Defeaters for Privileged Access?

UM > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES

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Status	已發表Published
	Defeaters for Privileged Access?
	BENJAMIN IAN WINOKUR
	2024-02
Size of Audience	12
Type of Speaker	Invited Lecturer
Abstract	Can you lose self-knowledge by coming to rationally (albeit falsely) doubt your possession of it? If so, and if such doubts are easy enough to come by, we may need to temper our confidence in the idea that rational agents typically possess especially secure (“privileged”) knowledge of their own mental states. I address this skeptical concern by examining the possibility that rational agents can lose self-knowledge whenever they worry, with epistemic warrant, that they have been self-deceived (even if they have not actually been self-deceived, and even if self-deception does not actually involve falsely ascribing mental states to oneself). If such possibilities do not really get a grip on us, or if we do not really face such possibilities with any notable frequency, we need to understand why not. To this end I pursue two arguments. First, I argue that skepticism about one’s self-knowledge might fail to get a grip in virtue of distinctive features of a rational agent’s first-person perspective, this being the perspective from which a great deal of putatively privileged self-knowledge is ordinarily possessed. Second, I argue that self-knowledge may be privileged in the sense of being especially easily recuperated after being eroded through self-doubt, even if it is not especially invulnerable to being eroded by self-doubt.
Keyword	Self-knowledge Privileged Access Self-deception Epistemic Defeat
Conference Date	February 29th, 2024
Conference Place	University of Connecticut (Online)
Document Type	Presentation
Collection	DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES
Affiliation	University of Macau
First Author Affilication	University of Macau
Recommended Citation GB/T 7714	BENJAMIN IAN WINOKUR. Defeaters for Privileged Access?, February 29th, 2024.

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