuguese Settlement in Malacca.

Likewise, the relationships with foreign institutions must be handled with care. As we have seen in Goa, certain activities of the Orient Foundation have been criticised by the Chief Minister there. In view of the prominence of the Orient Foundation in Macau and the Macanese diaspora, caution is required so as not to court political ill-will, because the Macanese, who represent about two per cent of the population, are heavily reliant on the graciousness of Macau's Chief Executive —unlike the Christian Goans who make up about forty per cent of their population.

Significantly, there has been a conscious attempt by community leaders in Goa to define the Goan identity in terms of locality —not along ethnic, cultural or religious lines. This has resonance for Macau, where there is a growing chorus, including some influential Macanese, which seeks to inculcate the idea of a Macau identity. As Jorge Rangel, the most senior Macanese in the last colonial administration stated (1999):

I think we have to revise the whole concept of Macanese. Not only those who see themselves as having a Portuguese heritage are Macanese but the Chinese people who belong here are, too. ... If we want Macao to be a

a Chinese enclave inside the Christian city. See Senna Fernandes, "Macau, Yesterday", in L. S. Cunha

separate entity with its own values and traditions, we need younger generations to think in terms of being a new Macao community.¹³³

Clearly, a new Macau identity—which includes Macanese culture—is being forged in contemporary Macau. The Chief Executive Edmund Ho alluded to this in his inaugural speech on 20 December 1999:

After a long separation from the motherland, Macau is returning with many characteristics and attributes that have not originated in traditional Chinese culture. Macau is home to citizens of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds who have coexisted in harmony, and this very special feature will continue in the new era.¹³⁴

Subsumed in an identity beyond themselves, the Macanese community in Macau will, figuratively speaking, occupy a place in the sun. This does not obviate the need for the Macanese community to pay proper attention to their own culture and histories. In the case of Goa, such apparent lack has confined the Luso-Indians to relative obscurity, while the Portuguese Eurasians in Malacca have been rescued somewhat by the recent attention given by Margaret Sarkissian in her book *D'Albuquerque's Children* (2000).

Sarkissian's work emphasises the importance of cultural representations in the life of a community, which also have relevance for the Macanese in Macau. The popularity of the performances by the Portuguese Eurasians in Malacca has revitalised the community in numerous ways. In Macau, the existence of the Macanese patois drama group *Dóci Papiaçam di Macau*, and the musical band *Tuna Macaenses* deserve wholehearted

(ed.), *Macau di nosso coracam*, pp.51-69.

¹³³ McGivering, *Macau Remembers*, p.19.

¹³⁴ *Macau Focus*, Handover edition, p. 89.

support from everybody because they are valiantly attempting to keep alive their traditions. The fact that both these initiatives have been incorporated into tourism promotion programs and the annual Macau Arts Festival indicates their significance for Macau in general and the Macanese in particular.

The Goan and Malaccan experiences point further to the pivotal role of government in the life of minority groups. Without government support, land reclamation and urban encroachment would have subverted the Portuguese Settlement in Malacca. In Goa, the lack of a Non-Resident Indian Bureau within the Goan State Government allegedly impeded the worldwide Goan community. Consequently, at the Goan International Convention, December 2000, the diaspora urged the Goan government to establish such a bureau to coordinate the overseas Goan communities.¹³⁵ In this regard, the Macanese community is more advanced than their Malaccan and Goan counterparts. The International Reunions of the Macanese Communities continue to be subsidised by the Macau government while the Basic Law obliges the government to protect the rights of the Macanese community in the Macau SAR. As all the Macanese institutions can attest, the Macau Government since 1999 has continued its subsidies through the Macau Foundation and has appointed some Macanese representatives to important civic positions to oversee municipal affairs, the important foundations, and as members of the Legislative Assembly.

A final observation concerns the relationship between the communities and their diasporas. In Malacca, that relationship appeared fractious leading to charges made, in 1996, of dissociation, as noted in a previous section. But as has been also noted, the

¹³⁵ “Goan International Convention”, *Goa Now*, January 2001 issue (www.goacom.com/goanow).

recent establishment of a secretariat to coordinate the various Portuguese Eurasian Associations in pensinular Malaysia has been a positive move. In Goa, the relationship with its diaspora is still finding form. The relationship between the Macanese in Macau and its diaspora will undoubtedly evolve over time. So far, it has been a cordial and close-knit one, thanks to the efforts of last Portuguese Administration in Macau, the role of the Orient Foundation and the leadership within and without Macau. What the future unfolds in this area will be their continuing story in the years ahead.

