

# Racial Diversity, Majority–Minority Gap, and Confidence in the Criminal Justice System<sup>1</sup>

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**Abstract:** Racial status, that is, majority/minority identity, affects an individual's confidence in the criminal justice system, and this effect could vary across social contexts. We analyzed people's confidence in the criminal justice system comparatively in 88 societies using the World Values Survey (1981–2020). Results from the hierarchical linear models showed the following patterns: (1) Racial majority members display higher confidence in the criminal justice system than minority members; (2) the majority advantage in confidence is greater when racial diversity increases; (3) the majority advantage is most salient in societies with Black or Arabic majorities. The results suggest that majority members' higher trust in order institutions is associated with perceived advantages and social comparison with minority members. Our findings reveal the profound interactive effects of racial status and context on confidence in the criminal justice system, shed light on racial diversity, and contribute new knowledge to public opinion studies.

**Keywords:** racial diversity, racial status, majority–minority gap, confidence in criminal justice system, hierarchical linear models

**Résumé:** L'appartenance raciale, soit le fait de s'identifier à la majorité ou à une minorité, influence la confiance des individus envers le système de justice pénale et son effet peut varier selon le contexte social. Nous avons comparé la confiance que les gens accordent au système de justice pénale dans 88 sociétés en nous servant des données de l'enquête mondiale sur les valeurs (World Values Survey, 1981-2020). Les résultats obtenus à partir de modèles linéaires hiérarchiques révèlent les récurrences suivantes : (1) les membres de la majorité raciale témoignent d'une confiance plus élevée envers le système de justice pénale que les membres des minorités ; (2) cet écart se creuse lorsque la diversité raciale augmente ; (3) cet écart est

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le plus marqué dans les sociétés où la majorité est noire ou arabe. Ces résultats suggèrent que la confiance plus élevée envers l'institution judiciaire des membres de la majorité est associée aux avantages perçus et à la comparaison sociale avec les membres des minorités. Notre travail révèle les effets interactifs profonds de l'origine ethnique et du contexte sur la confiance envers le système de justice pénale, éclaire d'un jour nouveau la diversité raciale et contribue à élargir les connaissances en matière d'opinion publique.

**Mots clés:** diversité raciale, appartenance raciale, écart majorité-minorité, confiance envers le système de justice pénale, modèles linéaires hiérarchiques

Race is an important factor shaping confidence in order institutions, or the criminal justice system (Weitzer and Tuch 1999; Tyler 2001; Wu and Cao 2018; Cao and Wu 2019), with impacts at multiple levels of society (Cao, Frank, and Cullen 1996; Cao and Hou 2001). At the individual level, a person's racial identity (e.g., Asian, Black, Latino, White) and racial status (racial majority or minority) could affect their experience of and confidence in the police, courts, or legislative systems (Tyler and Huo 2002; Cao 2011, 2014; Wu, Lake, and Cao 2015; Zhang, Hu, and Zhang 2020; Jiang and Zhang 2021a, 2021b). At the aggregate level, the degree of racial diversity, segregation, and social tension in society could contribute to the way people perceive the criminal justice system (King 1994; Holmes and Goodman 2010; Lee and Gibbs 2015). In a context where racial inequality is especially pronounced, and the justice system predominantly comprises certain racial or ethnic groups, it is natural to expect those belonging to other groups to have lower confidence in the criminal justice system. For instance, because of their negative experiences with law enforcement and courts, Indigenous persons and immigrants in Canada trust the criminal justice system less than other Canadians (Wortley and Owusu-Bempah 2009; Jeffries and Bond 2012; Cao 2014).

Although previous studies have identified a few individual- and societal-level predictors of confidence in order institutions, their interaction effects have earned less attention. We know there is a gap between the racial majority and the racial minority's confidence in the justice system (Tyler 2001; Tyler and Huo 2002), but we do not know the nature of the gap or how confidence varies across contexts. For example, is the majority–minority gap (alternatively, “majority premium” or “majority advantage”) greater in a Latino-majority or Arab-majority society? Does the majority premium increase (or decrease) as racial diversity goes up? These unanswered questions motivated the current study, and we hope to reveal how individual-level political trust in order institutions is situated in and affected by the social environments.

