| Residential College | false |
| Status | 已發表Published |
| Extended Mentality and Ascriptive Authority | |
BENJAMIN IAN WINOKUR
| |
| 2024-04 | |
| Size of Audience | 30 |
| Type of Speaker | Invited Lecturer |
| Abstract | Self-ascriptions of one’s current mental states often enjoy a distinctively strong presumption of truth. Some philosophers claim that this ascriptive authority is non-transferable in the sense that it cannot be matched or surpassed by anyone else. In this paper I examine this non-transferability claim in the light of potential extended mentality cases. These cases threaten to show that popular accounts of ascriptive authority do not vindicate its alleged non-transferability. However, I also argue that a less popular account of ascriptive authority can do so. |
| Keyword | First-person Authority Self-knowledge Extended Mentality Extended Cognition |
| Conference Date | April 26th, 2024 |
| Conference Place | Ashoka University |
| Funding Project | Knowing and Expressing Ourselves |
| Document Type | Presentation |
| Collection | DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES |
| Affiliation | University of Macau |
| First Author Affilication | University of Macau |
| Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | BENJAMIN IAN WINOKUR. Extended Mentality and Ascriptive Authority, April 26th, 2024. |
| Files in This Item: | There are no files associated with this item. | |||||
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