CONCLUSION

In the Introductory Chapter, I outlined the research questions that this thesis seeks to explore. Here, it is appropriate to restate them and to furnish some answers that emerge from the investigation.

Is the Macanese a dying race? Can the Macanese community survive the momentous changes that decolonisation represents? Has decolonisation led to the decimation of the community?

The transfer of sovereignty in Macau in 1999 marked a powerful transition for the small but significant Macanese community. Despite the dismal outlook predicted for them, the community has survived the first five years of the Edmund Ho Administration in robust form. Significantly, there is no dying community to speak of yet; the record shows that decolonisation has not led to the decimation of the Macanese community. Although a slight reduction in their numbers can be detected in the run up to decolonisation, the attrition level may be played down due to the localisation program — which offered the Macanese civil servants a choice to join the civil service in Portugal or face the uncertainties of the future in Macau — and a propensity for emigration in search of better prospects elsewhere, in line with the rest of the population. These two elements combined to bring about a marked, but non-lethal, decline in numbers. Significantly, the loss has not been qualitative due to the continuing presence of virtually all members of

the Macanese elite who were prominent in the pre-1999 era.¹ By remaining, they are part of the on-going transformation of their community.

At the levers of power, for complex and multifarious reasons, the community suffered a form of relegation. Their representation at the Executive Council has been obliterated, while their numbers —and influence —at the Legislative Assembly have also declined. Yet they have managed to retain four of the twenty-seven seats in the Legislature. Considering that the community represents only about two per cent of the population, this level of representation far exceeds their numerical significance and is indicative of their continuing relevance to Macau. The strong representation is also seen as a measure of support by the Chief Executive, Edmund Ho, who appointed two of the four Macanese deputies. Whether the current level can continue in the future remains speculative and will depend largely on the relations between the future Chief Executives and the Macanese community. At the administrative arm of government, unlike colonial times, there are now no Macanese among the five Secretaries through whom the Chief Executive exercises his authority over the Macau SAR. And within the public service, the localisation process has reduced their numbers although some Macanese are visible at the upper echelons and in municipal affairs. A significant continuity is the appointment of some Macanese to the boards of the universities and the various foundations.

Can the Macanese adapt to the new environment and maintain their relevance? Are they up to the task?

¹ Such as Anabela Ritchie, former President of Legislative Assembly, is now a board member of the Macau Foundation, among others; Jorge Rangel, former Secretary in charge of Administration, Education and Youth Affairs, heads the Macau International Institute; Leonel Alves is still a member of Legislative Assembly; José Sales Marques, former President of Leal Senado, Macau's municipal authority, is now

Though diminished to some extent, the Macanese community has adapted to the new environment, expressing their relevance in different ways. Many Macanese professionals, such as Carlos Marreiros (architect) and Miguel de Senna Fernandes (lawyer), are carrying on with their careers without much interruption. Marreiros's contributions were recognised by the Macau Government in January 2002, when he was included in the New Year Honours list for his services in the professional area (see p. 187 above). Some who took early retirement from the civil service due to the localisation program have branched out into other fields. Manuela da Silva Ferreira used her entitlement to open a Macanese restaurant that has continued to win accolades. For her services to tourism, she was honoured by the Macau Government in January 2002 (see p. 185 above). Likewise, Maria de Fátima S. dos Santos Ferreira retired from the civil service in 1998 and started a new charitable organisation working with the intellectually handicap children in Macau—a role that is clearly relevant in contemporary Macau (see p. 186 above). The former Secretary for Public Administration, Education and Youth, Jorge Rangel, remains a high profile participant at non-governmental levels. Presiding over the *Instituto Internacional Macau* (IIM), he is making an immense contribution to the Macanese community and to Macau (see p. 169 above). Clearly, these Macanese, to name only a few, are adapting to the new environment. They seem equipped to deal with the challenges ahead.