We studied the influence of racial fractionalization as an aggregate-level feature of a society on people's confidence in the criminal justice system comparatively. We asked if being a member of the racial majority versus being a member of a racial minority has different consequences for trust in order institutions. We were also curious about how this might differ across social contexts such as religions, cultures, and societies, which demands cross-national evidence. We employed all seven waves of the World Values Survey (1981–2020, hereafter WVS) and analyzed 88 different societies' attitudes to the criminal justice system. Hierarchical linear models based on the WVS data showed that racial majorities have higher confidence in the criminal justice system, consistent with previous research on political trust and public opinion research (Tyler and Huo 2002; Wilkes 2015). This majority–minority gap is moderated by two other aggregate-level factors: the degree of racial diversity and the dominant race in a society. The majority's confidence in the criminal justice system increases when racial diversity goes up, lending support to the “social comparison” argument; the

majority advantage is greater in societies where Blacks, Arabs, or southeast Asians are the racial majorities.

This study contributes to the literature on race and political trust in the following ways. First, it quantitatively assesses the roles of majority–minority status, racial diversity, and specific dominant racial groups in shaping confidence in order institutions, especially their interaction effects. This article confirms the existence of a majority premium and discovers that this premium is more salient in racially heterogeneous contexts, which implies that it results from the social comparison effects between majorities and minorities. Second, it assesses societal-level variations across 88 countries and regions, making it one of the most comprehensive comparative studies on this subject. Last, it has important implications for the field of diversity research. Though diversity has been theorized as a positive covariate of creativity, collaboration, and cultural richness (Szkudlarek et al. 2020), it could also foster social divisions and cleavages by generating social conflicts and highlighting the discrimination and disparity in political access and legal procedures (Marier and Cochran forthcoming). It alerts us to injustice and disparities accompanying the social integration process; it also reminds us of the importance of racial equality and procedural fairness for building a harmonious and tolerant social order.

### **Confidence in the criminal justice system and racial status**

Confidence in the criminal justice system often results from people's everyday experience with the police, the courts, and legislative bodies at various levels (Berthelot, McNeal, and Baldwin 2018; Roberts 2007; Van de Walle 2009). Yet individuals' experience is largely determined by their social status. Family background, class, occupation, and political status could all affect how the criminal justice system treats an individual and how that individual, in turn, perceives the fairness and legitimacy of the system. People with a relatively advantaged status are less likely to face unfair treatment and unpleasant contact with law enforcement; those who are disadvantaged are more likely to have negative experiences and outcomes, causing them to distrust the criminal justice system's procedural or substantive justice (Brooks and Jeon-Slaughter 2001; Alberton et al. 2019). An exception is education: Better educated people are often more critical of law enforcement and courts, a finding consistent with the critical citizen thesis posited by public opinion researchers (Weitzer and Tuch 1999; Jiang and Zhang 2021a, 2021b; Zhang, Sun, and Cao 2021). According to the critical citizen thesis, more education would encourage critical thinking and civic virtue, which demand that individuals criticize rather than blindly comply with and trust authorities.

In addition to the factors discussed above, racial identity (i.e., the specific racial group to which one belongs) and racial status (i.e., belonging to a racial majority or minority) are important factors in an individual's personal experience of the criminal justice system. In societies where certain racial categories are privileged, and others are discriminated against, unfair treatment is more likely among minority groups (Cao 2011; Marier and Cochran forthcoming). The encounter between minority groups and order institutions such as the police often involves more distrust, tension, and conflict (Wu, Sun, and Cao 2017). For instance, Blacks and Latinos in the United States and Indigenous persons in Canada face more racial profiling and biased trials (Reitzel, Rice, and Piquero 2004; Cao 2014). Such differences in the daily experience of the criminal justice system may produce what we call a majority–minority gap in confidence, which is our primary focus in this study.

Wu et al. (2017) formulated a conceptual framework to explain such perceptual variation between immigrants and the majority groups; they found demographic, experiential, structural, and attitudinal differences between minorities and majorities. They further distinguish these variables as group-specific variables that only affect certain groups and universal factors that all minorities may encounter. Following their theoretical classification, we argue that sometimes it is not a certain racial category that matters; instead, it is whether a person belongs to the largest racial group in the population (Wilkes and Wu 2018). A member of the racial majority is more likely to enjoy benefits in health, education, job markets, and business; this, in turn, implies higher social status, more social capital, and better access to resources and power (Bovens and Wille 2010; Wu and Cao 2018). In addition, racial majorities are usually safeguarded against the risks of victimization and prosecution (Lo, Howell, and Cheng 2013). Moreover, the criminal justice system – police officers, judges, legislators, and so on – is more likely to be composed of racial majority members (Lee and Gibbs 2015), leading to systemic bias (Cohen 2018). All the advantages enjoyed by the majority group can be referred to as a “majority premium.” This majority premium can lead to higher confidence in order institutions among majority members. Taken together, previous findings suggest racial majority members will have higher confidence in the criminal justice system, leading to our first hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1: Being a member of a racial majority is associated with higher confidence in the criminal justice system.*

