In this article, we contribute to the earnings management literature by addressing the issue of Related Party Transactions (RPTs) during a firm’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) process. We regard RPT-based earnings management as a kind of agency problem in the context of Chinese IPOs,and argue that the conflicts of interests between the controlling share-holders and the minority shareholders are the root of RPT-based earnings management in Chinese IPOs. We provide empirical evidence to demon-strate that RPT-based earnings management in a portfolio of earnings management tools including accruals management, and how it affects the firm’s post-IPO long-term performance in China. Using 257 Chinese A and B shares IPOs during 1999 and 2000, our empirical findings suggest that controlling shareholders structure operating RPTs in pre-IPO period and these RPTs are positively associated with firm’s operating performance.The decline in operating RPTs after IPO contributes to firm’s post-IPO long-term underperformance and negatively affects firms’ stock return.