Regarding the question of relevance, the findings of this thesis expose a weakness in the existing literature where most, if not all, of the discussions pertaining to Macanese relevance have generally been confined to their numerical presence within the levers of

head of the European Studies Institute; Henrique de Senna Fernandes, doyen of the Macanese community,

government, commerce and the professions. This thesis has argued that such a narrow perspective is inadequate to convey the dilemma facing the miscegenic Macanese community —a small minority group that had suffered relegation due to varied and complex reasons, such as decolonisation, localisation, race and the nationality question. Accordingly, the notion of relevance requires modification in their case. In presenting this argument, I draw support from the fact that in the post-1999 era, the Macau Government has seen fit to honour a significant number of Macanese individuals —and the *Santa Casa da Misericórdia* —with honours and decorations, thus validating their continuing relevance to present-day society.

What transformation, if any, has decolonisation wrought on their culture and institutions?

At this early period, 1999-2004, the findings do not permit a full view of the transformation that decolonisation has wrought on the Macanese culture. But a few points pertinent to this question may be made. To begin with, the retrocession to China may have reduced the level of financial support available to the Macanese community for cultural pursuits. Moreover, the loss of some individuals due to emigration may have reduced the pool of talent available. This is certainly the experience of the musical group, *Tuna Macaenses*, where it takes years for members to adjust to playing together and learning the repertoire. But there appears to be no shortage of talent for the patois drama and singing groups. Furthermore, in the post-1999 era, the community appears determined to preserve its unique culture, evidenced by the rejuvenation of interest in the Macanese patois language, due to a perception that its culture is under threat in the post-

still carries on with his writing and legal practice.

colonial environment. Whereas under Portuguese rule, they were distracted —if not also discouraged — from doing so due to the Portuguese Administration’s emphasis on promoting Portuguese culture in the enclave. In this respect, the transfer of sovereignty may have a beneficial impact on the maintenance of Macanese culture in the longer run.

Accordingly, in the post-colonial era, the Macanese community has maintained a fair degree of robustness in the cultural arena. The most pervasive element —and most popular —is the Macanese cuisine, which is seen as an expression of their relevance and identity. It is also manifested in the performances by the patois drama group, *Dóci Papiaçam di Macau*, led by the lawyer Miguel de Senna Fernandes, which has become a regular feature of the program of the annual Macau Arts Festival. Senna Fernandes also organises a patois singing group that performs each December at a special Macanese mass celebrated at San Domingos Church. Another Macanese cultural flag bearer is the musical band *Tuna Macaenses*, which is under contract to the Macau Government Tourist Office (MGTO). The group performs weekly at the MGTO’s training restaurant established at the Institute for Tourism Studies at Mongha. They are deployed for the MGTO’s promotional campaigns around the Asian region. In the process, they are fast becoming a cultural ambassador for the Macanese community in Macau (see pp. 181-182 above). At the individual level, one should not forget the literary works of Henrique de Senna Fernandes (Miguel’s father), whose prolific writings, one of which was made into a movie, carry Macanese themes. Together with occasional exhibitions by various Macanese artists at the *Instituto de Cultural Macau*, the local residents are well reminded of the Macanese community within their midst.

Although some ancient institutions, such as the *Leal Senado* and *Clube de Macau*, have floundered due to complex and multifarious reasons, the community demonstrates its vitality by establishing new ones, such as the *Instituto Internacional Macau* (IIM) and the *Casa de Portugal em Macau*. These have carved out their own niches within a very short time. Notably, the *Casa de Portugal em Macau* is forging a unifying role between the local Macanese community and the Portuguese expatriates. Gaining multilateral support, it has become a meeting point for the Lusophone community and a compulsory port of call for overseas dignitaries from the Portuguese-speaking world. Moreover, august institutions such as the *Santa Casa da Misericórdia* and *Associação Promotora da Instrução dos Macaenses* (APIM) have managed to sustain their activities and membership. The less prominent *Associação dos Macaenses* (ADM) struggles to maintain itself; its existence attests to the fact that the Macanese community, like other communities, is also stratified along socio-economic lines. But, the prospects are likely to improve for ADM due to the recruitment of some prominent individuals to its membership (see p. 176 above). It is fair to say that prior to 1999, these individuals would have been ambivalent towards the association. What caused their change of mind is yet to be revealed, but their interest indicates that the Macanese institutions are undergoing a process of renewal, which is part of their transformation in post-1999 Macau.