### **Racial diversity, dominant race, and the majority–minority gap**

We have discussed how individual-level racial features, such as individual racial identity and status, could affect one’s perception of order institutions. When we shift to the aggregate level, there are also societal factors that could contribute to one’s attitudes. The racial context, such as racial relationships, racial diversity, and the racial composition of a society, could also affect people’s attitudes, including general social trust, political trust, and confidence in the legal system (Cao et al. 2015). Racial diversity, sometimes called racial fractionalization (Alesina et al. 2003) or racial heterogeneity (Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby 2004; Trawick and Howsen 2006), is associated with intergroup relations (Bahry et al. 2005), crime and deviance (Trawick and Howsen 2006), law enforcement (Cao et al. 1996; Cao 2011; Marier and Cochran forthcoming), and jurisdiction (Alesina et al. 2004; Cohen 2018). Although some scholars argue that diversity enriches our culture and ideas (Bohman 2006), more evidence supports the argument that diversity hurts our society in many ways: economic performance (Alesina, Harnoss, and Rapoport 2016), public goods provision (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999), intergroup relations, general social trust (Craig and Richeson 2014; Wilkes and Wu 2018), and so on.

The impacts of racial diversity on political attitudes and intergroup relations are complex and vary across contexts. A racially homogeneous society may be intolerant and unwelcoming to outgroups – the fact that there are few minority members may imply that the dominant group disapproves of minorities and immigrants. The majority group may perceive the minorities as a threat, rather than an addition to the community (Blalock 1967). As a result, racial minorities may encounter severe discrimination in such contexts (Gundelach 2014). In contrast, a racially heterogeneous society may be open-minded and have harmonious intergroup relations; the very fact that there are a large number of minority groups proves

that the mainstream society and the administrations are embracing the minority groups. If this scenario is true, we shall expect that a racially homogeneous society is in tension and struggles, while heterogeneous societies are harmonious.

However, the opposite could be true as well: Racially homogeneous societies may be at peace and with few intergroup conflicts, while societies with fractionalized and heterogeneous population may face constant conflicts. Why? Because people may feel safe when they are in an unquestionably dominant position, but rising diversity may raise challenges to that position. In one of the most impactful classics on intergroup relations, Blumer (1958) states that “the dominant group is not concerned with the subordinate group as such but it is deeply concerned with its position vis-a-vis the subordinate group” (1958: 4). Roccas and Amit (2011) also find that the majority may feel secure because their status is unchallengeable. Increasing exposure to outsiders may generate escalated competition and perceived threats, leading to intergroup hostility and racial and ethnic conflict (Blalock 1967; Liska 1992; Holmes 2000; Horowitz 2000; Craig and Richeson 2014; Van der Meer and Tolsma 2014; Marier and Cochran forthcoming). In other words, we do not know for sure whether racial homogeneity or heterogeneity is associated with political trust.

Nor do we know how the racial contextual effects would shape different groups’ political trust. We are curious as to how the cross-level interaction between macro-context (e.g., racial diversity) and micro-dynamics (e.g., racial identity) works. Previous literature has established that group status associates with subjective feelings (Blumer 1958). Racial majority members in a homogeneous society may have high political trust because they feel safe and are served well; alternatively, racial majority members in a diverse context may have higher political trust than minorities because of their relative status and a social comparison effect – in other words, they can feel their advantages by comparing themselves with others.

In which context shall we expect a higher majority premium, a racially diverse society or a homogeneous one? When will the majority perceive more advantages? The same question applies to racial minority members as well. We know that minority groups tend to perceive the daily experience of the political process and legal procedures negatively (Tyler and Huo 2002; Wu et al. 2017). However, we are unsure if their perception of unfairness goes up or down when their group size increases. Though increased group size may entail in-group trust and a feeling of security, it may provoke hostility and perceived threat among other racial or ethnic groups (Blalock 1967). We know that the link between diversity and intergroup relationships could go either way, but we are not sure when it will go up or down.

These unsolved puzzles motivated the current study. We wondered how aggregate-level racial diversity would affect confidence in the criminal justice system. Specifically, we asked how the degree of racial fractionalization would influence racial majorities and minorities differently (Staerklé et al. 2010). Previous work has noted that racial majorities tend to trust the criminal justice system more than minorities (Wu and Cao 2018). But will this majority premium change when the macro-level diversity changes? Existing work has not addressed this issue, and we hope to fill this gap.

