| Status | 已發表Published |
| Disincentives for Risk-Taking in Mortgage and Other Financial Markets: Adjusting Management Remunerations | |
Lai, R.N. ; Van Order, R.A.
| |
| 2014 | |
| Source Publication | 49th AREUEA Annual Conference
 |
| Abstract | Guaranteed Financial Institutions can structure portfolios with imbedded options to take on excessive risk without paying for it. This provides an incentive to take on higher risk. This paper proposes variants on Contingent Convertible (CoCo) bonds to be mandatorily included in the management remuneration package as a disincentive to taking higher risk. We show how the conversion ratios of the CoCo bonds can affect managers' appetite towards risk-taking and how incentives can be set up to have management make choices consistent with those made under efficient pricing. |
| Keyword | Financial Institutions Contingent Convertible Bonds Management Incentives Risk-Taking Dodd-Frank Act |
| Language | 英語English |
| The Source to Article | PB_Publication |
| PUB ID | 13183 |
| Document Type | Conference paper |
| Collection | HONOURS COLLEGE |
| Corresponding Author | Van Order, R.A. |
| Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Lai, R.N.,Van Order, R.A.. Disincentives for Risk-Taking in Mortgage and Other Financial Markets: Adjusting Management Remunerations[C], 2014. |
| APA | Lai, R.N.., & Van Order, R.A. (2014). Disincentives for Risk-Taking in Mortgage and Other Financial Markets: Adjusting Management Remunerations. 49th AREUEA Annual Conference. |
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