Why did the Macanese leave Macau when their roots are embedded in the territory and their sense of belonging to it is strong? Why do so many Macanese remain when they could have moved overseas to live?

The Macanese have a tradition of emigration throughout their long history. The reasons for leaving, and for staying, are many and diverse — reflecting individual circumstances. Chief among these is the employment situation. During colonial times, there was a form of “glass ceiling” that prevented many capable Macanese from attaining the top positions, which were invariably reserved for expatriates from Portugal, resulting in a “brain drain” from Macau. Interestingly, in the transition to decolonisation, the same argument has been used again —only this time, the “glass ceiling” is allegedly imposed by the local Chinese. Such a perception caused some Macanese to leave Macau to join the Portuguese civil service —an option opened to them under the localisation program. Although localization is an inevitable process of decolonisation, many Macanese felt disadvantaged —eventhough they were born and raised in Macau —due to issues of race, language and China’s uncompromising nationality policy. Besides, Macau experienced a surge in violent crimes and triad turf wars during the 1990s, prompting fears for their personal safety and familial security. But much of it was also psychological. Most Macanese felt that Macau would not be the same for them under Chinese rule. Some feared the problems associated with decolonisation, such as marginality and racial discrimination; there was a lack of trust in Beijing over whether China would honour its pledge to accord Macau a high level of autonomy. Some left for family reasons; others left because their revamped retirement benefits made it difficult to sustain their lifestyles in Macau. Rather than downgrading their livelihood, they opted to leave. Despite the confluence of such powerful elements in the 1990s, the feared mass exodus did not materialise.

For the Macanese who choose to remain in Macau, their reasons for staying are just as diverse. To begin with, the sense of belonging is deep. Furthermore, not all Macanese view the future apprehensively; the smooth transfer of sovereignty in Hong Kong, two years before their own, was reassuring for many, despite the problems facing Hong Kong in the years that followed. Moreover, many Macanese do not possess the means and the qualifications to emigrate. Those who have left for Portugal tended to have a job to go to, the means to buy a house and the wherewithal to retire on. Needless to say, those who aspire for destinations such as Canada, United States and Australia have to satisfy stricter criteria regarding skills, qualifications and financial assets. Additionally, many Macanese consider that the lifestyle available to them in Macau out-weighs the risks and disruptions of new beginnings. For them, Macau is attractive because it is compact, less hurried, easier to obtain domestic helpers, and convenient. Many still have good jobs in Macau; even those without a job said that it is easier to survive in Macau than to be jobless in Lisbon. Lastly, some are clearly excited by living in such a dynamic region, sustained by a belief that their skills and services will still be useful in the new environment.

In what way can the study of the Macanese diaspora contribute to the field of diaspora studies?

This thesis began with the assumption, among others, that a study of the Macanese community in Macau holds implications for the field of diaspora studies. To begin with, it is widely believed that major political upheavals, such as revolutions and decolonisation, engender diasporas. Certainly the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia

dislodged many Russians to seek refuge in Vienna and Shanghai, while the withdrawal of Portugal and Britain from their African colonies in the 1960s and 1970s uprooted settler communities dispersing them to Europe and North America. Yet, as noted previously, Macau's decolonisation, in 1999, has not given rise to massive emigration from the territory — even by the Macanese community, who are widely believed to be most disadvantaged by the political change. This suggests that the conventional argument — that decolonisation gives rise to the formation of diasporas — may no longer be veracious in today's globalised environment; given adequate planning and constitutional guarantees, emigrative pressure resulting from these changes can be ameliorated.