We speculate that if the majority premium comes from the dominance of power and resources in society, we would expect this premium to be high in racially homogeneous contexts. For example, if Group A composes 99% of the national population, it may dominate

the criminal justice system and create a gap in confidence levels; when the percentage drops to 50%, Group A will no longer maintain its hegemonic role in politics and justice systems, and the majority–minority gap will decline as a result. However, we would reach the opposite conclusion if the majority premium were mainly a psychological phenomenon or a “perceived” advantage coming from social comparisons. A dominant group composing 99% of the population may not feel it enjoys any benefits, as minorities are almost invisible to it. As racial heterogeneity increases, their identity advantages become more evident and perceivable. Following this argument, Hypothesis 2 concerns possible interactions between aggregate-level racial diversity and individual-level racial status:

*Hypothesis 2: The majority advantage is moderated by aggregate-level racial diversity.*

The dominant race of a society could be another contextual factor shaping political trust and confidence in the criminal justice system. The dominant race is associated with a society’s history (frequently a colonial history), culture, norms, and religious beliefs, all of which could have a path-dependent effect (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Milligan, Andersen, and Brym 2014; Zhang 2020). Different dominant races could also have other political systems, intergroup dynamics, and state–society relations (Weitzer and Hasisi 2008; Craig, Rucker, and Richeson 2018). Otherwise stated, these macro features of society may produce different justice systems and collective mindsets. In sum, a society’s dominant race and related characteristics could affect the criminal justice system and individuals’ attitudes to it. Furthermore, due to different historical backgrounds, cultural norms, and intergroup relations, the dominant race could have a main effect on confidence in the criminal justice system; it could also moderate the differences between the racial majority and the racial minority. In other words, the majority premium in the criminal justice system for a Latino in a Latino-majority society or an Arab in an Arab-majority society could vary across contexts, leading to the third research hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 3: The majority advantage is moderated across societies dominated by different races.*

## Data and methods

### *WVS (1981–2020) and aggregate-level data*

We used data from the WVS project, which has conducted nationally representative surveys worldwide and focuses on public opinion and political and cultural attitudes. Since its first wave of surveys in 1981, the WVS project has conducted seven surveys in more than 100 countries. We selected all seven waves of data from the WVS project, comprising 429,778 observations collected from 105 countries and 295 country–year units (e.g., Ukraine-2006, Ukraine-2011, and Romania-2018). We removed countries with missing values on critical demographic information or aggregate variables and only analyzed complete observations. The final sample contained 253,768 observations from 88 countries and 188 country–year level units.

One of our research goals was to reveal the macro–micro interactions shaping trust in legal systems. We also needed aggregate-level information on countries’ economic, cultural, and political variations. We measured the aggregate-level information by each country–year observation for the time-varying variables. We used GDP per capita to measure a society’s


economic development and affluence. The data for GDP per capita in our analysis came from the World Bank with purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted. The numbers are in constant 2017 international dollars<sup>2</sup> and are thus appropriate for comparisons across periods and places. Another measure was the Gini coefficient to tap the national degree of economic inequality; we took this from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID, version 7) collected by Solt (2016).

For cultural backgrounds, we built a classification system following the typology of Samuel Huntington (1993) and Shalom Schwartz (2006). The typology has seven categories representing cultural traditions and dominant religions: Western Europe and North America; Catholic/Latin America; Orthodox/Eastern Europe and Russia; Islamic/Middle East and North Africa; sub-Saharan Africa; India/South Asia; Confucian/East and Southeast Asia. To ensure that we controlled for enough contextual-level information, we considered the political features of each country: political freedom (Repucci 2020), the experience of communist rule, and the durability of a polity. The regression analysis did not show the significant relevance of these factors, and we decided to exclude them in the final models and reports.<sup>3</sup>

#### *Confidence in the criminal justice system: Outcome variable*

Scholars have proposed many ways to measure confidence in the criminal justice system (Cao, Lai, and Zhao 2012; Ewanation et al. 2019). Most existing measurements are constructed based on degrees of confidence and composed of trust in different aspects or institutions in the legal system. The most well-studied component of order institutions is the police system (Cao et al. 2015), which is at the center of people's daily experience and perceptions of the order institutions. Other commonly studied components include the legislature and the courts. Following such practice and considering the data availability, we selected the following items from the WVS data: (1) confidence in the police system, (2) confidence in courts, and (3) confidence in legislatures.<sup>4</sup> We use them to build a comprehensive measure of trust in order institutions; it taps people's perception not only of the police but also of other critical order institutions. For all three variables, respondents could give four responses, labeled and recoded in the following ways: I have "a great deal of confidence" (= 100), "quite a lot of confidence" (= 67), "not very much confidence" (= 33), and "not at all confident" (= 0) in the corresponding agency. We took the average of the three variables to get a 0–100 scale of overall confidence in the criminal justice system, with higher values representing more confidence.

