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The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
INACIO GUERBEROFF LANARI BO; Rustamdjan Hakimov
2022-09
Source PublicationGames and Economic Behavior
ABS Journal Level3
ISSN0899-8256
Volume135Pages:411-433
AbstractLately, there has been an increase in the use of sequential mechanisms, instead of the traditional direct counterparts, in college admissions in many countries, including Germany, Brazil, and China. We describe these mechanisms and identify their shortcomings in terms of incentives and outcome properties. We introduce a new mechanism, which improves upon these shortcomings. Unlike direct mechanisms, which ask students for a full preference ranking over colleges, our mechanism asks students to sequentially make choices or submit partial rankings from sets of colleges. These are used to produce a tentative allocation at each step. If at some point it is determined that a student can no longer be accepted into previous choice, then she is asked to make another choice among colleges that would tentatively accept her. Participants following the simple strategy of choosing the most-preferred college in each step is an ex-post equilibrium that yields the Student-Optimal Stable Matching.
KeywordMarket Design Matching Sequential Mechanisms College Admissions
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.07.001
URLView the original
Language英語English
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Document TypeJournal article
CollectionDEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
Corresponding AuthorINACIO GUERBEROFF LANARI BO
Affiliation1.Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
2.University of Lausanne and WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Recommended Citation
GB/T 7714
INACIO GUERBEROFF LANARI BO,Rustamdjan Hakimov. The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism[J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, 135, 411-433.
APA INACIO GUERBEROFF LANARI BO., & Rustamdjan Hakimov (2022). The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism. Games and Economic Behavior, 135, 411-433.
MLA INACIO GUERBEROFF LANARI BO,et al."The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism".Games and Economic Behavior 135(2022):411-433.
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