Residential College | false |
Status | 已發表Published |
SoK: Decentralized Finance (DeFi) Attacks | |
Zhou, Liyi1,2; Xiong, Xihan1; Ernstberger, Jens2,3; Chaliasos, Stefanos1; Wang, Zhipeng1; Wang, Ye4; Qin, Kaihua1,2; Wattenhofer, Roger5; Song, Dawn2,6; Gervais, Arthur2,7 | |
2023-07-21 | |
Conference Name | IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy |
Source Publication | Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy |
Volume | 2023-May |
Pages | 2444-2461 |
Conference Date | 21-25 May 2023 |
Conference Place | San Francisco |
Country | USA |
Publisher | IEEE |
Abstract | Within just four years, the blockchain-based Decentralized Finance (DeFi) ecosystem has accumulated a peak total value locked (TVL) of more than 253 billion USD. This surge in DeFi's popularity has, unfortunately, been accompanied by many impactful incidents. According to our data, users, liquidity providers, speculators, and protocol operators suffered a total loss of at least 3.24 billion USD from Apr 30, 2018 to Apr 30, 2022. Given the blockchain's transparency and increasing incident frequency, two questions arise: How can we systematically measure, evaluate, and compare DeFi incidents? How can we learn from past attacks to strengthen DeFi security?In this paper, we introduce a common reference frame to systematically evaluate and compare DeFi incidents, including both attacks and accidents. We investigate 77 academic papers, 30 audit reports, and 181 real-world incidents. Our data reveals several gaps between academia and the practitioners' community. For example, few academic papers address "price oracle attacks"and "permissonless interactions", while our data suggests that they are the two most frequent incident types (15% and 10.5% correspondingly). We also investigate potential defenses, and find that: (i) 103 (56%) of the attacks are not executed atomically, granting a rescue time frame for defenders; (ii) bytecode similarity analysis can at least detect 31 vulnerable/23 adversarial contracts; and (iii) 33 (15.3%) of the adversaries leak potentially identifiable information by interacting with centralized exchanges. |
Keyword | Model Fit |
DOI | 10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179435 |
URL | View the original |
Indexed By | CPCI-S |
Language | 英語English |
WOS Research Area | Computer Science |
WOS Subject | Computer Science, Information Systems ; Computer Science, Theory & Methods |
WOS ID | WOS:001035501502028 |
Scopus ID | 2-s2.0-85166486256 |
Fulltext Access | |
Citation statistics | |
Document Type | Conference paper |
Collection | DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SCIENCE |
Corresponding Author | Zhou, Liyi |
Affiliation | 1.Imperial College London, United Kingdom 2.Berkeley Center for Responsible, Decentralized Intelligence (RDI), United States 3.Technical University of Munich, Switzerland 4.University of Macau, Macao 5.ETH Zurich, Switzerland 6.University of California, Berkeley, United States 7.University College London, United Kingdom |
Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Zhou, Liyi,Xiong, Xihan,Ernstberger, Jens,et al. SoK: Decentralized Finance (DeFi) Attacks[C]:IEEE, 2023, 2444-2461. |
APA | Zhou, Liyi., Xiong, Xihan., Ernstberger, Jens., Chaliasos, Stefanos., Wang, Zhipeng., Wang, Ye., Qin, Kaihua., Wattenhofer, Roger., Song, Dawn., & Gervais, Arthur (2023). SoK: Decentralized Finance (DeFi) Attacks. Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2023-May, 2444-2461. |
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