To ensure that the items are conceptually and statistically related, we computed Cronbach's alpha for the entire WVS sample, the subsamples within each country, and all country–year observations. The items listed above showed high internal consistency for all the samples (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.83$ ), ensuring the validity and cross-context comparability of a grand measure composed of the items. The details of the coding and distributions are in Table 1, along with the descriptive statistics of the variables. We can see that people's average confidence is 48.31 out of 100, and the standard deviation is 25.82. This indicates that worldwide confidence in order institutions is at a moderate level, and individuals from various positions have quite different perceptions. This variation urges our further investigation and explanation. Racial diversity and confidence in the criminal justice system of the countries surveyed are plotted on a coloured map in Figure 1. The figure shows the global patterns of the predictor and outcome variables.



**Figure 1:** Racial diversity and confidence in the criminal justice system in 88 societies, WVS data  
*Note:* Data are from the 88 WVS-surveyed societies in the HLM models; average values are reported for the cases surveyed for more than once.



**Table 1: Descriptive statistics of individual-level variables (frequency and percentages for categorical; mean and SD for continuous; employed observations only)**

	Summary
Wave (%)	
1	6,663 (2.63%)
2	9,854 (3.88%)
3	43,137 (17.00%)
4	35,096 (13.83%)
5	53,464 (21.07%)
6	69,316 (27.31%)
7	36,238 (14.28%)
Gender	
Female	129,873 (51.18%)
Male = 1 (%)	123,895 (48.82%)
Age (15–103)	40.80 (16.20)
Marital status	
Never married (reference group)	65,910 (25.97%)
Married/cohabiting	159,498 (62.85%)
Divorced/separated/widowed	28,360 (11.18%)
Level of education	
None (reference group)	18,204 (7.17%)
Elementary school	49,831 (19.64%)
Junior high school	67,089 (26.44%)
Senior high school	70,193 (27.66%)
College or above	48,451 (19.09%)
Race	
White (reference group)	108,482 (42.75%)
Black	39,738 (15.66%)
South Asian	13,537 (5.33%)
East Asian	25,818 (10.17%)

	Summary
Arabic	28,872 (11.38%)
Southeast Asian	15,512 (6.11%)
Other	21,809 (8.59%)
Racial status	
Racial minority	31,408 (12.38%)
Racial majority	222,360 (87.62%)
Dependent variable (0–100)	
Confidence in the criminal justice system	48.31 (25.82)
No. of observations	253768

### Individual-level predictors

The following variables were controlled for in the data analysis, as they are either important demographics or possible correlates with confidence in the criminal justice system: gender, age, marital status, and level of education (Cao et al. 1996; Federico and Holmes 2005; Cao 2011; Ren et al. 2005; Jiang et al. 2021b). Age was a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 99; the other variables were all categorical variables converted to dummy variables. A few focal predictors were related to race, which need more attention. The first was racial status at the individual level; this variable was dichotomous, that is, whether the respondent belonged to a racial majority (= 1) or not (= 0). The second was the dominant racial category in a society's population; it included the following categories according to the WVS codebook: (1) white (reference group); (2) black; (3) South Asian; (4) East Asian; (5) Arabic; (6) Southeast Asian; and (7) other groups. Finally, we generated an aggregate-level variable from the individual-level racial identity information: the degree of racial diversity or the racial fractionalization index (RFI). RFI was calculated using the formula proposed by Alesina et al. (2003):

$$RFI_j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^N S_{ij}^2.$$

In this formula, “ $S_{ij}$  is the share of group  $i$  ( $i = 1, \dots, N$ ) in country  $j$ ” (Alesina et al. 2003: 159). In other words, the index was calculated by subtracting the sum of the squares of racial groups' population proportion from 1. The theoretical range of RFI is from 0 to the limit of 1; a country where all respondents belong to the same religion would have an RFI index of 0, showing complete racial homogeneity. When the RFI gets closer to 1, it shows that the country is of high racial heterogeneity and there is no dominant racial group. In sum, with racial majority/minority status and RFI, we could examine whether being a majority (or minority) member affects confidence in the justice system and if this relationship varies in different racial contexts.

