Residential College | false |
Status | 已發表Published |
Leader versus lagger: How the timing of financial reports affects audit quality and investment efficiency | |
Liu, Nanqin1; Zhang, Xiao Jun2 | |
2024-09 | |
Source Publication | Contemporary Accounting Research |
ABS Journal Level | 4 |
ISSN | 0823-9150 |
Abstract | This paper examines how relative timing affects the quality of financial reports in a staggered reporting system in which some firms report earlier than others. We show that the audit quality of the leading firm exceeds that of the lagger. Investment efficiency also differs systematically across firms, depending on the relative reporting timing as well as the audit market structure. Audit regulations mitigate the misalignment of interests between auditors and investors but limit the effect of information spillovers. We characterize the socially optimal auditing standards and show how and why imposing minimum audit quality requirements complements and/or substitutes for adjusting auditors' legal liability. Overall, we show that a staggered reporting system dominates a simultaneous reporting system in enhancing audit quality and investment efficiency through regulation. |
Other Abstract | Résumé Cet article étudie l’impact du calendrier de production desétats financiers sur la qualité de l’audit au sein d’unsystème de divulgation échelonnée où certaines entreprisespublient leurs rapports plus tôt que d’autres. Les auteursdémontrent que la qualité de l’audit est supérieure pour lesentreprises publiant plus tôt comparativement à cellespubliant plus tard. De plus, l’efficacité de l’investissement varie de manière systématique entre les entreprises enfonction du calendrier de divulgation et de la structure dumarché de l’audit. Les règlementations en matière d’auditcontribuent à aligner les intérêts des auditeurs et desinvestisseurs, mais limitent l’effet de la diffusion del’information. Les auteurs définissent les normes d’auditsocialement optimales et expliquent comment l’impositiond’exigences minimales en matière de qualité de l’audit estun complément ou un substitut à l’ajustement du niveaude responsabilité juridique des auditeurs. Dans l’ensemble,les auteurs montrent que le système de divulgationéchelonnée est plus efficace que le système de divulgationsimultanée pour améliorer la qualité de l’audit etl’efficacité de l’investissement grâce à la règlementation. |
Keyword | Audit Quality Audit Regulation Financial Externalities Financial Reporting Timing Investment Efficiency |
DOI | 10.1111/1911-3846.12967 |
URL | View the original |
Indexed By | SSCI |
Language | 英語English |
WOS Research Area | Business & Economics |
WOS Subject | Business, Finance |
WOS ID | WOS:001314929800001 |
Publisher | WILEY, 111 RIVER ST, HOBOKEN 07030-5774, NJ |
Scopus ID | 2-s2.0-85204206602 |
Fulltext Access | |
Citation statistics | |
Document Type | Journal article |
Collection | Faculty of Business Administration DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT |
Corresponding Author | Zhang, Xiao Jun |
Affiliation | 1.Department of Accounting and Information Management, University of Macau, Macao 2.Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, United States |
First Author Affilication | University of Macau |
Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Liu, Nanqin,Zhang, Xiao Jun. Leader versus lagger: How the timing of financial reports affects audit quality and investment efficiency[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2024. |
APA | Liu, Nanqin., & Zhang, Xiao Jun (2024). Leader versus lagger: How the timing of financial reports affects audit quality and investment efficiency. Contemporary Accounting Research. |
MLA | Liu, Nanqin,et al."Leader versus lagger: How the timing of financial reports affects audit quality and investment efficiency".Contemporary Accounting Research (2024). |
Files in This Item: | There are no files associated with this item. |
Items in the repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
Edit Comment