This article argues in favor of the recognition of biometric harm, i.e. a specific type of harm arising from the use of biometrics to identify and classify people. Biometric technologies have raised in importance, and pervasiveness. And, while the development of biometric systems is rapidly advancing, their potential negative implications for individuals and society are routinely dismissed, or willingly ignored. However, biometrics deeply affect some of the basic needs of humans: the need to step out of one’s social identities to enjoy unobserved time, and to self-represent oneself in all social relationships. Such necessities are preserved by the legal system via high-ranked provisions that protect personhood, dignity, the rights to private life, and to express one’s personality. Because of these negative effects on core human necessities and legal values, biometric identification should be considered harmful, unless justified by another equally fundamental legal value. In line with other restrictions of the involved fundamental values, necessity, and law enforcement purposes may justify biometric identification. Conversely, consent, while essential, does not fulfill the requirements of a stand-alone justification for biometric harm.