Modelling strategy

We employed hierarchical linear modelling (HLM) to capture individual- and aggregate-level effects. Our HLM models used a three-level design: Individuals were nested within each country-year observation; each country-year observation was nested within each country. This design allowed both constant (e.g., cultural zone) and time-varying (e.g., GDP per capita, Gini coefficient) aggregate-level information to be considered in the models. We began with a baseline model, Model 1, with all individual-level predictors included. Model 1 contained only the fixed effects of predictors with random intercepts. Model 2 added the random effects of racial majority status at the country-year level (Level 2). Both models tested Hypotheses 1 and 2. To test Hypothesis 3 on interaction effects, Model 3 included the interaction term between RFI and racial majority status. Finally, Model 4 introduced all aggregate-level predictors to see if previous results would change after controlling these macro factors. For all the models, we included the fixed effects of the wave of surveys.<sup>5</sup> The modelling strategy can be summarized as follows:

- Model 1: Individual Predictors + Racial Status + Dominant Race + RFI. (H1)
- Model 2: Model 1 + Racial Status × RFI. (H2)
- Model 3: Model 1 + Racial Status × Dominant Race. (H3)
- Model 4: Model 1 + Racial Status × RFI + Racial Status × Dominant Race.

Results

Our HLM modelling results are displayed in Table 2. First, we find some patterns that remain stable in all models. Consistent with previous works (Ren et al. 2005), aging is associated with higher trust in the criminal justice system. Males, on the average, have somewhat lower trust than females. However, neither age nor gender has an impressive effect. Education, according to previous work, has a “critical citizen” or “informed citizen” effect on people, which may result in less political trust (Zhang et al. 2020; Jiang and Zhang

Table 2: Multilevel models predicting political trust (standard errors in parentheses)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	49.48 (6.40)***	52.14 (6.41)***	51.69 (6.40)***	54.23 (6.41)***
Individual-level predictors				
Male (female = 0)	-0.53 (0.09)***	-0.53 (0.09)***	-0.55 (0.09)***	-0.55 (0.09)***
Age (15–103)	0.05 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.00)***
Marital status (never married = 0)				
Married_Cohab	0.26 (0.12)*	0.26 (0.12)*	0.35 (0.12)**	0.34 (0.12)**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Divorce_Sep_ Widowed	-0.61 (0.19)**	-0.62 (0.19)**	-0.53 (0.19)**	-0.54 (0.19)**
Levels of education (no education = 0)				
Elementary school	-1.87 (0.20)***	-1.86 (0.20)***	-1.71 (0.20)***	-1.70 (0.20)***
Junior high school	-2.81 (0.20)***	-2.79 (0.20)***	-2.60 (0.20)***	-2.60 (0.20)***
Senior high school	-3.04 (0.20)***	-3.03 (0.20)***	-2.71 (0.21)***	-2.73 (0.21)***
College and above	-3.41 (0.22)***	-3.41 (0.22)***	-3.06 (0.22)***	-3.09 (0.22)***
Racial status (minority = 0)				
Racial majority member	2.45 (0.16)***	-0.26 (0.41)	0.01 (0.24)	-2.51 (0.45)***
Aggregate-level predictors				
Dominant race in society (White = 0)				
Black	2.71 (2.93)	2.70 (2.93)	-4.08 (2.96)	-3.88 (2.96)
South Asian	-0.95 (3.93)	-0.69 (3.92)	-1.06 (3.96)	0.02 (3.96)
East Asian	4.70 (3.86)	4.67 (3.86)	5.18 (3.91)	4.68 (3.92)
Arabic	2.82 (2.78)	2.85 (2.78)	-1.95 (2.84)	-2.14 (2.84)
Southeast Asian	14.04 (4.34)**	14.12 (4.34)**	10.93 (4.40)*	10.96 (4.40)*
Other	-1.73 (3.00)	-1.82 (2.99)	-1.65 (3.04)	-1.49 (3.04)
RFI (racial fractionalization index, 0–1)	9.68 (4.46)*	3.69 (4.54)	9.49 (4.48)*	3.52 (4.56)
GDP per capita (in \$1000)	0.28 (1.02)	0.28 (1.02)	0.46 (1.03)	0.45 (1.03)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Gini coefficient (0–100)	-0.28 (0.15)	-0.29 (0.15)	-0.31 (0.15)*	-0.32 (0.15)*
Freedom House index (1–7)	1.03 (0.63)	1.05 (0.63)	1.04 (0.64)	1.06 (0.64)
Interaction effects				
Racial majority member × RFI		6.84 (0.96)***		6.78 (1.01)***
Racial majority member × dominant race				
Majority × Black			9.41 (0.43)***	9.10 (0.43)***
Majority × SouthAsian			0.47 (0.62)	-0.71 (0.64)
Majority × EastAsian			-0.21 (0.83)	0.25 (0.83)
Majority × Arabic			5.37 (0.59)***	5.55 (0.59)***
Majority × SEA			3.90 (0.87)***	3.87 (0.87)***
Majority × Other			-0.39 (0.49)	-0.70 (0.49)
AIC	2308352.22	2308303.11	2307776.92	<b>2307733.57</b>
BIC	2308592.44	2308553.77	2308079.80	<b>2308046.89</b>
Log likelihood	-1154153.11	-1154127.55	-1153859.46	<b>-1153836.78</b>
No. observations	253768	253768	253768	253768
No. groups: CY: country	188	188	188	188
No. groups: country	88	88	88	88
Var: CY:country (intercept)	35.40	35.30	36.44	36.24
Var: country (intercept)	85.70	85.84	82.51	83.07
Var: residual	520.27	520.17	519.07	518.97