Furthermore, from the start, this thesis holds that the Macanese community in Macau should not be studied in isolation but in conjunction with its diaspora, due to the multifarious links between the two. Such an approach represents a departure from the conventional framework, which treats the home community and its diaspora as separate entities. It runs counter to the recommendation of Wang Gungwu that overseas communities, such as the Chinese, should be studied in the context of their national environments. To do otherwise, Wang argues, may incur a charge of conflicting loyalties, which can lead to untold damage to the diaspora community itself, such as occurred in Indonesia in 1998. But my formulation — that the Macanese community in Macau should be studied in conjunction with its diaspora — recognises the indispensable role played by the Macau governments (past and present) and the institutions based in Portugal and Macau in forging and reinforcing the diaspora infrastructure. This multilateral involvement places the Macanese in a category distinctive from other diasporas of the modern era. It is a major contention of this thesis that without an appreciation of these

inter-relationships, it is impossible to gain a proper perspective of the Macanese community in Macau and elsewhere.

Moreover, the field of diaspora studies has, thus far, failed to tackle the issue of miscegenity, which is a defining feature of the Macanese community. Miscegenity challenges the traditional notion of a diasporic homeland or centre from which the members may be said to have emigrated. Essentially, the overseas Macanese communities – with partial Portuguese ethnicity – should not be considered as a sub-group of the Portuguese diaspora because that does not accord with their self-image; they see themselves as distinctive —as originating from Macau, not Portugal. The present day reality and make-up of the community clearly defy conventional analysis and the use of artificial and arbitrary criteria, such as place of birth and nationality. Accordingly, an individual approach is needed that incorporates their miscegenity, their identity and historical connectivity.

Lastly, in some literature, the Macanese are also termed Luso-Chinese. Such labeling should be avoided due to its propensity to confuse. In Portugal, there is another group of Luso-Chinese arising from the inter-marriage between the Portuguese and the local Chinese community, which hailed mostly from Mainland China. Numerically, this group of Luso-Chinese looks set to dwarf the Macanese in Portugal.² Such possibility underscores the need for caution in using the term and reinforces the argument that a specific approach is needed in order to incorporate the Macanese community's identity and historical connectedness to Macau.

² Eduardo Tomé, "The thriving Chinese community of Portugal", *MacaU*, September 2002, pp. 10-31.

Evidently, the ties between the Macanese community in Macau and its overseas communities are etched deeply within the Macanese psyche. In the post-colonial era, the international reunion of the Macanese communities has continued with sponsorship from the new regime. *Encontro IV* was convened in Macau in November 2001 and plans are underway for a fifth gathering at the end of 2004. Although the Macanese diaspora is well established, their future as distinct communities appears less certain with the passing years due to assimilation into the dominant cultures of the new countries. The diaspora Macanese will likely marry people of other ethnic backgrounds and will retain some sort of Portuguese culture provided that there is sufficient vigilance and the presence of a local Portuguese community. Moreover, the ranks of the pioneers are thinning fast and there is strong imperative to encourage the younger generation to value their history and culture. Although there are encouraging signs, what the future holds for the diaspora communities is difficult to predict.

The Outlook

In Macau, the community has a buffer in that the Basic Law obliges the government to respect their customs and cultural traditions, and to protect their rights — at least for fifty years. This suggests a continuation of government subsidies, albeit at indeterminate levels. Despite encouraging signs at this early transitional period, the socio-politico circumstances for the Macanese remain fragile due to influences from the past. In such a delicate environment, the interactions between the Macanese community in Macau and institutions based overseas, such as the Orient Foundation, must be handled with care. These institutions have legitimate reasons to operate in Macau; in a sense, their presence is indicative of Portugal's continuing support for the Macanese and Portuguese

residents there. But their activities can add to the complexities confronting the Macanese community. Specifically, the intrusion of these institutions may be misconstrued by some Chinese as a desire to cling to the past — an unwillingness to embrace the present. Caution is therefore needed, for, given the history of Western institutions in China and the chaos that followed the recent break-up of the Soviet Union, one can well understand Chinese sensitivity towards foreign influences in their territories. After all, Chinese paranoia over subversive elements from abroad helped shape the formulation of the Macau and Hong Kong Basic Laws; it continues to temper Beijing’s attitude towards the Vatican, and continues to colour the ongoing debate in Hong Kong over democratic reforms and civil liberties.³

