| Status | 已發表Published |
| The mixed Blessing of Psychological Explanations | |
Dolcini, N. 
| |
| 2015-10-01 | |
| Source Publication | Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e psicologia / International Journal of Philosophy and psychology
 |
| ISSN | 2039-4667 |
| Pages | 335-340 |
| Abstract | After the recent “cognitive turn” it is commonly assumed that the domain of the cognitive is much broader than the domain of the linguistic. Consequently, the quickly decreasing appeal of “linguistic idealism” is now totally clouded by the view that language is not necessary for thought. I here highlight how the target paper is fully attuned to this mainstream view, which originally and fundamentally rejects any linguistic idealist claim. Furthermore, I propose a new formulation of an “old” methodological concern about psychological explanations, which potentially challenges the efficacy of any argumentative strategy hinging on higher order cognitive capacities. |
| Keyword | psychological Explanation Morgan's Canon Cognitive Turn Mentalizing Non-linguistic Thought |
| Language | 英語English |
| The Source to Article | PB_Publication |
| PUB ID | 16050 |
| Document Type | Journal article |
| Collection | DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES Faculty of Arts and Humanities |
| Corresponding Author | Dolcini, N. |
| Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Dolcini, N.. The mixed Blessing of Psychological Explanations[J]. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e psicologia / International Journal of Philosophy and psychology, 2015, 335-340. |
| APA | Dolcini, N..(2015). The mixed Blessing of Psychological Explanations. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e psicologia / International Journal of Philosophy and psychology, 335-340. |
| MLA | Dolcini, N.."The mixed Blessing of Psychological Explanations".Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e psicologia / International Journal of Philosophy and psychology (2015):335-340. |
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