| Status | 已發表Published |
| Equilibrium in the Symmetric Two-Player Hirshleifer Contest: Uniqueness and Characterization | |
Ewerhart, C; Sun, G. Z.
| |
| 2018-08-01 | |
| Source Publication | Economics Letters
 |
| ISSN | 0165-1765 |
| Pages | 51-54 |
| Abstract | The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent. |
| Keyword | Contests Mixed-strategy equilibrium Rent dissipation Uniqueness |
| Language | 英語English |
| The Source to Article | PB_Publication |
| PUB ID | 40087 |
| Document Type | Journal article |
| Collection | DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS |
| Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Ewerhart, C,Sun, G. Z.. Equilibrium in the Symmetric Two-Player Hirshleifer Contest: Uniqueness and Characterization[J]. Economics Letters, 2018, 51-54. |
| APA | Ewerhart, C., & Sun, G. Z. (2018). Equilibrium in the Symmetric Two-Player Hirshleifer Contest: Uniqueness and Characterization. Economics Letters, 51-54. |
| MLA | Ewerhart, C,et al."Equilibrium in the Symmetric Two-Player Hirshleifer Contest: Uniqueness and Characterization".Economics Letters (2018):51-54. |
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