The Macanese community ignores such official sensitivity at its peril. Being a small minority, it is dependent on the support of the Macau government for many things, including its status in society. The political system in Macau concentrates enormous power in the hands of the Chief Executive and a good rapport is necessary for the well being of the community. This includes the need for political leadership, at the Chief Executive level, to promote cultural diversity and a new Macau identity, which are important to the Macanese community. Sensing an opportunity, some Macanese are already doing this, but it is not something that they can push for on their own. Due to overhangs from the past, the wider community may dismiss any debate initiated by the Macanese as self-serving. Governmental and community leadership is therefore needed in this arena. On the surface, it appears an easy task given the guarantee of a high degree of autonomy and that Macau people are now governing Macau. However, in the patriotic

³ Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “Article 23: the Debate – Crux of the issue is how much Beijing trusts SAR”, *South*

euphoria generated by the retrocession to China, it is a task fraught with political difficulties and may take decades to accomplish. Slowly but surely, a new Macau identity is evolving and there is a contribution that the Macanese community can make. If the Macanese community can infuse the general community with their strong sense of belonging and commitment to Macau, it will represent an inestimable bequest to the society at large. Having been relegated to a lower rank, socially and politically, one cannot help but conclude that the Macau government should applaud the courage and commitment of the Macanese community, and their decision to face, with the rest of the community, the challenges of the future.

Another area where the Macanese community will need governmental support and understanding is the hurdle posed by the nationality question, which has prevented many capable Macanese from contributing to Macau at the senior political and governmental levels. It appears that the time may be opportune to make redress. Two changes may be considered: to remove the nationality requirement for appointments to the Executive Council, and to install two vice-presidents for the Legislative Assembly — one Chinese, the other Macanese. By restoring to the Macanese community some of its lost prominence, the Chief Executive will have gone a long way to salve the scar that decolonisation has inflicted on the Macanese community in general. It will also demonstrate, in a concrete way, the Administration's determination to preserve ethnic and cultural diversity in Macau. And in coming to terms with this aspect of her colonial legacy, it may underscore Macau's growing confidence and maturity within China.

While no one knows what will happen during the fifty years that have been allotted for both China and Macau to adjust to each other, in regard to the Macanese community, many expect a dilution of their ethnicity and culture —due to the process of Sinicisation and a diminution in size resulting from emigration. While this scenario is probable, the first five years of the Ho Administration has shown the error of past dire predictions for the community. With capable leaders to the fore, the demise of the community is not a foregone conclusion.

In the future, as in the past, the Macanese will continue to struggle to survive and maintain their relevance as a minority community. Their distinctiveness represents a social adhesive in the trying times ahead while their much-touted adaptability will help ease the pain of marginality. Short of another major disaster in China —on the scale of the Cultural Revolution or the xenophobic expulsion of foreigners in the wake of the Communist takeover in 1949 —the Macanese community in Macau is likely to continue to transform itself and adapt to the changing environment. It is highly likely that the transformation will occur over a long period of time, representing generations, perhaps centuries, and not decades. Under this last scenario, it is more appropriate to view the Macanese community in Macau, as an endangered —not dying —species. In offering this analysis, one hopes that the modest contribution here will trigger interest from other quarters to pay more attention – politically and academically – to this small but significant community. The Macanese merit attention because they represent the continuing legacy of a significant phenomenon in modern world history — when Europeans first settled in Asia *en masse*.

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Appendix

The *Guanxi*-based Interview Methodology

This section articulates the methodology adopted in the thesis. It has been provided in response to an examiner's comments and is an adjunct to the segment 'The Investigative Method and Process' (see pp. 54-66).

As stated in the thesis, the *guanxi* method of recruiting participants is where people will talk to you because someone they know — an intermediary — introduces you and vouches for your credentials. In this research project, the intermediaries employed included individuals, community leaders and organisations (see pp. Acknowledgements, 61, and 64). All methodologies have its strengths and weaknesses requiring a disciplined approach and this is no exception. Care should be taken with the selection of intermediaries because the recruits are likely to be sympathetic towards the viewpoint of the person or organisation that recommended them. In order to counter such bias, it is preferable to have a broad range of intermediaries/participants and to consciously seek different and opposing views including persons from outside the focus group — as I have done for this project (see pp. 58, 111). Indeed, because of such concerns, I commenced my field research in Macau with persons and organisations that were not members of the Macanese community, in particular with Gary M. C. Ngai, the Chairman of the Sino-Latin Foundation in Macau, who suggested a list of thirty persons. He also recommended that I sought the assistance of the Rotary Club of Macau, an international service organisation made up of business and professional people (see p. 64). As mentioned in the thesis, finding members of the Macanese community who were willing to be interviewed was not as difficult as first contemplated (see p. 61). Yvonne Herrero,

