Residential College | false |
Status | 已發表Published |
FIFL: A Fair Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning | |
Liang Gao1; Li Li2; Yingwen Chen1; Wenli Zheng3; ChengZhong Xu2; Ming Xu1 | |
2021-10-05 | |
Conference Name | 2021 IEEE International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, MWSCAS 202 |
Source Publication | ACM International Conference Proceeding Series |
Volume | 2021-August |
Pages | 326 - 329 |
Conference Date | 09-11 August 2021 |
Conference Place | Virtual, East Lansing |
Abstract | Federated learning is a novel machine learning framework that enables multiple devices to collaboratively train high-performance models while preserving data privacy. Federated learning is a kind of crowdsourcing computing, where a task publisher shares profit with workers to utilize their data and computing resources. Intuitively, devices have no interest to participate in training without rewards that match their expended resources. In addition, guarding against malicious workers is also essential because they may upload meaningless updates to get undeserving rewards or damage the global model. In order to effectively solve these problems, we propose FIFL, a fair incentive mechanism for federated learning. FIFL rewards workers fairly to attract reliable and efficient ones while punishing and eliminating the malicious ones based on a dynamic real-time worker assessment mechanism. We evaluate the effectiveness of FIFL through theoretical analysis and comprehensive experiments. The evaluation results show that FIFL fairly distributes rewards according to workers' behaviour and quality. FIFL increases the system revenue by 0.2% to 3.4% in reliable federations compared with baselines. In the unreliable scenario containing attackers which destroy the model's performance, the system revenue of FIFL outperforms the baselines by more than 46.7%. |
Keyword | Attack Detection Federated Learning Incentive Mechanism |
DOI | 10.1145/3472456.3472469 |
URL | View the original |
Language | 英語English |
WOS ID | WOS:000946959000013 |
Scopus ID | 2-s2.0-85117168287 |
Fulltext Access | |
Citation statistics | |
Document Type | Conference paper |
Collection | DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SCIENCE Faculty of Science and Technology THE STATE KEY LABORATORY OF INTERNET OF THINGS FOR SMART CITY (UNIVERSITY OF MACAU) |
Corresponding Author | Li Li; Yingwen Chen; Wenli Zheng |
Affiliation | 1.National University of Defense Technology, China 2.State Key Laboratory of IoTSC, University of Macau China 3.Shanghai Jiaotong University, China |
Corresponding Author Affilication | University of Macau |
Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Liang Gao,Li Li,Yingwen Chen,et al. FIFL: A Fair Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning[C], 2021, 326 - 329. |
APA | Liang Gao., Li Li., Yingwen Chen., Wenli Zheng., ChengZhong Xu., & Ming Xu (2021). FIFL: A Fair Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning. ACM International Conference Proceeding Series, 2021-August, 326 - 329. |
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