Residential College | false |
Status | 已發表Published |
Game theoretic analysis of green spectrum and infrastructure leasing on TV bands | |
Xing, Xiaoshuang1,2,3; Chen, Biao4; Liu, Hang5; Cheng, Xiuzhen2; Zhou, Wei6; Chen, Dechang7 | |
2017-07-01 | |
Source Publication | IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology |
ISSN | 00189545 |
Volume | 66Issue:7Pages:6511-6522 |
Abstract | In this paper, we propose a green spectrum and infrastructure leasing framework for sharing unused TV spectrum, in which the ownership of the network infrastructure and spectrum are decoupled, and each can be leased as a service on demand. An incumbent TV spectrum owner (TSO) can lease a share of the infrastructure from a network infrastructure owner (NIO) with a pay-per-use model, to provide new services to its end users. On the other hand, a TSO can rent a portion of its unused spectrum to the NIO for revenue such that the NIO can obtain access to the spectrum to serve its customers. This proposed framework achieves green communications through both resource sharing and energy saving. Our paper aims to analyze the interplay between TSO and NIO, and create a win-win situation to provide sufficient incentives for them to cooperate on this green communications. A multistage Stackelberg game is formulated, where TSO and NIO sequentially determine the total bandwidth supply for sharing, the infrastructure leasing price, the amount of infrastructure to lease, the spectrum leasing price, and the amount of spectrum to lease to maximize their utilities. The best strategies that will be taken by the TSO and NIO under various deployment scenarios are analyzed. Evaluation results show that the proposed green spectrum and infrastructure leasing framework is a promising scheme under which both TSO and NIO can benefit, and their utilities can be maximized in terms of user data throughput and revenue/payment, which provides sufficient incentives for them to cooperate. © 1967-2012 IEEE. |
DOI | 10.1109/TVT.2016.2636331 |
Language | 英語English |
WOS ID | WOS:000405691700079 |
The Source to Article | Engineering Village |
Scopus ID | 2-s2.0-85029672182 |
Fulltext Access | |
Citation statistics | |
Document Type | Journal article |
Collection | University of Macau |
Affiliation | 1.School of Computer Science and Engineering, Changshu Institute of Technology, Changshu; 215500, China; 2.Department of Computer Science, George Washington University, Washington; DC; 20052, United States; 3.Provincial Key Laboratory for Computer Information Processing Technology, Soochow University, Suzhou; 215006, China; 4.University of Macau, China; 5.Catholic University of America, Washington; DC; 20064, United States; 6.Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing; 100044, China; 7.Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda; MD; 20814, United States |
Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Xing, Xiaoshuang,Chen, Biao,Liu, Hang,et al. Game theoretic analysis of green spectrum and infrastructure leasing on TV bands[J]. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 2017, 66(7), 6511-6522. |
APA | Xing, Xiaoshuang., Chen, Biao., Liu, Hang., Cheng, Xiuzhen., Zhou, Wei., & Chen, Dechang (2017). Game theoretic analysis of green spectrum and infrastructure leasing on TV bands. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 66(7), 6511-6522. |
MLA | Xing, Xiaoshuang,et al."Game theoretic analysis of green spectrum and infrastructure leasing on TV bands".IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology 66.7(2017):6511-6522. |
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