President of Casa de Macau in Australia, provided introductions to some of the Macanese institutions in Macau (see p. 61) and Daniel F. Castro, a friend who had ignited my interest in the community introduced me to various people in Macau and the diaspora and even sat in on some of the interviews (see Acknowledgements).¹

As the field research progressed, the participants would often recommend others whom they believed to be more knowledgeable about the topic in question. Such multiplication led one to believe that given time and opportunity, you could get to almost anyone in Macau. Over the entire project, I managed to interview more than forty persons whose selection depended largely on their availability, expertise and other considerations such as the need to use the time in the field efficiently as well as to avoid unnecessary duplication.

Moreover, before embarking on the interview program in Macau, I had accumulated a considerable amount of information concerning the Macanese community, which had been alluded to in various parts of the thesis (see pp. 4, 54, 327). Therefore the type of information I sought was rather specific —geared towards gaining insight or making a discovery. As such, the interview methodology emphasised the qualitative rather than the conventional method of a standard questionnaire aimed at extracting quantitative data. By way of illustration, consider the issue of the localisation of the Macau public service (see pp. 102-114). It was fortuitous that the publication of the book by Herbert S. Yee, *Macau In Transition* (New York: Palgrave 2001), coincided with the commencement of my project. The book contained a chapter that described the

¹ I am convinced that his presence at the interviews aided the research ensuring that the responses were authentic and enabled the interviews to be conducted at a relaxed and penetrating level.

politics of localisation and was the most detailed account published thus far but Yee's perspective on the Macanese was underdeveloped. Accordingly, through interviews, I sought to discover how the localisation program affected the Macanese community, how they responded to the options on offer from the Macau Government and the reasons for their individual choices. I pursued this investigation at various levels including with the top official responsible for the program within the former colonial government. The insights gained were threaded into various parts of the thesis (see pp. 102, 107-109, 186, 189-190, 195-197).

From the foregoing, it would be obvious that the questions would vary from one interview session to next even though a standard opening question —“What changes have you noticed since the ‘handover’ and how have the changes affected you?” —had been formulated before hand. Supplementary questions were shaped as much by the enthusiasm of the interviewee as well as his/her area of expertise. To the community leaders, a relevant question that needed to be addressed concerned the perception of fragmentary leadership and disunity (see pp. 204-210). And for the professional people, how they responded to the changes after 1999 would provide insight into their current predicament (see pp. 193-195).

The method discipline also embraced a series of repeat interviews designed to assess whether previously expressed views had been modified as well as evaluating the changes that had occurred since our last meeting. As stated in the thesis, this was an indispensable element of the investigative process due to the contemporaneity of the study (see pp. 59-60); without it, the findings would have turned out markedly different.

Another essential element of the methodology concerned the protection of the participants. The University of Western Sydney imposes strict ethics protocol on research involving human participants aimed at ensuring that their rights and interests are protected. Where possible, the interviews —in particular those involving members of the Macanese diaspora —were recorded on tape with their permission and consent, which had enabled me to quote some of them verbatim (see pp. 226, 230). However, in Macau, the participants were averse to the use of a tape recorder, reflecting the fears and uncertainties following decolonisation, which gripped the newly marginalised community fearful of recriminations if criticisms were traceable to them individually (see p. 55). Accordingly, in the text, I labored to camouflage the identity of the respondents such as the young Macanese woman who would not have volunteered the information if her identity could be uncovered (see pp. 110-111). Thankfully my university's Human Research Ethics Committee had agreed to waive the signing of consent forms for this project, which meant that only the participants would recognise who they were.

