The Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) s inability to conceive and implement a comprehensive rational policy for economic development and modernization in the Maoist era was clearly demonstrated in the failure of many revolutionary campaigns such as " building a socialist coun - tryside " ( collectivization ) and the Great Leap Forward . These campaigns and policies were executed with a " one-knife cut " ( yi dao gie ) , often without taking into consideration local con - ditions and needs
In contrast to the Maoist strategy of emphasizing uniformity in implementation , there was relatively less social engineering in the post-1978 reforms and policies . In reviewing the trans - formation of rural China since the late twentieth century , Alpermann ( 2011 : 175 ) points to the decline of the grand comprehensive designs and revolutionary claims that were characteristic of te earlier periods ( from the 1920 to the late 1970s ) . China since Deng has diftered signif - cantly , moving away from authoritarian utopianism with the exception of one initiative , " build -ing a new socialist countryside " ( BNSC ).
During the Maoist era when ideology and politics were of highest priority , factional and bureaucratic politics from the top down dominated much of the formulation and implementa - tion of policy in China ( Lieberthal and Lampton 1992 ) . Many of that eras institutional factors in policy-making persisted into the reform era ( Huang 2000 ) . Among these are the persistence of factional , bureaucratic and local politics that influenced many levels of the policy process , the Persistence of a one-knife-cut approach in implementing policy across rural China after an initial experimental stage , and the ambiguity of policy that generated serious conflicts at the local level , notwithstanding some pragmatic innovations in response to policy ambiguity .