The proliferation of unilateral economic sanctions, which was exacerbated by the Russia-Ukraine war, has revived the debate on the extraterritorial application of such restrictive measures, as the imposing countries have striven to avoid the circumvention, and enhance the effectiveness, of their restrictive measures. The European Union (EU) is, in principle, opposed to extraterritorial sanctions, and the EUBS prohibits European companies from complying with certain US extraterritorial sanctions. The European Commission was dissatisfied with the effectiveness of the EU blocking legislation and the negative effect of extraterritorial sanctions on EU strategic autonomy, so has pledged to recast the EUBS. This article analyses how the EUBS is deficient in counteracting US extraterritorial sanctions, and maps the contours of its potential revision. In particular, the article argues that the enforcement of the newly adopted EU Anti-Coercion Instrument could serve as a viable alternative to the blocking legislation, given the latter’s overall ineffectiveness in discouraging third countries from adopting extraterritorial sanctions or protecting European companies from secondary sanctions. Furthermore, the emerging anti-circumvention measures aimed at supporting the EU’s own sanctions appear to be inconsistent with the principles underlying the EUBS. Finally, the enhanced transatlantic cooperation on matters of economic sanctions and export controls renders the recasting of the EUBS counterproductive.