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ .


2021a). Our results support that argument: From no or little education to college level, confidence in the criminal justice system gradually declines, and all differences are significant at the  $< 0.001$  level.

Model 1 of the effects of the focal predictors shows that Hypothesis 1 is supported: Those belonging to a racial majority have higher confidence in the criminal justice system by 2.45 points ( $p < 0.01$ ). In terms of the aggregate-level racial factors, several findings stand out. Out of all racial contexts, people's confidence in criminal justice is highest in Southeast Asian majority societies. Societies dominated by other racial categories do not show significant variation in overall trust in the criminal justice system. RFI shows a positive effect on the level of trust; from a completely homogeneous society (RFI = 0) to a completely heterogeneous society (RFI = 1), the difference in confidence is 9.68 points ( $p < 0.05$ ). Other aggregate-level controls, such as GDP per capita, Gini coefficient, and the Freedom House Index, do not have significant effects. Model 2 tested Hypothesis 2 by including the interaction term between individual majority status and RFI. While most previous effects stay the same, the interaction term is significant and positive (6.84,  $p < 0.001$ ). This supports Hypothesis 2 that macro-level racial diversity moderates the majority advantage in confidence; the majority advantage is greater in a racially heterogeneous society than in a racially homogeneous society. Model 3 included the interaction term of racial majority status and the dominant race in each society. Here, a more interesting pattern emerges: In Black-majority societies, Arab-majority societies, and Southeast Asian-majority societies, racial majority members show higher confidence in the criminal justice system.

Finally, we took the interactions from Model 2 and Model 3 and included both effects in the same model, Model 4. Model 4 aimed at examining whether findings in Model 2 and Model 3 would cancel, complement, or complicate each other. The previously discovered patterns remain the same; the effects of racial majority status, racial diversity, and dominant race do not disappear when we control for more terms. The AIC, BIC, and log-likelihood information criteria show that Model 4 is the best fit. Therefore, we used Model 4 as the final model and plotted the effects in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Figure 2 shows that racial majorities and racial minorities have clear differences: Most of the time, racial majority members have higher confidence in criminal justice; that difference is invisible when RFI is close to 0 (racial diversity is low), and when RFI goes up, the majority–minority gap increases and is as high as 4.5 points on a 0–100 scale. In other words, diversity highlights the majority group's advantage over minority groups. Figure 3 reveals another cross-context variation: The majority advantage is highest in Arab- and Black-dominated societies. This may imply a criminal justice system favouring the racial majority or the perception of unfairness among minority members.

## Discussion and conclusion

The relationship between race and the justice system is a topic of long-standing interest for scholars in sociology, criminology, and political science. We approached this topic by examining several individual- and aggregate-level racial factors: individual racial status (i.e., majority vs. minority), racial diversity, and the dominant racial group in society. Following Blumer's theory of group status and perceptions (1958), we seek to examine the majority–minority effects on political trust and answer the following questions: Will a majority member differ from a minority member in perception of the criminal justice system? Will that gap be more pronounced in certain contexts if there is a majority-minority gap? If so, what are those contextual factors?




**Figure 2:** Confidence in the criminal justice system, predicted by racial fractionalization index (RFI, 0–1) and individual racial status

*Note:* 95% confidence intervals reported, based on estimates from Model 4

We speculated that racial majorities would have more confidence in order institutions than racial minorities. We further expected that this majority–minority gap (or majority premium) would vary in societies with different degrees of racial heterogeneity and be dominated by different racial categories. To test these hypotheses, we employed the WVS 1981–2020 data and compared the attitudes to criminal justice systems in 88 societies. Our hierarchical linear modelling results support our speculations: (1) Racial majorities on the average show a higher confidence level; (2) the majority–minority gap is greater in diverse societies; and (3) the majority–minority gap is greater in societies where Blacks, Arabs, or Southeast Asians are dominant groups.