THE SURVIVAL OF AN ENDANGERED SPECIES:

The Macanese in Contemporary Macau

CANDIDATE: Barnabas Hon Mun Koo

DEGREE: Doctor of Philosophy

University of Western Sydney

Year of submission: 2004

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Statement of Authentication

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

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B. H. M. Koo

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADM	<i>Associação dos Macaenses</i> , the Macanese Association in Macau.
ANDM	<i>Associação do Novo Macau Democrático</i> , a political group in Macau.
APIM	<i>Associação Promotora da Instrução dos Macaenses</i> , Association for the Promotion of Macanese Education in Macau.
BMC-NLA	Braga Manuscript Collection, the National Library of Australia, Canberra.
CEPA	Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (between China, Hong Kong and Macau).
CNN	Cable News Network, American news service.
CODEM	<i>Convergência para o Desenvolvimento de Macau</i> , a political group in Macau.
EU	European Union
FETCPC	Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries
HKBL	Hong Kong Basic Law
HKTDC	Hong Kong Trade Development Council
IIM	<i>Instituto Internacional Macau</i> (Macau International Institute)
IPOR	<i>Instituto Português do Oriente</i> , Portuguese Institute in the Orient, Macau.
JAF	Jorge Alvares Foundation, based in Lisbon.
MBL	Macau Basic Law
MGTO	Macau Government Tourist Office
MSAR	Macau Special Administration Region
NPC	National Peoples' Congress (Beijing)
SAR	Special Administration Region
SCMP	<i>South China Morning Post</i> , Hong Kong daily.
SJM	<i>Sociedade de Jogos de Macau</i> , current casino franchisee
SPJD	Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration (1987)
STDM	<i>Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau</i> , former casino franchisee
TDM	<i>Teledifusão de Macau</i> (Channel 1, Macau TV)
TVB	Television Broadcasting Ltd., in Hong Kong.
UMA	<i>União Macaense Americana</i> , a Macanese diaspora organisation in San Francisco, USA.
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UST	University of Science and Technology, Macau.
VOC	<i>Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie</i> , Dutch East India Company.
WTO	World Trade Organisation

ABSTRACT

The decolonisation of Macau on 20 December 1999 marked a powerful transition for the small Macanese community. Prior to the transfer of sovereignty, there have been grave concerns for the survival of these miscegenic descendants of the Portuguese settlers who came to China some five hundred years ago. Many feared that there would be a mass exodus similar to that which overtook the former Portuguese colonies in Africa and East Timor, and that the Macanese future would be threatened by the process of Sinicisation — in short, that they are a dying race. This thesis examines such fears using a combination of newspaper survey, extensive fieldwork and repeat interviews. The outcome of my research shows that despite the dire prognostication, the community has survived the first five years of Chinese rule in robust form; the feared exodus did not eventuate and there has been no death to speak of — yet. Admittedly, the community has suffered diminution in more ways than one. To begin with, their numbers are down but the loss is neither qualitative nor degenerative. For complex and multifarious reasons, the power that they once held at the Executive Council and the ministerial level of government have been obliterated while their representation and influence in the Legislative Assembly have also declined. And within the public service, the localisation process has diminished their numbers. Despite this marginalisation at the levers of power, the record shows that the Macanese community remains relevant in other ways — notably in the civil service, the professions, the community service organisations and the restaurant industry. Significantly, they are perceived as an important component of cultural diversity in Macau, and while some of their institutions are floundering and undergoing revitalisation, new ones have also emerged to cater to specific needs.

In the post-colonial environment, the Constitution (Macau Basic Law) obliges the government to respect Macanese customs and cultural traditions and to protect their rights—at least for fifty years. While no one can predict what will happen during this period, some expect a further dilution of the Macanese ethnicity and culture due to the process of sinicisation and emigration. While this scenario is probable, the first five years of Chinese rule in Macau have shown the erroneousness of past dire predictions for the community. With capable leaders to the fore, the future is not a foregone conclusion. Short of another major disaster in China—on the scale and magnitude of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) or the xenophobic expulsion of foreigners in the wake of the Communist takeover (1949)—the Macanese community in Macau is likely to continue to transform itself and adapt to the changing environment. It is highly likely that the transformation will occur over a long period of time, representing generations, perhaps centuries, and not decades. Under this last scenario, it is more appropriate to view the Macanese community in Macau as an endangered—not dying—species.