This study makes the following contributions to existing studies of race and perceptions of the criminal justice system. First, it confirms previous findings of majority advantage with global evidence. Our research scope included 88 societies with various economic



**Figure 3:** Confidence in the criminal justice system, predicted by dominant racial group in society and individual racial status

Note: 95% confidence intervals reported, based on estimates from Model 4.

development levels, cultural backgrounds, and political environments, thus adding to our confidence in the racial majority premium thesis. The study also suggests the cross-cultural differences in this advantage by showing how societies dominated by different racial groups generate different confidence gaps.

Second, the study reveals the interaction effects between individual racial status and macro-level racial patterns in a society in shaping political trust. Consistent with previous findings, our results show that individuals’ specific racial identities and status could affect their social situations and power relations concerning state apparatuses. These, in turn, contribute to their experiences when encountering law enforcement and legal processes. Our results remind us that the racial environment also affects how individual-level processes work on political attitudes at the macro level. An equal society could minimize the minority’s disadvantages while the majority premium was consolidated and enhanced in certain contexts. The link between individual racial identity and perception of justice highlights the importance of promoting racial equality and may explain why ethnic conflicts are intense in certain environments.



Third, our finding of an interaction between racial diversity and the racial majority premium is intriguing. Conventional wisdom says that when diversity is low (i.e., the predominant group accounts for a higher proportion of the population), the majority advantage will be high. However, we find the opposite to be true: When diversity is higher, the majority–minority gap in confidence in the legal system becomes wider. This suggests that the majority premium is a social psychological phenomenon, namely a social comparison effect. The gap in political trust is not about the actual advantage that the majority group enjoys; instead, it is a perceived advantage. When majorities see minorities (i.e., the group is large enough to be visible) and have direct experience and first-hand knowledge of the differences in daily contact with the legal systems, they recognize their privileges and appreciate the corresponding order institutions they encounter (e.g., courts, police).

There are several limitations to note in this paper. First, the research is based on repeated cross-sectional data without a panel design. Therefore, our findings lack a temporal scope to reveal how confidence changes when racial composition changes (Howell and Korver-Glenn 2021). Future work could add a dynamic perspective to see how social environments and individuals coevolve and determine the causal directions in the mechanisms. Second, we did not take the intersectional of race and other dimensions into account; for instance, the intersections of race and gender or race and social class could complicate the patterns of individuals' experience and perception of the criminal justice system. Third, we examined how individuals are embedded in a macro-social context; future work could consider how meso and micro levels, such as a neighbourhood's racial composition, affect an individual's attitudes. In sum, the relationship between race and confidence in the criminal justice system is an important theme worth approaching from more angles.

Our paper has important implications for criminal justice and political trust in Canada. A country famous for its commitment to multiculturalism, Canada is composed of a diverse population and is continuing to diversify. As of now, around 40% of the residents are first- and second-generation immigrants, according to Statistics Canada (2022). The diversity is reflected not only in place of birth but also in language, religious belief, ethnic group, and race. Canadian society has long been scrutinized for its ethnic and racial politics, especially the interactions between the Indigenous peoples (First Nations, Métis, Inuit) and law enforcement (Wortley and Owusu-Bempah 2009; Cao 2011, 2014; Jeffries and Bond 2012). Our findings suggest that the majority premium may increase as society diversifies – a demographic pattern we expect to see in Canada. However, it is also possible that when there is no predominant group in the population, the trends in political trust will differ from what we anticipate here.

We suggest that future research could further our understanding of what “majority” means. For example, what are the implications when a highly diverse society lacks a “majority” group? Would extremely heterogeneous societies be immune to political distrust and intergroup conflict when there was no single predominant group? Or will they suffer more from a lack of consensus and social solidarity? These questions need our attention. Our paper also has general implications for research on confidence in order institutions. As Cao and Wu (2019) noted, the key to solving unequal political trust in order institutions lies in procedural justice and perceived fairness rather than in the status of a specific racial group. To better explain the source of political trust and distrust, we need to assess not only the

individual-level characteristics but also the social and institutional environment for a more comprehensive picture.

## Notes

- 1 The authors contributed to this article equally. The authors declare no conflict of interest. The authors would like to thank the editorial office and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and help in the peer-review process.
- 2 See World Bank (2021).
- 3 Detailed aggregate-level information is available upon request.
- 4 The corresponding variable names in the WVS data are E069\_06\_02, E069\_06\_17, and E069\_06\_07.
- 5 We omitted the corresponding estimates considering the length of the article and the fact that they are not of research interests and significance.

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